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THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST,

AND

IMPARTIAL INQUIRER.

ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING A SUITABLE MEDIUM FOR
THE DELIBERATE DISCUSSION OF IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIAL ECONOMY, &c.

"MAGNA EST VERITAS, ET PRÆVALEBIT.


"There is no learned man but will confess that he hath much profited by reading controversies, —his senses awakened, his judgment sharpened, and the truth which he holds more firmly established. If, then, it be profitable for him to read, why should it not be at least tolerable and free for his adversary to write? In Logic they teach that contraries laid together more evidently appear: it follows, then, that all controversy being permitted, falsehood will appear more false, and truth the more true; which must needs conduce much to the confirmation of an implicit truth."—MILTON.

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
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PREFACE.

It is with no ordinary emotions of pleasure that we present our subscribers, and the public with the second volume of the **BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST** and **IMPARTIAL INQUIRER**. Having been diligently engaged upon it for the last twelve months we cannot but rejoice that the time has now arrived when we have only to give a few finishing strokes in order to complete this important part of our work. Nor would we disguise our satisfaction, as we review the nature and extent of our labours during the present year, and contemplate the goodly volume of four hundred and eighty pages which they have produced. When we consider the important matter contained in this volume, and the subjects of enduring interest which are here fully and ably discussed, we feel assured that it is no unworthy offering to be placed on the altar of our country, or to be cast at the feet of the true-progress spirit of our age.

Another prolific source of pleasure and encouragement is the manner in which our Magazine has been received alike by the public press of every shade of politics, and private individuals of various sects and parties. The unmeasured terms of commendation which have been bestowed upon us by the Reviewers, are peculiarly inspiring; while it is a significant fact that throughout the whole period of the existence of this Magazine and among the mass of communications which have poured into our office from every quarter, we have not received one censorious letter; for all have expressed, more or less strongly, feelings of approval, and not a few have recorded sentiments of gratitude. This state of things has had its beneficial influence upon our circulation, and we are still in a position to adopt the words of the Poet, and declare that

“Thus far our fortune agents an onward course;
And we are graced with wreaths of victory,”

though, at the same time, we have a long march before us, and victories yet to achieve.

But beneath these outer signs of favour and success, we do not fail to recognize, what is far more important,—the healthful influence which our Magazine must bring to bear upon the minds of its readers, and the valuable assistance which it must give to the right formation of their opinions. We feel that it is no small honour to be called upon to preside over such a work, and thus to generate influences, that for ages yet to come, may regulate the pulsations of many a throbbing heart, and direct the aspirations of many an earnest soul. In our pages, perhaps for the first time, Truth and Error have been fairly brought into contact with each other; and we have yet to learn who has reason to regret the result. Where opponents have not been led to embrace the same opinions we know that often they have been compelled to esteem each other highly, and to respect even the views from which they have dissented. It is only by a course like this, that Error can be ultimately vanquished. “Pains and penalties” have long been enforced against her, but they have utterly failed; mere authority cannot put her down; she

long-lived and potent, but then let us take heart as we remember, that Truth is immortal and omnipotent. We have strong faith in the ultimate issue of every great mental and moral conflict; for

"Truth struck to earth shall rise again,
The eternal years of God are hers;
But Error, wounded, writhes with pain,
And dies amid her worshippers."

While we suffer Error to lurk beneath the shades spread for her concealment, she lives; but her realm thus invaded by the lovers of Truth, and herself thus brought into the dread presence of Reason—she must inevitably die! The friends of Truth should rightly understand their duties and their high vocation: they should first have a deep conviction of the correctness of the opinions they hold, and this can only be obtained by a careful examination of all that may be advanced against them; and then they must seek by calm reasoning and moral suasion to promulgate those opinions. And it is because the "British Controversialist" affords an appropriate medium for the accomplishment of both these purposes that we have confidence in commending it to public attention, and in soliciting for it a still more general support.

With respect to the present volume we need say little. It will speak for itself wherever it goes. Its appearance will be found prepossessing, and its contents instructive and weighty. We are sure that it will not suffer from a comparison with any of the numerous serials now issuing from the press, while we believe it will be found to be the most suitable hand-book for the young, the inquiring, and the thoughtful. If it does not equal our wishes, it does not disgrace our intentions.

And having advanced thus far, it becomes us to anticipate the future; and this we are doing by arrangements which we have no doubt will be satisfactory to every subscriber. Of the proposed series of articles on "Rhetoric" it is enough to say that they will be worthy of the preceeding ones on the "Art of Reasoning," while the contemplated "Sketches of Modern Philosophical Literature in Britain, France, Germany, etc." will give additional value to our work in the estimation of every thoughtful mind. In the selection of questions for discussion we shall be guided by a due reference to two points,—present interest and permanent importance—and we hope still to maintain that impartiality which has hitherto been unimpeachable. The continuation of the "Inquirer," the enlargement of the "Young Student and Writer's Assistant," and perhaps some additional medium, will enable us to manifest more effectively our deep sympathy with those who have entered on the arduous task of Mental Improvement and Self Education; and while we shall gladly supply every facility for the acquisition of knowledge, we shall not fail to impress upon all the necessity of self-reliance, mental labour, and moral discipline.

And now, in conclusion, we cannot but gratefully acknowledge the services of all who have contributed to our pages, or supported us in the prosecution of our work. To our readers who have exerted themselves to extend our circulation, our thanks are specially due. Our usefulness is mainly in their hands. We are powerful only as we are popular. In acknowledging past services we therefore respectfully solicit their repetition, so that, through a vigorous and united effort, we may with the New Year attain what ought to be our minimum point—A MONTHLY CIRCULATION OF TEN THOUSAND COPIES.

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ERRATA.

- Page 164, line 35, for "may be either a substance," etc., read "may be considered as resulting from either a substance," etc.
- Page 168, line 12, for "subject," read "predicate."
 " 23, for "subalternans," read "subalternant."
 " 28, transposse the words "universal" and "particular."
- Page 169, (in some copies,) in Scheme, corner A, for "c.v.," read "c.f."

THE BRITISH CONTROVERSIALIST.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. IX.

JUDGMENT.

IDOLS OF THE INTELLECT.

"This great and dangerous impostor, *PRÆJUDICE*, who dressing up falsehood in the likeness of truth, and so dexterously hoodwinking men's minds as to keep them in the dark, with a belief that *they* are more in the light than any that do not see with *their eyes*."—*Locke*.

"Our senses narrow and our reason frail,
Life short, and Truth a gem which loves the deep,
And all things weighed in Custom's falsest scale—
Opinion an Omnipotence."—*Byron*.

GENTLE READERS,—We wish you a happy new year and many returns of the season. 1851 has come. We have reached the cope-stone of the arch of an Era. One-half of the nineteenth century is gone. One foot is firmly planted on the past, and the other is stretched out with confidence towards the future, although unseen. Our mind is Janus-visaged. Memory gazes into *the bye-gone*, and counts the steps we have mounted in our gradational ascent; and Hope, with joy-bright eye and quick-pulsating heart, looks on the rosy-tinged dawn-clouds of *the to-come*. Were this the proper place for such disquisition, much would it rejoice us to recount how the rays of intelligence,

"Like sunbeams conquering a cloudy sky,"

have steadily continued to gladden the anxious eyes of the "day-dawn" watchers—to narrate how the artizan classes of the present time, like "Claude Melnotte,"

"Seek to rise
Out of the prison of their mean estate,
And with such jewels as the exploring mind
Brings from the caves of Knowledge—to buy their ransom
From those twin gaolers of the daring heart—
Low birth and iron fortune"—

to record the upward and onward growth of the mental life of humanity, and from all these

"To point a moral and adorn a tale"

of warning, instruction, encouragement, and hope for "the good time coming." Such a series of years, brilliant with genuine mind-achievements—achievements at which the brightest page of war-conquests pales—might well tempt our pen to turn aside from

the abstract speculations in which it has erewhile employed itself, to paint a passage of history so bright, so glowing, and so grand; but the feeling that our present theme is different, acts as a powerful dissuadent. Suffice it, for the present, to say, that as we listen to the recitals with which Memory favours us, and the lofty-toned songs which the poet—Hope—is singing, we think there is good cause why the heart of man should be glad—why we should all feel called upon to make efforts still more arduous and praiseworthy than heretofore—why we should engage more devotedly than ever in strenuous endeavours to rise higher and higher in intellectual attainments—why we should all aim more perseveringly to attain to greater perfection—and why we ought, each and all, to “take courage and be glad.” The work of human progression has still resulted in success,—why, then, should we grow “faint and weary?” It seems to us peculiarly appropriate to the present period, and the associations which the advent of a new year naturally excites in the mind, to devote our present paper to a consideration of the “Idols of the Intellect.” So shall the work of Self-Reform, so suitable to such a season, be helped on, and men be aided in their attempts to purify their souls as temples “dedicate to Truth,” and be taught to detect, and perchance to overthrow, the Idol-gods which seek a lodgment there.

The “Idols of the Intellect” is the somewhat fantastic, though, withal, appropriate and illustrative term by which Lord Bacon designates those errors, prepossessions, and prejudices to which man is liable in his investigations, and which, to use his own words, *Sunt abneganda et renuncienda, et intellectus ab eis omnino liberandus est expurgandus*.* In this paper we intend to accept his classification of these *Idola*, and to describe, illustrate, and explain the method in which they most commonly operate; by so doing our young readers will learn from us the obstacles and hindrances which may cause them to turn aside from the highway of intellectual success, and how they may be overcome. Without some attention to this department of logical instruction it is impossible to proceed aright in the work of Truth-acquirement. Unless we know the impediments in our way, our own tendency to enter into the “devious labyrinths of Error,” and take due precautions to remove the one and to avoid the other, we shall only return jaded, fatigued, and disappointed,—the object of our exertions unaccomplished, and our search in vain, and we shall be unfit to exert our minds with confidence, accuracy, acumen, and rapidity. Of these Error-Sources Dr. Thomas Brown truly observes, “the temple which he purified was not that of Nature itself; but the temple of the Mind; in its innermost sanctuaries, were all the Idols which he overthrew; and it was not till these were removed that Truth would deign to unveil herself.”

Erroneous judgments are called Prejudices. A prejudice is an opinion formed without due examination of the premises on which it rests—the reception of a proposition as Truth without a proper degree of verification—a bias of the mind resting on no stable foundation. The dispositions of the mind from which these arise, as well as these prejudices themselves, are both included in the Baconian term—Idols. Of these there are

* Must be solemnly abjured and renounced, and the intellect wholly freed and purified therefrom.

four classes, respectively denominated *Idola Tribus*, *Idola Specus*, *Idola Fori*, and *Idola Theatri*, each of which we will now notice as rapidly as possible, in the order in which they are here mentioned.

Idola Tribus—the Idols of the Tribe—are so denominated because they are common to humanity at large, are not confined to any mere sectional portion of the *Tribe*, but are universally diffused throughout it. They arise not from any peculiarity of circumstances, but from the circumscribed nature and variety of our minds, or from the power which imagination, passion, prepossession, or attachment has to warp the Judgment or cloud the Truth-percipient faculties. As created beings we have bounds set to our capacities, and limits assigned us which we cannot overstep. We are, as it were, the inhabitants of an island set in the midst of Truth's limitless sea. From this island we have no means of departure. We may employ any instrumentality we can to extend our visual range along the boundless continuity with which we are surrounded, but cannot emigrate on any voyage of discovery, however important or momentous; hence phenomena, and phenomena alone, is all of which we can attain a knowledge. Noumena we cannot perceive. Yet limited as the mind from its very nature is, such is the overweening vanity or folly of our race that more time has been spent, more ingenuity exerted, and more labour expended in searching for the undiscoverable, than in the scrutiny of what is utile and knowable. Some of these Error-sources are the noblest and grandest endowments with which our race is blest; but their unguarded and unrestrained exercise becomes fraught with many evil consequences. It is to be hoped, however, as men improve in a knowledge of their own Nature, these Idols will have fewer worshippers at their shrines, and that men will soon be lead to abjure and renounce an idolatry so injurious to themselves and pernicious to their race. "To be forewarned is to be forearmed;" therefore should our readers peruse these pages with a self-examining eye, saying, Have I bent my knee in Idolatry like this?

The chief place in the description of these Idola is due to *the spirit of systematisation*. We have formerly explained how the mind proceeds to classify the many myriads of phenomena which it observes. The advantage and beneficiality of this capacity cannot be doubted; but this, like all other human endowments, is liable to be abused. Men frequently deceive themselves by supposing that greater harmony is found in the variety of events than there is warranty, in the truth of things, for believing. They seek to arrange the facts which they perceive according to their preconceptions, and in their haste to prove their suppositions true, wrench phenomena from their true classification, and by loose analogies endeavour to connect things in themselves essentially dissimilar. Hence it is that hypotheses are so often looked on with suspicious eye. Not that hypotheses are, *per se*, unworthy of regard; but because of their prejudicial effect upon the mind, by unfitting it for looking unbiassedly upon the phenomena of Nature. Hence did the ancient Philosophers, on perceiving that the heavenly bodies returned again into their orbital paths, suppose that they revolved in *perfect circles*. Hence the great prominence given in olden times to the numbers 3 and 7. Hence, too, much of the false reasoning of the Ancients, of which the following specimen will, we think, more

than amply suffice:—"There are four quarters of the world and four cardinal winds, consequently there are four Gospels in the Church as there are four pillars that support it and four breaths of life that render it immortal."* Rash and superficial generalisation and classification have been retarding causes of human progress in every generation. Systems of philosophy are constructed on insufficient *bases*, and before the labour of investigation has been sufficiently performed; and when men, by farther and more extended observation, see that it is become necessary to unlearn the philosophy of their ancestors, there is usually a period of fierce contention between the conservatists and the progressionists. This remark has been frequently verified in the history of science. This Error-source retards the march of Truth-acquirement in two different ways; 1st, By the rash, hasty, and precipitate manner in which it adopts general truths and constructs orderly systematisms, before the complement of the facts to be considered has been filled up; and 2nd, When these systematisms, be they creeds or scientific formularies, have been accepted, there is a general indisposition in the minds of men to admit any new truths into the already, as they think, completed circle, or the subversion of any stone in the fabric which had cost them so much labour to upbuild. Examples of this twofold operative power may be found in the axioms of physical science bequeathed to us by Aristotle, the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy and the Vortices of Descartes, the persecution of Galileo, the reception of Jenner's Theory of Vaccination, and the science of Geology. Instead of too readily following the *spirit of systematisation* we should strive to learn how the finger of Truth is pointed, wait patiently on her instructions, and follow only where she leads. So shall we accurately learn the mysteries of the universe—not by mere mental exertitions, but by observation—not according to human suppositions, but in accordance with the Divine Idea which superintended its creation.

Our *Prepossessions* have a great influence in imposing upon the Judgment. These incline us to a great tenacity of opinion. Having imbibed our ideas on the most important topics of thought in early life from the lips of those whom we revered and whose memory we gratefully cherish, our attachment to *them* is transferred to their opinions, and we cannot believe that they have been mingled with error. Self-love, too, complacently, yet slyly, insinuates that it would be greatly derogatory to ourselves to be found in Error. Thus urged on by veneration, attachment, and self-esteem, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt of the truth of our opinions, and repel every attack upon the principles in which we have been educated, as an insult to the memory of those whom we respect, and our own judgment; as if the tenacious and unhesitating adhesion to an idea could, by some strange alchemy, transmute Falsehood into Truth. Another of our prepossessions we may mention as singularly pervertive of correct thought, namely, National partiality. This prevails to a great extent amongst mankind; so much so, that there are few nations which would yield the palm of precedence to another, either in literature, science, or the arts. The Jews, the Greeks, the Romans, the Persians, and the Carthaginians, all entertained inveterate prepossessions regarding their own superi-

* Irenæus, lib. 3, cap. ii.

ority; and the recent jealousies existing between ourselves and the French and German nations fully illustrate the perniciously blinding effect which such partialities exert within the mind.

Imagination is apt to become enamoured with whatever excites it, or raises the emotions of wonder, amazement, sublimity, or beauty. A well-drawn analogy or brilliant figure of speech is often more convincing than an argument. The comparison of ideas is an irksome and tedious labour; and when one has but the tact of casting

“O'er erring deeds and thoughts a heavenly hue
Of words,”

the multitude of men will welcome him with the warmest expressions of applause; for their imaginations are easily captivated, let their reason be ever so rusty. We employ fancy, too, in filling up the deficiencies which we find in our knowledge, and giving it that rounded completeness in which the mind delights.

Restless activity is another retarding cause of human progress. For

“There is a fire
And motion of the soul, which will not dwell
In its own narrow being, but *aspire*
Beyond the fitting medium of desire ;
And, but once kindled, quenchless evermore,
Preys upon high adventure, nor can tire
Of aught but rest.”

This aspirative tendency in the human soul, although it is undoubtedly an exceedingly valuable and most noble endowment, yet often tempts us to strive after the unattainable. The incomprehensible, the mysterious, the infinite, have strange charms for the mental powers. They cannot confess their impotence and incapacity to search into “the deep things” of Nature. Time, space, infinity, eternity, perfectibility, &c.; they weary themselves with striving to investigate. Is it not lamentable to think that men will thus waste their time, ingenuity, and mental energy in frivolous and inutile speculations, to a knowledge of which they can never attain, because they lie beyond the bounds of their cognition, and transcend their perceptive faculties? Why should we make inquiries into the nature of substance, spirit, and other *noumenal* essences, rather than into those things which are appreciable by our intellectual powers, and which are not only comprehensible but may become practically useful?

Will and Passion likewise affect the decisions of the Judgment, and obscure the light of rationality. “The human intellect is not a pure light, but receives a tincture from will and passion, and frames the sciences accordingly. What men desire to be true they believe: ‘the wish is father to the thought;’ therefore they reject difficulties through impatience of inquiry, moderate things because they limit their hopes, the deeper things of Nature through superstitious awe, the light of experience through pride and haughtiness, paradox on account of the opinions of the mob; and thus, in innumerable ways, and often imperceptibly, the affections tinge and colour the understanding.”* When passion

* *Novum Organum*, lib. 1, aph. xlix

guides or self-interest sways, how difficult it is to hold the balance with an equal hand ! How often do they rather eject from the mind every idea of candour, consistency, or justice. Impartiality is rarely to be expected when the will is biassed and when passion prompts to the formation of an opinion, or the performance of an action ; and most men will be found to be more willing to forsake the Temple of Truth than stand single in her defence among the multitude.

The fallaciousness and incompetency of the Senses impair our capacity of rightly deciding on many matters. They occupy themselves with the externals and superficialities of things, and seldom seek, except at the earnest promptings of the mind, to examine things in their contexture, organic properties, or powers of change. Sometimes they are neglectful of impressions made on them, at other times they bring in fallacious accounts of their experience. Sensations sometimes acquire a supremacy over the mind, and suffer it not to receive as Truth that for which no evidence is capable of being given to them. Thus spiritual phenomena are passed by unnoticed and unchronicled, while sensuous impressions are readily observed, registered, and recollected. All this is highly prejudicial to the impartial exertion of the Judgment, and lead it into many errors. Too frequently has a soulless and dehumanizing Materialism resulted from this sense-dominance. We ought carefully to cultivate the neutrality of our sensation-powers, and perpetually to guard against that action and reaction of mind and sense which tends so much to the obscuration of our views.

Such, then, is a brief exposition of the *Idola Tribus*—those sources of erroneous judgments to which our race is subject. Difficult and arduous as the task may be of emancipating ourselves from thralldom to their sway, or of abjuring the worship of these Idols, it is nevertheless our duty to make the attempt boldly, resolutely, and determinately ; otherwise our investigations can neither be attended with pleasure nor crowned with success.

Idola Specus—Idols of the Cave. We have not only the publicly worshipped Idols of our Tribe, but we have each one his own Lars and Penates—household gods at whose shrine we privately burn incense and offer homage. These Error-sources have their origin in the peculiar mental and corporeal constitution, habits, studies and position of each individual. Some of these deserve to be particularly pointed out, in order that caution may be used regarding them.

Particular Studies unbalance the Judgment. One idea or set of ideas gains a pervadency in our minds, and we look upon the universe as if all its phenomena might be explained by the light which that idea or series of ideas gives. We seek in all other departments of knowledge, that peculiar kind of proof which our favourite science yields. Thus a mathematician will strive to reduce Moral Philosophy to a *formula* as rigid and demonstrative as the science of his delight ; and may even go so far as to ask, gravely, what proposition “Paradise Lost” is meant to prove. Hence Descartes having applied his “Theory of Vortices” to the heavenly luminaries, constructed upon the same Theory a chemico-mechanical system of Medicine, which received much favour, for some time, on the Continent.

Difference of Mental Capacity also exerts itself prejudicially to the furtherance of the empire of Truth. Some minds are analytic, others synthetic. Some have greater readiness in observing differences, others resemblances. Both are alike liable to error; the one by too great subtilty of division, the other by supposing a too comprehensive range of conjunctive phenomena. Each extreme is alike to be avoided; and the mind should, as far as possible, be trained in the direction of its deficiency.

A too great reverence for Times is likewise one of those sources of prejudice which mightily impair our powers of accurate discrimination. One man, enamoured with the "days of old" and the "wisdom of our ancestors," considers nothing can be worthy of notice on which the rust of antiquity does not lie thick, and trembles at the very thought of innovation. Another, whose eye opens more widely to futurity, looks with disgust on all things characterized by ancientness of days, and earnestly desires that all old things would pass away, and make room for the glorious epoch of which he fondly dreams. Each of these is in Error. Man is progressive, and antiquity cannot satisfy him; but he is progressive by gradations, and is unable to suit himself to any sudden and unexpected change precipitately brought about.

Procrastination is another fruitful source of self-deception. We are very solicitous of ease, or we have peculiar fancies in which we are very fond of indulging. For the gratification of these whims and this love of passivity we too often neglect the improvement of the most important periods of life, and leave an accumulated heap of duties unperformed. Man, however, has such an aptitude for acknowledging the accuracy of this truth, and yet casting the consideration of it aside, that *we* need not hope to impress minds which have grown callous by often renewed and broken resolutions "to be up and doing."

Great care should be taken to preserve the neutrality of the mind; and if we be conscious of any of these Idol-gods dwelling in ourselves, *now* is the time for vigorous exertion for their rejection. Lest each man's "seducing familiar spirit" should gain supremacy, let *now* "contemplative Wisdom proceed to dislodge and chase away the *Idols of the Cave*."

Idola Fori—Idols of the Forum. "These," says Lord Bacon, "are the most troublesome of all." They are those which arise out of our intercourse with society, and chiefly proceed from the words or terms which we employ in the interchange of thought. The principal sorts of these result from the use of words which convey no real meaning to the mind, or whose signification is so indefinite that it is enlarged or circumscribed according to the mind which employs them. "Words," he again says, "are for the most part accommodated to the vulgar, and they define things by bounds which are most obvious to common minds; and when a more acute understanding or more accurate observation would enlarge these boundaries, and arrange them more in accordance with nature, *words cry out and forbid*." We may instance the words Liberty and Necessity, Taste, Beauty, and Education, as of the description meant. We are, however, happily released from the necessity of lengthening this department of our subject with any additional remarks, having already treated so fully upon the need of attention to the signification of words in a previous paper.

Idola Theatri. The Idols of the Theatre are the last class of Error-sources to which we are to direct attention. These may be comprehended under the three following heads:—Partizanship, Fashion, and Authority. *Political and Religious Rivalries* have been most prolific generators of evil. Whenever men allow themselves to get superstitiously attached to a party or a creed, their minds become blinded to the virtues and good qualities of those who differ from them. Discernment and candour are driven from their breasts, and a mole-eyed partiality usurps their place. It would be endless to attempt an enumeration of the monster evils of which this prejudice has been the occasion. History contains a crime-stained record of them on its every page. Too frequently is a malignancy of soul and bitterness of heart, most alien to the spirit in which Truth should be sought, engendered by it. We take a one-sided view of every measure introduced by our opponents, and accuse them of the basest and most dishonourable motives; the heart is corrupted, Jealousy aroused, Envy—venomous Envy—fostered and bred; and thus the Judgment is fatally mislead. We need only point to our elections, and the doings of bitter sectarians at all times and in all places, to show the fearfully ensanguined Idol to whose car these parties have yoked themselves, and the necessity there is for greater impartiality in the discussion of each others' views. May we not justly hail the establishment and success of the "British Controversialist" as an omen of good, from its possession of this very much-desiderated quality? How much happier would it be for our race were we each to examine opinions honestly and candidly! Then Superstition would not "flourish like a green bay tree." Quackery would not immolate its myriads of deluded votaries. Party Zeal would not close our eyes to the perception of Truth and steel our hearts to the feelings of humanity, nor would National or Positional Jealousies "cry havoc, and let slip the dogs of war," or the heart-torturing vultures of Envy; but Truth, like a beneficent goddess, would scatter the seeds of Peace, contentment, happiness, prosperity, and love, throughout her subject-universe.

Fashion is also a greatly prevalent mind-seducing and Judgment-perverting agency. Nothing is exempt from it. Dress, Amusements, Language, Social Customs, Opinions, Art, Science, Studies, Law, Religion, all succumb to its authority, and own its sway. The Reason of man is exceedingly ductile, and easily moulds itself to suit any prevailing *modishness*. It may not be wrong, in indifferent things, to follow the usual customs of society—the practice of the *beau-monde-ists* or the *bon-ton-ites*; but it is most unjustifiable weakness to sacrifice our convictions on any point to the mere influence of the *mode* of the world. Men have often been likened to sheep, who unhesitatingly follow the bell-wether; and there is too much truth in the comparison. Hence originates the *cant* of parties, sects, classes, and coteries, formularies of address, prudery, affectation, and costume *a la mode*. It is exceedingly necessary to cultivate so much independence of spirit as shall enable us to withstand the influence of Fashion whenever it advances beyond the foibles of men, and seeks to interfere with the unbiassed exercise of the intellectual faculties.

Authority differs little from Fashion except that the latter is the practice or opinion of the majority of that class to which we belong, while the former is the opinion or

example of eminent individuals in the various walks of life. The reliance upon Authority is a prejudice so far as it is an unreasoning assent yielded to a point which we have not sufficiently examined for ourselves. It exercised a most disastrous effect upon the progress of mankind for many ages. Such was the domination of Aristotle over the minds of men for centuries. The distrust of authority and the investigation of Nature were the first steps in the march of modern intellect. Let then the opinions of every Theorist be candidly examined; but let his arguments, and not his authority, be the agency of our conviction of his accuracy. Daring and superior minds may build stately temples of philosophy; but if they be "mere pleasure domes, of rare device," without any of the real and stable materials of Nature, let them be rejected.

Thus we have rapidly, but we hope, intelligibly, described and illustrated the Idols of the Intellect; nor let it be thought a thing contemptible that we thus perform the office of a compiler or an abridgee; for independently of the full confidence which we repose on the sagacity of our readers to perceive that we are not the mere retailers of the thoughts and words of other men, there is the important consideration that truths which have long lain imprisoned in several massive tomes, written in a dead language, are apt to be neglected, and to have their usefulness impaired, nor can they be brought readily enough to service by the thoughtful, though, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, unlearned student. It is therefore a good service done to humanity to bring these great thoughts out of their prison-house, and set them free to yield instruction to the masses. Besides, old ideas are sometimes despised in their other-land or antiquated dress, which if revived under a modern form would strike upon the mind with all the force of newly discovered truths, and by mere novelty of statement and the modernization of the exposition would be valued and appreciated more than they possibly could be in their "olden garb." But as our paper has greatly exceeded our original intention, we will merely add a few rules to aid in the avoidance of error, and with these finish that department of our subject which relates to "Judgment."

1st.—Avoid hasty decisions. In every proposition presented for your assent, inquire whether the words accurately represent the thoughts—whether your ideas on the subject are distinct—whether there is any biasing motive latent in your mind. Thoroughly examine the evidence—then decide.

2nd.—If, after having used every precaution mentioned in the former rule, you find your ideas obscure, or the evidence deceptive, suspend your Judgment until these shall have been obviated.

3rd.—Never expect a greater degree, nor a different kind, of evidence, than that which the proposition admits, or the circumstances demand.

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM CHRISTIAN ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

CHRISTIANITY is emphatically a religion of love ; abstract this first, this essential principle, and there is left a mere cold, nominal thing, unworthy of the name it bears. Love should pervade the person “professing godliness ;” all his acts should bear the impress of this principle ; every motive and intention of his mind should breathe this spirit. Christianity calls the affections into operation in its great requirement of “Love to God and man ;” and wherever we discern disinterested benevolence, and a desire to meliorate the condition of man, there is an exemplification of character pleasing, lovely, God-like.

Since the Gospel dispensation was instituted, men in every age have arisen to explain and defend the doctrines of Scripture, and, by laborious metaphysical and philosophical reasonings, they have endeavoured to come at the true meaning of the Word of God ; but unhappily, in many instances, they have set aside the only key which could effectually unlock the sacred records ; and, relying upon their own resources, have given such a distorted meaning to many passages as to puzzle the minds of thousands, and make not a few infidels ! When any obscure passage has been the subject of consideration, they have often departed from its connection with other passages, and given a meaning in unison with their prejudices, or with some theory formed from their own imaginings. The abundance of Commentaries and other learned works now before the public, all bearing the distinctive characteristics of their authors’ own peculiar views, are proofs confirmatory of these assertions.

There is one peculiarity connected with the Bible which no other book possesses, —its meaning must be sought for within itself ; Scripture must be interpreted by Scripture, and in order to this, a careful collation of passages is absolutely necessary. But commentators in general have not considered this, but have brought in the aid of philosophy, and hence the almost infinite

variety of interpretations of Scripture. But enough of prelude.

It will be our business in this article,

I. To show in a few particulars the causes of Sectarianism, and

II. In what respects Christians differ.

1. We presume that the primary cause of Sectarianism arises from the variety of opinions entertained by men concerning the Supreme Being.

2. The mode or manner of worshipping him. There was a time when all Christians were of one heart and mind ; but, how soon was that unanimity lost ! We discover even among the chief Apostles difference of opinion, and sharp contentions, and we have no evidence that those differences were ever settled.

3. Another source arises from a difference of opinion concerning the mode of Church government, discipline, and the administration of the ordinances. We shall briefly notice these under their several heads.

First.—Church Government. Each section of the Church of Christ has a mode of Church government peculiar to itself, and seeks authority for the same in Scripture. One sect believes the Episcopal form of Church government to be both Scriptural and Apostolical ; hence the government of that Church by Bishops.

Another sect believes the Presbyterian form of Church government to be Scriptural ; hence the government of that Church by Ministers and Laymen.

Again ; other sects believe the Independent form of Church government to be Scriptural, and hence every particular Church or congregation of those denominations transacts everything relating to discipline or government within itself, and is in no way subject or accountable to other Churches.

Secondly.—Discipline. The discipline exercised in each department of the Church of Christ, is also various : one sect admitting or excommunicating its members by the voice of the whole Church ; another, on the sole authority of its ministers ; and another,

on the authority and by the sanction of its ministers and elders conjointly.

Thirdly.—The Ordinances. In the administration of the Ordinances, much diversity of opinion exists. By one sect the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper is administered and received in a sitting posture; by another kneeling: in one, the Deacons hand round the bread and wine to the communicants; in another, the communicants receive the symbols at the hands of the Minister.

On the subject of Baptism much controversy has arisen; one party maintaining that immersion is the only Scriptural and proper method of administering this ordinance; another, that aspersion is equally Scriptural and proper. It is also affirmed, that infants should not receive the rite of Baptism in consequence of their immature age: on the contrary, it is maintained that their age does not incapacitate them; that under the Jewish dispensation infants had a right to circumcision, and that our infants have an equal right to Baptism.

Want of space prevents us entering more largely into all the causes producing dissonance of mind, and obstructing a coalescence among Christians. We presume that enough has been said to show that the points on which Christians differ are principally *speculative*, and this is an important matter to bear in mind. That they are not necessarily opposed to each other on the great and fundamental principle, "Love to God and man," in consequence of a contrariety of opinion, remains to be shown.

It must be borne in mind that every man is responsible to God for his belief. Constituted as man is, there will ever be dissonance of mind, for this simple reason—that man being a free agent, and an accountable being, no one can determine or prescribe for another; he must follow the dictates of his conscience; act according to the light he has; and be fully persuaded in his own mind. That form of religious worship, and those ceremonies connected therewith, which he believes in his conscience to be most scriptural, he is at liberty to pursue; and every Christian whose mind is not miserably prejudiced will yield to others the same liberty of thinking and acting which he desires for himself.

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The meeting of Jehu and Jehonadab, as recorded in 2 Kings x. 15, is worthy of our consideration and imitation. In this meeting there is no allusion made to parties, or opinion; but on the contrary, an open, free, and frank address. "Is thine heart right, as my heart is with thy heart? And Jehonadab answered, It is. If it be, give me thine hand. And he gave him his hand."

There is no antagonism in Christianity. There may be difference without opposition. There may be agreement in the major, but not in the minor. All Christians bear a relationship to each other; and although they do differ on minor points, yet they severally recognise one God the Father of all. They believe in his eternity, power, wisdom, justice, goodness, truth. They believe in one Saviour, and in one Holy Spirit. We rejoice to know that many thousands can be found who, though belonging to different denominations, give the right hand of fellowship to their brethren in Christ. Witness the missionaries of various societies labouring in the same field; no doubt, they wish to add to the number of their society, but their chief aim is to gather souls into the fold of the Great Shepherd. For this they labour, and lend each other a helping hand.

Humanum est errare; therefore, we shall never behold perfect unity of sentiment existing among all denominations. We now know only in part. Sectarianism is the unavoidable consequence of this. Did we know fully,—were all our minds cast in the same mould,—were all our perceptions of things alike, then such a thing as sectarianism would not have been known. We maintain, therefore, that a difference of opinion, and practice, too, in the various sects of Christians, is no proof that animosities must necessarily exist, nor that sectarianism is not Christian.

In whatever sect these primary doctrines are acknowledged:—a belief in a Supreme Being as the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the universe; faith in our Lord Jesus Christ; the influences of the Holy Spirit;—and the members lead a godly and consistent life; there, in our humble opinion, we have the true elements and essential requisites of Christianity.

I. E. P.

NEGATIVE ARITCLE.—I.

THE present aspect of the Christian Church loudly calls for the serious consideration of this topic. Split and divided into a multiplicity of sections, it presents the appearance of discord and disorganisation. It is, indeed, humbling to see that which should be one great whole, crippled in its energies and resources from a lack of that unity which, in truth, is *strength*. We shall, however, at once proceed to examine the matter in its causes and effects.

Ever since the dark days of mental and moral confusion, when the knowledge of evil first entered the pure chambers of the human heart, there have been great differences of intellectual gifts, and as a necessary concomitant, an entire loss of *oneness* of opinion. Hence arise discussion and every manner of difference among men. It cannot be denied that this spirit of inquiry has been productive of much that is good; but when the heat of controversy is carried beyond proper limits, then is a blessing turned into a curse; and it is only when this boundary line of calm investigation is over-stepped, that *sectarianism* begins. As early as the time of the Apostles, this evil had found its way into the church—introduced by some who were “vain in their imaginations,” and whose “foolish hearts were darkened,”—and to such an extent, that the Apostles had stoutly to combat it in their Epistles.

From this it may be seen that, to look for entire unity of view among Christians, is to disregard the peculiarity of their position here, as imperfect beings, surrounded by many temptations, and harassed by many frailties. On this point it has been well remarked that, “there may be errors where there are no heresies: there may be mistakes, and serious ones, too, among those who are conscious of no enmity against the spirit of Christianity; there may be diversities of opinion among the heirs of heaven, which, in this land of mist and bewilderment—be it right or wrong—seem to justify them in walking apart as they journey hitherward.”

But besides this great fundamental difference of “original power,” there are several other minor causes in operation,

which it may be as well to indicate. Some have greater opportunities of hearing the Word, and of hearing it in its purity, than others. Some who possess equal opportunities, vary in regard to diligence of application, and others in the direction given, and the skill applied to, this application. All matters are not revealed with equal clearness in the Scriptures, and here some stumble and fall; while others, finding no difficulty, move calmly on. “God’s intention in this, undoubtedly was, to show clearly to his people the way of salvation, and yet call forth their most industrious search.” The legitimate effect of this is to call the mind into healthy and vigorous action, while if turned into a proper channel, it discovers many bright gems of truth, without leading to “vain disputations.” However much these particulars may show the frailty of our common nature, they can never excuse, though they may to a certain degree palliate, the division of the Christian Church. Perhaps we may be pointed to cases where separation becomes inevitable, such as the English and Scotch Evangelical Dissents, to avoid the blasting effects of spiritual oppression. True; but this is not *Sectarianism*: it is a holding sacred of the liberty of conscience: as well might we call Luther a *Sectarian*!

It is now time to ask, What are the effects to which all these causes lead? We might in one word reply, *legion-vilenesses*; but as generalisation is not sufficient, we shall descend to particulars. And is it not fearfully conspicuous in the very front of all, that God is apt to be forgotten? These quibblings and disputes, these hot contests and angry and bitter strifes, are, alas! too likely to lead us too much to look to ourselves. We think of our logical skill, of our fine dialectics, of our expansive intellects; then we begin to dispute more for the sake of disputing than for truth—to forget that it is God’s Word and God’s Truth we are dealing with; till at last the great Source of all is lost sight of in the immensity of our own nothingness! Preconceptions and misconceptions are inseparable from our present state, and the raising of rival banners is more likely to increase than to diminish

them. The multiplication of sects fosters and nurses a jealous, angry, and envious spirit. In the heat of contest undue colouring is always given to points of difference, and thus the contending parties are always driven to opposite and extravagant extremes. Personal acrimony is excited, and then, adieu for ever to all good results. What scenes are sometimes witnessed in the ministerial assemblages of various religious bodies! May such cases be rare; or, alas! for the fate of the Christian World. The sceptic's sneer, the relaxation of Church discipline, the retarding of the spread of Truth, and the contraction of the sphere of usefulness, are but a tithe of the baneful results that follow sectarian principles.

This is a most unnatural state for the Christian church to be placed in. It is like a complex and beautiful machine disordered and useless; like the "harp of sweetest sound," broken and unstrung; like the dislocated and shattered limb debarred from the right exercise of its functions. Though a fever may renovate a bodily constitution, yet it is not considered as a temporal mercy. Neither are dissensions spiritual mercies to believers, or bodies of believers. And besides, the fever may cast its victim into hopeless idiocy, or lay him prematurely in the silent grave. So the Church may be paralysed and benumbed in its energies, or prostrated in utter desolation by the fiery blast of contention and discord.

But we will now see what the Word of God says upon the subject. In the first place it very strenuously inculcates the great duty of "brotherly love." "Love one another," "God is love," casts a divine radiance over every page, and bathes in its glorious effulgence all the duties of life. See Heb. xiii. 1, 1 Thess. iv. 9. In Eph. iv. 1, 3, we also find the Apostle sending forth an affecting remonstrance, even from his prison, on this very point. He urges them with all the power of his condensed eloquence, to endeavour to "keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace." Thus far the foundation of a sect-destroying spirit is raised, but we are not left with the *abstract*; we find the matter practically dealt with, and that in a very powerful and decisive manner. There was, indeed, need for this; for before the primitive founders

of the Church had finished their earthly course, *sectarianism* had made sad havoc in the communities of the followers of Christ. It were useless here to quote at length an array of passages of this nature; but in Titus iii. 8., 1 Cor. xiv. 33, and many other places, we have the plain duty of Christians in this matter very beautifully set before us. There is a passage, however, in Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, i. 10, 14, to which we would particularly recommend our readers to refer.

We have now considered the matter before us in three aspects. We have seen that there are various causes in operation by which an entire unity of mind cannot be obtained; that this principle when kept within proper bounds is of great benefit to mankind, in leading to research and discovery, but that, when let loose and indiscriminately fostered, it becomes an instrument of great and unbounded evil. We have glanced at the sad results which the working of abused inquiry, or *sectarianism*, produces in the Church; and lastly, we have seen how this spirit is condemned in "the oracles of God."

It only remains to ask, How is this evil-introducing spirit to be overcome,—and how are its effects to be counteracted? The answer is simple—By the cultivation of that "brotherly love" which true Christianity alone can produce. In the pages of the very magazine for which we are writing, we have a triumphant illustration of the salutary effect of that "spirit," which "worketh by love." Here parties the most opposite in sentiment, meet and advance their various opinions in the mildest terms and in the gentlest manner. Had this always been the case, there never would have been any breaches in the walls of Zion. Her ramparts and her foundations would have been for one glorious temple dedicated to *Peace*! Why may not this *now* be the case? Why may not parties sink their minor differences, and unite on the broad principles of eternal truth? Or why may there not be a gigantic conclave of the Churches, by whose deliberations the foundations of a common faith may be laid? The union of the Secession and Relief bodies presented one noble example, and the proceedings of the Evangelical Alliance, are replete with interest to

every peace-loving mind. We have Brotherhood Leagues set on foot by "the learned blacksmith" of America; we have the Peace Congress, at which Cobden is always active, and at which, even one of the despised "children of the forest" has sent forth the tones of Nature's lovely eloquence; and shall the Churches be behind in the great strife for *peace*? Surely not. Let them but be alive to the great truth, that they "are taught of God to love one another," and then indeed will their peace "flow like a river."

The universal diffusion of the gospel cannot be accomplished while the Christian World is divided into sections, all striving against one another; it therefore becomes all who wish well to the cause of Truth, to enlarge and widen, as far as in them lies, the borders of the great province of *peace* and *love*.

What might we not expect of Churches

united in this holy brotherhood? The world would present a new aspect; men would meet under new relations, and breathe a freer and purer air.

Animated by one hope, inspired by one reviving, life-giving faith, the heirs of glory would tread this nether world with brighter and more glorious aspirations. Then, in the words of a beautiful writer—"a new day will dawn on our destinies, new sights will be seen by us, and onward shall we go in the right direction rejoicing in the God of our salvation, and saying to him, as we march along, 'Thou shalt arise and have mercy upon Zion; for the time to favour her, yea, the set time, is come. For her servants take pleasure in her stoves, and favour the dust thereof. So the heathen shall fear the name of the Lord, and all the kings of the earth, thy glory.'"

Leith.

M. G. M.

Philosophy.

WHICH MOST DESERVES THE ESTEEM OF MANKIND,—THE POET OR THE LEGISLATOR?

THE LEGISLATOR.—II.

IN entering upon a consideration of the question thus put forth for discussion, it will be proper to state, that when we speak of esteem deserved by the Poet and the Legislator, we shall be understood to mean, not that particular kind of esteem which is the reward alone of personal excellence, and which *both*, in common with all men, may, or may not deserve; but strictly that which they merit from mankind in general, *by virtue of their vocation or mission*; and we would also remark, that in striking the balance between the two, and awarding to the one a greater amount of esteem than to the other, we do not determine the superior worthiness of the other in *every individual case*,—in other words, that every Poet is more worthy of esteem than the Legislator, or every Legislator more worthy of esteem than the Poet, inasmuch as the esteem of the world is infinitely more due, on the one hand, to a Milton than to a Robespierre; and to a Peel than to a Byron, on the other.

The question, then, is this: Which of the two, in the true and faithful fulfilment of the duties of his capacity deserves most of the esteem of mankind? Our decision is given in favour of the Legislator, and, as our reason, we would in the first place submit:—That his services are of greater value to the community than are those of the Poet. Superiority of value universally commands superiority of esteem, where esteem can be commanded. That the services of the Legislator exceed in value those of the Poet, is proved by the fact, that the former are indispensable, while the latter are not. The Poet's calling may be a high and holy one, and his kindled soul may glow with the consciousness of its own nature and capabilities. His may be a noble destiny, and his resources boundless as the universe itself. The past, the present, and the future, may be his. He may re-write the chronicled records of ages, strip them of their false disguises, uncover their hoary errors, and win for their excel-

lencies a juster appreciation. He may linger among the tombs of the mighty, and teach living monarchs how brief a thing is earthly power. He may dip his pen in battle-streams, and write the emptiness of the warrior's glory. He may show to the ambitious man how lordliness has brought its own downfall;—to the designing and nefarious, how craft and chicanery have wrought out their own destruction. He may lay bare the veiled chambers of the priest's temple, professedly God's. He may unmask mystery, miracle-mongering falsehood, and sacerdotal jugglery; and he may have lent no mean aid in the restoration to life of a pure Christianity. He may sing the dirge of abrogated laws, absurd as atrociously cruel. Opinions current immemorial with an honest jingle, he may dare to pronounce intrinsically worthless; and rescue from the interdiction of bigotry and conventionalism the veritable issues of the mint of Truth: He may make and maintain his claim to be a world's teacher. He may give a complexion to his own times; influence popular customs and character: his songs may be received where sermons would be rejected; and their choicest beauties treasured as household words in every family. He may do battle for right against the encroachments of power; deal deadly blows at monopoly and exclusion; and hold up to contempt and scorn, to the test of religious principle and common humanity, the hollowness of cheap-shirt and gas-light civilization. He may encourage to noble deed and manly action, to continuance in well doing, and patient endurance of suffering. And his prophetic spirit may ascend the watch-tower of faith and hope, and herald the approach of a long-wished day of glory. These, and more than these, are the poet's claim to esteem; and insensible, indeed, must he be who would withhold it. But however glorious the Poet's service, it is not indispensable. He may lie in the tomb, his lyre be beside him, and his mantle fall on no successor, and the world, though a loser, would escape ruin. There would, it is true, be a dull, unsatisfactory void, which nought could supply. Mammon would gloat with greater delight over his gold,—Care brood darklier on the brow;—Intellect would have less lore, and Happiness would lose a fountain; but there

would be no stoppage of the vast machinery which society creates and keeps in constant motion. The hum of industry would not be hushed, nor the busy mart deserted. The engine would still set time and space at defiance; the telegraph speed its message; the ploughshare cleave the soil, the sickle reap the grain; and the printing-press symbolize thought. Justice and Order would still maintain their supremacy. To many of his neighbours the absence of the Poet would be but the absence of a useless dreamer, for whom feminine companionship, or perpetual confinement to the fabled regions of the Muses, were a fitter portion than the society of bustling men. And even to those who hold in opposite and just estimation the Poet's worth, and who would feel that no adequate compensation could avail for his loss, there would be this mitigation of the calamity—that *poetry* still remained: poetry finding utterance from every leaf and flower, in every object of nature, and in every phase of human experience. Poetry would still smile upon man from every direction, inwreath her associations with every circumstance of his existence, would light his path with the star of heaven, and cheer his heart with the charms of earth. She would paint bright visions to enchant his youth, weave rosy garlands for his bride, and softly radiate the summer's evening of his declining years. Bereft of her high-priest, Poetry, though unexpressed, would make herself intelligible, and man would not fail to be her interpreter.

Turning from the services of the Poet, how differently must we speak of those of the Legislator. His are, indeed, indispensable. He must be ever at the post of duty. If he leave it but for a moment—if he loose his hold of the helm, the vessel of state drifts swiftly to destruction. His very vacillations are fraught with imminent peril. It is only while with steadfast hand he remains faithful to his trust, that there is felt to be any security for a nation's interests. From the monarch who has a crown at stake, to the peasant, whose only wealth is its progenitor,—labour,—he is regarded by every man as the protector of his rights, the conservator of equity and good order, the guardian of cherished institutions, and the guarantee of the capital, the credit, the com-

merce, and the correspondence of the country. The public creditor knows that without the Legislator his bonds will be dishonoured; the shareholder that his scrip is but waste paper. The legislator establishes dynasties, directs armies, and equips fleets; in short, he is the directing, and virtually, the ruling power of an empire, and no empire can exist without him. Dispense with whom you will, you cannot dispense with the Legislator. The Laureate may be gathered from his honours to his fathers; the Court consign his office to the same oblivion with that of its jester; but it cannot thus dispose of the Minister. His indispensableness proves his greater value, and his greater value establishes its claim to superior esteem.

If it be objected here, that in the maintenance of our argument we must be prepared to admit a further application of the principle that the indispensableness of one kind of service proves its superiority over that of another;—that we shall have to place the Poet in an undignified and unfavourable comparison with every class which renders a necessary service;—that we shall have to acknowledge the inferiority of his service to that of the trader, the police-officer, and even of the servants of our household, whose offices we cannot dispense with; or, that we must discard our principle altogether,—we decline to commit ourselves to so disagreeable an alternative, and that because there is no occasion for it. We conceive of two kinds of service; the one, that, which while it serves others, has for its primary object the satisfaction, gratification, and aggrandizement of self, interested, mercenary,—the other, disinterested, philanthropic, in its nature; like sun-rays, outgoing, diffusive. The latter is just as much above the former in its character as it is in the motive which induces it. This, combined with great talent and correct principle, forms the highest degree of service which can be rendered by one man to another, or to a country. Mere talent, however great, commands no esteem. It may be admired, but it is only so far as united with generous motive, with effort for usefulness,—only so far as it is consecrated to serviceable and benevolent purpose, does it meet with esteem. When exalted intellect, consummate genius, profound philosophy, are thus made subservient to the benefit of

mankind, then, doubtless, does their possessor render the highest conceivable service. To this class of service belongs that of the Poet and of the Legislator. In inquiring which of these two deserves most of the esteem of mankind, it is obvious that we have to determine the relative value of their services; and we think it will be granted that to arrive at a decision on this point, the indispensableness of the Legislator is a fair ground of argument in his favour; and that, therefore, in this respect, his claims to our esteem preponderate.

We next submit that the Legislator is more worthy of esteem than the Poet, because his services are more arduous in their nature, and involve more of self-sacrifice. The extent of an obligation is enhanced when the conferring of the same has been attended with difficulty or sacrifice of any kind to him who confers it; and it is well known of the human mind, that it recognises this fact, and awards esteem proportionate to such difficulty or sacrifice, or feels that it ought to do so. Now, amidst what ease, and even luxury, of circumstance does the Poet transmit the inspiration of his genius. Who that loves retirement and quietude,—rest for the soul from the ceaseless turmoils of life,—does not covet his existence? He shares, indeed, in the common troubles incident to human life; but they, in so far as they have not their origin in the difference which makes him a poet, belong to the *man*, and not to the poet. Amidst the comforts of home, in the seclusion of his study, he fulfils his duty. He fulfils it in the far-off woods, where no interruptions mar his communings. He pursues his contemplations on a lonely sea-rock, and writes the praises of a morning whose glories come to him only through his chamber window. We do not, however, maintain that his immunities are enjoyed without abatement. Criticism, unfair as unfeeling, may, at the very zenith of his ambition, select him as the object of its attack; and his own generation, whom to serve would be the consummation of his happiness, receive his pretensions with contempt and scorn. His motives may be calumniated; his efforts ridiculed as pitiable futilities. It may be his lot to be termed a presumptuous innovator; a designation he will be sure to receive if, in con-

formation of mind and development of power, he chance to differ from his predecessors, and deviate from established rules of poesy. It may be also his to be denied recompense of a pecuniary nature; his immortal works may not be marketable commodities, and, precluded by his devotion to the muse from seeking, as other men do, for subsistence, he may suffer the pangs of poverty and want. All these drawbacks must be borne in mind if we would calculate rightly the poet's service. But he has his remedy in some of them, and in others his compensation. If the shaft of criticism hit, his own quiver is stored with ready arrows. If his own times persist in refusing his claims, posterity will render restitution. If he suffer want, disappointment, sickness of heart,—the result of “hope deferred,”—his recompense is in the hidden springs of delight which every devoted poet possesses, and which are peculiarly his. And it is proper to be borne in mind that if the faithful expression of his thoughts would endanger his personal safety, the poet may protect himself by secrecy, and incognito vex his enemy. Allowing that every true poet must be an earnest man; that his energies must be in constant and active exercise; that his life will be a *work*,—a mighty, magnificent, and imperishable work; he still remains exempted from onerous and costly duty. Laurels cluster thickly on his brow, and appropriately, too; for, in his case, they are rewards of high and illustrious service; but many of these honours have been easily won; their acquirement has subtracted little, in the general, from the amount of his personal ease and convenience.

If the foregoing be denied of the service of the Poet, or, at least, to the extent to which we have stated it, we believe the *greater* arduousness and self-sacrifice involved in the Legislator's service will not. Put the service of the Poet at what point you will within the truth, it is obviously exceeded in the present respect by that of the Legislator. Regard our remarks as proceeding from a gross want of appreciation in this particular, or from palpable ignorance, the thing is undoubtedly true as far as we require its use. There are Arcadian bowers, if the poets are worthy of belief, where it is their

peculiar privilege to dwell; but where are those of the Legislator? He lives and acts in the arena of party-strife and factious turbulence. He is no mere spectator; he is a chief and constant actor in that scene of endless conflict. Interests, principles, opinions, prejudices, passions, at enmity with each other and with him; class against class, creed against creed; Church, Queen, and “glorious constitution,” on the one hand; the six points on the other; with an intermediate family of familiar cognomen; these share largely in the constitution of his position, and we will leave it to the combatants themselves to decide what are the difficulties which beset their leader. Then, again, there are disaffection at home; jealousy abroad; destitution and famine among the people;—treason in the court; disunion in the cabinet; unruliness in the colonies; and all these rough and incongruous elements he has to contend with, to control and combine for the common advantage. He must be prepared, for his country's sake, to forego friends, favours, and fortunes; to bear undeserved charges of infidelity, tergiversation, and deceit; to live persecuted, and die despised by the very party whose interests have longest been served. Where is sacrifice like this demanded of the Poet? His monument of fame, once erected, endures for ever, despite the puny critic of his day; but who can restore the Legislator—the idol of yesterday, the stricken-down statue of to-day—to his lost position of dignity and honour? And this unequalled difficulty, this precariousness of power, this sacrifice of self, are not the mere accidents of a statesman's existence: they belong to his very being, as easier and more gratifying duty belongs to the Poet; take them away and the Legislator disappears with them. There is no privilege of choice in his lot; it must be taken as a whole, or altogether rejected. He enters upon his career with a full knowledge of this fact; he knows that what has been the fate of others may shortly be his own; he knows that to be open to conviction will be to lose friends; that to legislate for the commonwealth will be the way to incur the enmity of a clique. He sees, too, on every side, the wrecks of former greatness; nations mismanaged and lost; and he knows not that his courage and skill will

be sufficient to keep his own bark from the rocks on which others have stranded. He is called to duty, perhaps, at some important crisis of his country's history; inherits, with his uncertain tenure of office, enormous liabilities and wasted finances; commerce is paralysed; revolution and anarchy loom gloomily in the distance. But we find the faithful Legislator ready to meet the emergency. With the height of difficulty rises his determination to compass it; and though the whole storm should centre its fury in his own person, he will either place his charge in safety, or himself perish in the attempt.

We are willing to rest our case here, believing we have given two sound reasons why we should esteem the Legislator more than the Poet. How strikingly, we may add, have our views been illustrated in the history of that distinguished individual—the poet-statesman of France. In which capacity did he most to win for himself that profound esteem with which he is regarded by all men? Was it not in his capacity of

statesman, when in the hour of his country's need, he, with words of eloquence alone, held spell-bound the passions of her infuriated populace, and did better service in a single day than he had done through half a century as a poet? When had the most effective of his poetry wrought so mighty a work for the salvation of a nation? When had it exposed *him* to equal danger? It is true he escaped unscathed; but his fate might have been different, and no wonder felt; for who would guarantee the safety of a defenceless man surrounded by armed insurgents mad with the fumes of wine and riot, however mighty the principle to which he trusted, and likely to serve when heard by reason and sobriety? That he did escape was, perhaps, owing to his being a poet. The poet shielded the statesman.—The safety of the one provided against the danger of the other. As in the case of Milton, who, if he had not been a poet, would, in all human probability, for political offences, have ended his days on the scaffold.

B. W. P.

THE POET.—II.

SOCIETY has its upper and its lower servants—its butlers, its footmen, its lady's-maids, its cooks, its tutors, its governesses, and its servants-of-all-work.

Each of these is as justly entitled to his or her modicum of wages, the one as the other; but all do not receive an equal amount of reward. Though the estimate and importance of the offices which an individual fulfils in his relation to society depends very much upon the age in which he is born, and the state of his people, as civilised or uncivilised; yet, undoubtedly, there is essentially a difference in the deserts of men, and hence a difference in the right they have to the regard of their contemporaries, or posterity. The modification produced in the estimate of a man, through the influence of his age and country, may readily be accounted for. The Age forms the Man, not the Man the Age. A man may indeed modify his age, but it is not before the age itself has placed him on an Archimedian standing point, that he can perform this great exploit.

A Napoleon must have been born amidst the clash of swords, the thunderings of ar-

tillery, and the shoutings of armies, otherwise he would have proved no disturber of the peace of Europe. Out of that storm in history, the French Revolution, he might have ended his celebrated story by the same words with which he began it—"A Lieutenant in the regiment of La Fere."

But the age favourable to the development of one man's genius is adverse to that of another. As the melody of the birds, and the sighings of the groves, are unheard amid the storms of winter, so the "still small voice" of Philosophy, and the vocal warblings of her twin-sister, Poetry, are drowned by the confused noise of the warrior. Thus the contemporaries of a great man form their estimate of him, not according to the intrinsic value of his works, but according to their marketable price. But what has been, what is, and what will be, the valuation set upon the Poet?

In the earlier state of society, low, indeed, was his standing, nor could it by any means have been otherwise. The dealer in the unseen—the abstract, could not but have appeared to the rude and earth-loving faculties of man-primitive, inferior to the more

tangible realities of the hunter, the fisherman, or the warrior.

It is true that in a later age he became the companion of kings, but his company was only sought as the purveyor of flattery, the giver of fame.

As to the proper office of the Poet, I am afraid that we are very far from its true estimation, even in the present age. As the poor man in the tale is made to carry the found-diamond to the goldsmith, so must we carry the Poet to a future age. But who is the Poet? What is his office? Is he merely the manufacturer of rhymes, the gilder of language, the creator of beautiful—but to all practical purposes, useless—fancies? Doubtless many there are, sternly wedded to what *they* consider the practical and real, that would not even hesitate to pronounce such a verdict. But no, a thousand times No. The Poet is the painter, the popularizer, of virtue; the Prometheus, with fire from heaven, reanimating the cold and dead forms of morality; the evolver of moral light; in fine, the spirit of development resting upon the abysses of human nature. True it is that he deals in what some style the fanciful, but which is properly the imaginative. Of a verity it is that Poetry, divine as in its nature it is, partakes also of the gross and the earthy. But is not this essential to its nature, as the poetry of fallen and *depraved*, not of *perfect* human nature.

But how is the Poet the evolver of moral light? First, in his character as a philosopher and a thinker. In this capacity he unfolds those relations which bind together in harmony the different parts of the Universe, spiritual and material; and presents them to his fellow-men in the form of doctrines. Secondly, as an Illustration. The knowing or intellectual faculties of man possess but little control over the will of man, compared with the feelings or instincts of his nature. He may reason accurately, and arrive at a perfect logical conclusion; but still, with the broad light of day thus

streaming down upon his head, leap into the pit at the blind cravings of his instinctive desires. But here the imagination comes to the rescue with its vivid portrayals; and embellishing with its magic pencil the scanty outlines drawn by the reason, calms and subdues the passions. This, then, is the office of the Poet: to teach, to illustrate, to deck out abstract and ethical Truth in the garb of Beauty, and send her abroad into the world, to conquer and ravish the hearts of men with her seraphic loveliness.

What nobler office is there than this? We make bold to say, None. Is not he—the Poet,—the Priest of Nature, marrying in harmonious union the seen and the unseen, the material and the spiritual? Does he not thus throw a flood of light, a perfect noon-day upon that which otherwise is cold, and high, and abstract; and develop that first, and loftiest, and most divine of man's faculties—the Moral Sense.

What shall we say of the Legislator? That *his*, indeed, is a noble employment, to curb, to keep in due subordination the animal nature of man; and to guard from its attacks the rights and well-being of society. But how does he stand in comparison with the Poet? The Legislator must found his laws upon ethical principles, recognised by the society for whom he legislates: consequently he only affirms something already received. And except the principles or precepts of morality, on which law is founded, be visible to a people through their Moral Sense, it is obvious that their obedience will not be conceded to that law, except through constraint.

Hence the superiority of the Poet to the Legislator. The Poet is the revealer; the Legislator is the establisher of his revelations. The Poet speaks in the indicative mood, the Legislator repeats his words in the imperative. Thus, as the architect is superior to the mason, the author to the printer, the thought to its symbol, so is the Poet superior to the Legislator.

HAROLD.

Professing as we do, the toleration of all opinions, would it be in accordance with our generally recognised principles to oppose the aggression of Rome. To both of these we give an answer in the affirmative; our reasons for which we will now subjoin.

1st, That it is lawful to resist the Papal encroachment we have only to reflect that we have the testimonial evidence of nearly five hundred members of the English Bar, about fifty of whom are Queen's Councillors, in an address to her Majesty, to the effect that it is illegal, in the following words:—"We consider it our duty to declare to your Majesty that we regard with feelings of surprise and indignation the attempt made by a *foreign potentate* to interfere with your Majesty's *undoubted prerogative*, and to *assume* the right of nominating archbishops and bishops within these realms; and of conferring upon them territorial rank and jurisdiction." It is surely lawful to oppose a transgression of the law, and this appears to prove that the Pope has infringed the law. We have also the authority of *Stephens's Book of the Constitution*, p. 2, to the following effect;—"The British Crown is entirely free from the least shadow of subjection to the bishop of Rome, and is thereby relieved from many burdens and imposts under which other kingdoms groan; such as Appeals to Rome in Ecclesiastical Suits, Provisions, Dispensations, Confirmations, Bulls, &c., besides several tributes and taxes paid to the Pope." While in the "Oath of Supremacy" the sovereign is made to "declare that no *foreign* prince, person, prelate, state, or *potentate*, hath, or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority—ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm. *So help me God.*" Now, have not the Pope, Cardinal Wiseman, and the newly-appointed bishops, taken this "jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority;" and if it is not illegal so to do, why this passage in the oath? In the "Bill of Rights," too, Provision 5, it is stated that "the Sovereign and the two Houses of Parliament should make effectual provision for the settlement of the Religion, Laws, and Liberties of this kingdom; so that the same should not again be in danger of being subverted." The Magna Charta, likewise, contains in its first paragraph the

following important provision:—"That the English Church shall be free, and shall have her whole rights and liberties unhurt; and I will this to be observed in such a manner that it may appear from them, that the freedom of election, which was reputed most necessary to the English Church, which we granted, and by our Charter confirmed, and obtained the confirmation of it from Pope Innocent III., before the rupture between us and our barons, was of our own free-will; which Charter we shall observe, and we will it to be observed with good faith by our heirs for ever." This was in "the high and palmy days" of Rome, when in other countries her supremacy was unquestioned, and her every behest was most submissively obeyed. Even then, the Pope had not one iota of claim to pre-eminence or authority over the English Church. It was from a knowledge of this fact that Shakespeare put these bold words, which have been ringing from land's end to land's end, into the mouth of King John:—

"Thou canst not, Cardinal, devise a name
So slight, unworthy, and ridiculous,
To charge me to an answer, as the Pope.
Tell him this tale—and from the mouth of
England
Add this much more: that no Italian priest
Shall tythe or toll in my dominions."

This principle of the non-supremacy of the Pope within the British realms, is farther corroborated by Blackstone in his Commentaries, who, in mentioning the case of Archbishop Chichelle, the founder of All Souls' College in Oxford, says that "in the reign of Henry V. he prevented the king's uncle from being then made a Cardinal and Legate *à latere* from the Pope; upon the mere principle of its being within the mischief of Papal provisions, and derogatory from the liberties of the English church and nation. For, as he expresses himself in his letter to the King upon that subject, "He was bound to oppose it by his liegiance, and also to quit himself to God and the Church of this land, of which God and the King had made him governor." This was not the language of a prelate addicted to the slavery of the See of Rome; but of one who was of principles so very opposite to the Papal usurpations that, in the year preceding this—synod 17, Henry IV.—he *refused to consecrate* a bishop of Ely that was *nominated*

by Pope Eugenius IV.;—a conduct quite consonant to his former behaviour in 6 Henry IV., when he refused to obey the commands of Pope Martin V., who had required him to exert his endeavours to repeal the statute of *præmunire* (“*execrabile illud statutum*” as the Holy Father phrases it); which refusal so exasperated the Court of Rome against him, that at length the Pope issued a Bull to supersede him from his office and authority; which the archbishop disregarded, and appealed to a general council.” A synod was held in 1439, which refused to confirm and allow a Papal Bull which was then laid before them. We think, too, that by the acts 1st Eliz. c. 1; 13th Eliz. c. 2; and 9 and 10th Vict. c. 59, it will be seen that the law has been transgressed; for, in these, although too lengthy for extract in the present paper, any party using means for the advancement of any foreign potentate whatever, or who shall receive, publish, or put in use, any bull, brief, writing, or instrument whatever, containing any manner or cause whatever from the bishop or See of Rome, is adjudged guilty of a breach of law. From all these various authorities, legal, consuetudine, and historical, we can have no doubt that, by some of the parties implicated in this affair, an infringement of the law has been committed. If then this be so—if the evidence which we have adduced—and we could adduce more to the same purport—be satisfactory; and if it be just to infer that the law has been transgressed, we can have no hesitation in affirming that it is lawful to resist the Papal encroachment; for, if the “majesty of the law” be not defended, of what use is it?

2nd.—We have no wish to increase amongst our readers the *odium theologicum* under which the adherents of the Romish Church are viewed; still it is necessary in this strange juncture of affairs to look upon the history of that church with inquisitive, though impartial eyes; and to consider what are likely to be the consequences of our remissness in having thus allowed our mental liberties to be attacked. If, then, it be proved that the law has been transgressed, we have but one of two alternatives;—repeal the law, and let the tide of mind-enthralment rush unchecked throughout our land; or let the law pursue its course, and punish-

ment fall on the head whose guilt has caused the evil. “And is this your boasted freedom—this your much-vaunted tolerance?” We reply, *we* have exhibited no intolerance; *we* have made no attack upon the rights and liberties of others; *we* have not sought to fix a seal upon the lips of Truth. The assault has been committed upon *our* liberties. *Our* freedom it is which is about to be infringed; *our* laws they are which have been openly set at defiance; and if there is any evil proceeding resulting from this bold and arrogant step, the *onus* should be borne by the transgressors. Why should the law stay its majestic arm because the Pope is the aggressor? Should not the greatness of the criminal but heighten the offence? Or, why should a pseudo-infallible spiritual despot be permitted to err unpunished? Ought we, by our adhesion to the principles of opinion-tolerance, to subject ourselves to an intolerant power who has so often lighted the bigot’s hell-torch, and

“All internal impulses destroying,
Makes human will an article of trade.”

Is it the duty of a nation’s rulers to sit supine upon the senate chairs, in moveless apathy, while chains are forging to fetter, and a prison is building to endungeon, the free, the irrepressible mind? It is absurd to talk of tolerance in such an issue. What! be tolerant until the chains of intolerance are ready to be buckled on ourselves! Pshaw! who can gravely argue in favour of *such* a measure? But to proceed more orderly, let us notice a few points which may show the uncongeniality of Romish thought-repression to the spirit of our age and country, to prove how alien to the principles of true toleration, submission to the present insult would be.

1st.—Rome is unifying in its doctrine and, consequently, intolerant of free-thought and persecuting in its spirit.

2nd.—Claiming, as it does, infallibility, —unerringness,—it must be unprogressive; and if so, how alien to our age!

3rd.—Rome is anti-national; for by its arrogance of claim it seeks to hold the reins of all men’s minds, and therefore *it* alone can be the metropolitan, and all must be subservient to it.

4th.—Rome is usurpative, and seeks to raise itself above all controlling powers;

hence its whole history is full of struggles with, and triumphs over, states. How fallacious, then, the sophistry that spiritual dominion is all she claims. Let the inquisition—the persecutions—the massacres—the intrigues of ages, show how *temporal* are the powers she seeks to wield.

“Oh! this affected charity,
To suit the pressure of the changing times,
What palpable deceit!”

Upon each of these topics we cannot discourse at large. Reflection upon them will, we are satisfied, show that to permit this aggression to pass unchecked, is but to invite other and more aggravated invasions; will show how absurd it is to talk of tolerating any one to put mental chains upon a free-minded nation; will prove that by an extension of such tolerance we should be betraying that very cause which we maintain, by nourishing the power of the enemies of all toleration; should be whirled back by a regurgitation into the vortex from which our forefathers had so much difficulty to rescue their liberties. We need not now recount how William the Conqueror beat back the power of the Romish See from interference in these realms without his permission; we need not now tell how the spiritual power of the Pope launched the Spanish Armada to oppose the spirit of progress in these British isles; we need not enumerate the persecutions, the confiscations, the excommunications, which Popery has used to prop up her power, and forward her great idea of unification; by which she would make Rome the sum and substance of all power,—the *central heart* of the opinions of Europe; and cause each mind to throb with *her* pulsations, and be nourished by *her* circulation. Her history is one long blood-stained record, filled with woe. When

“Frantic priests waved the ill-omened cross
O’er the unhappy earth; then shone the sun
On showers of gore from the upflashing steel
Of safe assassination.”

Such a power surely no toleration-creed is justified in leaving unopposed. If it be a duty to resist sin in its vilest guise,—error in its most insinuating garb,—it is the duty of Britons to oppose the arrogant attack now made upon their Sovereign’s honour, and their religious liberties. Rome, we repeat it, has never contented herself with mere

spiritual domination,—grievous as that may be to be borne; she has uniformly pressed on, until the temporalities of the several countries which she conquered in her unscrupulous aggressions, came within her grasp. Let us notice, too, that it is sophistry to say that the Free Church of Scotland has her Presbyteries, Synods, and Assembly; and the Wesleyans their marked-out Circuits, and that the adherents of the Romish Church should have the same. There is this great difference,—a new element is introduced; a *foreign potentate* is acknowledged; and is permitted, unquestioned, to mark the bounds, describe the duties, appoint the officials, ordain the tribute, and regulate the affairs of churches in these realms; and by this means a vast lever is given into his hands for the subversion of the religion and liberties of this nation.

Shall then the people of *protestant* Britain—that people the ashes of whose saints were mingled with the fuel of Rome-kindled fires, the bones of whose ancestors were left

“Bleaching unburied in the putrid blast,”

—whose forefathers valued religious freedom far about ought of earth’s most pricey treasures; whose sublimest, noblest, and most heroic deeds, were shown in battling with Oppression’s fiercest advocates,—shall that people become mind-manacled, and yield quiescent and unresisting submission to that hierarchy

“Whose veil
Mantles the earth with darkness, until right
And wrong are accidents, and men grow pale
Lest their own judgments should become too
bright,
And their free-thoughts be crimes, and earth
have too much light?”

A few words more and we have done. We wish no persecuting edict to be promulgated against the adherents of the Romanist faith. We wish no circumscription of the rights and liberties of those who differ from us in the formulæ of worship. Were such a thing attempted, we should be among the first to hurl our censure at the measure. We wish them, in all points, to be equal to ourselves; but we do not wish a foreign potentate, supported in his spiritual power by some of the most formidable of the European states, to gain any authority or pre-eminence in this empire. All that is necessary for this, is to

interdict the Bull, and to command its rescindment, or, at least, its abeyance. The whole question appears to me to involve an absurdity. A slight periphrasis will make this apparent. Can we consistently with the principles of religious liberty, interdict the exercise of power by that hierarchy whose great object it is to annihilate all religious freedom, to unify men's minds, and fetter

their consciences. My own opinion is that we are bound by that very principle to oppose it to the uttermost extent that justice will permit, or an enlightened view of the danger may demand.

"Yet let us ponder boldly; 'tis a base
Abandonment of reason to resign
Our right of thought, our last and only place
Of refuge; this, at least, shall still be mine."
SALINE.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE torrent of indignation roused in this country by the recent "Papal aggression," seemed for the moment to have swept away, in its irresistible course, the firm reliance upon truth and love of fair-play so characteristic of the English mind. It burst upon us so suddenly, and proceeded onward with such overwhelming force, that to attempt to stem it was considered by many to be an act of superlative folly. Now, however, that the storm appears to have spent its fury, and indications are not wanting that many whose passions were carried away by the prevailing excitement, are bringing their reason to bear upon the question,—it becomes the duty of all who are really the friends of religious liberty, to give their reasons why they believe any appeal to the civil power in this matter would be a violation of that freedom of religious opinion which they hold to be the birthright of every Englishman.

In attempting to do this in the present instance, I think I shall be able to make myself the more intelligible if I show that, in my firm opinion, the Pope has not, in his recent establishment of a hierarchy in this country, assumed a power which the laws of the country will not justify him in exercising; and, therefore, that he cannot have been guilty of an attack upon the *civil* supremacy of the Queen. This done, I shall contend, that any attempt to prevent the Roman Catholics enjoying the privileges accruing from the recent Bull, by the passing of a prohibitory measure by the Legislature, would be a gross violation of the principle of religious liberty.

In nothing has the spirit of freedom been made more manifest in this country, than in the progressive abolition of the restrictions imposed upon the profession of Roman Catholicism. The passing of the Emancipation

Act was the acknowledgment of the right of that body of religionists to reject the *spiritual* authority of the monarch of these realms; and since then, one by one, their remaining badges of religious inferiority have been removed; until they now stand upon a perfect equality with the various bodies of dissenters; that is, they have perfect freedom to enjoy and propagate their religious opinions under that form of church government which they believe to be the true one.

At the commencement of this debate, the legal right to do this was most vehemently denied. But the "Appeal" of Cardinal Wiseman most effectually silenced that objection. In that document he shows, in extracts which your space will not permit me to quote, or I should like to do so, that when the Act was under discussion in the Commons, to allow the Roman Catholics to be governed by bishops, if they so wished, Lord John Russell not only expressed his approval of that measure, but thought it unnecessary to prohibit such bishops from even taking the same titles as are held by the Anglican bishops. Many other statesmen of eminence, whose opinions are on record, also spoke in unmistakeable terms as to the propriety of such an act of toleration as that then before the House. Well, the Act was passed with that restriction. That the Catholics did not avail themselves of their new privilege sooner, arose from various causes—one of which was the late Roman revolution. That it was their intention to do so, was well known some three years ago; and the preliminaries have not been carried on secretly since that time; for it appears the Pope mentioned the subject to Earl Minto, when in Rome as the agent of the British government, and that nobleman made no objection. But to pursue

this part of the subject further would be useless, as the objection founded upon the *illegality* of the proceeding has been given up by all parties; even the *Times* admitting, in an article on the Cardinal's defence, that it would avail him in the law-court of the Old Bailey; and, in a later article, plainly telling Dr. Ullathorne, that though *now* a Bishop, he will not be permitted long to retain that title after the assembling of Parliament;—thus plainly intimating, that the Government will call upon that House to pass a measure undoing what the present Premier was one of the most ardent and persevering in bringing to a successful issue. *Mutatis mutandum!*

The fallacy of the *illegality* of the step taken being thus exploded, the opponents of the measure changed their ground, contending that it was an attack on the *civil* supremacy of the Queen. It is all but impossible to read an article, or wade through the numerous speeches delivered at any one of the many meetings which have been held, without stumbling over this objection more than once or twice. But I have not, as yet,—and I have read much on the matter,—seen anything like a *proof* of the assertion. The Roman Catholics themselves repudiate the imputation as a foul libel on their loyalty; averring, that it is a purely *ecclesiastical* arrangement. Besides, how can that be an attack on the *civil* supremacy of Victoria which is not punishable by law? Will Nicholas Wiseman, in virtue of his title of Cardinal, be able to exercise any authority in this land, excepting spiritually, over those of his own faith, other than that which he exercised as Vicar-Apostolic? Will he be able to take a seat in the House of Lords, or adjudicate in matters of law, more now than before? Certainly not. Then the fallacy of this objection must be apparent at once. How can that be an attack upon the prerogatives of royalty which is perfectly nugatory? No one can be compelled to acknowledge or submit to Cardinal Wiseman's authority. It does appear to me somewhat strange, that not one of those who profess such faith in this objection has thought of attainting the Cardinal of high treason. If the objection be a valid one, why not do that?

Having thus given my opinion as to the

legality of the measure, and the fallacy of the civil-supremacy argument, thereby reducing the question to one of ecclesiastical polity, I now proceed to show that, in my opinion, the Government cannot interdict it consistently with the principles of religious liberty.

What is religious liberty? I understand it to be, the right of any and every man to worship God in whatever manner he pleases—to subscribe to those forms and creeds which most clearly express his own religious opinions, and to be allowed to propagate those opinions, free from persecution, under such forms of church government as may commend themselves to his judgment as best fitted for the purpose; also, to be free from compulsory support of *any* form of religion. I should like to see the man who would not claim thus much for his own religious views. How dares he, then, refuse it to his neighbour? What! shall frail man set himself up to say that his brother man must not have the same freedom of religious action as he has himself? Every man possessed of what he believes to be a truth, has a right to perfect freedom in propagating that truth, however opposed it may be to the pre-conceived notions of his fellow-men, always provided he does so in a peaceable manner. I had hoped the days were gone by—consigned “to the tomb of all the Capulets”—when the British people would call upon the civil power to prevent the full development of any section of the religious world. I say, *religious* world; for during the whole of this agitation, I have not met with one person, even the most violent opponent of the faith and practices of the Romish Church, who dares, when pinned down to the question, assert his belief that a sincere Roman Catholic was not a religious man. If they are not prepared to deny this, on what ground can they argue for the prevention of his having such ritual officers as he considers necessary to his religious well-doing? If they do deny it, I should like much to know on what authority.

There can, I submit, therefore, be no liberty, either civil or religious, where any man, or body or sect of men, claims that protection which he is unwilling to grant to his neighbour. It thus appears to me that

the Protestants of England, in urging the Government to pass a law declaring that the establishment of a Roman Catholic hierarchy in this country shall not be tolerated, are acting in direct opposition to that spirit of religious liberty which it has so long been their boast to possess. It will be an unfortunate day for this country when its Parliament shall, by re-enacting laws so recently declared inconsistent with our advanced state of freedom, do that which, I cannot but think, will have a tendency to impart a fresh bitterness to religious differences, and postpone for many years the enjoyment of that full toleration which we have only so recently obtained; and less than which is unworthy of the high and noble appellation of *religious liberty*.

In conclusion, permit me to say, that this opposition to the proceedings of the Pope appears to me to be but one of the natural consequences of a State-Church. The clergy of the Established Church, conscious that the greater portion of the temporalities they now possess originally belonged to the Church of Rome, fancy they see, in every onward movement of that

Church, a meditated attempt to regain what it has lost; and immediately run to the civil power to protect them. They tell us distinctly—how many times has it not been said during the last two months—that they have *no fear for their religion*; the doctrines of their Church, they assert, are in no danger, being founded in truth, which will triumph over all the assaults of Antichrist. This being the case, what, I ask, is it they want the civil power to defend? They cannot suppose for one moment that that power can defend their *principles*. If what they believe be not in accordance with the Word of God, the support of all the monarchs in the world cannot prevent its overthrow. If they do not believe this, then for what, but the support of their temporalities do they appeal to the civil magistrate? May the day be not far distant when every man shall see the injustice of imposing pains and penalties on his neighbour for his religious opinions; and, in the spirit of that charity which claims freedom for his own views, be willing to grant the same to all who differ from him.

S. H. W.

Social Economy, etc.

HAVE THE WORKING CLASSES BEEN BENEFITTED BY MACHINERY ?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

No one who has watched the course of events can doubt for a moment that the introduction of Machinery has produced, in the course of a very few years, great changes in the habits and occupations of society at large, as well as in the general aspect and prospects of our towns and villages. Occupations which were formerly confined to particular districts, and which were the source of competence, if not of wealth, to many, have either ceased altogether, or have been transplanted to other localities. Occupations which were formerly followed throughout the country have been, through machinery, confined to particular districts; while other occupations have rapidly sprung into existence, and been the source of immense wealth to many. Such has been the extent to which wealth has been amassed by manufacturers that we

find some who are capable of vieing with our princes of noble and even of royal blood.

From the influence of these changes, which have not failed to affect the most secluded, it would scarcely be supposed that the working man has been exempt. The question then is, Have they been, on the whole, as far as the working classes have been concerned, of a beneficial character? Our business on the present occasion is to show that as far as the working classes have been concerned, they have, on the whole, been far from beneficial; principally, because they have tended to annihilate those friendly relations which formerly existed between them and the wealthy classes.

Before the changes which were brought about by machinery, the wealth of our country was, for the most part, distributed

throughout the land. Landed proprietors resided upon their own estates. It is true, that they possessed an amount of power, in some respects, which to Young England might seem appalling. Yet it cannot be denied that many of these gentry really took an interest in the affairs of their tenants and labourers,—the working classes by whom they were surrounded. Hence the Squire, though indeed the ruler of the lordship, and in many cases a magistrate, was respected, and even beloved, by those under him. The people felt that in him they had a counsellor, a friend, a father; and hence, in all cases of emergency, they resorted to him for advice and assistance. Here was indeed, a state of dependence; but it was such a state as was not in general found to be irksome. The Squire was the hereditary sovereign of the place, and no one dared to question his authority. Besides, as the people had, for the most part, grown up with him, or he with them, there was scarcely a person with whose character and circumstances he was not entirely acquainted. In consequence of this, he was able to give advice, or aid, or reproof, as circumstances required. And then the parochial minister, being generally in the confidence both of the people and the Squire, was able, in many cases, in consequence of his frequent visits among the former, to render the latter still more accurately acquainted with the circumstances of his parishioners than he could otherwise have been. This would, doubtless tend, in many cases, to check vice while it was yet in the bud, and thus render that complicated machinery which is found necessary in our own day for the suppression and punishment of crime, perfectly uncalled for.

Owing, however, to machinery, this relationship has been often entirely put an end to. Larger money wages were offered in certain localities than could possibly be secured at home. Men left their homes, and, at the same time, the wholesome surveillance to which they had been subjected, in order, as they fondly dreamed, to become rich. By this means towns, which had formerly been comparatively insignificant, soon increased to ten times their former size; and persons who possessed the means, laid their nets in a thousand ways to catch the

hard-earned money of the working man. Wages, it is true, were high: but rent, taxes, and the necessities of life, were also high. Besides, this, owing to the density of the population, many of the comforts of a country life were not to be found, unless at the expense of the entire earnings of the working man.

Now was the trial which showed that the change had come before the mass of working men had been prepared for it. Bereft of his former home, the man felt himself to be alone; without the counsel and kindly influence of his former friend and guide, and being not sufficiently ballasted with principles of a soundly moral and religious nature to enable him to withstand temptation, he fell a prey to the influences by which he was surrounded. He resolves to mix with society, in order to try if he cannot discover something which will, in some measure, fill the place of the comforts of that home which he so painfully misses. Having begun with the love of money, and found that money in itself cannot render him happy, he now betakes himself to the cup: and with what result? His constitution is undermined, his money spent, his wife a beggar, his children—yes, painful though it may be to say it—his children trained up in such a manner as to be prepared to follow their father's course, or, it may be, *worse*. And all this has been owing, in the first instance, to the severance of that connection which formerly subsisted between the country gentry and the working man.

But this is not all. Not only has machinery been the means of severing the salutary tie which formerly existed between such of the working classes as have migrated to the manufacturing districts and the country gentry; it has also severed the tie which subsisted between the remaining population and the wealthy, in far too many instances. The very fact of many places having risen in a comparatively short time to a prodigious size, through the influx of the working population, and the extension of manufactures, has induced many of the gentry themselves to forsake a country life, and live in towns. Here they have discovered attractions which the country could not afford;—company occupying a like station with themselves, and facilities for the gratification of their

selfish desires, which they could not find in the comparatively isolated position which they occupied in the country. There they must, in many cases, hold communication of a friendly character with such persons as they could find, or with none at all; and to this source, probably, is to be attributed much of the kindly feeling which formerly subsisted between the working classes and their lords. This migration of the gentry to towns has, in many cases, been attended with the worst results, as far as the inhabitants of the country districts are concerned. Physically, socially, and morally, these districts have suffered. The trade which, through the patronage of these persons, was spread over the country, has been lost; and persons who once enjoyed a position of comparative affluence thereby, are the subjects of poverty, if not of actual want. The counsellor, the guardian, the friend of the working man is gone; and that kindly influence which tended to knit society together is gone also. But it is, perhaps, in a moral sense in which these places have most deeply suffered. The pot-house, which till now did not exist, is become the common haunt of the labouring man. Left in a state of discomfort, he seeks to drown his cares in the forbidden cup, far oftener than his scanty earnings will allow. Under these circumstances it is scarcely surprising that he has frequently put forth his hand and appropriated to his own use that which lawfully belonged to his neighbour, or that his children have, in many cases, made such progress in crime, as to become adepts in robbery long before they have arrived at the age of manhood. That such has been the case it is hardly necessary to state. Facts go to prove that our country villages contain numbers of children who are almost as great adepts at crime, and fully as willing to perpetrate the most daring thefts, as any that have been educated for that special purpose in the worst districts of our larger towns.

Nor is this all. We have already shewn that vast numbers of our working population have migrated to the large manufacturing districts. We have also intimated that the wealthy classes, the farmer country squires, have become enamoured with town life. It might with some reason be supposed

that the same paternal care, on the part of the wealthy classes, had followed the working man to his new abode; such however is not the case. It is true that many efforts, of a public and philanthropic character have been put forth in order to ameliorate his condition, but these for the most part have been too late. Good men have aimed to aid those who are really distressed, instead of taking means to prevent distress—to reclaim the fallen, instead of labouring to sustain the falling. Their efforts have for the most part been of a reparatory rather than of a preventive character, nor have these well-intentioned individuals been so blameworthy as some may suppose. The crowded state of our towns has in most cases rendered it impossible to ascertain the real state of the people's circumstances until their malady has been beyond cure. So that even this disadvantage under which the philanthropist has laboured, is to be attributed to the fact that men have been too thickly packed together, and this fact in its turn to the introduction of machinery, and the changes consequent thereon.

But we wish it to be carefully noted that, though the working classes have been introduced into towns, and the wealthy classes have followed them; the interest that has been manifested for their welfare has generally speaking been confined to few. It has by no means been general for moneyed men to take an interest in the well being of the working man. On the contrary, the working man has been looked upon by his employer, and by wealthy persons generally, pretty much in the light of a working machine. His health, his comfort, his heart, his head, his soul, have been little thought of, and nothing cared for. As it has been with his hands he has laboured, so his hands have in his master's estimation completely swallowed up all other attributes, so far has this been the case that the term *hand* has become the well known synonyme for a man.

Nor is it surprising that men who in their estimation of the working man have so far forgotten the *man* as to recognize only the *hand*, have been entirely indifferent as to the moral atmosphere by which their manufactories have been pervaded, and their *hands* surrounded. Since they have regarded

them but as *hands*, it seems scarcely consistent to consider them responsible for those acts of moral delinquency which in *men* might be called dishonest. Men however whose God is gain, are not always consistent; but in this one respect they are; they leave no stone unturned, by which they imagine they can make anything in the form of money. In consequence of this the working man sees that his employer takes no interest in his welfare any further than it is calculated to influence his own. He cares neither for his health nor his morals, and it will be found on examination that the working man has gone back in these two items more than in any other. They may not have adopted any direct and active means in order to pollute the atmosphere by which the gentle youth of both sexes have been surrounded; but they have at least taken no means to purify that atmosphere, any further than according to their views may have been necessary to their own direct pecuniary advantage. The thief, and the idler, may indeed have been ejected from the establishment: but the adulterer, the liar, the man addicted to obscene conversation, and the drunkard, provided their habits have not interfered with the immediate interests of their employer: these, and such as these, have been permitted to retain their position, without a thought as to the baneful effects which they were producing upon the rising generation around them. And what have been these effects? Let the present state of our towns and cities tell;—the thousands who live by pillage, and even more degraded means; the multitudes, who frequent saloons, and taverns, and places of a still worse description; the few of this class who attend the house of God; the numbers who eagerly peruse infidel works, and works which to please the public taste assume even a more degraded form; the few who care to read works that are calculated to exalt the taste, elevate the mind, and lead the soul to God;—let these, and similar things to these, tell what have been the effects of the atmosphere that has pervaded the manufactory.

All the evils to which we have adverted, may be for the most part attributed to the estrangement that has taken place between the higher and the lower classes. We are well aware that no mere system of govern-

ment surveillance can make a man a Christian. But we also know that the education of the affections has much to do with the education of the mind, and tends even more than the education of the intellect to promote the social and domestic happiness of man. And we question whether any person whose atmosphere has been continually pervaded by kindly influences, and whose affections have been so developed as to lead him always to make it a point of principle to seek the happiness of his fellow man, ever became an avowed infidel. Nor is it anything to the purpose to say that these consequences are to be attributed rather to the circumstance, that men have been collected into large masses than to anything essentially connected with machinery. The question under consideration relates not to what might have been, or to what would be, if machinery had again to be introduced, but to what has been, and to what at the present time notoriously exists. If these evils do really exist, and if their existence is fairly to be traced to the circumstance that there has been a want of sympathy exhibited by the wealthy classes, together with the fact that our large towns have been too thickly populated; and if these two evils are to be traced to the introduction of machinery, why, then, there is no getting rid of the conclusion that whatever has been lost to the working man by the change is to be attributed to machinery.

There are, doubtless, many things that might be said on the other side. It may be said that the working classes are better fed, better clothed, and better paid than they could have been had machinery never existed. These and such like advantages may, and with some show of reason, be said to have resulted therefrom. To these it would be well if we could add another item, *better lodged*. Is it not a fact, that the agricultural labourer is, in this respect, a subject of envy to the artizan of the town? Does not his cottage contain far more in the shape of real comfort? and is it not far more airy and healthy than the apartment which has commonly to suffice for the wife and family of the artizan? True, his food may not be so dainty, but it is often better cooked, and if not, his appetite is a good substitute for sauce.

Now, as it regards the agricultural labourer, we think that those who are acquainted with his position, must allow that he, of all other men, has least partaken of the benefits which machinery has had to confer ; his food, his clothing, and oftentimes his lodging, are of the very coarsest description. It could not have been much

coarser if machinery had never existed, and yet he is not uncommonly the envied of the workman in the manufacturing town. This circumstance, alone, we think, in itself, testifies that the blessings of machinery, as far as the working classes are concerned, have been extremely few.

G. N.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

We believe it to be resolved into an axiom that whatever tends to promote the greatness and prosperity of a nation, tends, at the same time, and in a corresponding degree, to promote the welfare of each individual, or class of individuals, therein ; the latter being only component parts of the former, and, as such, participating in its prosperity or misfortunes. There is no such thing as excluding one class either from any benefits or any disadvantages which the other classes may experience : all are linked together in one great chain, and all feel the influence of national prosperity or adversity, either directly or indirectly,—either in a lesser or greater degree. In England, perhaps, more than in any other country, every man feels himself identified with his fellow-men—his interests are mixed up with theirs. Where is the Englishman who does not feel that *he*, individually, participates in British freedom, British liberty, British nobleness of character, and British generosity ? National acts are the acts of many individuals ; national sins are the sins of many individuals ; national vice is the vice of many individuals ; national virtue is the virtue of many individuals ; and national prosperity the prosperity of many individuals ! We advance these considerations with a view to prepare the way for the consideration of the question before us. Therefore, when we are asked if “the working classes have been benefitted by machinery ?” we ask in reply, “Have the other classes of the community been benefitted thereby ?” If the reply be in the affirmative, we feel that we have cleared away at least some of the difficulties with which the subject may have been previously surrounded. We shall, of course, have to meet the counter pleading, “That the working classes, who are the great producers of the staple commodities constituting the internal commerce

of this kingdom, and whose livelihood depends upon the remuneration they receive for their services, must be more deeply interested in any change affecting the mode of production than any other class.” At first sight there may appear some semblance of truth in this proposition, and, indeed it would be sound reason were all the members of the working classes *alike* affected by the application of machinery to any particular branch of manufacture ; but such is not the case. Although in the aggregate of improvement, all shall be affected nearly alike, it is not so in each particular instance. Thus, taking three individuals, representing three different sections of the great body known as the working classes, let us see how each will be affected by the introduction of increased facilities into the several departments they represent.

First, we select the *agricultural labourer* ; next, the *weaver* ; and lastly, the *printer*. The Labourer has been accustomed to till the ground and produce corn for food, but his process was by spade husbandry, which, although very effectual, is very slow ; and, therefore, the cost of production is great on account of the manual labour required. But suddenly the plough, the harrow, and the drill are introduced : they, for a time, displace some of the hands formerly employed, or cause a slight reduction in wages, and the labourer therefore feels himself injured by the change. But how are the Weaver and the Printer affected by it ? They require a constant supply of food : food is made cheaper by the improvements introduced, and therefore *they* are benefitted. In process of time, however, a reform also takes place in the process of weaving. The spinning-jenny and the hand-loom become displaced, and the power-loom, with its score of shuttles, supersedes them. The Weaver, in his turn, is affected by the change ; for

the increased facilities of production have lessened, for a time, the demand for his labour, and, perhaps, brought a better-manufactured article than he could produce into the market. The Labourer and the Printer require clothing: they supply their wants at the smallest outlay, and hence they derive advantage by the change. As improvements go on, the Printer finds that the steam-engine—the mighty iron-horse of modern times—has displaced his hand-presses and hand-machines, and is eagerly panting to scatter forth its broad-sheets to the wind, yea, to the remotest corner of the earth. The Printer (or, perhaps *pressman* would be more appropriate) finds there is less demand for his labour, and his wages, perhaps, become reduced. But the Agricultural Labourer and the Weaver have acquired a love for books, and by the application of steam power to their production, books have become cheaper,—the Labourer and the Weaver thus secure great advantages. In each of the instances here given, we find *two* out of the three persons named, derive advantage by the increased facilities progressively introduced; the third, also, in turn, receiving corresponding benefits. And if our illustration had embraced fifty departments, instead of three, we should most probably have found that forty-nine of the number would, in some way, derive benefit from every new application of machinery to the purposes of production. Taking the working-classes, therefore, as a body, we have yet to learn in what way they can have been permanently injured by the introduction of machinery. We think a little further inquiry will show us that they have been actually benefitted by it, and that considerably.

It must, of course, be admitted that on the introduction of machinery to any particular branch of industry, temporary injury will be inflicted upon a certain number of hands previously employed therein; but we must look a little beyond this, and, in addition to the benefit conferred upon other classes, we shall, in most cases, find that increased production is followed by increased demand, in supplying which many more hands are frequently brought into employment than were originally displaced. We may refer to several remarkable instances of this.

Let us look at the production of cotton goods. Before the application of machinery to the manufacture of these fabrics, they were costly, and, therefore, very little in demand. Eighty years ago, the consumption of home manufactured cloth was estimated at *one yard* per head on the total population. Since the introduction of machinery in this department, and as a great consequence thereof, the consumption has increased to *twenty-six yards* for each person.* Must not this enormous increase have caused a great demand for labour in the various processes connected with this manufacture? We have ample proof that it has. Turning to M'Culloch's edition of Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations," we find that great master of political economy, while speaking of the manufacturing establishments of Lancashire, (p. 459), declaring that "their trade owes its origin mainly to the discoveries of Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Watt, and Cartwright;" and that "it is sustained almost wholly by the demand created in different branches of industry by these inventions, and others in the same walk."

Let us take another example, which is even more striking. Before the steam-engine was invented, the produce of the *coal mines* barely paid the expenses of working them; and had it not been for the application of steam and other machinery, the supply would have been gradually diminishing (as the mines become more difficult to work), while the price would have been constantly increasing.† But how stands the matter now? Take London alone:—instead of 80,000 tons per annum being consumed in the metropolis, as was the case about the end of the reign of Charles II., the yearly consumption is something like 2,500,000 tons; while the total produce of the mines cannot be less than 30,000,000 tons per annum.‡ But this is not all. Without coals but little could be done in the *iron manufactures*, which have now taken such an important place in our commercial transactions. At the close of the reign of Charles II., a great part of the

* Charles Knight's "Capital and Labour," p. 152

† Ibid., p. 130.

‡ Macaulay's "England."

iron used in this country was imported, and the whole quantity cast in this country was estimated at not more than 10,000 tons per annum. Now the trade is thought to be in a depressed state if *less* than 1,000,000 tons be used in that period.* If we reflect upon the multitudes who daily find employment in raising, shipping, and unloading these coals; of the equal numbers of founders, smiths, and others, employed in working up the iron produced, into articles of utility, to say nothing of the increased comfort afforded to every individual in the kingdom by such conveniencies, we shall not readily believe that any *one* class has been excluded from a proper share in the benefits resulting from machinery, or that the demand for manual labour has been lessened thereby.

Lastly, under this head, if machinery had not been applied to the purposes of *agriculture*, and the increased production of food, what would have been the probable condition of this country? Why, either we must have suffered from famine as our forefathers did;—have eaten bread of a description at which our modern refinement would cause us to shudder;—or half the population must have toiled upon the soil to keep themselves and the other half supplied with the means of subsistence; while those mechanical arts which have tended so much to promote our present advancement, must have been, for the most part, neglected! Who is it that feels most keenly the misery and privations of scarcity? Is it not the poor man, who, not having the means for supplying his wants possessed by his more wealthy neighbour, has to struggle on in his sufferings? It is a fact which is becoming every day more apparent, that any discovery, invention, or appliance, having a tendency to place the common necessities of life within the reach of the industrious classes, has a

direct influence in the promotion of their social and moral welfare.

We are here almost involuntarily led to another consideration,—viz., that one of the first objects of machinery is to rid the working classes of a vast amount of mere *drudgery*, which is incident to many processes of manufacture, and which, by causing men to lose a portion of that self-respect which all should possess, tends eventually to debase their characters. The effect of machinery is to give *man* a complete mastery over *matter*; to elevate and expand his mental powers; to afford scope to his genius and inventive powers, by the cultivation of which he will not only benefit himself, but the whole of his fellow-creatures. What is it that constitutes that feeling of manliness and self-dependence which characterizes even the most humble English mechanic or labourer? Is it not that he feels elevated in his calling? And does not this feeling arise from the fact that he has been relieved of the most debasing portions of labour by the application of machinery? Without this aid, we should be as badly off as the people of Spain and Portugal, who are miserably poor because they have *bad machines*; or as the Chinese labourers, who have scarcely any machinery, and are the poorest people in the world!*

We do not shut our eyes to the fact that machinery has in some cases been applied to the purposes of reckless competition, by which all classes, sooner or later, suffer; but this is the result of its *abuse*, and therefore does not in reality militate against any of the advantages which we have stated as resulting from its proper use.

We thus have given a brief summary of the reasons which induce us to believe that the working classes have been benefitted by machinery.

C. W., Jun.

* Macaulay's "England."

* Charles Knight's "Capital and Labour," p. 104.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. VII.

25. *Authority* opens the countenance, but draws down the eye-brows a little, so far as to give the look of gravity.—See *Gravity*.

26. *Commanding* requires an air a little more peremptory, with a look a little more severe or stern. The hand is held out, and moved towards the person to whom the order is given, with the palm upwards, and the head nods towards him.

27. *Forbidding*, on the contrary, draws the head backwards, and pushes the hand from one, with the palm downwards, as if going to lay it upon the person, to hold him down, immoveable, that he may not do what is forbidden him.

28. *Affirming* is shown in gesture by uplifting the right hand, with the palm open and slightly turned towards the person addressed. The eyes are sometimes raised upwards to the skies, and the hand is occasionally laid upon the heart. If with an oath, the person looks appealingly to heaven; the voice is firm, the frame collected and well-knit. The following extract from Shelley's "Queen Mab," will illustrate, if read feelingly, the mode of making affirmations.

" I tell thee that those living things
To whom the fragile blade of grass
That springeth in the morn
And perisheth ere noon,
Is an unbounded world.
I tell thee that those viewless beings
Whose mansion is the smallest particle
Of the impassive atmosphere,
Think, feel, and live, like man.
That their affections and antipathies,
Like his, produce the laws
Ruling their normal state ;
And the minutest throb
That through their frame diffuses
The slightest, faintest motion,
Is fixed and indispensable
As the majestic laws
Which rule yon rolling orbs."

29. *Denying* speaks in the same tone as the former ; for a negation is but an affirmation that a thing *is not*. The manner is, however, different ; for the hand is spread out as if resisting something pressing upon one, and the face is averted from the person whom we deny anything, or to whom we deny that anything affecting him or others injuriously has been committed. This extract from Shirley's play of "The Wedding" is an instance of *Denial* :—

Beauford.—Thou hast a hell about thee, and thy language
Speaks thee a devil, that to blast her innocence
Dost belch these vapours. To say thou liest
Were to admit that thou hast made in this
A human error, when thy sin hath aimed

The fall of goodness! Gratiana false?
 The snow shall turn a salamander first,
 And dwell in fire; the air retreat and leave
 An emptiness in Nature; angels be corrupt,
 And, bribed by mortals, sell their charity!

30. *Difference* is a mixture of *denying* and *refusing*, with a slight infusion of *anger*, and manifests itself in a sharp, abrupt tone, and a little *hauteur* in the air. When it increases in vehemence, all these manifestations are heightened, and it becomes *Quarrelling*.

31. *Agreeing*, when done with frankness and good-will, gives the face an open, joyous look, and imparts cordiality to the whole appearance; and when it succeeds a disagreement, it becomes reconciliation, and is warm and glowing. When it signifies mere assent in opinion, it very slightly moves the countenance with *Admiration*. A familiar instance of the two foregoing mental dispositions will be found in the "Quarrel Scene" of "Douglas."

32. *Exhorting* differs in the intensity of its expressions according to the party who is supposed to speak in a hortative manner. Its general external manifestations are a spirited look, a bright eye, strong inspirations of air, inflated nostrils, a courageous bearing, a rapid and vehement utterance, all betokening the inward enthusiasm with which the mind is filled. "Richmond encouraging his soldiers" is an example in point. We quote these four illustrative lines for their brevity.

"Yet though destruction sweep these lovely plains,
 Rise! fellow-men, our country yet remains;
 By this dread name we wave the sword on high,
 And swear with her to live; for her to die."

33. *Judging* requires a grave, sedate, serious, and reserved air. The countenance must be open, disengenuous, and candid, displaying deep attention. The voice must be solemn, slow, clear, and emphatic—accompanied by few gestures and the greatest appearance of impartiality.

34. *Reproving* imparts a stern roughness and slightly scornful tone to the voice, and gives to the body the general signs of displeasure and aversion. The countenance is severe—the hand held out almost menacingly and forbidding.

The following extract from Shelley's tragedy of "The Cenci" will illustrate this:—

Camillo.—

Oh, count Cenci!

So much that thou might'st honourably live
 And reconcile thyself with thine own heart,
 And with thy God, and with the offended world.
 How hideously look deeds of lust and blood
 Through those snow-white and venerable hairs!—
 Your children should be sitting round you now,
 But that you fear to read upon their looks
 The shame and misery you have written there.
 Where is your wife? Where is your gentle daughter?
 Methinks her sweet looks, which make all things else
 Beauteous and glad, might kill the fiend within you.
 Why is she barred from all society

But her own strange and uncomplaining wrongs ?
 Talk with me, count,—you know I mean you well.
 I stood beside your dark and fiery youth
 Watching its bold and bad career, as men
 Watch meteors—but it vanished not. I marked
 Your desperate and remorseless manhood ;—now
 Do I behold you in dishonoured age,
 Charged with a thousand unrepented crimes ;
 Yet I have ever hoped you would amend,
 And in that hope I've saved your life three times."

HINTS ON STUDY.

PREVIOUS to our directing the reader's attention to the desultory remarks which we are about to present to his notice on the subject of "Study," it may not be considered altogether out of place should we attempt to preface them by a few words on what is meant by, or implied in, that term. There is a common phrase in the Liturgy of the Church which we consider as exactly comprehended in, or synonymous with, the word Study: viz., "read, mark, learn, and inwardly digest." Such we conceive to be in their very order, and that too with metaphysical accuracy, the constituent elements of that idea. But having thus given a prosaic definition we are almost tempted to quote a brilliant explanatory passage in Bailey's "*Festus*," which, to our mind, admirably conveys the characteristic qualities—in industry, assiduity, ardour, aspirativeness, and mind-excitability—which we consider as the universal marks of the true student. It is not to be expected that every one to whom our hints are at present addressed can adequately fill up the portrait of student life therein depicted, but the *spirit* of it must be felt and acted upon by every one who is deeply penetrated with the *desire to know*. We find we cannot resist the temptation, and therefore the beauty and aptness of the extract must be our apology for so lengthy a quotation.

All mankind are students. How to live
 And how to die, forms the great lesson still.
 I know what study is ; it is to toil
 Hard, through the hours of the sad midnight
 watch,

At tasks which seem a systematic curse,
 And course of bootless penance. Night by night
 To trace one's thought as if on iron leaves,
 And sorrowful, as though it were the mode
 And date of death we wrote on our own tombs ;
 Wring a slight sleep out of the couch, and see
 The self-same moon, which lit us to our rest ;
 Her place scarce changed perceptibly in heaven,
 Now light us to renewal of our toils.

Fruit soon comes
 And more than all our trouble pays us—powers ;
 So that we joy we have endured so much ;
 That not for nothing we have slaved, and slain
 Ourselves almost. And more it is to strive
 To bring the mind up to one's own esteem :

It is to think
 While thought is standing thick upon the brain
 As dew upon the brow—for thought is brain-
 sweat—

And gathering quick and dark, like storms in
 summer,

Until, convulsed, condensed in lightning sport,
 It plays upon the heavens of the mind—
 Opens the hemisphered abysses here,
 And we become revealers to ourselves.

Festus.

Having thus remarked on the definition of our term, it may not be amiss to mention that we do not wish our student to be a mere bookworm,—learned in other men's opinions, in the facts which they have gathered, and the conclusions they deduce from them. We wish to inoculate our readers with the truth that mere *reading* is not study, it is but the food of thought, and that too of an artificial kind. *Thinking* is the grand generic idea, the *sine qua non* of study. Every thing should be unto us as a book. When night has set her silver lamp far up in heaven's blue sublimity, and spreads her star-studded curtain over sleep-indulging mortals, then should the student's anxious eye seek from the heavenly orbs themselves their evidence to astronomic truth. Each little herb which grows high on the mountain's top, or in the tangled wilderness ; each flower which blooms in garden bed, in forest depth, or on the plain which sleeps beneath the "witchery of the soft blue sky," should whisper in our ear of Botany. "The spring water welling its way through flowers ;" the winding river hurrying on so dancingly into the all-absorbing sea—the sea itself with its foam-crested waves, should be interrogated for their wisdom. The rocks contain within their rugged breasts, and exposed upon their thunder-splintered or volcano-reft sides, most marvellous tales of worlds which bloomed in times pre-Adamite ; and even the tiny pebble or the many-lined shell which strews the ocean's edge, can teach some lessons man were wise to learn. Then there are the changing seasons with all their vicissitudes and all their multiplied series of causes and effects. The habits, peculiarities and forms of the Animal Kingdom, from the polype or "the cricket on the hearth" to the mail-ribbed cayman, the strong-hided rhinoceros, or the proboscied elephant. The tornado, the hurricane, and the simoom ; the ice-sheeted ocean, the snow-peaked mountain, the geyser, the volcano, and the earthquake ; the fire-flashing electric bolt, the boreal lights, and the unimaginably distant, nebulae, are all ready to instruct us. Yea vast creation's wide space-filling domain, far as the eye can reach or the tele-

scope extend, and minute as the microscope can bring before our gaze, is filled with knowledge and replete with wisdom. But all this is not to be gathered up and hoarded for mere curiosity-gratification; it must be applied to some useful purpose, else is the great purpose of study unaccomplished. Hence it is that each new knowledge-attainment has resulted ultimately in some beneficial measure for the race; as Franklin's electrical experiments, Black's discovery of latent heat, Watt's steam engine, the electric telegraph, and gutta serena. Nature is anxious to reveal herself and her secrets for our use, while at the same time each mental exertion increases our mental power.

"Crescit enim cum amplitudine rerum vis ingenii."*

Hint 1st—Strive to acquire a knowledge of your own mental nature.

Self-knowledge is of all study the most important, though perhaps that which is most seldom engaged in. It is the root from which all really successful study should take its rise. By it we gain a knowledge of our aptitudes, our capacities, and our deficiencies. Hence we are enabled to gratify these aptitudes, to exert our capacities, and—what is of even greater importance—supply our deficiencies, and make up the wants of our mentality. This latter is an important consideration, it has been too much the custom to educate only on the side of our tastes and capacities. This is unfair treatment of the mind. Is it because one eye is blinded that no means should be employed to couch it and "make it whole even as the other." Why should we keep the mind thus cultivated one-sidedly, thus lame, thus imperfectioned. As each faculty is an activity, and each activity exercised is a pleasure-producer, it follows that we lose those mental joys which lie within our reach. This mind-knowledge which we desiderate for the self-instructionist, is to be acquired by meditation, by watchfulness, by the careful observance of what passes through his mind in the hours of thought, by an earnest exertion of attention and consciousness to discover the peculiarities of his own individuality. This is the foundation of all properly conducted education,—of all mental independence,—of all originality of thought; and therefore it is of too great importance to be neglected by the truly ardent student; and by student here we do not only mean one whose whole time is spent in acquiring wisdom, but any one who thinkingly employs his leisure hours in the cultivation of his intellect, the elevation of his nature, and the gratification of the higher tastes and sensibilities with which he is endowed.

Hint 2nd.—Endeavour to gain an accurate idea of the nature, object, and uses of each study.

A general idea of the nature, object, and uses of any study must be of great advantage in showing the mind how much it may do for its gratification, for the furtherance of its views, and for the advancement of the general interests of the individual. Without this we do not think it is possible to engage in any study

with that energy, ardour, and intensity, which is necessary as the complement of our ideal of what true study is. Unless we enter upon it with that mental appreciation which stimulates the mind to diligence by offering an object to its hopes and inspirations, and promising to contribute to the fulfilment of its desires, we shall never pursue any study with that eagerness and avidity, that yearning anxiety to *know*, that invincibility of resolution, and indefatigability of exertion, which are the forerunners and the earnestness of success.

Hint 3rd.—Let every study be pursued in a thorough-going and persevering manner.

Nothing is, perhaps, more common among young men who are desirous of improving themselves, than that which has been aptly designated "mental dissipation;"—a disposition which inclines them to change the subject of their study frequently, to hurry on from one science to another before any definite progress has been or can be made; to become wearied and fatigued with the mental exertion required, and so to hop from one study to another; not like a bee, from flower to flower, which sips the nectar from each one as it goes, but like a grasshopper skipping about for want of other employment. Such an individual may have dabbled in the whole "circle of the sciences," the languages, and history to boot, and yet have received scarcely one definite and useful idea from his vast range of studies; or if he has, his mental stores are but a series of "shreds and patches," consist merely of a few "excerpta," but have no consecutive order, no unity, no definitized wholeness. No part of the student's duty is so difficult of accomplishment, no one of his acquisitions costs so much trouble in its attainment, or when attained is more valuable or more essential than the habit of persevering attention. Without this nothing really useful can be done, with it almost everything may be accomplished. We do not wish to be understood as asserting that all knowledge is attainable by the student. What we mean is that while there will always be some determining consideration which will lead to the adoption of some particular study or range of studies, every one should aim at having a correct and properly generalized and classified view of human knowledge. As in Geography, the inhabitants of each country study their own peculiar little spot with greater care, accuracy, and attention, yet take a general survey of the other constituent countries of our globe; so should we in our survey of the chart of human wisdom, seek to gain especial acquaintance with the department or departments which use, convenience, prospects, or tastes, have determined us chiefly to pursue, but at the same time to acquire a correct idea of the other great branches of human study, what they teach, and what are their uses.

Hint 4th.—Accustom yourselves to express your ideas on the study you pursue, both verbally and in writing.

This exercise will be of great service to you in stimulating your attention, increasing your acquaintance with the facts and modes of expression which are peculiar to your studies, enabling you to analyse any topic, begetting conciseness and readiness of expression, and imparting regu-

* For the strength of the mental faculties increases with the greatness of the things which exercise them.

larity, order, and accuracy, to those laws, phenomena, hypotheses and theories which form the object of your study. It will moreover greatly assist in reviewing your labours, having them thus reduced into small compass, and readily arranged in your thoughts.

Hint 5th.—Let the best hours of the day be appropriated to your chief study.

It is a most important consideration to take for your hours of study that time at which the mind will be least inclined to wander away in aberration, or become inattentive and erratic. Now in the evening, with the numerous cares and occurrences of the day crowding upon a mind jaded, fatigued, and incapable of much exertion, the glowing reverie, the dreamy listless inactivity of thoughtlessness, the stirring excitement of romance, or any other “drowsy-headed,” or exhilarating occupation has, according to the temperament of the individual, generally far greater charms than the strong tension of the mental powers required in study. We would, therefore, however vainly, advise the morning hours as the most appropriate and fitting for mental application. Then the mind is fresh, vigorous, active, and powerful as a “giant refreshed by slumbers;” the lethargy of sleep has washed from remembrance the occurrences and cares of the past day, and her “popped wings” have charmed away the exhaustion and ennui under which we laboured. Even to those who, at the matin hour, long ere the sun has blessed us with its beams, require to go forth to early labour, we would earnestly recommend the adoption of morning study hours. Such health-bringing habits are easily acquirable by sternness and inflexibility of will and purpose. It is easy to retire earlier to repose, and arise betimes to useful, mind-improving, studies. It will be found, if steadily persevered in for any length of time, that more real knowledge is gained, more mental power acquired, greater pleasure in study excited, and less vitiation of mind and body undergone than in the burning of the “midnight lamp.” Not that *this* is by any means to be despised; the *desire to know* is honourable and praiseworthy, and, however followed, brings many gratifications to the mind: still we do think that by an appropriation of the severer studies to morning, and the less mind-bracing to the evening,—such as music, drawing, and elocution; besides light reading, and home amusements,—it would be found that the great objects in view would be much more advantageously effected.

Hint 6th.—Change the study, and alter the position of your body when you feel either fatiguing.

It is strange yet true that the mind and body exercise a reciprocal and reactionary influence upon each other, and whatever annoys or inno-

cently gratifies the one, communicates a part of that annoyance or gratification to the other. It is in consequence of this fact that the present hint is given. No study should be pursued until it jades the mind; neither should any position of frame be persevered in until it becomes fatiguing. Not that we are to be over-indulgent to our minds, so prone as they are to procrastination and levity; or to our bodies which are so luxuriously and indolently inclined; but that we should give them every reasonable indulgence. All lightness of disposition, all habits of heedlessness, all mental unsettledness and insolidity, as well as all bodily restlessness, over-refinement and torpidity, must be strenuously opposed; and with all the might of will resisted. But the real calls of health, or mental exhaustion, should never be unheeded. In fact, a large endowment of natural good sense is requisite in the student to distinguish between the imperious voice of nature, and the claimant annoyance and persistence of our own too-much uncurbed desires. In all things, moderation is desirable, and not less in study than in any other occupation.

These “hints” have already extended to greater length than we at first intended, and yet we feel desirous to add to their number; this however we will not do, as we believe that if these be followed in their spirit, the minor details will best be left to be arranged as is convenient to each party. Let no one however, even the least favoured in that respect, deceive himself with the idea that he has no time for study.

“Nihil est aliud magnum quam multa minuta.”

And a few minutes even, properly employed, each day, might accumulate a great deal of information on the general principles of science, and give food for much thought and intellectual exertion. To any one truly imbued with the desire, earnest, craving, and irresistible, as every such pure desire is, the means and opportunities of study will on the lacking. In the most unpropitious circumstances, some of the world’s great men have nurtured themselves to greatness and renown. Their high estimate of the value and pleasures of knowledge, their industry and perseverance, their indomitable resolution and invincible energy, should urge us on to higher efforts and more noble achievements. Let us therefore resolve firmly, exert ourselves energetically, and labour perseveringly, in the advancement of ourselves in wisdom, and in the increase of our knowledge.

“Till all is ours that Sages taught,

That Poets sang, or Martyrs wrought.”

S. N.

* No other thing has as great a power as an aggregation of little things.

MUTUAL INSTRUCTION AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.

Uxbridge.—*Young Men’s Improvement Society.*—The fifth Anniversary of this Society was recently held at the Public Rooms. The proceedings commenced by a *soiree*, at which about 200 of the members and their friends sat down to

tea. At the public meeting afterwards the room was crowded with a well dressed and respectable audience. About 500 occupied the body of the hall; the gallery was full; and as the sound of the music from the excellent band of the society

ceased, James Newton, Esq., of Iver, took the chair. After making a few very appropriate remarks, he called on Mr Edbrook to read the report, of which we furnish an abstract:—

"The Society's Reading Room has been open every evening in the week for the use of its members. One daily and four weekly newspapers are regularly supplied. The library is at all times accessible to its members, and books are allowed to be taken from the room once a week. Eight lectures have been delivered in connection with the Society, one at the Public Rooms, the others in the Society's Reading Room, which were generally well attended. The one delivered at the Public Rooms was a very interesting one on Astronomy, by B. Godlee, Esq., the expense of which was defrayed by Mr John Fell, and the lecturer presented a donation of £1 to the Society. Three classes were conducted during the winter months for the study of writing, arithmetic, and music. The discussion class has been kept up and is now carried on in a most spirited manner."

Mr W. Baynham proposed and Mr J. K. Gurney seconded the adoption of the report.

The Rev C. P. Price.—After some preliminary remarks said, he rejoiced exceedingly, as a clergyman of this place, that the society had done something in giving the youth of the town a refuge from the taproom and the gaming table; that it was encouraging the moral as well as the intellectual powers of the mind; and professed principles which, if carried out, would render a nation truly great and virtuous.

Mr Walter Baynham, the present secretary of the institution, said—he had been a member four years—knew its history, it was eventful—its object, it was good—its means, simple and well adapted to the end designed—its motto was "We seek the good of man." We appeal to our neighbours, our school-fellows, our townsmen. We say, "come from demoralising pursuits to the banquet of good things we provide for the mind; ours is a college, a college of the people; true, we cannot confer degrees, but we can, by instruction, prepare them to fill as they should do the station to which they have been called.

The Rev D. Bailey, in an able speech, drew an eloquent picture of the progress of which the society was evidence. He described the wonders

which science now daily produces; spoke of machinery, railways, tubular bridges, electricity, steam; then introduced subjects from natural history, to show that the natural state of the world is progress. As intelligence advances, we must advance with it, or be jostled in the race. He argued that science aiding physical power as it does, should have the effect of enabling the world to do with less of manual labour, and leave to all a greater space of time for the cultivation of the mind. He was glad to identify himself with the society, and scanned some of the many advantages it offers to the young men of Uxbridge, and in a beautiful peroration called upon them to take care they did not mistake intellectual greatness for moral goodness.

Mr Thomas Norton next addressed the meeting in a highly humorous and amusing speech.

The Rev John Tod Brown, A.M., interested the meeting for upwards of an hour in a very eloquent and amusing speech.

John Eden, Esq., and several other gentlemen, afterwards addressed the meeting; a vote of thanks was awarded to the Chairman; the band played, and the whole audience sang, "God save the Queen;" the Vicar pronounced the benediction, and at ten the meeting broke up.

Watton Mutual Improvement Society.—The First Anniversary of this Society was celebrated, by a *soiree*, Nov. 5th, in the Large Room, Crown Inn, engaged for the occasion, about 180 friends, male and female, sat down to tea. The Room was tastefully decorated with flowers, evergreens, appropriate mottoes, and a splendid transparent Banner, made for the occasion by the Secretary. The Chair was taken by the President, Rev A. Griffin, who, after a few remarks, called upon Mr Grooure, the secretary, to read the report, from which it appeared the number of members was 120, and, considering the population of the town (1100), the Committee were encouraged by the success which had attended their efforts. The meeting was addressed by J. Hargreaves, Esq., Messrs C. W. Alexander, G. W. Layland, T. L. Alexander, who urged the necessity of increased exertion, during the coming year, in carrying out the object for which the Society was formed, viz. The moral and intellectual improvement of the People.

The Inquirer.

26. *Mathematics.*—In your December number I find an inquiry respecting the best introduction to mathematical studies. My own experience may perhaps serve as an index to your correspondent. I should recommend T. J. B. to commence Geometry with Potts' university edition of Simpson's Euclid, published by Parker, West Strand, London. With this he should use a blank book, having each page divided into two columns, and on one side writing the propositions, and on the other giving the demonstrations. W. G.

We presume that T. J. B. wishes to become acquainted with Mathematics,—that he is not desirous of merely skimming the surface. It is

perhaps unnecessary to state that mathematics may be learned superficially, as well as any other science. We will suppose, further, that he really has a taste for them, and that he has already made some experiments, and has discovered that they contain treasure which is worth the digging for; unless this be the case, it is impossible for him, or any other person, to assert with propriety that he has a great taste for the Mathematics.

The pure mathematics are usually divided into three branches—Arithmetic, Algebra, and Geometry. As our friend believes himself to have a taste for mathematics we will presume him to be so far acquainted with the former as to be

able to perform, with tolerable ease, any of the ordinary processes in Arithmetic. We will presume that he is able to solve any question in the Rule of Three. The first thing that we should advise him to do, is, to make himself thoroughly familiar with the algebraic signs. These he will find contained in the definitions of his algebra. He may best accomplish this by practice with figures; for if he have to deal, at the same time, with the difficulties which these signs present to the learner, and also with those which the letters present, he may find more than he is able, without the assistance of a teacher, properly to cope with. Nor would it be thought strange if, at this point, he were to retire discouraged. At the outset he may use very simple numbers, as $3+7+4+9-2+6-12=15$, which will be read thus: 3, plus 7, plus 4, plus 9, minus 2, plus 6, minus 12, equals 15, and signifies that if the numbers 3, 7, 4, 9, and 6 be added together, and the numbers 2 and 12 be taken from their sum, the result will be 15. Similar exercises might be formed with the other two signs, $\times$ (into), and $\div$ (by) which are usually denominated the signs of Multiplication and Division, as: $(7 \times 6 \times 3) \div 9 = 14$, i.e., 7 multiplied by 6, and that result by 3, and this product divided by 9, equals 14. This exercise might be stated thus: $7 \times 6 \times 3 \div 9 = 14$. It is per-

fectly immaterial which form is used; the result is the same. The querist may form exercises for himself until he is able to read the signs as well as the words for which they stand. This done, we advise him to proceed with the Algebra. We have seen Chambers' work; it is, we believe, a good one, but we think there are books which are to be preferred to it, for learners. The best we have seen, which is in fact an interesting book, is published by Scott, at a shilling. The charm of this book is, that each division—Addition, Subtraction, &c., is succeeded by a course of simple Equations adapted to the progress of the learner. The book is entitled, *Bridge's Algebra: Part 1st*. Having obtained such a work, and familiarized himself with the signs, we advise him to proceed with Addition of Algebra. Nor are we aware that he can adopt any better course than to proceed as the book directs. If, however, he use Chambers' book, we recommend him to proceed with the questions as far as Division, and then to turn his attention to the simple equations, and work through such as can be worked without the aid of fractions. Then, to return to the fractions, and afterwards to proceed with the remaining equations. At this stage he must return to, and proceed with, the Extraction of the Square Root; after which, without interfering with the surds, he may work many of the simpler quadratics. A supplementary paper will be given next month. G. N.

27. Latin without a Master.—We recommend you to commence by studying the Accidence, committing to memory the declensions of nouns and adjectives, and the conjugations of the verbs;—this will supply you with a key to all the words in the language, belonging to these parts of speech, in their various inflections. You may then take up the *Delectus*, learning the rules of Syntax as they are there brought

under your notice, which is far more profitable and pleasing than taking the rules as they stand in the Grammar. Having arrived at the end of the *Delectus*, you will find "*Cornelius Nepos*," or "*Cæsar's Commentaries*," easy, interesting, and instructive, to proceed with. In the mean time, however, you must commence turning English into Latin, which you will be able to do after studying some dozen or more pages of the *Delectus*. As this is the principal point in studying a language, you must by no means neglect it.

As to books, there are so many good ones that it is difficult to say which is the best; we can, however, confidently recommend Smith's or Moody's Eton Latin Grammar, and for turning English into Latin, "*Valpy's First Exercises*." Riddle's large Dictionary, we think, the best that has yet appeared; you cannot distrust too much "pocket editions and abridgements," the purchaser of which is sure to be disappointed.

We will not say that the plan here indicated is the QUICKEST you can adopt, but we know it to be safe and sure, (especially if you desire a thorough, grammatical knowledge of the language;) and must, if followed out faithfully, terminate successfully.

We admire the courage you exhibit in addressing yourself *solus* to the mastering of the Latin tongue, but if you can obtain a fully qualified teacher, to direct your studies, by all means do so, and you will then attain the end proposed with more ease, more certainty, and in much less time, than if left to yourself.

In conclusion, we caution you against putting too much faith in systems. Rely principally upon yourself, and whatever course you pursue, let it be one in which you fully concur; and once adopted, let it be rigorously followed. Never swerve from it to test the merit of any new-fangled system presented to your notice.

S. M. F.

28. The degrees M.A., B.A.—The degrees of M.A. and B.A. are not only signs of the attainment of a certain amount of knowledge, they also indicate that the possessor has passed satisfactorily through a course of college discipline and study. We believe the curriculum at most of the universities extends over a period of five years; at the end of the third year the student may proceed to take the degree of B.A., and at the end of the fifth, the degree of M.A. On each occasion he is subjected to a searching examination, and shame be to him if he is "plucked," or turned back. As the course of study differs at different universities we cannot strictly answer your question. At ALL, though, it is indispensable that the candidate be fully acquainted with Greek and Latin, and conversant with one or more of the modern languages. To this we may add a knowledge of natural philosophy and logic. At Cambridge, Mathematics predominate, and at Oxford, the study of Divinity and the "Fathers" takes the lead; and other universities, we doubt not, have some distinctive features, so that, in all probability, the successful candidate at one would not be able to achieve the like success at another, without submitting to a preparatory course.

S. M. F.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

In reference to the above department, the Editors are of opinion that they cannot better explain their purpose and the reasons which urged them to its adoption, than by quoting the "Prospectus" of their design in which the uses, advantages, and desirability of such a scheme of improvement are slightly outlined. They therein remarked that "in order to meet the wants of that very numerous class of earnest young men from whom they have received so many cheering communications regarding the advantages which they have derived from the perusal of the *British Controversialist*, and who have repeatedly sought direction as to the best course to pursue in the training of their intellectual faculties, and the acquisition of the power of expressing their thoughts with grace and accuracy—arrangements have been concluded by which such parties may be effectually aided, by the opening of a new department for their especial service, under the title of "The Young Writer and Student's Assistant;" or, "Our Collegiate Course." In this department a series of queries will be given, answers to which, in the form of Essays, will be invited from those who are resolutely determined on self-instruction and mental improvement. These Essays will come before the Editors, whose duty it will be to classify them according to merit: supply such hints and information as may seem necessary for the various writers; and otherwise assist, by counsel, reproof, correction, or caution, the students whose contributions are submitted to their judgment. To those who maintain a uniform superiority in their exercises, and are most regular in their transmission, it is in contemplation to award such "*Certificates of Merit*," as will be gratifying to the Students to receive, and to the Proprietors to bestow. The awarding of these "*Certificates*" will take place yearly, at such a period as will enable the Editors to transmit them to the parties previous to the close of the year; and to the three highest on the list they will have much pleasure in presenting a substantial *New Year's Gift*, in the shape of some valuable Work. Any Essay of distinguished ability will also be printed in the Magazine." They would likewise refer to the essay given in another page of the present issue entitled "Hints on Study," as containing advice suitable to the parties who may desire to become competitors in this strife for intellectual elevation.

The first series of Essays will be founded on those excellent articles on the "Art of Reasoning," which are now in process of publication in this work—both on account of the interest and usefulness of such a study, and the fact that they being already in our "Student's" hands, will be easy of access, and inexpensive of acquirement. The following are the queries which we now propose as the foundation of our "Young Writer's" efforts. It will not be necessary that the same opinions as are contained in these papers should be advocated in the essays: as *merit* and not *opinion* will be the chief object of investigation: neither will it be expected that each student

will answer *all* the queries given, although we confidently anticipate that the interest which this department will excite will be commensurate with its importance as an attempt to improve the minds of our young readers, and as a means of effectually assisting the struggling self-educator.

EXERCISE ON ART OF REASONING. No 1.

- 1st—Of what advantage has the faculty of Reason been to the human race, and in what does it employ itself?
- 2nd—What must be considered as bearing a share in the production of vice? Why?—with examples. What is the natural inference?
- 3rd—What is Theory? Give illustrations of its use, and show the necessity of accurate theory in the perfectioning of science.
- 4th—With what should man live at perpetual enmity? and why?—with illustrations.
- 5th—What is Logic? What are its various divisions? and of what do these respectively treat?

RULES.

- I. Each essay must be legibly written on a sheet or sheets of Demy Wove Post, for the sake of convenience in reading and subsequent preservation and reference; on one side only, with a margin of at least half an inch all round the page, and numbered on the right hand corner of the first side thus—

"Art of Reasoning," paper 1st, 2nd, &c., as the case may be.

Query 1st, 2nd, &c., as the case may be. and distinctly headed in half text, with the words of the query to which it is an answer.

- II. In addressing any letter to this department, no other business must be mentioned except such as belongs to it; and the department should be specified on the envelope thus—

The Editors of the *British Controversialist*.
Care of Messrs Houlston and Stoneman,
66, Paternoster Row,

The Young Student }
& Writer's Assistant. } London.

- III. The ground work of the essay alone is to be found in the Papers to which the Queries relate; the composition is to be strictly original; all quotations therefore, whether from the Papers or other works, must be marked with inverted commas, and accurate references given.

- IV. As the quantity of MS. will probably be great, and the reading must be carefully and discriminatingly proceeded with. All communications must be posted in time to reach the publishers on the 16th of the month in which the query answered was asked. The receipt of such as have come to hand up to that period will be acknowledged on the cover of the next issue, and a list classified in the order of merit, and with such comments as the Editors deem necessary, will be issued in the succeeding No, under the head of this department.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. X.

RATIOCINATION.

"Every man is born to search for Truth, and to make free his nature from confusion and doubt."—*Mendelssohn*.

"The writer professes no more than to lay down, candidly and freely, his own conjectures concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiassed inquiry after Truth."—*Locke*.

"The laws of our rational faculty, like those of every other natural agency, are only learned by seeing the agent at work."—*Mill*.

LOGIC depends, for its first principles, upon an investigation of the *laws of thought*, and hence a knowledge of "Mental Philosophy"—in so far as it informs us of these laws, is substratory to an accurate and well-founded science of Ratiocination. As Mr. Hallam justly remarks, "every logical method is built upon the common faculties of human nature, which have been exercised since the Creation in discerning, better or worse, truth from falsehood, and inferring the unknown from the known." Logic is not, therefore, an enactatory science: it does not, with an imperious and despotic *dicta*, utter its tyrannical behests; saying, thus and thus only, shalt thou do: it is not, as it has been represented, a mere system of mental enchainment, which enables the mind, like a mill horse, to go round and round, in continual progression but no advancement. It does not immure the mind in a dungeon of cumbrous and unnatural forms, and thus restrain the free-thoughted from pursuing their course of investigation. It is not a wily net of fine woven subtilties and cunning, to cast over the mental activities and impede their growth and onward motion—to retard alike their development and progression. It is not a mere curious specimen of perverted, though ingenious, human invention, having no foundation or warranty in the *facts* of the mentality. On the contrary, it explains the natural method of the operations of the human mind while engaged in the investigation: it is a system of law which has been carefully gleaned from a pains-taking and persevering study of the intellect in its activity. It is a strictly inductive science: the whole superstructure is upbuilt upon that foundation which affords the highest evidence of any truth or series of truths—conscious observation. It is a verbalized picture of the invariable *forms* of active thought as it develops itself in accordance with the laws of the human mind, and is thus well calculated to assist men in the task of truth-investigation, both by warning them of the sources of Error, and by instructing them in the most accurate and infallible, because the most natural, forms of Ratiocination. It "does not tell us how to make syllogisms, but how we do syllogise when we do not violate the laws of our mind

as much as we should violate the laws of our body, if we tried to walk upon our heads instead of upon our feet.”* The great *desiderata* for the construction of such a system of Logic, which would be at once plain in its teachings and trustworthy in its *formulae*, are an exact and determinate knowledge of the capacities of the intellection, “the limitations and conditions to which our minds themselves are subject,” the process of idea-formation, and the laws which govern the evolution of thought. Could these be obtained, the whole of Logic might be reduced to a few axioms, from which would flow, with mathematical certainty, the whole of the formularies and processes of Ratiocination. Should we be successful, however, in indicating the *method* in which such a science might be constructed, we shall, for the present, be content, as we shall thus enable the intelligent student to extend his confidence in logical *axiomata* in proportion as he improves in his acquaintance with the modes of the mental operations. We dare not presume to assert that we shall succeed in completely developing the *rationale* of the mental processes by which men acquire certitude and confidence; but our readers will generously pardon us should we not altogether succeed in proving to his entire satisfaction, that the teachings of Logic are the natural results of the action of those laws which are inwoven with, while they limit and circumscribe, the mind: nor impute to the science the incapacity of its teachers.

Facts are the products of law;—the individual manifestations and results of the great governing agencies or operative properties with which the Creator has endowed every specifically different existence in the universe. If, therefore, we carefully examine any series of manifested facts, and colligate them into assimilatory classes, we shall acquire a knowledge of the laws on which these facts depend for their development, and discover the modes in which these laws regulate and control their evolution. Let it, however, be noted here, that the word *law* is used to signify—what we think it should always be understood as meaning—not an essential and self-efficient power; but an expression of the general fact from which all the particular facts proceed as results: the cause, principle, or propension, by which, from a derived, though invariably-acting, tendency, individual facts are educed. If, then, by an attentive surveyance of any series of distinct, individuated facts, we can attain to a knowledge of the general fact on which their manifestations proximately depend; and, by our acquaintance with this fact, can reproduce other similar products, by placing them under the same proximately-efficient agency, such intelligence must of necessity be highly conducive to human happiness and intellectual advancement. In no department can these inquiries be followed by such manifold benefits as in the acquisition of a knowledge of the principles of human thought-development; for it is by the exercise of the human thought-powers that each new truth is gained,—each new invention elaborated,—each new principle eliminated,—and each new discovery disentangled from the ravelled skein of our ideas. On these truths, inventions, principles, and discoveries—and, consequently, on that by which they are educed and perfectioned—the world’s prosperity, advancement, and happiness is contingent. And seeing it is of so great moment, we can offer no other apology, nor do we think any other is required, for occupying

* “Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy”—Ancient. Rev. F. D. Maurice. “Encyclopædia Metropolitana,” New Edit., p. 171.

attention somewhat lengthily upon the *facts* of the reasoning process, for the purpose of attempting to discover an answer to that all-important inquiry,—What are the laws of Ratiocination ?

The advantage of such an investigation will be readily seen from the fact, that man is only capable of gaining information because he is endowed with knowledge-acquiring faculties : that he can only *know* in a ratio with the exercise which he gives to these faculties ; and that he will know more accurately and truly the more perfectly these mental capacities are employed in accordance with the laws of their action ; as it is evident, that the fewer the impediments and hindrances offered to the realization of knowledge, the more easily will it be acquired ; and that the more accurate our acquaintance with the laws of thought, the more fitted shall we be to remove or overcome the obstacles which impair or retard the due exertion of the mental functions. But here let us interject a remark on the distinction which we think ought to obtain between the *manner* and the *matter* of thought. The former is thought in its subjectivity—in the method in which it evolves itself in the mind—in its action circumscribed by the laws of the intellection—in its obediency to the *forms* of the mentality. The latter is thought in its objectivity—in its phenomenal appearance to the mind : but as each phenomenal existence is symbolized either in or to the mind, by a word or words, it follows that, in a logical sense, this verbalized expression may be considered congruent with, and representative of, the phenomenal manifestations ; and hence the *matter of thought* may, in certain cases, be regarded as thought in its manifestation in language—in its word-symbolization. The former relates to the general operations of the intellectual faculties irrespective of the investiture which ideas receive from words—the signs of thought ; the latter refers to the attainment of true and accurate notions, and with the attempt to translate these inner and mind-contained conceptions into words. By abstracting our attention as far as possible from the words and even the ideas upon which our thought-powers are exercised—*i.e.*, the *matter* of thought, and fixing our minds carefully upon the operative processes which they perform—*i.e.*, the *manner* of thought, we may find that the *manner* may very probably be unical, while the *matter* may be indefinitely multiplex. Not so easily, perhaps, may this be observed ; as, in looking upon machinery in action, we shall find the lever, the axle, the pulley and wheel, all engaged in the invariable fulfilment of their laws, however diverse may be the processes of manufacture, locomotion, &c., in which they are employed, and however complex may be the combinations in which they are formed. Yet, we believe, as surely and invariably will the several mental powers, if carefully and attentively surveyed in operation, be found to fulfil definite and peculiar laws. We will endeavour to prove that this is a fact ; and, if it be found so, we shall, perhaps the more readily, be enabled to discover what is the law of the Ratiocinative faculty.

We advance this, then, as a fact in Mental Philosophy ;—that Experience is the basis of all human knowledge ; that without *that*, as a foundation, no idea can possibly enter the mind, unless, indeed, by immediate and direct inspiration ; that unless our Consciousness be impressed, through the channels of our Sensational organisms, and Reflection be excited in us by these impressions, we can have no knowledge. By this, we do not mean that we can *not* know anything except that which we have experienced ; but that we

can have no knowledge which is not founded upon our experience, either by congruency, resemblance, causative agency, or some other definitive relationship. For it is evident that knowledge must have an object—must have reference to some definite existence; but without Experience, either of our own, or that of some one else, the mind cannot become cognizant of existence, and can acquire no knowledge of objectivities. Experience we here employ to signify the results of any one or more of those mental processes formerly detailed, illustrated, and explained under the head “Nature and Kinds of Evidence.” The truth of the assertion, that Experience is the basis or groundwork of knowledge, is assailed, and even denied, by those sects of philosophers whose systems of psychology are founded upon the assumptions of “innate ideas,” “fundamental verities,” &c., and may be supposed, on that account, to require some considerable amount of proof. For our own part, we believe that the mind is naturally adapted to eliminate Truth from the phenomena of Nature, and is so constituted, that, by the mere evolution of its faculties in accordance with the laws which govern them, it is capable of acquiring certitude and confidence. It is true that there are few topics upon which we can assert our opinions with perfect and irrefragable reliance; nay, that on many subjects the utmost amount of evidence which we can receive, rises only to probability. But this, be it remembered, originates in our relative imperfection; is a necessity of our derivative being, and does not at all impugn the capacities of our intellection, so far as these capacities extend. We find, then—to return to our proof of the Experience-origin of our Knowledge—that men’s knowledge increases only with the cumulativeness of their Experience; that practice results in relative perfection; and that untrained reasoners argue best on those topics with which their experience renders them familiar; that knowledge and truth are only gradually and progressively communicable to the mind: it originates in the formation of elementary conceptions, one fact or idea being upbuilt upon the other, that the advances of the mind are made in successive stages, and that every advance depends upon what has already been accomplished. The law of progression is interwoven with the texture of the mentality; as well might the bright flower-denizens of the garden, start into sudden and unnurtured growth and luxuriance of bloom, as any truth or series of truths spring up in a mind unprepared by experience to develop it. It is from this cause, too, that any thing or event which takes place contrary to or diverse from our experience, *e.g.*, an earthquake or a fierce summer hail-shower, paralyzes us with terror, or strikes us with alarm and surprise, and otherwise interrupts the train of our ideas. Hence, too, men acquire by habit, which is the result of experience, a belief in the uniformity in the operations of Nature, and calculate upon the occurrence or recurrence of events as, they have previously witnessed them, with the most unshaken confidence. We think a great deal of the misunderstanding upon this subject, results from the neglect of the distinction which we hope we have pointed out with sufficient clearness, between the *manner* and the *matter* of thought. By a slight confusion of ideas, as it appears to us, those who believe in the *innateness* or *fundamentality* of some truths, and their consequent superiority to experience, apply that necessity which is to be found in their *matter*, *i.e.* the nature of the thing inquired into, to the *manner*, *i.e.* the formulæ of thought, and thus assign a different origin to certain truths, not from any real appreciable mental distinction in the manner

in which our thought-powers operate, but in the superior universality of the possession of certain attributes by the objectivities presented to us. To illustrate this, we will quote the following paragraph from Coleridge, which, if we mistake not, (for we have not the work now at hand for reference) appeared in the "Friend":—"A man having seen a million of moss-roses, red, concludes from his own experience and that of others, that all moss-roses are red. That is a maxim with him—the greatest amount of his knowledge on the subject. But it is only true until some gardener has produced a white moss-rose; after which the maxim is good for nothing. Again: suppose Adam watching the sun sinking under the western horizon for the first time: he is seized with gloom and terror, relieved by scarce a ray of hope that he will ever see the glorious light again. The next evening when it declines, his hopes are stronger, but still mixed with fear; and even at the end of a thousand years, all that a man can feel is a hope and an expectation so strong as to preclude anxiety. Now compare this, in its highest degree, with the assurance which you have that the two sides of any triangle are greater than the third. This demonstrated of one triangle, is seen to be eternally true of all imaginable triangles. This is a truth at once perceived by the intuitive reason, independently of experience. It is, and must be, so, multiply and vary the shapes and sizes of triangles as you may." No one will deny, we think, that this is strongly and vigorously expressed, and that it is an accurate statement of the distinction sought to be made betwixt innate ideas or fundamental truths, and experience-educed verities; so that we cannot be charged with couching our lance at a weak, or a self-made, opponent, with whatever presumption we may be taunted for daring the tourney with a foe so lordly. Well, then, will the reader peruse the passage a second time, reflecting, as he reads, upon the almost infinite variety of change-causing influences which may be exerted on a moss-rose; the equally innumerable, invisible, awful, and mysterious forces which might be employed to cloud the sun or close the eye of man for ever; and the comparatively few, simple, and obvious properties which the triangle possesses; while we gently whisper in his ear, that this so-called intuitive perception, gained independently of experience, is, in Euclid's "Elements," tolerably lengthily demonstrated by reference to formerly acquired, though more elementary, experiences—viz., other propositions and definitions. Is not all this sufficient to prove that the complexity of the one kind of ideas, and the simplicity of the other, is the real cause of the comparatively intuitive perception made by our idea-formative faculties. Indeed, the real causes of the superiorly rapid and perfect progress of the mathematical, and many of the physical, sciences, are the greater simplicity of the experience on which they are founded—the greater purity in which the elements may be procured—the greater facilities which they possess for experimentation—and the regular and gradational nature of the superstructure which they are thus enabled to raise. So that we think we are quite warranted in asserting that it is in the nature of the things that the additional certitude is found, not in a different manner of thought-education. It is undeniable that prince, peasant, child, and philosopher, all alike judge of the unknown, and the future, by the familiar, the experienced, and the past. Hence the necessity, the use, and the agreeability of pictures, diagrams, models, experiments, &c., and those figures of speech, metaphor, simile, personification, and analogy: they yield to the mind a sort of substitute for

experience: they serve to introduce the idea into the mind, and, when the elementary ideas are gained, both knowledge and progress are possible. Every new item of experience impresses itself on our Consciousness, and, being registered in the mentality, becomes the originator of an idea, or is connected by some relationship, discoverable by the generalizing faculty, with some idea previously educed and formed from some item of prior experience. There are two chief and distinct sources of Experience—internal feelings and external impressions; our internal feelings comprise all our appetites, passions, sympathies, mental capacities, &c.—all that is included in that multi-continent though little pronoun, *I*; our external impressions are those varied and multiplied revelations of the objectivities of the outward world which we receive through our senses. The former of these are immediately cognoscible by the mentality, the latter are, to a certain extent, mediately and inferentially manifested to the intellection; but both impress themselves on our Consciousness, and thus originate thought. The former, however, are characterized by self-evidence; for we really cannot suppose that our own internal mental operations are deceptive; the latter are inductively arrived at, and so are less evident. Beyond these sources, however, *we* know no other method of acquiring knowledge; and, consequently, we believe that Experience is the basis of knowledge; and that to human beings, Consciousness is the only ultimate criterion of certitude.

But "Experience," says Dr. Whewell, "must always consist of a limited number of observations. And however numerous these may be, they can show nothing with regard to the infinite number of cases in which the experiment has not been made. Experience being thus unable to prove a fact to be universal, is, as will readily be seen, still more incapable of proving a fact to be necessary." * * * * "She contemplates external objects, but she cannot detect any internal bond which indissolubly connects the future with the past,—the possible with the real. To learn a proposition by Experience, and to see it to be necessarily true, are two altogether different processes of thought." * * * * "Experience cannot bestow that universality which she herself cannot have, and that necessity of which she has no comprehension." * * * * "It will then appear that when the mind collects from observation truths of a wide and comprehensive kind, which approach to the simplicity and universality of the truths of pure science, she gives them this character by throwing upon them the light of her own fundamental experience."* These are strong sentences, and pithily expressed, and *appear* to have a good deal of truth in them. Let the reader, however, notice, in the first place, the sort of admission, that simplicity has somewhat to do with the formation of necessary truths, and compare it with the explanation we gave above. Again: let him reflect that men *know* their experience, and can *know* nothing else; *that* is irresistible: now, if the attributes of any object be so simple and so easily perceived, as, being once seen, all its properties are known, and these properties be unalterable, our experience is quite sufficient to account for the necessity and universality of our belief regarding it; for if *all* our experience has been uniform, regarding any series of objects,—if no one exceptional instance has been met with, how is it possible that we can look upon the revelations of

* Whewell's "Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences," pp. 59, 60.

our own experience but as necessary truths? When each future experience is confirmatory of our first, how can we doubt the fact which that experience made known? Is it not plain, then, that the "necessity" and "universality" of our belief results from this;—that this is our experience; that we cannot possibly transcend *that* experience; and that, consequently, we must believe in what our experience has enabled us to *know* regarding any series of objects until at least that experience be changed by the occurrence of a new experience. We cannot possibly believe in that which Experience, in some shape or other, has never presented to our minds; and whatever has been so presented, we must believe to be "necessary" and "universal," simply because that is the sum-total of what we *know* concerning it. Take a simple illustration from every-day life:—An infant, whose only definite idea of objects is of their nutrient properties, is found continually to apply all objects, indiscriminately, to the nutriment receiving aperture, until, gradually, experience corrects the erroneous induction. When it grows up, until it has become more capable of noticing, we see it act on the same system, if it has been agreeably impressed by any of the objectivities, with the properties of which it is acquainted, *e.g.*, sugar or honey: it so trustingly reposes in the truth, the necessary and universal truth, of its experience, that parents frequently conceal the most nauseous and ill-tasted drugs in these naturally pleasant-tasted objects, and it takes them unsuspectingly; and thus, too early, is often taught its first lesson in doubt and scepticism.

So much then having been advanced in proof of the assertion that Experience is the ground-work of Knowledge, let us next inquire how this affects the subject under consideration. We have, in former papers, shown, at sufficient length, how it is that the mind becomes acquainted with the properties of objects; and that it can really and truly acquire no acquaintance with anything else, and, consequently, that the sum-total of our knowledge is, in reality, of qualities only, and not of things. Now, each item of our experience, whether internally perceived or externally originated, must come under the influence of the faculty of Generalization, whose peculiar province it is to reduce the vast multiplicity of objects which call it into activity, into distinct classes, characterized by some peculiar and definite quality, or collection of qualities; to which classes the mind applies generic names, applicable not only to the whole of any one class, but also to each individual comprehended in that class. This process is thus the great means by which propositions are capable of being made by the "Judgment;" for, names being applied by the mind to classes of objects possessed of certain attributes, the Judgment has only to settle whether the object in question displays the same properties, and it is immediately entitled to be ranged under that class whose peculiar properties it exhibits. The Judgment can only decide upon the agreement, or incongruency, of objects whose relations flash the conviction of their identity upon the mind by a mere juxtapositional view. When this cannot be effected, however, the process becomes more intricate and involved—the mind seeks the aid of an intermediate idea, and Ratiocination commences. Correctly and carefully considered, however, it will be found that the process of generalization actually involves the whole *law of Ratiocination*, inductive and deductive; for, as Reasoning consists of a series of propositions, and each proposition must be an affirmation or a negation of the existence of some quality, property, or relation, as belonging to

some particular objectivity or collection of objectivities, it is evident that the generalizing faculty, in its operations, is, in reality, the instinctive operation of the Ratiocinative power. All Reasoning is employed for the purpose of discovering—1st. From the *known* qualities, &c., of *known* objectivities, the *unknown* qualities, &c., of *known* existences; or,—2nd. From certain *known* and *manifested* qualities, &c., the *unknown* existences in which they inhere; *e.g.* :—

1st. All planets revolve, in certain specific periods and in definite orbits, round the sun ;
Neptune is a planet ;
Therefore, Neptune revolves, in a certain specific period, and in a definite orbit, round the sun.

Again :

All bodies which, in every possible position in which they can be viewed, project a circular shadow, are spherical :

The earth, in every position in which it can be viewed, projects a circular shadow ;
Therefore, the earth is a spherical body.

2nd. Neptune revolves, in a certain specific period, and in a definite orbit, round the sun :

All bodies which do so are called Planets ;
Therefore, Neptune is a Planet.

Again :

The earth projects a circular shadow in whatever position it can be viewed :

Those bodies which, in every possible position in which they can be viewed, project a circular shadow, are spherical ;

Therefore, the earth is a spherical body.

Let us now very briefly trace the operation of the generalizing faculty. When it, for the first time, receives the impression of any one new objectivity, it is impressed by it, in virtue of its possessing certain attributes. When a second time an object is presented to it, possessed of precisely the same general attributes, it has no hesitation in ranking the latter object in the same class and under the same idea as that which first impressed its perceptivity ; and if a name has been assigned to the former, the same designation will be readily applied to the latter ; or if no cognomen has as yet been attached to the idea-originating object, the same name will certainly be applied to both ; because, as we formerly explained, the mind designates not the *objects* which excite ideas in it, but the *ideas* which these have originated ; so that, however multiplex the objects may be which are comprehended in any class, the idea which represents that class in the mind is unical. The conception of a class having been originated in the mind, then the idea will stand thus : the object + its attributes—or rather, certain attributes + an inferred object ;—the name being but the communication-sign of the conception. Let us now suppose a new object presented to the mind, and, the classificatory office of generalization being begun, the object will be arranged in its class somewhat after the following fashion :—The mind will discern, by its attributes, that it has an affinity to some particular class ; the peculiarities of this class will then be called up in the mind, and the newly-presented object will be affirmed or denied of that class. This *form* of the mind, then—this law of its

operation, when verbally expressed or represented in words, constitutes a syllogism ; and from this very fact of the mentality, we find that the syllogism is an accurate verbalized representation of the process through which the mind passes while engaged in the act of Ratiocination ; and that the general formula of that act is, *that whatever two (or more) objects agree or disagree in any relation, quality, property, circumstance, attribute, &c., with one and the same third, agree or disagree with each other in so far as such relation, quality, property, circumstance, attribute, &c., is concerned.*

Our space will not at present allow us to proceed farther in the development of this topic. We will return to it in our next. Permit us at present merely to indicate two important points which, if our idea be correct, will be established. 1st.—That the old antagonism of induction and deduction will be destroyed ; for they will both be shown to be necessary to the production of a valid syllogism, or act of Reasoning :—induction as the initiatory power,—that which gathers up and registers the qualities, &c., of objects ; deduction as the continuatory power, by which additions are made to our knowledge. 2nd.—That either of these processes is defective when singly employed : but that this arises from the necessary and relative imperfection of our nature as derivative beings, and is, therefore, no valid argument for their disuse, but rather that we ought the more carefully to cultivate our powers, so that all defects not naturally inherent in us may be uprooted, removed, or vanquished. For it is by arduous, well-regulated, and continuous cultivation alone that man can attain that modicum of relative perfection which it is granted him to acquire. Truth is not a boon freely granted to those who merely desire its possession, but a reward bestowed upon the continuous and uninterrupted exertion of our mental powers. To those alone who resolutely practise thought-introversion, will the multiplex feelings, emotions, capacities, and processes of the intellection, become clearly and accurately defined ; but to the negligent inquirer, they will emit no elucidatory spark. Hence, if we wish to gain authentic knowledge regarding the inherent powers and capacities of our nature, we must labour assiduously in their education, and attentively consider the manner in which they exercise themselves. The results of this labour will be—increased mental power, readiness of perception, intellectual acumen, higher capacities of enjoyment and progression, and loftier views of the nobility of our thinking part. “There is,” as Carlyle says, “a perennial nobleness and even sacredness in work.” This is pre-eminently true of mental toil—of intellectual exertion. Wherefore let us labour earnestly, manfully, hopefully, and think with Tennyson as we do so :—

“Not in vain the distance beckons. Forward! forward! let us range ;
Let the great world spin for ever down the ringing grooves of change.
Through the shadow of the globe, we sweep into the younger day :
Better fifty years of Europe, than a cycle of Cathay.”

By being rubbed long and often against the great loadstone of society, we obtain, in a thousand little minute points, an attraction in common with our fellows. Their petty sorrows and small joys—their objects of interest or employment, at some time or other have been ours. We gather up a vast collection of mental and moral farthings of exchange, and we scarcely find any intellect so poor, but that we can deal with it in some way.

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM CHRISTIAN ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.—(CONCLUDED.)

SECTARIANISM, as defined by most persons, means nothing more than the identification of one's self with a certain party, religious or political,—a procedure certainly not at variance with either the precepts or spirit of Christianity. We never find Jesus Christ, its great Author, casting aside any person because he belonged to a despised or sinful sect; though he never looked upon an exalted one with any extraordinary degree of complacency;—a course of conduct clearly indicating that he considered sect or party, grade or caste, as of comparatively little moment. It is true that he often exclaimed, "Woe unto you Scribes and Pharisees," &c., &c.; but these utterances were against the unworthy individuals composing the sect, more than against the class collectively. And when Nicodemus sought an interview with him, he received him favourably, saying nothing in disparagement of the sect to which he belonged, nor in favour of any other.

In our opinion, Sectarianism is in strict accordance with the spirit and teachings of Christianity, *if due regard be paid to the opinions of others*. We observe in Nature, endless variety, and yet universal harmony; and proceeding upon analogy, we can easily conceive of similar laws to those which influence matter, influencing mind. Certain is it that no two persons are to be found who agree in every particular; so that if "sects" were annihilated, "Sectarianism" would not be destroyed.

Every man, learned or illiterate, has his own peculiar creed. It may never be repeated, never, perhaps, properly arranged; but as all have the power of thought, so all have the means of forming opinions. Man is a social animal; a being adapted for intercourse, rational and intellectual. Our organs of acquisitiveness impel us to seek knowledge; order arranges it. Our minds accept that which our understanding accounts good, and refuses that which it pro-

nounces bad. The sociability of our character prompts us to seek out "kindred spirits;" veneration for our own opinions desires their preservation and propagation; and just as the ancient Saxons sought protection for themselves and dependents, by alliances and confederacies, so we, by forming ourselves into associative bodies, are enabled to combat that which we deem error, and disseminate that which we believe to be truth.

In expressing an opinion upon the sectarianism of religious denominations, we feel that we are treading upon delicate ground, and must therefore advance cautiously. We are aware that there are Christian churches who deem it prudent to exclude from communion those who do not, in every particular, agree with them. To such, this may appear desirable; but it is not Scriptural. This doctrine of exclusiveness has sometimes been carried to a ludicrous extent; but we are happy in knowing that in many quarters it is being renounced. "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" is the great question, and if there be sufficient evidence for an affirmative reply, why should men (the young and ignorant especially) be tortured with interrogatories concerning

"Providence,
Foreknowledge, will, and fate, fixed fate, free
will,
Foreknowledge absolute, of good and evil;
Of happiness, and final misery;
Passion, and apathy, and glory, and shame.
Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy."

All that is requisite to knit together the members of a Christian church appears to be, sterling charity and an absence of those *extreme* ideas which would appear likely to mar unity and create discord.

Of course, with the Sectarianism of Bigotry we have nothing to do. We pronounce that as inhuman as it is anti-Christian, while we maintain that the Sectarianism of Truth is neither the one nor the other.

J. W. C.

NEGATIVE ARITCLE.—II.—(CONCLUDED.)

It is a lamentable fact that, throughout the whole world, there is no system of religion, the votaries of which are subdivided into so many sects as those who profess an adherence to the Christian faith. While Christians are agreed upon leading doctrines, they continue in a state of separation from each other, as if they had no common bond of union, and are, as rival sects, too frequently in a state of alienation, and even of open hostility. Yet these points of difference are so minute that they frequently cannot be clearly defined, nor rendered palpable to an impartial inquirer. When we consider the number and importance of the leading facts and doctrines in which Christians agree, it seems both strange and absurd that rational beings should stand aloof from one another on account of comparatively trivial differences, more especially as they all profess to be seeking the same end, travelling to the same heavenly country, and expect, ere long, to sit down in harmony in the mansions above.

The evils which flow from the divided state of Christian society are numerous, and much to be deplored. A sectarian spirit has burst assunder the bonds of Christian love and charity, and prevented that harmonious and affectionate intercourse which is one of the chief enjoyments of social religion. It has encouraged jealousies; fanned the flame of animosity and discord; set friends, brethren, and families, at variance; and divided even civil communities into factions and parties: it has kindled contentions and heart burnings, produced envyings and animosities, burst asunder the strongest ties of natural affection, and led professed Christians to violate the plainest dictates of humanity and of natural justice. It has excited a feverish zeal for the peculiarities of a sectary, *while the distinguishing features of Christianity have been either overlooked or trampled under foot.* It has wasted money in erecting separate places of worship, that might have been devoted to the promotion of the interests of our common Christianity. It has *corrupted our very prayers*, infused into them a spirit of party, and confined them to the narrow limits of our own denomination, as if the Omnipotent whom we

profess to adore, were biassed by the same prejudices as ourselves, and dispensed his favours according to our contracted views. Could we fly with the swiftness of an angelic messenger through the various assemblies convened on the Sabbath day, while they are offering up their prayers to heaven, what a discordant and repulsive scene should we behold in the leaders of certain sects imploring a *special* blessing on themselves, as if they were the chief favourites of Heaven; lamenting the errors of others, throwing out innuendoes against rival sectaries, taking credit to themselves as the chief depositories of gospel truth, and thanking God for their superior attainments in Christian perfection! How unlike the noble, benevolent, and expansive spirit which Christianity inculcates! In particular, the divisions and contentions of Christians have been one of the chief causes of *the progress of infidelity.* "First agree amongst yourselves," disbelievers say, "then we will consider the truth and importance of your opinions." Such a mode of reasoning is, indeed, unfair; but it is to be deplored that Christians, by their animosities, throw a stumblingblock in the way of rational investigation into the truths and foundations of religion, and cause thousands to stumble and fall. But, perhaps the worst effect of sectarianism is, that it has greatly retarded, and still retards, the universal propagation of the gospel. Something has, indeed, been effected of late years, by various denominations in the different missionary enterprises which, in their separate capacities, they have undertaken; but it is not too much to affirm, that had they acted in agreeable harmony, ten times more good would have been accomplished.

Such are some of the evils which a sectarian spirit has produced in the Christian church. It is almost needless to say that this spirit does not originate in the genius of the gospel, which is *directly opposed* to it, but in the corruption of human nature, and the perversion of true religion. It has its rise in *ignorance*, which is favourable to the development of self-conceit.

Now rises the important query, Does the good done by Sectarianism compensate for its evil? Is an obscure question on church

government to be set in competition with Christian union? Is a metaphysical opinion regarding the sovereignty of God, and his councils during eternity, to be obstinately maintained, although the strongholds of Christian love should thereby be burst asunder? Can we suppose that He whose law is *love*, who has commanded us to "keep the unity of the spirit in the bonds of peace," and who has declared, "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another,"—will consider the maintenance of such opinions, under such pretences, as a warrant for the infringement of the law of charity or the breach of Christian union? Can we suppose that He sets

a higher value on intellectual subtleties and speculative opinions than on the practical requisitions of his word, and the manifestation of Christian temper and conduct? Whatever is not so clearly revealed in Scripture that every serious inquirer can plainly perceive it to be truth or duty, can scarcely be supposed to be of such importance as to warrant a breach of unity in the church; for the inspired writers, who were the vehicles of revelation, can never be supposed to have used vague or ambiguous language in explaining and enforcing matters of the first importance.

PACIS AMATOR.

Philosophy.

WHICH MOST DESERVES THE ESTEEM OF MANKIND,—THE POET OR THE LEGISLATOR?

THE LEGISLATOR.—III.

It might well make a mere child at arms turn pale to see an opponent like J. F. stepping into the arena. To have such a person for an opponent is calculated to make us look to our footing, to see that all is right below, or to make us half suspect that we have chosen the wrong side. But when we have such a friend as B. W. P., who is so great an adept at the lance, stepping in to the rescue, it is calculated to restore one's equilibrium, and lead us to imagine that all is not exactly lost, even yet.

In the very able production of J. F. there occurs the following remarkable passage:—"If we turn our attention to the Legislator, we shall at once see, that we have not to unveil his character, or trace his influences through the obscure pathways of the mind; we need not seek to correct any misconceptions of his importance in society, or attempt, as we have on behalf of the poet, to vindicate his claims to esteem. His prominence and adornment at once bespeak his importance, and, at the same time, show that the share of esteem he enjoys can hardly be less than he merits." We have quoted thus largely, that we might not be charged with

unfairness,—a charge which, in the present case, we should be exceedingly sorry to incur.

From the foregoing, then, it appears to be the opinion of J. F., that the claims of the Poet are far more liable to be misunderstood than those of the Legislator. Nay, we think we ought to have expressed ourselves more strongly. We ought rather to have said, that the claims of the Poet are never thoroughly understood and appreciated, while those of the Legislator are not liable to be misunderstood.

1. Is it a fact that the claims of the Poet are never thoroughly understood and appreciated? Our friend himself informs us that there was a time when his claims were appreciated. "In the ancient world the power of the poet was such, that every other power which affected the condition of man was under his control." Surely this was according to the Poet his full quota of esteem. This surely would be all that the Poet could wish for; rather more, we think, than he deserved. In this opinion J. F. seems to concur; for he says, "It must be lamented that his influence was then, upon the whole, morally injurious." And yet it cannot be

denied that it was in the time of the "ancient world" that some of the best effusions of the Poet were given forth,—effusions, which to the present day are generally held to be unsurpassed.

From the older portions of the Bible, and also from the works of Homer, it is pretty evident that the art of Poetry was at a very early period, in a high state of perfection. It is also evident, at least in our friend's estimation, that then the Poet was really esteemed as high as, or a little higher than, he deserved. At the present time, however, he is not esteemed so highly as he was then, nor so highly as our friend thinks he has a right to be. In other words, during the last four thousand years, the Poet has lost, from some cause, either in himself or others, a portion of the esteem which he then had. Our friend acknowledges that the Poet's power was then, on the whole, abused. We incline to think that it has been, on the whole, abused ever since. We know that plain and prosy truth, without the aid of Poetry, would commonly not find admittance to the ear, much less to the mind and heart of man. But we also know that the Poet has done more to palm upon the world falsehood as the "veritable issues of the mint of truth," than any other power besides.

The Poet's sphere has been the imagination—a noble sphere, indeed, when kept in subservience to, and under the control of the judgment. But the cause of the Poet, we think, losing a portion of the esteem which he once enjoyed, is, that he has not kept the imagination sufficiently under the control of the judgment. That men, from other sources, have learned to use the *intellect* as well as the imagination, and, in proportion as they have done so, they have discovered the incapacity of the Poet entirely to guide them. An image may, indeed, be useful when it is found to represent a living reality; but an image, a mere image, without a living active, spirit, and which represents no actual existence, is, to say the least, a useless thing. And yet these are the things which the Poet has been principally engaged in constructing these four thousand years. He has made images in abundance; but the reality is yet to come. He has constructed models, drawn plans, executed paintings, beautiful, indeed, to the eye, captivating to the taste,

and delightful to the imagination. But it is no part of his business to construct the building which he has so beautifully planned. This, men have discovered; and hence it is that he has lost their allegiance. Instead, therefore, of attributing the fact that the Poet has, to some extent, lost the esteem of mankind, to the circumstance that his claims are not understood, ought we not, rather to attribute it to their being understood *too well*?

2. Are the claims of the Legislator not liable to be misunderstood? J. F. asserts, "His prominence and adornments at once bespeak his importance." Is this the fact? How is the Legislator generally looked upon? Some regard him in a similar light to that in which they regard the taxgatherer. Others take a higher view. Like "Harold," they hold his employment to be, to curb and to keep in due subordination the animal nature of man, and to guard from its attacks the rights and well-being of society. But is this the status of the intelligent, disinterested, and philanthropic statesman? By no means. His is a higher,—a nobler work. True it is that these form a part of his business:—true it is that he has to conserve the interests of a nation, or an empire. But these important, as on all hands they are acknowledged to be, are only a part. He has other, higher, because more difficult, hazardous, and noble, duties to perform. He, like the Poet, has to enter the regions of the ideal. He has his image to construct, not, as in the case of the Poet, that they may remain images; but that they may imbibe the breath of life, and so become living realities! He also has his models to construct, not, indeed, to please the fancy, or gratify the taste; but with a view to the rearing of the stately structure—that structure under whose shelter the family of mankind will rejoice to dwell. He, too, like the Poet, has his plans to construct; but not like those of the Poet—constructed for the world to admire. They are for the most part kept from the world until they are well-nigh executed. Then, indeed, men admire, but not a thing of paper, or a castle built in the air: but a reality, which will bear the test of common sense, and which is calculated to promote the welfare of the world at large. The work of such a man cannot be under-

stood until it is completed; nor is his importance known till he is lost.

But the Legislator has derived much of his materials from the Poet. Granted: yet which is the greater—he who makes an image, or he who gives it life? He who draws a plan or he who builds a city? He who conceives an idea, or he who makes that idea a living reality? Unquestionably the latter. Besides, though the Poet may have furnished the thought, it has been the Legislator who has had to seek for means to carry it out. These means have not been furnished, not even suggested, by the Poet. They lay not in his province. They belonged not to the region of the imagination, in which the Poet lives and moves, but to that of men and things as they really exist in every-day life.

Thus we think we have succeeded in showing that the work of the Legislator is far more extensive than is generally supposed,

and that it is not altogether superfluous to attempt to remove “misconceptions of his importance in society.”

In conclusion. Though we are ready to acknowledge that the Poet is worthy of esteem of no mean kind, inasmuch as he has aimed at, and secured, very important benefits to society; yet we think the Legislator more worthy of esteem, inasmuch as his work has been of a more extended and decisive character; has been attended with greater hazard to himself, and, consequently required more self-denial; has been more complicated, and, therefore, required more tact and intelligence; has been attended with greater obstacles, and, on that account, required greater perseverance. In the work of the Poet, Imagination has played the more important part; in that of the Legislator the Intellect. The Poet has dreamed what the Legislator has realised.

G. N.

THE POET.—III.

THIS is an elevated discussion; it deals in elevated thoughts and elevated actions. The mighty doings of ancient and modern heroes, in politics and literature, appear in the antagonistic arena, and give it an aspect of respectability;—the deeds of a Wilberforce, a Washington, a Cobden, and a Kossuth—the outpourings of a Milton, a Shakspeare, and a Cowper, shed around it a lustre of exaltation, and dispel from it all triviality. But the difficulties to be solved are as great as the subject is highborn. We therefore approach it in a respectful attitude, not with dogmatical confidence, but with a desire to add our humble mite for the elucidation of a subject so pleasing and so grand.

The physical, intellectual, and spiritual nature of man divide the vast field on which all the ameliorators of our kind are actively employed. Their comparative importance is fully understood, and we have been taught to esteem those the more who give attention to the more important of these; ever thinking that *they* deserve the most gratitude, who render service of the most valuable kind. God exercises a fatherly care over the whole of these; but his attention to our spiritual nature is the more marked, because

He only can attend it. With our physical nature Legislators have legitimate concern; and for our intellectual, there is a noble class of intellectual trainers, amongst whom we unhesitatingly rank Poets. This is one reason why we admire them with an intense admiration; their work is more precious, more valuable, in our eyes, than the work of the Legislator, and therefore we esteem them more.

Mind may be compared to a piece of metal, which is not worth much unless polished; but which, when polished, serves as a mirror in which are reflected the beauties of Nature, of reason, of revelation. When this mind-metal is revealed, what fields of intellectual pleasure, of exalted enjoyment, and refined comfort, open to our view, and invite us to tread their flowery pathways. These fields can be cultivated—this mind-metal can be sublimated—aye, sublimated, until it seems to copy the nature, and reflect the glory of that great spirit-fountain from which it was cast off like a spark from a forge, or a resplendent meteor from an upheaving volcano. To be classed among those who give this value and beauty to mind, Poets have an undoubted right, and for this reason have they solemn claims upon our gra-

titude and sympathy. What a blank would there be in our being, did their angel-breathings bid us farewell! Where would be the hallowed feelings, the melted affections, the more than earthly thrills of pleasure, which their poetic fires call into existence? Can the work of the Legislator be compared to their sublime work? Can the catering to our physical wants outweigh in importance the brightening and refining—the supplying the wants and feeding the high desires—the softening, the soothing—the making glad of our intellectual being? If not, then give to the Poet the greater meed of praise.

It may be said that Legislators can assist in doing this. They may assist;—they may order that in every parish there be a school, in every district a church; they may unfetter the press, and make literature accessible to all; they may establish schools and colleges, and foster and cherish learning; but all this is but “the form without the power,”—the carcass without the spirit—the shell without the kernel. These things are means to a great end; and the same originating energy which provided the means, whether by legislative instrumentality, or by more natural and efficient agency, must accompany these means, and make them effectual. They are channels designed to convey from the fountains of original thought those vitalizing streams which alone may clothe with verdure, enrich with fruitfulness, and brighten with beauty, the waste places of society.

But not only in our estimation are the works of the Poet more precious and more to be esteemed than those of the Legislator, but the *manner*, also, in which he must work, and has worked, is more to be admired. The statesman's achievements are more the creations of circumstances, and interminable chains of causation, than the individual and independent exertions of one mind, while the Poet's work is necessarily the production of an original mind, individually working, and, to a great extent, independent of existing circumstances. Let us but attentively consider the great practical reforms which have transpired during the last fifty or sixty years, and it will appear that they have been rather wrung from those in power than presented as a free gift—asked more as a right, than as a blessing which Legis-

lators could give or withhold. We all know the fierce opposition which the advocates for the abolition of British slavery had to withstand before their cause was victorious; the difficulties which had to be overcome, before the Reform Bill became a British law; and to come nearer our own times, the inveterate opposition which the never-to-be-forgotten champions of Free-trade had to encounter before their salutary measures prevailed in British legislation. No doubt master minds moved in all these; but would they not have moved alone, had not the united voice of a mighty nation responded to their call, and making an army, of which they were the leaders, fought for, and won, these great and glorious reforms.

Legislators may conceive, but without the aid of others their conceptions are of little value. Even the most praiseworthy Legislators,—the most upright, well-meaning, and sincere—require the support and help of those they wish to benefit; hence their work is not an individual work, therefore their honours are more scattered. Perhaps their laurels are as numerous as the Poets', but too many heads have to be crowned for any great amount resting on one; after that the lesser and auxiliary spirits have paid their honours, there is no splendid halo encircling the greater. With the true, the philanthropic Poet, it is not so. He acts individually and originally, when he intends good. He neither courts the popular hydra, nor adulates for kingly smiles. For crowned heads he cares not: princes influence him not: the assistance of none he seeks: he works, and works alone. The inspiration he requires cannot come from them: he needs nobler aid than they can give: he pleads not for our vote, our countenance, or our money. He has

“A soul exalted above earth,”

and disdains the aid ordinarily given by mere mortals; to the wandering spirits of the ancient muses he must appeal, and evoke their inspiration; their midnight haunts he must frequent; the recessful wood, the dusky glen, the rugged mountain's side, the moonlit lake, the castle ruin, and monumental pile, the radiant streamlet, and the shady bower; and in such scenes hold high communion with Nature, and the departed great, and

assimilate his spirit to theirs. Nay, more: wafting himself to the classic grounds of the ancient bards, "he must clamber up the steep of Parnassus, and scale the summit of Mount Helicon; he must enter into the city of Delphi, surrounded by its cloud-capt precipices; he must penetrate within its two lofty rocks, its inmost penetralia, and drink the pure Castalian fount as it oozes from the rock frequented by the Pythian priests; he must even enter the Corycean cave, sacred to Pan and the kindred nymphs, and enjoy communion with the geni of the place." But enough; while the Poet has soared above earth and above its aid, too often has he soared with loaded wings, and care dragging at his heel. The poverty with which the majority of the poets had to contend while producing some of their most sublime works; the uncongenial and unsympathising spirits with whom they came in contact, who helped not, nor pitied, because they could not understand; and the little hopes they had of reaping honour or benefit, give them additional claims upon our esteem and admiration.

Allow us, before closing, to notice briefly the candid paper of G. N., in a previous number, in favour of the Legislator. We say candid; for he does justice to the Poet in a manner we must admire. He is, indeed, very frank; but we conceive he has fallen into the error of supposing the good the Legislator does, he does of himself. He says, "Do we not owe to him our very existence; for without law there is reason to believe that ere this our race would have been extinct. We owe to him the security of our dwellings, the safety of our persons, and the protection of property;" while,

perhaps, this very writer plays no mean part in assisting the Legislator to do all this. And should he not have more pride, than pay so much homage to any one for doing that which he himself helps to do.

B. W. P., also, in an able paper, has given us, he says, "two sound reasons why we should esteem the Legislator more than the Poet." These are, that his services are of greater value to the community than are those of the Poet; because, in the first place, those of the Legislator are indispensable, while those of the Poet are not. Secondly, "because his services are more arduous in their nature and involve more of self-sacrifice." If we are to understand that the services of the Legislator are indispensable to the safety of "the state," then we may grant that "the vessel of the state" may sail securely without the Poet. But it may sail as securely without religion,—yes, history shows us that human wisdom may keep the state afloat, and steer it clear of danger, at least for a time; yet, will this writer maintain, that because religion is not so indispensable to the safety of the state as legislation, that it is therefore less valuable? And again: "The services of the Legislator are more arduous in their nature, and involve more self-sacrifice." Is this correct, have not nine-tenths of the privations, sufferings, and sorrows, of the Poet's arisen from their attachment to the muses, and their zeal to serve their race? How much happier and longer had been their lives had the same master-spirits followed the world in its pursuit of wealth, or even taken hold of the helm of the state!

Dundee.

W. H.

Politics.

CAN THE GOVERNMENT INTERDICT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC HIERARCHY IN ENGLAND CONSISTENTLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

In considering this subject, the first question which arises is, What is the duty of a Government? I answer—1st, To support all existing laws, and to punish those

who break such laws; and, 2nd, to amend the laws according to the wants, the spirit, and the demand of the times. If such answer be correct, I would then ask—1st, What is

the law respecting the appointment of bishops in England? 2nd, Has that law been violated? And, 3rd, If so, ought such violation to be rebuked?

1st, As to the law itself.

The ancient Britons are believed to have had at least one archiepiscopal see, before the time of Augustin the Monk; viz., at Caerleon, or at Llandaff. (*Johns. 85, God. 17.*)

When cities were at first converted to Christianity, the bishops were elected by the clergy and people; it being thought convenient that the laity as well as the clergy should be considered in the election of bishops, that the bishops might come in by general consent. But, as the number of Christians increased, this was found inconvenient, for tumults were raised, and sometimes murders committed. (*Ayl., par. 126.*) The emperors then, being Christians, reserved the election to themselves, but in some measure conformable to the old way; that is to say, upon a bishop's death, the Chapter sent a ring and pastoral staff to the emperor which he delivered to the person whom he appointed bishop of the place. But the Pope, who afterwards gained power, had such elections confirmed at Rome. But princes had still some power in these elections, and particularly in England. We read, that in Saxon times, all ecclesiastical dignities were conferred by the king in parliament. By the statute 25 Henry VIII., cap. 20, all papal jurisdiction whatsoever was taken away; and by 1 Edward VI., cap. 2, all bishoprics were made donative again, and vested in the king alone, "to whom only appertaineth the collation and gift of all archbishoprics and bishoprics and suffragan bishops *within this realm.*" This statute was afterwards repealed, and the matter was brought back again, and still rests on the statute 25 Henry VIII., cap. 20, by which it is enacted that "the King may grant to the Dean and Chapter a licence under the Great Seal, as of old time hath been accustomed, to proceed to an election of bishop or archbishop;" which licence is called *conge d'elire*, and with this licence a letter missive is sent, containing the name of the person which they (the Dean and Chapter) shall elect.

Such was the law prior to the year 1829, and such it remains at present, as to the ap-

pointment of "bishops and archbishops within this realm of England."

I now come to the Emancipation Act of 1829. The first fourteen sections remove certain disabilities from *lay* Catholics. By the 15th section they are not to vote in *any ecclesiastical appointment*; and by the 24th section it is enacted, "That if any person other than the person thereunto authorised by law, shall assume the name, style, or title of archbishop of any province, bishop of any bishopric, or dean of any deanery in England or Ireland, he shall for every offence forfeit £100.

I have given this enactment at length, because on it hinges a great deal of the present discussion. The Catholics, by Dr. Wiseman, contend that it applies only to *existing* bishoprics; but on a fair reading of the section, I take a different view of it. The words are, bishop of *any* bishopric in England—not any *existing* bishopric; and as the Roman Catholic dioceses take their names from England, I contend that they are bishoprics within the meaning of the act. I am aware that many persons think otherwise; but as the section itself is seldom brought plainly before the public, I have ventured to introduce it here. Cardinal Wiseman, in his Manifesto, gives us, not the enactment, but Lord Lyndhurst's speech, which, for aught we know, may have been repugnant to the feelings of the House, for residents in the country have no means of referring to "Hansard."

It will possibly be asked, why, if my interpretation of the clause be correct, I am not satisfied with the penalty given by the statute, without any further enactment? My answer is, I am satisfied; but as others think contrary, a new enactment is needed.

If, in the foregoing statement, I have established the law, that no one has a right to appoint bishops "within this realm of England," save the King and the Chapter, then, I contend, 2ndly, that the Government are not only justified in punishing, but bound to punish any breach of that law. And this principle, I hold, overrides that of religious liberty:—it is a principle interwoven with the Government.

In answer to the Catholic's statement, that it is against the feeling of the country to punish them—I would deny that such is

the feeling, and also remark, that it would be no answer for an offender against any particular law, to say, you cannot punish me for my offence, because the feeling of the country is against such punishment. The reply would be, you must wait until that feeling is made law; as it is, the existing law is inviolable. I contend, therefore, I have established a right in Government to interdict the establishment of the Roman Catholic hierarchy by a principle overriding that of religious liberty.

I now come to the question, Whether a Government professing to give every person full religious liberty, can punish such person for carrying out his religion in his own way? I have attentively read Cardinal Wiseman's Manifesto, and was at first much struck with his arguments. But without staying to reply to them all, I would remark, that in his arguments he forgets his previous assertion, that the State freely grants to all, "perfect toleration and complete freedom to practice their religion, so long as the practice is *within the bounds of law, and trenches upon no others' rights.*" And here lies the gist of the question. Has the Pope kept within the bounds of the law? and has he trenched on others' rights?

From the preceding statement, I contend that he has not kept within the bound of the law; and I also contend that he has trenched on others' rights? Let us look at the state of our Church.

The Government, in its wisdom, has thought fitting to provide spiritual instruction for its members, and for that purpose has adopted the old British Church, and has legalised her system of government by bishops; and to this end has divided the *whole realm* into dioceses. Is it not, then, a trenching on the Church's rights for an alien to appoint bishops within her dioceses?

Dr. Wiseman contends that the Bull extends only to Catholics; but does it so appear on the face of it? Does it not comprise all England, and, consequently, the existing dioceses.

Again: by the Cardinal's own admission, (in his "Lectures on the Catholic hierarchy") England *was* divided into dioceses for every practical purpose of Catholicism, before the venturing upon the appointments which have so aroused the country, and beyond

doubt, every Roman Catholic bishop may *de facto* know the boundaries of his district, and every priest within it may know his own diocesan, as well without English titles as with them.

Having now asserted the right of Government to interdict the Roman Catholic hierarchy, by a principle superior to that of religious liberty; and having shown that the Pope has transgressed the principle of religious liberty as laid down by Cardinal Wiseman, I will now consider whether, supposing the above obstacles were removed, the Roman Catholic hierarchy ought to be tolerated? And I plainly answer, No;—because, 1st, The Catholic Church, when strong enough, would destroy the principle of religious liberty. This is sufficiently proved, not from past history alone, but from the present proceedings of that Church wherever she has power. In fact, it is a principle inherent in her constitution. Her first, her last, her primary object is *self*. To establish her own power, her own authority, what will she not do? History furnishes many examples. The Catholics say they are altered; but I deny it, and point to the countries where they have rule. And, therefore, is it reasonable, or just, to admit to the enjoyment of certain privileges, persons who, if they had the power, would destroy those privileges?

And I say, No...; because, 2ndly, the Catholic religion is one inimical to the well-being and the morality of a country. When I see a religion, embracing within its arms men notorious for crimes of the darkest hue, with these crimes purged by money payments;—when I see a religion throwing, by a confessional, its cloak over the secret and dastardly murderer;... when I see a religion encouraging its followers in idolatry and superstition, hypocrisy and prevarication, and openly releasing them from their solemn oaths; and when I see a religion supporting its tenets by an *Inquisition*—I feel it to be my duty (and the duty of all true Christians) to raise my voice at every opportunity, and by all the means in my power, openly to oppose its progress.

That the Catholic Church does embrace men of real religious habits, I believe; but I also believe such habits to be imbibed in spite of the religion, not in consequence of it.

B. S. A.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

PROTESTANT England has been startled by an act, in the blush, audacious and terrible. The Pope of Rome, it is asserted, has laid claim to that ancient spiritual dominion over this country, the mere mention of which gives umbrage to many of its people. However offended they may be with the recollection, it is hard to deny that the Bishop of Rome did interfere, to a great extent and on many occasions, not only with our ecclesiastical, but also with our political, management. Times are changed. We should now ridicule an interdict, instead of trembling at it. Papal claims have cowered, throughout Europe, before the steady advance of investigation, backed by substantial power. Nor is it imaginable that England should be foremost to renew her servitude, foregoing the long-enjoyed delights of religious liberty.

There is, notwithstanding, a serious question to be discussed in relation to the Bull of Pope Pius. Measures of coercive resistance have been proposed by distinguished individuals, whose opinions being held in great regard, may tend to do harm under the plea of doing good. A candid examination, such as that invited in the "Controversialist," is an honest and honourable course; and though the influence of its infant pages may not be wide, there is hope that its readers will disseminate the opinions they may form from its arguments.

The terms of the question preclude any remarks upon many notions now current with the public. I shall first briefly allude to the legal aspect, and then pass to consider the religious view of the case, endeavouring to shut out extraneous observations. If the establishment of a Catholic hierarchy be contrary to the laws of England, the Government is justified in interdicting that establishment, without any reference to religious opinions; because, under such circumstances, the Government is merely the executive to enforce the laws. Nor would Catholics object to such a course, unless they desired to destroy that reverence for law which is the cement of society. Apparently, no restrictive law exists, since it is probable that the Papal government have

weighed the costs, and our English lawyers would already have expressed a more decided judgment. This branch of the subject is alluded to solely on account of legal references made in a former article. The wording of the question demands a decision upon other grounds.

As a religious question, Government has no right to interfere in the matter, except at the instigation of the people. If no law exists, none can be prepared for the emergency except through the Parliament, the representatives of the people; and as, in such a momentous subject, a representative would grossly violate his conscience if he disregarded the express wishes of his constituents, it follows that judgment rests with the English people.

Having brought the question to a practical issue, by substituting the People for the Government, it remains to discover the principles of religious liberty, consistently with which can the people of England interdict the establishment of a Roman Catholic hierarchy in England? And first, the *implied* principles of this nation would be violated by any suppression of Roman Catholic forms. To every other sect, full latitude is given within the bounds of morality and decorum. To the Catholics themselves, growing liberality has added concession upon concession, with such indiscriminate generosity, that even those whose hands cancelled the obligations, are astonished to learn how the account at present stands. The Catholics are free, to the surprise of the nation whose zeal for liberty has granted equal rights, even to the professors of a religion hitherto regarded with inherited dread and animosity. Whatever Protestant feelings may declare, Protestant judgment has deliberately averred, that the arena of Reason should be open to all, and that it will not shrink from the challenge of its own opinions before an impartial presence. England has advanced too far to retrograde with safety or honour. The Romish Church claims a hierarchy, which cannot be legally or consistently denied. The political question does not come within this argument: it may or may not be inju-

rious to allow civil privileges to Catholics, or to make possible any suspicion that the Pope—a foreign prince, tampers with English politics: but this forms a separate discussion. Unless, indeed, it may be urged that the Pope may use his political authority to subvert Protestantism, which possibility appears to justify a precautionary opposition. Were the Catholic religion in England to be assisted by such treacherous acts, we need not fear that the Foreign Office would be blind to the business:—a lion, while he is awake, has little to dread from a fox. Or, hasten the catastrophe, suppose the Catholics to preponderate numerically, and that they desired to transfer allegiance to Rome. Absurd as the supposition is, they would be justified in the act, according to the principle of English liberty—representation by the majority. But do Protestants fear such extremes? They do not—unless their actions belie their thoughts. They have vindicated the principle of perfect toleration, not doubting that “Truth is great, and will prevail.”

Religious Liberty is that for which the Reformers contended—the right of private judgment and individual responsibility. Reformed churches should be the last to refuse to others what they have so pertinaciously demanded for themselves. If the fallibility of man is their creed, they must not express

surprise at the errors of their neighbours and display their own doctrines with dogmatic vanity. Truth is never recommended by a contempt for one's adversary. The English Church or churches must not Pharsaically invite converts; but as she has permitted to Romanists the free exercise of their religion, with all its forms and ceremonies not subversive of public order—thereby virtually acknowledging an abatement of hostility—offering truce; she is engaged to complete the reconciliation; she is engaged to withhold derision and contempt, and to employ Truth with a better grace than religious disputants usually assume.

From these premises, it ensues, that the Catholic Hierarchy cannot be interdicted by the English People or Government consistently either with their own declarations or with the principles of religious liberty. The assumption of authority by the Pope, the arrogance of the Catholic Primate, the conflicting statements of the Catholic laity, give other aspects to the affair, and demand separate consideration; but having confined myself to the point at issue, I can see no other just conclusion than that which I think I have derived from the very admissions of the English nation.

CHURCHMAN.

Social Economy, etc.

HAVE THE WORKING CLASSES BEEN BENEFITTED BY MACHINERY?

NEGATIVE ARTIOLE.—II.

THERE has occurred during the course of the last hundred years, no event which has contributed so much to alter the condition of society in this kingdom as the substitution of mechanical power for manual labour. During that period, the political changes which this nation has undergone have been comparatively slight, and the subject of Queen Victoria possesses few more legislative privileges than did his ancestors under the early sovereigns of the House of Brunswick. But it is far otherwise with the social state

of the country. England of the nineteenth century would be almost a *terra incognita* to our forefathers of a few generations back. Where they remembered rural hamlets, barren heaths, or insignificant fishing villages, they would see manufactories reckoning their artisans by hundreds, mines with an immense subterranean population, and ships bringing from every shore countless articles of utility and comfort. They would see, likewise, a universal cheapness pervading the nation: things that in their time were luxuries only

to be enjoyed by the rich, are now brought within the reach of the poor; and, far from being satisfied with this, the public are incessantly demanding greater reductions. If we inquire the cause of these vast alterations, we are told, They are the results of machinery. Now, an ordinary observer, viewing all these effects, apparently so beneficial, would be inclined to give unqualified praise to the means that had produced them. But the man whose inquiries penetrated beneath the surface, would soon find that much evil pervaded, and was inseparable from, the good. He would see that the command of mechanical power had made the capitalist more independent of the multitudes, of whose sweat his wealth was the produce; that it had enabled him to count his gold by hundreds of thousands, while those who toiled for him, and who were considered as much machines as the engines and looms—their fellow-labourers—were struggling either with poverty and idleness, or with over-toil and its consequence, dissipation; that large fortunes had absorbed smaller ones, and that the man of moderate means had no chance of competing with his neighbour who could bring machinery to his aid. It is a fact, as lamentable as true, that while the capital of the country has been increasing to a degree almost surpassing belief, large masses of Englishmen are dragging on a painful existence in the lowest abyss of penury and degradation, embittered by the thought, that the produce of their toils is not for themselves, or their starving wives and families, but goes to swell the already bursting money bags of mill owners. Not that I would willingly censure this more than any other class of men. Thank God, there are many mill owners who are an honour to their order—men who consider that they are simply stewards, and not absolute proprietors of those riches which Providence has allotted them; men who feel it at once their bounden duty and their highest pleasure to ameliorate, as far as in them lies, the condition of those committed to their charge. But power, when entrusted to the generality of mankind, whether to an absolute monarch, an aristocracy, or a body of capitalists, is a dangerous thing, and very apt to degenerate into tyranny.

And this leads to a consideration of the

political results of machinery. Power, as I have observed, is ever dangerous, unless there are sufficient restraints upon it. That power which the capitalist exercises over his operatives is more unlimited than any other, except, perhaps, that of a military chieftain. It is far superior to that influence which a great landed proprietor possesses over his tenantry, and which the landed interest have been so much censured for abusing. A landlord may, if he likes, injure a tenant that votes against him, but he can seldom ruin him. He may deprive him of the value of any improvements made on his farm, by expelling him, if the tenant has been so foolish as not to secure protection by a lease. But there his power ends. He cannot prevent his tenant from removing his stock and capital to another county, or turning it into money, and employing it in a different business. Not so with the manufacturing operative. He is dependent on his employer for every morsel he eats. Were he to offend that employer, and dismissal should be the consequence, he has no capital to fall back upon. What absolute sovereign possesses so powerful an engine of authority as the capitalist by the aid of machinery has acquired? The former seldom feels any inclination to oppress the lower class of his subjects. They do not come continually within the sphere of his observation, and their very obscurity, in general, screens them from injury. Those who suffer most from his tyranny are courtiers, and persons of rank and wealth. Goldsmith has made the Vicar of Wakefield speak truly when he says that "absolute monarchies are often the best governments for the poor, as commonwealths are for the rich." But the despotism of the capitalist is seldom passive, like that of the autocrat. By being brought into daily and immediate contact with those under him, a petty and vexatious tyrant is erected in every mill, possessing, if not the will, the capacity of doing as much mischief in his small circle as the monarch can do in a nation. How many sad tales could Manchester, Nottingham, and Paisley tell of female chastity dishonoured; of infants sent by harshness and over-toil to a premature grave; of strong men broken-hearted, enfeebled in mind and body; hearing on every side of the privileges of Englishmen, and debarred, in reality, from many former

enjoyed by our slaves. He dares not complain if he sees his wife or his daughter insulted before his eyes ; it is not for him to speak if he sees one little one after another becoming wan, emaciated, and careworn, and at last falling a victim to the tender mercies of the factory system, or the brutality of an overseer. No : he must be silent—he must quench every spark of the spirit of a man ; for, should he resent it, beggary, crime, or a workhouse, are the alternatives. His employer, too, is exempt from many restrictions which, in other cases, considerably prevent the abuse of power. The public eye is not so constantly fixed on him as it is upon other men occupying a more prominent position. Thus he may commit many acts, undetected, which no man of a superior grade, who had the slightest respect for public opinion, would dare to perpetrate. Selfish motives, too, are wanting, to induce him to have mercy on his labourers. He knows well that it is his interest to get as much from his workman as possible while he employs him, and that when he is worn out there will be plenty more ready to supply his place.

But I now pass on to review those moral and physical results which machinery has produced, by collecting masses of the population in one locality, and by the employment of female and infant labour. And with regard to the first, I think it will be admitted on all sides that machinery has been the principal cause of the formation of our large towns, and that it must reap the praise or bear the blame of the good or evil attending the transformation of the majority of the working classes from agricultural labourers into mechanics. Wherever bodies of men are collected, they are sure to corrupt each other. Vice is like heat :—if it be present in any substance, it never rests till it has made everything in its vicinity equal to itself. But there the parallel ceases ; for one body must lose some part of its heat by imparting it to another ; but the vicious man aggravates his own crimes by making others criminal. We find that the dissemination of vice is continually going on, even in places where the greatest precautions are taken against it, as in our public schools, in our universities, in our regiments, notwithstanding the strictness of collegiate or military

discipline. A liberal education, the instructions of religion, the examples and admonitions of parental tenderness, are too frequently, alas ! of no avail. How then shall the poor operative, who has never enjoyed any of these advantages, be expected to keep himself uncontaminated in the noxious atmosphere which he breathes. Born in misery, neglected in infancy, those hours of childhood which should have been devoted to education and sportive play, passed under the tyranny of a harsh master ; with one unvarying round of toil, as the portion of his manhood ; and the vision of a workhouse as a retreat for his old age ;—how can we wonder if the bolder spirits should be driven into a course of violence and crime, and that the more timid ones should be lead to drown in intoxication, at once their faculties and the remembrance of their cares. In our manufacturing towns, a vast population has been growing up destitute of spiritual and moral instruction, and one of the consequences is, that £50,000,000 yearly are spent in intoxicating stimulants. What dreadful accounts of the appalling ignorance which prevails, do the commissioners of the *Morning Chronicle* and the ministers of religion reveal ;—families who know nothing of the existence of the Deity, except by hearing his name mentioned in oaths and blasphemies ;—individuals who know not even the name of the reigning sovereign ;—and others who believed Pontius Pilate and their Saviour to be the same person ! And vice abounds in the same ratio with its parent, ignorance. I could point to places where the absence of female virtue is considered rather a qualification for matrimony than an obstacle to it.

And here the physical consequences of the factory system may be noticed as no less pernicious than the moral ones. Where do we see such emaciated and careworn objects as among the denizens of our factories ? Immured during the day in a close and noxious atmosphere, their evenings spent in imbibing a compound of vitriol and turpentine, which they call gin ; lodged at night in some dark and fetid alley,—in which the chief study of the builder has been to crowd the greatest possible number of human beings on the smallest possible space,—it is no matter for surprise that infectious diseases should count twice as many annual

victims in this country as fell by the sword of Napoleon at Waterloo. Compare the artisan of our towns with the ploughman of Westmoreland or Cumberland: how diminutive, how weak, how physically inferior in every respect is the former to the latter! The employment of children in factories has contributed much to promote this physical degeneracy. The season of childhood was intended by Providence as a period in which the mind should be instructed, and the body strengthened. During that period the natural course of things is, that the parents maintain their children, and when the latter have reached maturity, that they, in return for that kindness which watched over them in infancy should support the former, now incapacitated from labour by old age. Another natural state of things is, that while the husband is working abroad, the wife should be occupied in her duties at home. But in the factory system both these are reversed. While the husband and father is in the gin palace, his wife and elder children are at the mill, and the younger ones neglected at home. The children as they grow up, finding that they have been supporting their parent in idleness, determine on henceforth enjoying their earnings themselves. Consequently at an age before they have acquired sufficient prudence to guide their actions, they separate from the paternal dwelling, and begin the world on their own account. The parents,

deprived of the assistance of their children, when old age is coming upon them, are forced to resume their labour. They have no hold on the affections of their offspring. They cannot appeal to the care they took of them in infancy, or to the tender solicitude which they then displayed for them through many long years, in which they toiled for them, as reasons why now, in their declining age, reverence and assistance should be their due. Their children only remember them as those for whose selfish benefit those hours which should have been their happiest, were blighted; and the bright morning of their days rendered sunless, miserable, and careworn.

In conclusion, I would hope that none of these remarks will give the slightest pain to any one interested in the system which I have attacked. My hostility is not against them, but against that all-absorbing accumulation of capital which I believe to have been the primary cause of much of the misery and degradation of the lower orders, and which, I think, threatens, unless some adequate counteracting means be devised, to overbalance the other great interests of the country, and to create an oligarchy of wealth, as odious and oppressive to the free labourers of England as was the despotism of the commercial nobility of Venice and Genoa to the Italians of the middle ages.

S. A. J.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

INCREASE of Population in Great

Britain from the year 1801 to	
1841.....	10,700,000
Ditto, from 1841 to 1846.....	1,300,000
Marriages in 1801	67,288
Ditto in 1840	115,548
Number of Dwelling-houses, 1801	1,467,870
Ditto in 1841	2,753,295
Rate of Mortality in 1700 ...	1 in 39
Ditto in 1800	1 in 47
Cotton Exported in 1801 (lbs.)	54,203,433
Ditto in 1844	554,196,602
Steam Vessels owned in Great	
Britain in 1814.....	2
Ditto in 1844	988
Executions from 1805 to 1825	1,614
Ditto from 1825 to 1845 ...	626

G. R. Porter.

In placing the foregoing figures at the beginning of these remarks, I have proceeded more according to the plan adopted by novelists, and first introduced, I think, by the author of "Waverley,"—viz., that of placing a verse or quotation at the beginning of each chapter, bearing some relation to the subject-matter, than from a hope that the said figures will have any very material effect in fortifying my position or strengthening my argument. True it is that, taken as a whole, they go to prove the general increase of the national prosperity; but do they, or can they support a corresponding increase of wealth or happiness in any particular class of which the nation is composed? Without assuming the absolute irrefragability of these figures,

we think that, to some extent, they can. In the first place, it may be laid down as an undeniable truth, that in whatever country the ranks of the people, taken in its widest sense, as including both aristocracy and democracy, are undivided by any wide or marked line of demarcation,—where the one class is well-nigh lost in the other, as regards the barrier line—that in such a country, and among such a people, the general and national prosperity will always be more or less productive of the individual and particular. For where the lower classes are not mere serfs, and cannot be compelled to work without wages, it is evident that the greater the number of employers, and the more capital these possess, the greater will be the demand for labour, and the higher the wages given. So far then will the national prosperity affect the individual.

But may not machinery be made to perform the work of man, and thus abridge the amount of labour, and, consequently, the quantum of wages? To some extent, undoubtedly, it may; but we think not so much as is generally supposed; for if machinery lessens the supply of labour, on the one hand, by diminishing the demand for hand-labour; on the other, it increases the demand for labour in the construction of the machinery itself. Not that we would assert that these additions and subtractions are equal to each other; nor could we wish them to be so. If machinery did not lessen the demand for manual labour, what, then, were the uses of machinery? If God has bestowed upon man inventive faculties, and given these faculties an impetus in order that they may conduce to his happiness as an intellectual and moral being, by the contrivance of machines to lessen his physical labour, and thus afford him an opportunity of cultivating his mental and moral faculties;—is not this a noble boon? And to whom does the blame belong, that this rich gift has not as yet fully realised its destined purposes? Surely to man;—to that grasping selfishness which still dwells enthroned within his heart. But shall not the demon be cast out? Shall the designs of the Most High be frustrated? Most certainly not. Nor has machinery been in vain. To what do we owe these increasing exertions for the welfare of society;—that laying bare of the evils resident

in the heart of the community;—the disposition to see and grapple with the giant evils that stalk about among mankind;—the desire to analyse and dispel the fetid vapours that poison and obscure the moral atmosphere? Most undoubtedly to machinery,—to that mightiest and best of machines—the Printing Press.

We are accustomed to look back upon the days of Robin Hood, and dream of “Merry England” as a sort of second Eden;—a lackadaisical Paradise, to which our thoughts are doomed to wander back with vain regrets and hopeless pinings. Sad delusion! Strip these days of the romance and poetry which ever, like the whistling winds and rustling leaves of autumn, hang over the past; dismiss for a moment the happy remembrances which cling closest to our hearts and memories; call up the well-nigh forgotten struggles and sorrows that form the lot of the universal, as well as the individual man, and what have we then? Stripes and serfdoms, hunger, thirst, and colds; miseries of which we could not form a true, a deep-enough conception, because of our want of intelligence. And so was it in those days with the working man of Great Britain. There were then no complaints heard from him, because he had not the power to complain. Ground down, oppressed to the earth, which alone received his sorrows, and echoed back his groans, he was alternately the companion of the horse and the ox, or the slave doomed to expiate in the blood and slaughter of his fellow-slaves the ferocious passions and outrageous tyrannies of his obdurate taskmaster. There was then no printing press, to whisper abroad his miseries; no *Morning Chronicle* commissioners to inquire into his condition or prospects. But methinks I hear some one say, “This is merely dream-painting. Show us proofs of the abject condition of the working classes in those days.” Our proofs are at hand. Not to speak of Jack Cade’s insurrection, and the many historical facts, which indicate how oppressed and degraded the lower classes were, we shall demonstrate the truth of our position from our opponents’ own assertions.

They say that the working classes have not been benefitted by machinery, through the selfishness of capitalists, who have monopolised these and their profits. But was

this selfishness less inherent in the constitution of our ancestors than of their descendants? Most assuredly not. Man is naturally a selfish being, and the less civilised he is, the more will he give the rein to this pre-

dominant instinct. Hence we may argue *a priori* that our ancestors did oppress and tyrannize over their dependents in a greater degree than their more civilized children.

HAROLD.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. VIII.

35. *Acquitting* is the act of releasing from any accusation or suspicion of guilt. This mood of mind expresses itself in a calm, kindly tone; its manner is bland, affable, and benignant; the countenance is open and pleasant; the right hand is gently waved to the party addressed, as if dismissing him.

"Yes, Byron, thou art gone,—

Gone like a star that through the firmament,
Shot, and was lost,—in its erratic course
Dazzling—perplexing. Yet thy heart, methinks,
Was generous, noble—noble in its scorn
Of all things low or little; nothing there
Sordid or servile.

* * * *

Thou art gone;

And he who would assail thee in thy grave,
Oh, let him pause! For who among us all
Tried as thou wert, even from thine earliest years,
When wandering yet unspoilt, a highland boy;—
Tried as thou wert, and with thy soul of flame;—
Pleasure—while yet the down was on thy cheek—
Uplifting, pressing—and to lips like thine—
Her charmed cup;—ah! who among us all
Could say he had not erred as much—and more?"

—Rogers's "*Italy*."

36. *Condemning* is the pronouncing of a person to be blameworthy, censurable, or meriting punishment, and displays itself in a stern manner, slightly tinctured with compassion; austerity of countenance, mingled with sympathy, and an appearance of painful regret, should be expressed; the voice not just so harsh as if expressing displeasure. If, however, the fault be heinous, and the detestation and abhorrence be strongly felt, the voice should be harsh and slightly husky, while the face assumes a sternly forbidding aspect. The hand should be held forth, the palm downwards, in the direction of the party presumed to be guilty.

The following extract from the "*Merchant of Venice*" will illustrate this and the following passion; the first part, in the ordinary type being read as *Teaching*; the latter, in italic, as *Condemning*.

Portia.—It is enacted in the laws of Venice,
 If it be proved against an alien,
 That by direct, or indirect, attempt,
 He seek the life of any citizen,
 The party 'gainst the which he doth contrive
 Shall seize on half his goods. The other half
 Goes to the privy coffer of the state !
 And the offender's life lies in the mercy
 Of the Duke only, 'gainst all other voice.
In which predicament, I say, thou stand'st ;
For it appears by manifest proceeding
That indirectly, and directly, too,
Thou hast contrived against the very life
Of the defendant, so that thou incurr'st
The danger formally by me rehearsed.
Down, therefore, and beg mercy of the duke."

37. *Teaching*, explaining, or illustrating,—the most usual method of address in an exordium—requires an open, pleasant, countenance ; a steady eye—the eye-brow, however, somewhat overshadowing it; and a gentle vertical motion of the right hand—sometimes with the forefinger laid open in the palm of the other,—sometimes pointing in one or other direction, as the case demands. The manner firm, grave, authoritative, and commanding; the form closely-knit and drawn up; the voice clear, slow, carefully emphasized, and accurately intonated—varying according to the subject, and free both from pedantry and petulant dogmatism.

38. *Pardoning* is the absolving of an individual from the punishment of guilt, and differs from *acquitting* in this: that in the former case the person is really guilty, while in the latter the guilt is only supposititious, and by the acquittal he is rendered free even from suspicion; hence there is a greater harshness of tone and manner, and a greater infusion of displeasure into the voice and gesture than in *acquitting*.

39. *Arguing* is the producing of reasons or considerations why a thing should be believed or disbelieved. It may either be done *solus*, as in a demonstrative sermon or lecture, or it may be in debate. In whichever way, however, arguing is manifested, its great design is persuasion; and hence there is a necessity of adapting the style of argumentation employed, to the parties on whose minds conviction is to be wrought; and in each case the gestural manifestations will differ in a smaller degree. Generally, however, it may be remarked that, in arguing, a calm, attentive, and decided appearance; a steady, clear, unhesitating, and emphatic utterance; with moderate gesticulation with the hands, makes the greatest impression on an ordinary audience.

Miriam.—

Love thee ? I am here,—
 Here at dead midnight, by the fountain's side,
 Trusting thee, Javan, with a faith as fearless
 As that with which the instinctive infant twines
 To its mother's bosom. Love thee ? When the sounds
 Of massacre are round me ; when the shouts
 Of frantic men in battle rack the soul
 With their importunate and jarring din,—
 Javan, I think on thee, and am at peace.

Our famished maidens gaze on me and see
 That I am famished like themselves ; as pale ;
 With lips as pale and eyes as wild. Yet I
 Sit patient, with an enviable smile
 On my wan cheek ; for then my spirit feasts
 Contented on its pleasing thoughts of thee.
 My very prayers are full of thee. I look
 To heaven and bless thee, for from thee I learnt
 The way by which we reach the eternal mansions.
 But thou, injurious Javan, coldly doubttest !
 And—— Oh ! but I have said too much ! Oh ! scorn not
 The immodest maid whom thou hast vexed to utter
 What yet she scarce dared whisper to herself."

—*Milman's "Fall of Jerusalem."*

The soliloquies of Hamlet and Cato will yield other well known examples of this mental state.

40. *Dismissing*—the sending away of a person from one's presence, or the discharging of a subject from the mind—implies authority in the person so discharging another party, and hence an air of condescension is necessarily to be expressed if the dismissal or leave be approbatively given, or anger if displeasure be the cause of the discharge. In the first case, a kind tone and look, and a gentle inclination of the head towards the person, is assumed, and the right hand is waved permissively to the party ; in the latter case, a mixture of displeasure, aversion, and wounded pride, is felt ; the mein is haughty ; the voice loud in tone and vehement in utterance ; the hand is thrown out violently in the direction of the offending person ; and the face is half averted.

41. *Refusing* is the act of not granting an application or request. If this be accompanied with a feeling of displeasure, the external manifestations are similar to the state of mind referred to immediately above. If it be done unwillingly, from want of power, there is a reluctance manifested ; the words are slowly and regretfully expressed ; the head is shaken somewhat sorrowfully ; the hands are stretched forth to the person ; and the whole frame betokens an anxiety to befriend, if possible, the applicant.

THE DECLINE OF ELOQUENCE.

THE era of British eloquence appears to have passed. The senate and the pulpit, which once rung with the inspirations of genius, are now silent ; and the bar, from being the nursery and school of orators, has ceased to be remarkable for an ordinary amount of the "art of speaking." The days of Erskine and his splendid forensic orations, have become the traditionary legends of the courts, while the impassioned brilliancy of Brougham excites admiration, but does not stimulate emulative exertion. The bar seems satisfied to wear the faded

laurels of past triumphs ; to boast in having once had orators ; and to remain in a disgraceful inactivity. The present position of the bar would credit the belief that the highest altitude of eloquence had been attained, that all the mines of human thought had become exhausted, and that man, satiated with his conquests, had returned again to a rude and half-barbaric mode for the expression of thought. That we have not now at the bar any example of the highest order of eloquence, will be universally acknowledged. The appearance of such men upon any stage

of oratory is but seldom, and their outbursts of eloquence are but rare and fitful. While such superior minds may enhance the value of the age in which they live, may give models of their divine art to their contemporaries and posterity, and become the admired of the world, it will be contended, and justly, that their displays are adverse to the undeviating course of justice, and dangerous to men having to perform deliberative functions. It is better that juries should not be electrified into acquitting the guilty, or condemning the innocent, and that judges should preserve their serenity of mind and correctness of judgment; and, although such eloquence may procure admiration, the effects of it are evil, and, consequently, it should not be too much encouraged.

But let us inquire whether or not the bar of the present day can lay claim to that judicial eloquence which is so immediately adapted to the circumstances of legal argument, and which should be one of the great aims of every member of the bar to obtain. When we say judicial eloquence, we mean the eloquence of the judgment, in contradistinction to the eloquence of the feelings; clear, correct, and logical; embodying the discussion of legal principles in concise and elevated language. Such was Lord Erskine's in the case of the Dean of Asaph, displaying the greatest preciseness and beauty of arrangement; the language being sufficient to sustain, but not remarkable enough to detract from the attention to the arguments, and the whole managed with the most admirable address. Even at a later period, some of Lord Campbell's speeches partake of this description of what may justly be considered as bar eloquence. At this time, however, it is impossible to point to any man at the bar who may be said to possess it. The requirements for it are a considerable amount both of legal and erudite learning, and a sound discretion in the application of both. And it should be remembered that this description of oratory, not depending so much upon the imagination, but more upon the exercise of the memory and the use of the reflective powers, may be more easily acquired than such as rests for its force upon the variations of the mind and the intensity of the conception. There are, indeed, but

few men who may not, by study and perseverance, perhaps imitation, acquire a nervous and dignified style of expression, and an appropriate use of language; and by strengthening their recollective and concentrative faculties, arrive at some degree of proficiency in this branch of the oratorical art. While this is more easily obtainable, it is regarded with much greater favour by the judges than even the higher order of eloquence; for a "florid style and a sparkling manner never fail to make the speaker be heard with a jealous ear by the judge; they detract from his weight, and always produce a suspicion of his failing in soundness or strength of argument." The characteristic of this style of oratory may be summed up in the advice of Quintilian—"*Cura sit verborum; sollicitudo rerum.*"

To seize the leading points of the argument, to corroborate or destroy them by sufficient evidence, and to add chasteness, power, and boldness of expression, are the chief requisitions for a description of oratory highly esteemed by the judges and by the bar; and admirably designed for appealing to the judgment of men whose duty it is to decide unbiassed by feeling or passion. This eloquence, we believe, may be attained by labour; but we not only aver that our bar is destitute of this sort of it, but we will take one step further, and say that there are but very few gentlemen of the bar who are moderately correct or elegant in their style. The Superior Courts of Law, when the judges are presiding for the hearing of appeals, and the reversal of judgments, in which only a select body of practitioners appear, and, in which, therefore, eloquence should be cultivated, are remarkable for the total absence of anything which can aspire to that name. If the pleader is well skilled in his technical law points, he has gained the only object which he sought, and cares nothing about the inaptitude of his expressions, or the want of clearness in his argument. Not only is such the case, but even those adventitious adornments which nature has afforded unlimited opportunity for improvement, seem entirely neglected; the modulation of voice, the strength of utterance, and grace of attitude and action, serve to render even a poor or barren speaker, passable, if not attractive. The orators of

olden time thought no labour too intense, no extent of time too much, to gain these desirable advantages; but the gentlemen of the bar seem to consider them as scarcely worthy of their notice. There is some reason for believing that Walpole and the orators of his time gained their ascendancy over the minds of their hearers as much by the gracefulness of their delivery and the propriety of their deportment, as by the power of their eloquence.

But if the address is slovenly, the matter ill-arranged, and the most extraneous subjects and precedents dragged into arguments upon which they have no bearing, in the courts of judgment and appeal; the style of speaking at *Nisi Prius* and in the criminal courts is still lower. In the former the same defects exist which we have before noticed in a more eminent degree; and the business falls to the lot of men of less experience, who appear as little to have cultivated a just manner of expressing their thoughts. The criminal bar, while, in some degree, liable to the faults we have referred to, is chiefly chargeable with another, in fact, more dangerous to the growth of true eloquence. It is a kind of spurious eloquence, and coarse, violent and declamatory; attracts some attention, and passes with the vulgar for that of which it is only the base counterfeit. This style, though repressed by the judges, is yet upon the increase; and as but the smallest amount of talent is requisite for its acquirement, it seems to recommend itself to the attention of those who are desirous of making a display with as little real industry or oratorical powers as possible.

It must be a matter of regret that the bar of our country has ceased to be distinguished for its eloquence, and it becomes important to inquire into the causes which either positively prevent or negatively do not encourage a taste for this noble art. The inns of court, although well endowed with revenues, have long since ceased to recognize any responsibility in the legal or intellectual advancement of their students. They cause them to be assembled, it is true, at stated periods in Term time, but not either for the purpose of instruction, or the formation of associations which might promote the science, but only for the pleasure

of conviviality. The student, after having wearied himself by his day's employment at the chambers of a pleader, dines at the hall of which he is a member; and the little converse which he enjoys with his fellow-students is confined to the courtesies of life, but does not extend to the reciprocation of studies and opinions. Were the students, while in their novitiate, brought into constant collision, a spur would be given to their activity; they would mutually refine their manners, aid the learning, and strengthen the powers of each other. Why should not the inns establish lectures upon oratory, give scholarships for success in its attainment, encourage the attendance and the efforts of students, and make eloquence one of the great branches of legal education? Why should not the public halls be opened as the usual resort of students of law and barristers, and devoted to the holding of moot courts and discussion clubs? Under the presidency of some able lawyer, such courts might be rendered almost as important as addressing the judges; and while the principles of law would be acquired, the mastery of eloquence would not be a subordinate object. Westminster Hall ought not to be the first theatre on which a man displays his ability in speaking, but he ought to be well and severely trained before he delivers himself in the presence of the judges of the land. It ought to be an imperative necessity for every barrister to have delivered a certain number of speeches at the hall of his society, before he is permitted to rise in court; and, were such a system adopted, we should soon gain for the bar the reputation of sound reasoning and manly eloquence, while we should save the judges from the annoyances and impertinences to which they are subject. The want of a proper superintendence on the part of the inns, renders it necessary for the students to place themselves in the chambers of pleaders; and there, without any counteracting influence, they become absorbed in the intricacies of the statute law, and the technicalities of pleading. They do not acquire large and extensive views of the origin and foundation of laws, or an intimate acquaintance with the common law, but narrow their pursuits to a conversance with the peculiar acts of Parliament, which affect our own jurispru-

dence: they drink from the many tributary streams, but never from the fountain head of law.

Another cause of the present discouragement to oratory, must be found in the culpable negligence of gentlemen preparing for the bar. When students of law, with time upon their hands, neglect to promote a taste for oratory; barristers are little likely, with less opportunity, to attempt it. The forensic clubs, which formerly served to supply the place of a national institution, to prepare the minds of youth for the professional conflicts of after age, are, many of them, closed: and in this age of universal movement, eloquence alone seems despised.

Much may be done by every individual,

intending to make the bar his profession, by a determination to excel in this necessary art; and, if every student, feeling that the honour of his profession and his country was, in this respect, committed to his keeping, would mature his capacities for speaking, by the study of British eloquence, and the habit of committing to writing legal arguments, the style of oratory at the bar would soon shew symptoms of improvement. We refer to students, in these remarks, because, from them alone must be expected the future greatness of the bar; and we would willingly see them join in an attempt to revive its past fame.—*From an article in "The Lawyer," by our correspondent "Eolo,"*

RULES FOR MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

IN an early No. of this Magazine we requested the Secretaries of Mutual Improvement and Debating Societies to forward to us copies of their laws, and promised that we would endeavour to compile a "model" code from those received. We have now to thank numerous friends for their prompt compliance with that request: and, at the earnest solicitation of several correspondents, we proceed this month to fulfil our promise. This we should have done long since, but from the absorbing nature of more pressing duties; and now we are only able to treat the subject with great brevity.

Time, and a desire to be practical, forbid us attempting to scatter the flowers of Rhetoric around this subject, or to present an essay on that "order" which is "Heaven's first law." Nor is this necessary; for the importance of good "rules of action" will be admitted in all associated bodies. Indeed, error has generally lain in the opposite direction—of attributing to rules too great a potency, and expecting from them too much. When the prosperity of a society is waning, it is frequently the practice to call in question the propriety of the rules, without considering the spirit and manner in which those rules have been carried out; forgetting that while rules may direct energy, they cannot create it; and that they never will supply the lack of earnest men.

The first matter which claims attention in framing a code of laws for a Society, is the object at which it is to aim; clear and definite ideas on this point are essential to the order and propriety of what is to follow. A consideration of the objects will suggest the name,—which should always be *short and expressive*. Long names are objectionable, and high-sounding ones ridiculous.

The next subject for consideration will be the

means to be brought into operation for securing the objects of the Society. These will, in some measure depend upon its size and general character; but if it be established for mutual improvement,—discussions, essays, and lectures, should all be contemplated. The lectures, if of an interesting character, may be thrown open to the public, on a small charge for admission. A Library of standard works is very desirable, and in addition to this, or as a substitute for it, a Reading Club should be commenced, for the purchase and circulation among the members of new books and expensive periodicals, such as reviews, &c. We say, *expensive periodicals* advisedly, and maintain, on general grounds, that persons interested in any cheap magazine ought to purchase it themselves, both for their own sake and from the fact that such a magazine requires an immense *sale* to make it self-supporting.

With respect to the admission of members, few restrictions will be found necessary. A desire to join a society for the improvement of the mind is a strong testimony in favour of those who possess it; and if the applicants are known to the members, their general impression will be sufficient to enable them to come to a wise decision. The amount of the annual subscription required, may easily be determined by calculating the probable expenses of the society, and the probable number of those who will have to bear them. While low rates of subscription are fashionable, it is important that a society should not be crippled in its resources.

Again: the size and circumstances of a society should determine the number of its Officers. If there be a man of influence connected with it, or even known to be friendly to its objects, he may be solicited to become the president. He should preside at the annual, and some of the other more

public, meetings : his name will give the society a local standing which it otherwise would not possess. In such a case, a vice-president will be needed for taking the chair when the president is absent. But if the society cannot find such a man for president, as we have referred to, it should elect one of its own number to perform his duties, under the more humble title of "chairman." This should be an individual well acquainted with the order of business, and exhibiting *suaviter in modo and fortiter in re*. A treasurer and secretary will be indispensable, and upon the latter much will depend. He should be a man known to have the interest of the society at heart, and possessed of general intelligence and the "pen of a ready writer." If there be a library, a librarian will, of course, be required. A society having less than twenty-five members might manage its own affairs without a committee, or have a committee of three individuals, in addition to the officers ; three to form a quorum. A society of forty members might elect six committee men, five forming a quorum. Large committees are not generally found to work well—the business is left to a few active men, who ought to have all the honour, as they have all the labour.

The frequency of the meetings must depend on the engagements of the members, and the time of opening and closing upon their convenience ; only let what is fixed by law be strictly adhered to, except when otherwise determined by vote. We think that such societies as those we are treating upon, should meet *at least* once a fortnight, and where it is possible, once a week. We are acquainted with some that meet monthly ; but they are very ineffective, and are, what some of our contemporaries would delight to designate—"great shams." In addition to the ordinary meetings, opportunities should be given at stated periods, for friendly intercourse and enjoyment. The social element in human nature has been too much overlooked by the promoters of these societies ; this we believe to be a principal cause of their frequent dissolution, and more frequent decline.

To maintain societies in a healthy state, it is essential that the members regularly attend the meetings ; in order to secure this, fines for absence, in some instances, have been enacted. We can say little of their practical effect, as we have rarely seen them enforced. We incline to the opinion that where interest will not draw a person to a meeting, the fear of a fine will not drive him. But when members agree to enact fines, we should say, *in every instance enforce them*. Laws that are not maintained are powerless for good, and productive of evil. It is important for a society to know at any time who are *bona fide* members, and hence there should be a rule for dissolving the connexion of those who have been absent for a given period, without assigning a satisfactory reason. It may also be necessary in a society where discussions are carried on, to have, as a proviso, a rule authorising the expulsion of any disorderly member ; but for the honour of human nature, we with pleasure record the fact, that in a somewhat lengthened experience, we never met with an instance in which this penalty was required to be inflicted.

In conclusion, it is well to guard against change,

and minister to stability, by adding a rule, prohibiting the alteration of the preceding ones, without due notice ; or the dissolution of the society except by general consent.

We now append a set of rules framed in accordance with the suggestions that we have offered.

RULES.

Name.

I. That this Society be designated "The ——— Mutual Improvement Society."

Object.

II. That its object shall be to promote the intellectual improvement of its members, and to facilitate acquaintance and fellowship with individuals of similar views and character.

Means.

III. That periodical meetings be held, for the discussion of questions, the reading of essays, and the delivery of lectures.

Members.

IV. That all persons desirous of being admitted to the Society shall be proposed and seconded by two members, at an ordinary meeting, and that their admission be decided at the next meeting, by ballot, in their absence.

Subscriptions.

V. That each member subscribe not less than ——— per annum, to be paid quarterly, in advance.

Office-Bearers.

VI. That the affairs of this Society be conducted by a President, Vice-President, Treasurer, Secretary, and Six Members, who together shall form a committee of management, and meet at least once a month ; five to form a quorum.

Duties of Committee.

VII. That it shall be the duty of the committee to undertake the general business of the Society ; that questions for discussion, and subjects of lectures, be first approved by them, and that they make the necessary arrangements for all meetings.

Ordinary Meetings.

VIII. That the ordinary meetings of the Society be held ———, to commence at ——— o'clock and close at ——— o'clock, unless a majority of the members present wish to continue the business.

Annual Meetings.

IX. That the Annual Meeting of the Society be held in the month of ———, when the Secretary's Report, and Treasurer's Account (being duly audited) shall be presented, and the Officers and Members of the Committee shall be chosen by ballot, for the ensuing year, and such matters considered as may affect the interests of the Society.

Social Meetings.

X. That the Committee arrange once a quarter for Social Meetings of the Members and friends, at which tea shall be provided, and business of an interesting character introduced. At these meetings Ladies shall be invited to attend.

Members' Privilege.

XI. That Members may introduce friends, by tickets, to the ordinary meetings of the Society, but such Visitors shall not be entitled to take part in the proceedings.

Non-Attendance.

XII. That in case any members absent themselves from three successive regular meetings, the Secretary shall communicate with them, and if no satisfactory reason be assigned, and they continue absent from the next three meetings, their connexion with the Society shall cease.

Expulsion.

XIII. That any member refusing to obey the decision of the Chairman, or violating the laws of the Society, may be expelled by the Committee; but such member shall have the right of appeal to the Society at an ordinary meeting; the decision (by ballot) of a majority of the members then present shall be final.

Alteration of Rules.

XIV. That no rule of the Society be altered or rescinded but by a majority of the members present at an Annual or Special Meeting; a month's notice having been given of such proposed alteration: and that the Society shall not be dissolved, or its meetings suspended, except by the consent of two-thirds of the members.

We cannot close without recommending to all our readers the countenance and support of these societies. We would urge as many as can to become members: and where there is no society existing, with these Rules, and the information given from time to time in our pages, we do not see why any young man should hesitate to propose the formation of one. To such we shall

be happy to give any further assistance in our power: and it will afford us sincere pleasure to have an opportunity here of recording their success. As an example to others, we cannot but add a letter which has for some time been lying upon our table:—

"Gentlemen,—In the month of August last I called a meeting of all my acquaintances (young men) in this town, and proposed to establish a debating society, which was unanimously agreed to, and a committee appointed to frame rules, &c. The society was commenced with spirit on Sept. 3, and on our next night of meeting, which was a public night, one of our members delivered the opening address to the society, before a numerous and highly respectable audience. The members now number 19; and I have been appointed secretary and treasurer.

"In a conversation with one of my friends, he mentioned your journal, when I at once ordered the last No., with which I was so well pleased, that I ordered a complete set. And if my testimony to the value of your much-wanted publication will be of any service, you are at liberty to add it to those you have already received.

"I have recommended the members of the society to take in your publication, which, I doubt not, they will do. *I expect to leave for Edinburgh this week, where I have a number of friends, and I intend to establish a similar society there, of which I will give you notice.*

"I am, &c.,

"Wigtown, Oct. 23, 1850."

"J. C."

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

The Plymouth Institution.—Capital Punishment.—The Plymouth Institution was opened for the winter course of lectures by J. N. Bennett, Esq., delivering a very argumentative and eloquent address on the subject of "Capital Punishment," which led to a most interesting discussion, in which the various arguments on both sides of the question were thoroughly sifted.

The Lecturer commenced with a brief reference to the temporary unpopularity of the view about to be advocated, and proceeded to a definition of the terms which would represent his main ideas, and the authorities which would be admitted as conclusive on the matter at issue. Municipal law must be dismissed as an insufficient authority, since it occupied the position of the accused rather than that of the Judge. The divine and moral laws were alone of competent authority—the former being defined by the Lecturer to be the law of God expressed in positive precept—the latter as also the law of God impressed on man as a social being. The first authority was held to have spoken—and that decisively (instances were quoted) to prove the lawfulness of taking away life for crime, but not decisively as regarded the necessity of doing

so always even for any crime—the universality of the application of the rule shown not to be required—instances were quoted in proof. The circumstances and conditions which should demand the enforcement, or permit the waiving of extreme punishment were thus left open—how were they to be determined? The moral dispensation must be the Judge. Man is a moral agent—society a moral agency—man's natural state is social—the adaptation of his nature—his powers of mind—his capabilities and moral attributes prove it. A rapid sketch of the constitution of society was then given—its operations—instruments and ends. Government is one of its necessary chief instruments; power its chief characteristic; the preservation of order its chief work; the repression of crime the chief mean to that end. Mistakes in government adverted to—the principles of tyranny and licentiousness—the compromise of their claims—the exact limits of liberty incapable of being defined. The attempts of moral philosophers in this direction, their standards of right—1st truth—2ndly justice—3rd utility. The Lecturer's adoption of the last—not in opposition but in subordination to the two former. A view was then taken of the moral condition of society as

now existing in England. The lecturer then spoke of the prevention of crime as being the great end of punishment, and quoted Bentham at some length on that subject. He then glanced at the several modes of punishment adopted in England from the money fine to the penalty of death, and after considering the popular objections to the last, very ably dwelt upon each of the following branches of the subject.—Capital Punishment more frequent and rightly so in a dark age and a gross condition of society—its relaxation and rare application the legitimate effect of civilization. Some of the necessary conditions to the adoption of capital punishment. First—The commission of a crime *equal in quality* to that of punishment. Secondly—The universal instinct of mankind (not excepting the criminal) of the *justice* of the sentence. Thirdly—*The general popular consent* to the execution of the law. The two former, perpetual conditions,—the latter may fluctuate and vary in degree—Revenge—retribution—self-defence—all elements in the sentiment which finally adjudicates, but the latter only should preside over and controul the two former—banishing torture and all incidents calculated to disgust. We must deal with our social evils not as we may hope to find them in a future generation, diminished in number, and alleviated in quality by the beneficent influences now happily bearing upon them with, we trust, a daily increasing power; but as they present themselves to our eyes and our ears, as they are seen in our criminal calendars, in our encumbered jails—in the pauperism and unmitigated ignorance of our lowest population—as they obtrude themselves on us in every day life—as they are present and palpable existences even at our doors. Let us not, however, be decried as disciples of Draco. If for one entertain no fears for society. I do not despair even of our own generation. Turning back only a very few pages of history, we can trace the progress and conquests of civilization. Legislation has partaken of the common impulse—human life once held so cheap as to be forfeitable for the commission of a common larceny, is now valued in proportion to its worth—and in delivered up to the officer of justice where not justice only, but a believed necessity combine to pronounce no less a sacrifice available. By many even this necessity is denied, and the right of man to take away the life of his fellow called in question. Theories beautiful in themselves, and admirable in their motives, even though in the main fallacious, are started and popularly entertained, which claim the reformation of the capital offender rather than his punishment, to be the proper end of a beneficent legislation. Far be it from me to check the most sanguine hope for the betterment of our social condition. With such hopes we would warmly sympathise. That there is a good time coming is quite an article of my creed. I see it pronounced by unerring truth, for it is declared that the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the glory of God, even as the waters cover the deep. Whether that good time be near or remote I need express no opinion, neither need I attempt to calculate with precision even the indications of its approach; but until we can discern some signs in the moral horizon—some pledges to assure us of

a fraternity of which other than that of Cain and Abel was a type—until, as regards peace, order, and beneficence, the wolf and the lamb shall lie down together; or as regards civil dealing, fraud and wrong shall have no more a place, but righteousness shall be stamped on our common things, even down to the bells of the horses; or rather exchanging the language of hope for that of experience, so long as rapine, violence, and murder are abroad—so long as Heaven fail to attract, and Hell to deter—I believe a legislation which shall be just to society must appeal to animal fear, under the guise of temporal punishment, instant and condign. At the conclusion of the lecture, to which the greatest attention was paid, the Chairman invited discussion on the subject, and a very interesting and able debate then ensued, in which Dr Soltau, Col. Dunsterville, the Rev Præbendary Luney, Mr Weymouth, and other gentlemen sided with the lecturer in supporting the necessity for the maintenance of the law as it stands in relation to capital offences, and the opposite view of the question was strongly maintained by Messrs David Derry, Rooker, Harder, Paine, &c.—who advocated the expediency of the repeal of the law altogether, and the substitution of some milder form of punishment.

Chichester Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society, previous to the present session, which commenced in October, was called the "Chichester Discussion Association;" such alteration it was thought desirable to make to admit of essay writing, which hitherto had been excluded. The committee, to further the objects of the Society, intend offering prizes for the best essays on two given subjects—the essayists will be divided into two classes, according to age; by doing this, they hope to induce those members to write their thoughts who have been either unable or unwilling to speak them. The Society has been in existence upwards of four years, and has now about eighty members; during which time many interesting and important subjects have been discussed; and though party zeal and the enthusiasm of youth have at times overstepped the bounds of prudence, harmony and good feeling have in general characterised the meetings.

Colchester Literary Institution.—*Lecture on Chemistry.*—On Monday, Mr. Coleman, M.R.C.S., commenced a course of lectures on Chemistry at this institution. The subject selected for his first lecture was the four gaseous elements,—Oxygen, Nitrogen, Hydrogen, and Chlorine. He began by bespeaking the attention of his hearers, making an apology for using some terms which might probably be unknown to them, and describing these terms as the tools with which he worked. He then proceeded to describe the nature and properties of oxygen gas: and after giving an outline of its most general properties, the lecturer went on to describe the apparatus for experimenting on gaseous bodies. The oxygen gas he procured by the ordinary methods of heating chloride of potass and black oxide of manganese; the former, he remarked, was seldom used, on account of its expense, unless very pure

oxygen was wanted; and it was necessary to dry the latter carefully before putting it into the retort, as it sometimes contained a considerable quantity of water, which coming over as steam, was condensed by the cold water of the pneumatic trough, and was apt to flow into the retort, and cause mischief, frequently explosion. Sometimes, too, it is mixed with common salt, or charcoal, and then the product was not oxygen, but carbonic acid. It was necessary to try this substance before using it; and when dry and pure, the oxygen obtained from it was sufficient for all practical purposes. The lecturer then performed several beautiful experiments of burning substances in oxygen. A small piece of phosphorus was introduced into a jar of this gas, and it instantly burst into the most vivid light, so that the eye could scarcely bear the intensity. After this, the Bude and Oxy-hydrogen lights were exhibited, with beautiful effect. Mr. Coleman afterwards went on to speak of the remaining gases, all of which were most clearly explained and illustrated by numerous well-performed experiments. The lecture elicited the hearty applause of all present; and at its conclusion, Mr. Coleman received their unanimous thanks.

Southampton Mutual Improvement Society.—The members of this Society celebrated their second anniversary by a soirée on New Year's Eve, when about three hundred and fifty sat down to an excellent tea. After the tables were removed, the mayor of the borough, Richard Andrews, Esq., took the chair, and was supported by various gentlemen of the town. After a short speech from the chairman, expressive of the great delight he felt in presiding over such a meeting, he called upon the Secretary, Mr. S. Chennell, to read the report of the Society's progress. This paper commenced by illustrating the intent and design of the Society, and then proceeded to give a statistical account of its present position;

from which there appeared to be one hundred and twenty Members, four Evening Classes established, and a Library of nearly three hundred and fifty volumes. The report concluded by endeavouring to impress on the minds of the members the necessity of combined and continued exertion for the attainment of the objects of the Society. A poetic address (composed by the Secretary) was ably recited by one of the members; and sentiments embodying the principles of the Society, the "Early Closing Movement," and the "Great Exhibition of 1851," were eloquently spoken to by the gentlemen present, amid the repeated applause of a crowded audience. The entertainments of the evening were enlivened by several songs, glees, duets, &c., together with the performances of an excellent brass band. The meeting broke up at a late hour, one and all delighted with the excellent arrangements which were made to enable the members and their friends to participate in the enjoyment of a "merry New Year's Eve."

Ebbw Vale Mutual Improvement Society.—A few weeks ago, a Tea Meeting was held, in connection with this Society, in the large room of the "Ebbw Vale Iron Company." Tea was provided at 3 o'clock, and the chair was afterwards taken by Mr. William Roden. Thomas Brown, Esq., first addressed the meeting. In the course of an interesting speech, he promised the Society a donation of *fifty pounds' worth of books, several monthly periodicals, and two or three newspapers*. He also intimated his intention of erecting a Room, for the better accommodation of the Society, as well as doing all he could in other ways to further its interests. He was followed by Messrs. Rowlands, Linsey, Thomas, Perry, Mason, and Wanfield. The proceedings were of a highly interesting character, being greatly enlivened by a brass band; it terminated about 9 o'clock.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

33. Which is the best standard of English pronunciation? I have been in the habit of consulting Walker, regarding his reasoning on the whole as sound and conclusive, but I fear that he is now out of repute among correct speakers.

INCOGNITO.

34. Will you kindly inform me which are the best grammars of the German and Italian languages, their price, and publishers. I have heard that Falck Lebatim's German, and Veneroni's Italian Grammars are good ones; perhaps you will kindly give your opinion.

O. R. L.

35. Which is the most concise, simple, and

inexpensive work on the French Language, and what course of study ought I to adopt to gain a knowledge of that language, without the aid of a master?

INCOGNITO.

36. I am a young man earnestly seeking after knowledge, but am troubled with a bad memory, which I find to be a great obstacle to my progress. Could C. C. M., or any of your talented correspondents recommend a course, by pursuing which I might remedy this serious defect.

J. M. C.

37. Will any of your correspondents be kind enough to give me an outline of a system of phrenotypics, and inform me of the price of a good work upon the subject?

38. Being connected with a debating society, which is but imperfectly governed, on account

of our not knowing the laws of debate, I should be greatly obliged if some of your correspondents would kindly inform me what they are in your next number. J. R.

39. Having been highly edified with the reading of your invaluable periodical, "*The British Controversialist*," and encouraged by the explicit answers given to some of the correspondents, I make bold to ask for a little advice relative to the attainment of knowledge.

I am acquainted with the subjects of Natural Philosophy generally, and I find no difficulty in conversing on any of the sciences therein comprehended—Astronomy, Geology, Geography, Chemistry, Mathematics included.

But I find I am totally deficient in something; what, I hardly know, it seems not relative to matter, but mind; the duties of man, his capabilities. This is, I know, a poor description of what I would convey. Perhaps you will be able to comprehend my meaning, and be kind enough to advise me what course of study to pursue that will supply my deficiency. J. B.

40. Can any of the readers of your truly valuable periodical advise young men who are alike anxious with myself for mental improvement, but similarly incapacitated. Imperfect vision prevents the possibility of reading small print without the aid of a strong light, consequently the advantages accruing from general reading at night, are denied. Some correspondent may be able to suggest some kind of study that does not require trying sight. I will just state, without comment, what I conceive may be turned to account. Writing what may be suggested from the reminiscences of reading or conversation; and re-introducing subjects to the mind, thus assisting the memory to retain them.

Hints, practical or theoretical, will be gratefully acknowledged, by H. W. N.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

27. *Latin without a Master*.—The best course for a young man to pursue to obtain a knowledge of Latin, without the aid of a Master, is, to take Arnold's *Henry's First Latin Book*, and study it thoroughly; that is, write it all out two or three times. But, in all cases where practicable, we would advise that a master should be sought. E. B.

Make yourself thoroughly acquainted with the inflexions undergone by all the declinable and conjugable words, i.e. Nouns, Adjectives, Pronouns, Verbs, and a few Adverbs, together with the rules of Syntax. This will require long and careful study, frequent repetition; and I would advise the transcription of all the examples given under the specimens. The Grammar which I would recommend as containing the greatest amount of accurate and orderly classified information, in comparison with its price, is what is generally termed the *Edinburgh Academy Rudiments of the Latin Tongue*. Macgowan's *Lessons* are very useful, and might be advantageously employed, as the book gives many exercises. The great difficulty, however, is, to know, without a master, whether these are correctly written. Having made the acquisitions

above-mentioned, I would advise commencing to read *Cornelius Nepos*, or *Cesar's Commentaries*, to be had with Vocabularies, in this manner:—acquire an accurate knowledge of the meaning of each word from your vocabulary, decline or conjugate the words until you can discover which part of the word—case or mode, tense and person, as it may happen; then arrange them in what you think is the syntactical order, and translate. You must then exercise your own judgment as to whether your translation, thus made, conveys sense; if it does not, you must suppose that you are in error somewhere, and resume your work again, by a carefully extended revision. When you have so translated it as to make sense, copy it out fairly for future reference, and proceed to the next sentence, as before. By reading the whole chapter thus consecutively translated, you will see it carries with it no obscurity or contradiction,—that it reads so as to be plainly understood: if the former, revise the part or parts which seem so; if the latter, you may in the mean time take it for granted that it is correct, and proceed—having finished in this manner a Life or Chapter—making continual reference to your grammar for the solution of any difficulty, whether in accidence or Syntax. It should be again read carefully, and reviewed; and, so far as the light of greater experience enables, the translation should be amended. Proceed now to the following part; and, having gone through a portion of that, take up your first, your earliest translation, and endeavour to retranslate it into Latin, striving to be as idiomatic in your style as possible. If this plan be arduously and perseveringly followed, you will soon find your knowledge of the Latin language so thorough as to enable you to follow up your studies without any other advice or assistance. I have little doubt, however, that were a sufficient number of the readers of the *British Controversialist* to apply to the editors, they would have little hesitation in procuring the services of a person of ability to superintend their studies in their newly opened department, "*The Young Students' and Writers' Assistant*." Should this suggestion, however, not be immediately and energetically followed up, I shall have great pleasure, in next issue, with the permission of the Editors, to supply a few "*Practical Hints on the Latin Language*," which may be of some future service to J. K., and those possessed of similar desires. S. N.

I would recommend J. R. to use Robson's *Latin Exercises* on the crude-form system; he will find it all he wants as an introduction, and it will throw abundant light upon his subsequent path. W. G.

30. *Hesitation in Speech*.—We confess we are almost posed at the request of E. T.; we can readily understand how and why a young man should be bashful; but, to be so timid as to have one's words frozen upon the lips, is certainly a very peculiar situation. Yet we would bid E. T. look up with confidence; time and constant intercourse with society will do a great deal towards removing the evil. The best thing you can do is, to join freely in conversation with your friends, whether you meet them singly or in small circles. Strive at all times to appear calm and collected in your conversations; speak

as you think; don't be puzzling your brain, at the time you are speaking, as to whether people are criticising; let them do it if they like; you are none the worse,—and you have this consolation, that no person of sense would do so, and for others you have no need to care.

If you have not joined a discussion class, do so immediately, even if you do not speak; you will gain confidence merely by sitting amongst debaters. But commence speaking as soon as you can muster courage; and when you do so, first of all look at your audience, and remember that they are all like yourself. Get to know them all individually, and you will then know the effect your speaking will have upon each; and what indulgence you may expect. But, above all, learn to look at your audience, as we said before; strive to acquire the power of letting your eye fall upon new objects without allowing them to confuse you. Emerson says, "the eye is first conquered in battle." And in this there is great truth; for how often may you escape danger by keeping the eye steady and firm to its duty. It is more powerful than the arm when a man knows how to use it. Words need not be spoken at all times; the eye can often say more than the lips, let them speak ever so long. How painful it is to sit under a minister or a lecturer who cannot look his audience in the face. We have often felt towards them as though we could say, "Look at us, we will encourage you—we will not criticise—we feel your painful condition." It is certainly a great deal to face an audience for the first time; you feel that not the eye alone of each individual is fixed upon you, but that the very soul of each is looking out from those strange windows of their stranger occupant. "Not an eye that sees you, but is a physician to comment your malady." Yet all these difficulties may be overcome, if the will be powerful. Say it *shall* be, and it *must* be. One good practice would be to read or speak before a mirror, learn to look at your own face, and you will probably soon be able to look at others. E. B.

30. By exercise, morning ablutions, the abandonment of all effeminating habits, all over-excitement, and a course of medical treatment, establish the tone of the nerves. Get, if possible, a friend or schoolmate to listen to your recitations; after a while, increase the number, and thus gradually accustom yourself to the sight of faces. Carefully guard your utterance so as to improve the nicely discriminative power of the vocal organs, both as to the *sounds* of words, and the *expression of feeling or passion*. Study with diligence so as to inspire yourself with *perfect confidence* in your own ability. Persuade yourself of the fact that all men are generally possessed of only *average* merit, and that whatever be the foundation of the figment called "collective wisdom," be you assured it can never be exercised in an assembly either of students or any where else;—especially in a class room, you will generally find that each one is so burdened with his own anxieties and difficulties, that he has little, if any, attention to bestow on his neighbours. The importance of the interests at stake should inspire E. T. to vigorous and manly exertions to overcome his defects, and we shall be happy if we have been ever so slightly service-

able in indicating any means by which his future prospects may be aided. Let him remember Demosthenes and Curran; and, by the aid of a resolute will, make his motto, *Nil desperandum*. S. N.

31. *Works on Composition and Punctuation*.—We would refer F. R. Y. to the article on "Composition," vol. 1, page 207; we think he will there find the information he seeks.

I beg leave to refer F. R. Y. through the medium of your columns, to an excellent work on Punctuation, entitled, "Where to Stop, and Why," by a Professional Grammarian. It is published by Longman and Co.; the price is moderate. A. T.

The best elementary works which I know upon Composition are "Irving's Elements," "Parker's Composition," and "Reid's Rudiments of Composition;" any one of these perused carefully, the exercises performed diligently, and the directions minutely attended to, will amply repay the trouble and expense, by the increased power of expression, and the ability to concentrate and develop thought, which will be the result. S. N.

32. *Arithmetic*.—S. has asked largely. He will, however, we imagine, not attempt to swallow all he has asked for at a single draught. No doubt it is desirable that he should obtain an acquaintance with all the subjects he has named. It is however scarcely possible to conceive of a young man with so capacious a memory, and so powerful an intellect, as to be able to make great proficiency in so many different subjects at the same time. He will find two excellent papers on Grammar and Geography in last year's "Controversialist" to which we would refer him, and shall now satisfy ourselves by giving a hint or two on two subjects—Arithmetic and Geometry.

Our friend must not be offended, if, in writing on these topics, we begin at the beginning, 1st, Because it is impossible that we can, by any thing he has said, tell what proficiency he has made; and 2nd, Because what is of no use to him may be useful to some one else.

If he refer to any work on Arithmetic, he will find that Arithmetic is the science of numbers. The first thing, then, that is requisite to the learner of this science is, that he should be able to make and read figures. The next, that he should be acquainted with the fact that these figures represent units, tens, hundreds, thousands, &c., according to the position they occupy in any horizontal line, *e. g.*, the right-hand figure in any whole number is units, the figure next to the left, tens, the one to the left of it, hundreds, &c. We have been thus particular, because we know from experience the value of a thorough acquaintance with even the Numeration Table. As, however, most works on the subject contain a Numeration Table—some which we shall name, an extended one—we shall content ourselves with recommending T. S. to make himself well acquainted with the table, at least so far as to be able to write with ease any numbers to ten places of figures.

As soon as he is familiar with the Numeration Table and its application, he cannot do better than make himself acquainted with the following Algebraic signs, +, −, ×, =, ÷, there is no great difficulty either in these signs or their use.

A few minutes' consideration will make the form $3+6$, represent as clear an idea as " 3 added to 6 ." "The reason they are generally so perplexing is, that they are generally deferred until the student commences Algebra, when he has often at the same time to grapple with the representation of numbers by letters, the distinction of known and unknown quantities, the signs of which we have been speaking, and the use of figures as the exponents of letters; either of these four things is quite sufficient for any one time, and there is no period more favourable for beginning to make use of the signs than when the habit of performing the operation commences."

The best way to become thoroughly familiar with these signs, is by putting together the simplest numbers in this new form, *e.g.*,

$$\begin{array}{rcl} 6+3 & = & 9 \\ 1+8+4 & - & 3 = 7+2+1 \end{array}$$

These, and such exercises as these, will render the signs perfectly familiar to him. The names of the signs may be gathered from any work, on Arithmetic, and are given in the last number of the "Controversialist," under the head of "Mathematics."

One thing it may be necessary here to mention, because it is generally overlooked. It is desirable that in the first instance, before any steps are taken in the way of working exercises, that the learner should know the Addition Table, at least, so far as to be able to add any number of units, to any number whatever, without an effort. This may be accomplished by learning the table. The Addition Table is by no means difficult to learn. The Multiplication Table is more difficult. This however, on the first instant, need not be learned beyond 9 times 9 . It is desirable, however, that as the learner proceeds, he should learn it to 20 times 20 . The exercise in this table will furnish him with a fine opportunity for making himself familiar with the use of the signs for Multiplication and Division. He may with profit make for himself a great number of such equations as the following:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} 7 \times 9 & = & 63 \\ 45 & - & 5 \\ \hline & 9 & \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{rcl} 9 \times 8 \times 3 & & \\ \hline & 12 & \end{array} = 18$$

We should advise him to make many such as the first two, on the impulse, and correct them by the table. By this means he may render himself thoroughly master of the signs and the table at the same time.

The books we should recommend are, Professor De Morgan's Principles of Arithmetic, 5s., and either Thompson's Arithmetic, 3s. 6d., or the Large Arithmetic, published by the Irish National Society. Keith, by Maynard, is a good book, but rather expensive. If the principles are well digested, the book of Exercises is of secondary importance.

Geometry.—By this term we generally understand Euclid's Elements of Geometry. We have used Lardner's version, which we believe may now be had for 5s. 10d. Some use Simpson's, others, Bell's. It is, however, as in Arithmetic, a matter of but secondary importance what book we use. We think Lardner more concise and also clearer than some we have seen; besides, he often gives two or three methods of demon-

strating the same proposition, which is an advantage. The learner, however, must not imagine that when he has obtained the book, all he has to do is to read it through as fast as possible; an error of this sort would be fatal. He has in some sense to make every part of it, as far as he proceeds, his own. But he has not to get it by heart; to do this would be fatal to the end he has in view. The study is designed not to train the memory, so much as the reasoning powers.

The first thing that demands our attention on opening the book, is the *definitions*. The definition of the simple terms point, line, and surface, have given rise to much discussion; but the difficulties which attend them are not of a nature to embarrass the beginner: provided he will rest content with the notions which he has already derived from observation, no explanation can make these terms more intelligible. To them may be added the words "straight line," which cannot be mistaken for one moment, unless it be by means of the attempt to explain them by saying, that a straight line is "that which lies evenly between its extreme points." It would be well to commit the other definitions to memory, as also the postulates and axioms. This is a matter of some importance, as he will have constantly to recur to them in demonstrating the propositions. If they are not committed to memory, they must, at least, be thoroughly understood.

This done, he must furnish himself with a piece of chalk, a black board, and a duster; in default of these, a slate and pencil may be made to answer the purpose. Thus equipped, he may proceed with the various propositions. Nothing is more common than for students to suppose that they understand a proposition, before they are able well to work it. It is therefore desirable, where it can be had, to have a friend with whom he can go over it after he has worked it alone.

The student will not find the labour lost, if, as he advances, instead of taking for granted earlier propositions upon which the more advanced ones are based, as is generally done in the book, he works the more important ones back to the axioms.

For further information on this subject, we refer the querist to "Mathematics,"—Library of Useful Knowledge, 6s. G. N.

32. *Chemistry* is a science so comprehensive in its nature, that no definition of it has yet been given which is possessed of perfect logical precision. The name itself seems to be derived from the Greek $\chi\epsilon\omega$ or $\chi\upsilon\omega$ to melt or fuse, and bears a much more intimate relation to the metallic-transmutation dreams of the Alchemists, than to the *modus operandi* of the modern science. The chief objects of Chemistry are to investigate the nature and properties of the elementary substances of which matter is composed, to discover the relative proportions in which they unite, and the means of effecting their separation when combined; and to acquire a knowledge of the laws of the phenomena resulting from their mutual affinities or repulsions. It inquires 1st, What are the general powers and properties of matter? 2nd, What are the properties of the elementary properties of which matter consists, and their capacities of mutual action and

reaction? 3rd, What are the different properties of the diverse compound substances which these simple elements form, when variously combined? In consequence of the extensive nature of the inquiries in which it engages, it has been found expedient to divide and subdivide it into very numerous sections, and thus, by the adoption of the "division of labour system," its progress has been comparatively rapid, and the benefits derivable from it, have been co-extensive with its cultivation, as well as almost simultaneous with its progression. As a science it is intimately connected with all others which have for their object the investigation of natural phenomena, *e.g.*, the causes of rain, hail, ice, wind, volcanoes, earthquakes, meteors, *aurora boreales*, climates, seasons, vegetation, the formation of *strata*, the action of manure, the qualities of the various medicinal earths and plants, and the various phenomena of "life, health, and disease." Its two chief divisions are *Organic* and *Inorganic Chemistry*. These are farther subdivided into *philosophical* or *theoretical*, *meteorological*, *geological*, *agricultural*, *physiological*, *pathological*, *therapeutic*, or *pharmaceutical*, *hygienic*, *applied*, and *electric chemistry*.

Organic Chemistry treats of the elements, properties, and combinations, of organized substances, whether vegetable or animal.

Inorganic Chemistry teaches us the constituent elements and properties, the affinities and repulsions of unorganized matter, such as minerals, metals, waters, and gases.

Philosophical or *Theoretical Chemistry* explains the signification and details of the laws of the various affinities, *e.g.*, the affinity of cohesion and chemical affinity; describes the phenomena of fusion, solution, crystallization, saturation, ebullition, neutralization, &c., and defines the changes or modifications of temperature, density, form, &c., which bodies undergo in chemical processes. It shews that affinities co-exist between two simple bodies—a simple one and a compound, or two compounds respectively—that affinity is unequally displayed in different bodies towards others, and explains the causes of this electivity, and the various circumstances which modify it. It measures the degrees of affinity which bodies, whether simple or compound, exhibit. It notices attentively the modifying causes which assist or hinder the exertion of the attractive power, and demonstrates that two bodies will not act upon each other, unless one of them, at least, is in a state of solution—that even bodies in a fluid state will only act upon each other at imperceptibly intimate distances—that sometimes two bodies may be combined through their affinity for a third—and, that each compound possesses entirely new properties from those of either body, in its simple state.

From these principles, it proceeds to the investigation of bodies themselves—examines the effects of the imponderable agents, caloric, (heat) light, electricity, and magnetism—the nature of inflammable bodies, and of gases and fluids—the combinations and decompositions of acids—the nature and qualities of salts—the relations of salts and acids—the calcination, fusion, alloying, and assaying of metals—the nature and constituent elements of plants—the phenomena of life—the properties of animal bodies—the pro-

cesses, characteristics, and results, of the decay of organized structures, &c.

Meteorological Chemistry has for its object the investigation of all those various phenomena which occur in the region of the atmosphere, *e.g.*, clouds, mist, fog, rain, hail, snow, ice, meteoric stones, *ignes futui*, *aurora boreales*, and the different species of fulgurites, waterspouts, evaporation, condensation, &c., the relation of the atmosphere to the barometer, thermometer, and hygrometer, and all those chemical processes which go on in the air.

Geological Chemistry chiefly considers the mighty combinative forces of material bodies, *e.g.*, the producing causes of volcanoes and earthquakes, of metallic ores, coal strata, salt and lime beds. It inquires into the results of deluges, water currents, the formation of basalt, and other species of conglomerate and derivative rocks, the influences of climate on plants and animals, and the various other important considerations which the changes which have occurred, or are still in operation, in the nature, deposition, or qualities of the crust of the earth, are calculated to educe.

Agricultural Chemistry treats of the general properties of matter, which are in any manner connected with the art of culture, heat, light, electricity, gravity, cohesion, and affinity—the elements which enter into the formation of plants, with the laws by which they are combined and arranged in their organization—the structure of the vegetable tribes, the rotation of crops, the chemical composition of their parts, and the substances found in them, the properties of soils, manures, &c., &c.

Physiological Chemistry employs itself in the investigation of the processes, changes, and transformations which are the consequences and phenomena of life, as developed in animal bodies.

Pathological Chemistry explains the changes, results, and phenomena of disease, whether organic or superinduced.

Therapeutic, or *Pharmaceutical Chemistry* treats of the nature and effects of *MEDICINAL SUBSTANCES*, and the method of preparing and preserving them.

Hygienic Chemistry instructs us in the properties of healthy air, the advantages of ventilation, the method of protecting ourselves from the contagious nature of some diseases, the necessity of wholesome victuals, and exposes the evils of fashion, custom, occupation, and residence, in so far as they relate to health.

Applied Chemistry is the theoretical and scientific deductions of the science employed in the furtherance and perfectionment of the arts; for example, dyeing, bleaching, glass making, tanning, calico printing, and metalurgy, depend for their processes on ascertained chemical facts. Bread baking, purifying oils, brewing, distillation, &c., are all dependent on chemical knowledge. This department of chemistry aims at discovering, improving, perfecting, simplifying, and extending those processes, by which our wants may be provided for, our tastes gratified, our health cared for, and our comforts increased.

Electro-Chemistry describes the various powers which the agency of Electricity exerts in the production of chemical changes.

In next month's issue we will give a short out-

line of the general teachings of chemistry, as a supplement to this notice. S. N.

33. *Pronouncing Dictionary*.—The latest, and we can say upon a careful examination, the best pronouncing dictionary of the English language, is *Worcester's*. It is an American work, but is republished in this country by Bohn, and is fuller in its vocabulary than any other which comes within the reach of the ordinary purchaser. The author has collected the opinions of preceding orthoepists with great industry,

and presents them, in connection with his own judgment, as to the best pronunciation of words that are differently pronounced by different speakers.

"Walker" is quite out of date as an authority in pronunciation, and that with reason. Several such glaring faults as the use of the long *e* of *me* in the two final syllables of *hostility*, run through his work. Phonetic Science was in its infancy in Walker's day, and he did well, considering the helps at his command.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING,

No II.

1st—What is Perpetuity? Name its two sources, and their general mode of operation.

2nd—What is sensation? Mention the different senses, and describe their objects and manner of acting.

3rd—What is Perception?—its differentia from sensation, and the objects of its notice.

4th—What are Ideas?—their varieties, and their characteristics.

5th—What are the practical Rules deducible from a knowledge of the Mind's action, while exerting its Perception?

Notices of Books, etc.

Not the Church, not the Pops, but the Bible. By W. Thwaites. London: Houlston and Stoneman.

This is one of the many "tracts for the times" which the present discussion of the character and claims of the Church of Rome has called into existence. The author's object is to show that "the Fathers" cannot be taken as authorities in matters of religion, seeing that the many serious errors which are referred to in the Epistles, crept into the primitive church. The pamphlet is written in a plain but forcible style, and is worthy of the perusal of all who are interested in this subject.

The Family Sunday Book. By the author of "Pleasant Pages"—monthly, London: Houlston and Stoneman.

Some few months ago we had the pleasure of introducing to our readers Mr. Newcombe's "Pleasant Pages;" we have expressed a high opinion of their value, and, in subsequent issues, we have seen no reason to alter it. The work appears to have so rapidly progressed in public favour as to have encouraged the author to commence the "Family Sunday Book." The name is expressive of its design, which is "to afford interesting and suitable reading for the leisure hours of Sunday." It is addressed to "Christian parents and Infant and Sabbath school teachers," and, doubtless, will meet with a cordial reception from them.

Chapters on Policy v. Straightforwardness. By Frederic R. Young. Ashton-under-Lyne: Mic-klethwaite.

It appears that these "Chapters" originally appeared in a provincial periodical entitled the *Ashton Times*, and they are now printed in a separate form, with a dedication, "*To the Fearful, the Unbelieving, and Hypocritical, in all and every place!*" The object of the author is to contrast Principle with Policy; to show the unchangeable nature and stern requirements of the former, and the world-wide evils of the latter. With the sentiments of some of the chapters many will disagree, while all will admit the force and truthfulness of others. The following passage may be taken, not merely as a specimen of the work, but as an embodiment of its spirit:—

"If a certain course of conduct is right, nothing can make it wrong; while if it is wrong, no power can transform it into right. We admit that circumstances alter cases; but we have yet to learn that circumstances can ever affect principles. That which as a principle was right in the past, remains so now, and ever will be. Thieving is as much a violation of honesty now as it ever was, just because honesty itself remains unchanged. Let us think of this."

Thoughts on the Nature of Man, the propagation of creeds, and the formation of human character. London: Joseph Clayton, 265, Strand.

These thoughts are, to say the least of them,

very immature, and are rather hastily brought before the public. The author ought, in justice to himself and the subject, to have *formed* some opinions on those topics to which he directs the reader's attention. Though the work is valuable as containing a great number of opinions on the points treated of, which have been expressed by many eminent authorities; yet, as a whole, it is only a mass of the "*disiecta membra*" of thought, and will be found by the majority of readers destitute of that logical consecutiveness of treatment which the subject requires. It is beyond our province to discuss the sentiments of the work: it is merely its execution, its literary merit, on which we give judgment. Its author is well read, and might, with a little care, have given his work greater consistency and readability.

Hamilton's Temperance Music Book. London: Houlston and Stoneman.

To the advocates of the crystal element this little, cheap, and excellent work, will be very acceptable. We have tried many of the original airs, and find them very well adapted to the spirit breathing through the words. The price of the work is truly astonishing—forty-eight pages of music and letter-press, well executed, for 6d., is what we could hardly have looked for. "Oh! soft sleep the hills," is a beautiful song, and will become a favourite. It is superior to the generality of Bacchanalian songs. We have often thought that Temperance songs would be the best advocates of the doctrines. Bacchanalians have their "Down among the dead men," and "Wine, mighty wine;" and the Temperance man may now have "A glass! a glass! but not of sherry," "Glorious radiance dancing," and "Rays of light." And even Tam O'Shanter, we think, would forego his "wee drap" to join in—

"Gang hame, then, and drink, John Sharp,
John Sharp;
Gang home, then, and drink, John Sharp,
John Sharp,
Frae the clear crystal spring, an' your house
will soon ring
To the tune of the knife and the fork, John
Sharp."

A Universal Geography, in four parts,—Historical, Mathematical, Physical, and Political.—By the Rev. Thomas Milner, M.A. Illustrated by Ten Maps, with Diagrams and Sections. Tract Society.

This is a cheap but valuable work; it is written with great care, and got up in a superior manner. We have much pleasure in drawing the attention of our readers to it.

The Phonetic Bible; Bath Fables; A Thousand Gems of Thought; Evangeline. All printed phonetically. London: Fred Pitman.

We cordially welcome these works,—the latest issues of the phonetic press. The numerous publications that have already appeared in the new orthography, and the unceasing labours of the

advocates of phonetic writing and printing, may perhaps be taken as an "affirmative" to the inquiry in our first number—"Is it desirable or practical to effect such a Reform in our Spelling as Mr Isaac Pitman proposes." We shall, nevertheless, be open to receive *literary* as well as *business-like* affirmatives to the inquiry; also "negative" papers, for we occasionally hear this new way of spelling much spoken against. For ourselves we must candidly confess that we have yet to hear the first sound argument against it.

Each of the works before us deserves particular notice. To have the whole Bible presented in a phonetic orthography,—each word bearing upon its face the infallible signs of its pronunciation,—is a triumph that we did not expect to see accomplished for many years. It seems to fore-shadow the happy period when men of every land, and every tongue, will possess the Holy Word in their own language, expressed by a phonetic alphabet. The *Bath Fables* consist of fifty original pieces from the pen of the Rev. Sheridan Wilson, who observes in his preface, that "if in the composition of them he has proposed to himself any model, it is Gay for the verse, and Cowper for the moral." Both the spirit and the versification of these fables are excellent. The title of the next work explains its character. The *Gems of Thought* are all of a "moral and spiritual character," and are "extracted from the best authors." So far as we have examined it, we have found it a priceless casket of precious stones; the most valuable compilation of the kind it has been our lot to meet with; and who that is a lover of books does not possess one or more of such compendiums? The sweet *Evangeline* is here dressed in elegant and chaste attire. The book would be an ornament to any drawing-room table, yet it is published at a lower price than any previous edition we have seen.

We may remark, in conclusion, that the extreme legibility of these works, to the eye that is accustomed to ordinary printing,—and particularly when compared with the systems of notation that are adopted in pronouncing dictionaries for the purpose of conveying the pronunciation of words;—is the crowning point of excellence in the phonetic printing alphabet. The full value of books printed phonetically cannot be felt by those who have already learned to read, and by dint of many years' study have acquired an average acquaintance with the pronunciation of the whole language. It is the child, the unlettered adult, and the reader who is at fault in his pronunciation, that experience to the full the advantages of reading by letters that have the same value in all situations. "We undertake to say," observed Messrs Chambers in their *Journal*, in an early notice of phonetic writing, "that, expressed by characters so unequivocal, and so easily distinguished, a savage novice in Christianity would learn to read the Bible in one-twentieth of the time necessary when his language is expressed in English [romanian] characters."

* * Books intended for Review must be forwarded to the Publisher's, Postage or Carriage Free.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XI.

RATIOCINATION.

THE INVESTIGATION AND DISCOVERY OF TRUTH.

"Science is nothing but the finding of analogy—identity in the most remote parts. The ambitious student sits down before each refractory fact, one after another; reduces all strange constitutions, all new powers, to their class and their law; and goes on for ever to animate the last fibre of organisation—the outskirts of Nature—by insight."—*Emerson*.

THE mind of man is naturally filled with a yearning desire—an invincible aspiration—a quenchless curiosity, which continually prompts him to unwearied exertion, in order that he may

"Perceive

The reason and the science of *his* being,
And the relations, with the universe,
Of all things actual and possible."

This God-implanted impulse finds perpetual exercise in the contemplation and investigation of those myriads of co-existent objectivities which he perceives around him in the universe. All that is beautiful, sublime, mysterious, varied, and utile, afford unceasing allurements to human curiosity, and yield incessant occupation to his mental powers. The brilliant, sun-diffused lustrousness which mantles the rosy cheek of morn—the exquisitely tinged flowers which bloom beneath the summer's care—the steep-sided hill, where "the stiff grass amid the heath-plant waves"—

"Here the shadowy main,

Dim-tinted—there the mighty majesty
Of that huge amphitheatre of rich
And elmy fields"

—the ripe harvest-clad landscape—the shadow-yielding forestry—the lake reposing calmly in the bosom of the vale—"the river rushing o'er its pebbled bed," reflecting back the sunbeams' golden gifts—the clouds—the quiet dells—the rock-engirt and wave-washed shore—

"Heaven's ebon vault,

Studded with stars unutterably bright,
Through which the moon's unclouded grandeur rolls"

—the boiling Geyser—the irruptive blaze of the fire-vomiting volcano—the lightning, those "dread arrows of the clouds"—the poison-breath of the simoon—the fury-blast of the hurricane—the wide tempest-weltered ocean—the upheaving earthquake—all natural

phenomena—all animal and vegetable existence—all normal and abnormal states of mind, incite the curiosity and the research of man. It is impossible that he can look unmoved on these Creation-phenomena, nor ask himself those immensely significant questions, Whence? When? How? and Why? Truly it is from scenes and circumstances like these that man drinks in his

“ Intellectual life,
All sweet sensations, all ennobling thoughts,
All adoration of the God in Nature,
All lovely and all honourable things,
Whatever makes his mortal spirit feel
The joy and greatness of his future being! ”

On the eduction of these self-communings depends the mental progress of humanity.—It is not until these ideas spring into being in the human soul that the full glory of his intellectual life can be felt. The universe is the nutrition-agency by which the mental germ is quickened into activity, and the blossomry of thought is produced. As this mind-life and thought-fruitition advances, savagery and superstition is changed, even as the embattled mists that throng around the uprising sun are converted into “ clouds of feathery gold shaded with deepest purple.” There is a purifying and ennobling influence in intellectuality; hence it is that we have faith in the beneficiality of educative exertion, even when it is extended beyond the boundaries which were wont to limit its diffusion; and hence it is that we have endeavoured to give instruction in “ The Art of Reasoning,” beyond the precincts of collegiate halls, and have sought to open up the well-springs of knowledge to all classes who earnestly desire to drink of their mind-improving waters.

We have now arrived at that point in our prelections at which we may intelligibly and profitably describe “ the method and order of truth-investigation,” and, by a few examples culled from the bright page which chronicles the conquests of science, demonstrate that it may be said of Logic—“ The art itself is Nature.”

Observation is the origin of all knowledge—the primal external agency by which the germ of mentality is nourished into growth. The senses are the agents through which observation acquires a knowledge of external objects, and the perceptions thus attained are the crude materials which enter the mind as *facts*, and are subsequently ripened into *Truth*. Facts are the single stones of which the edifice of Science is upbuilt,—of small value scattered and isolated, but collectively of great and essential service in the erection of the temple of Truth. By observation, facts receive an entrance into the mind, and thus become the objects upon which Memory, Judgment, and Reason, exercise themselves; in which process Truth is evolved and certitude attained. We cannot open our eyes to the perception of the light, expand our ear to receive the undulations of the air, or place our senses in any relation to those stimuli which excite them to action, without being impressed by the objectivities around, and thus may, in one sense, be said to observe. This however, is not the observation of which we speak. We mean the observation in which the developing thought-powers engage themselves when the shadows of great thoughts loom hazily around the horizon of the mind—when the soul first begins to be awakened to the pleasures of intellectual exertion, and seeks to penetrate the secrets of that world of

mysterious beauty and grandeur of which it finds itself a denizen. The observation on which we are remarking does not content itself with merely noticing the phenomena which present themselves to our sensational ken; but it goes after, it searches for, and seeks to place itself in relation with, other phenomena lying beyond, though capable of tangentiating upon, that circle. Observation is to look upon Creation with a thoughtful eye;—is to exercise discrimination and discernment;—is carefully to note the purposes, functions, qualities, and differences of objects, and thus to take the initiatory step in that series of mental processes which enables us to perceive the elements, operations, results, and causes of things,—originates science,—and effectuates the acquirement of Truth.

Hypothesis succeeds Observation, and is a new exertion of the mental powers. It postulates the accuracy of the investigations in which observation was employed, and from this early step in truth-search, strives to rise "higher still, and higher." It accepts from observation its account of the phenomenal facts which it had gathered;—receives these as the *data* of its speculations, and then asks under what generic formula the law which regulates their interdependency may be expressed; and thus seeks to account for the causation of phenomena, and makes a guess at what may reasonably be considered as a solution of the causality of the facts of observation. It proceeds upon the ground that where certain determinate conditions exist, certain determinate causative agencies have preceded, and certain determinate results will follow them; and from the few, and perhaps ill-arranged, facts with which observation furnishes it, strives to deduce some probable truth. For this purpose it *subpones* or *underlays* an hypothesis or imaginary explanation of the causes which superinduce any given series of phenomenal manifestations. The operation to be performed in the formation of an hypothesis is this;—given a certain series of phenomena, concerning which we know of no efficient producing cause, to assign the probable causality of that series. This is evidently a tentative process—a calculation of likelihoods and probabilities which is not to be accepted as Truth, but merely taken as a guide or helper in our investigations of Truth. The grand object of Hypothesis is to discover a conception which will bind together in our mentality, the coherencies, derivations, and relations of phenomena. This, of course, must be formed by the facts of observation suggesting to, or originating in, the mind an idea which may account for them; this idea, of course, implying that something corresponding to it exists in the phenomenal series. Hypothesis is an incipient theory—a gratuitous assumption, by which we are enabled to collate, classify, and generalize phenomena. There is a widely prevalent prejudice in the present age against hypotheses and theories. We need not say that we do not share in it; we consider hypothesis a perfectly legitimate operation of the intellectual faculties. For it is quite evident that by discursive or general observation, facts can only be accumulated, as it were, in unorganized heaps—in unsystematized groups, or chaotisms; but the elements of many sciences—the rudiments of many truths, may exist in these facts. How then are either sciences or truths to be elicited from these conglomerated individual facts;—how are they to be disentangled from the ravelment in which they are amassed, and be woven into a web of celestial dye? Clearly by searching among them in order to discover a probable sequency and subordination, which may be afterwards subjected to verification. This the

mind, in framing hypotheses, does:—it organises the facts of observation—arranges the unsystematized chaotisms into analogous groups—collocates the individualities of the masses according to certain relations and congruencies which it supposes it perceives among them;—it adjusts and classifies sensational impressions into certain sequences—endeavours to imagine what the order of these phenomenal manifestations may be—strives to estimate their probable collateralities and successions—which is first, which middlemost or intermediate, and which final; and thus the understanding gives them a supposititious *oneness*, and the mind is able to look upon each of these groups of multiplex facts—the *data* of science and the elements of truth—as a sequent and systematic whole. Some such mental process as this, therefore, we consider as distinctly necessary in all our researches; for unless some such definite idea as this affords us—some fixed notion of what we are in search of—be carried along with us in our induction, we shall be apt to accumulate not only false, but superfluous, experiences, and thus be retarded in our progress, or bewildered in our search. This *a priori*, though observation-suggested, conception, which we endeavour to substantiate by Induction, is the lamp which we bear along with us, to enable us the more certainly to thread the labyrinth of discovery. We place this hypothetical conception before us, and then “interrogate” each objectivity of the class we meet, as to how far it lends support to it; upon the response of these oracles depends the fate of our hypothesis. This is the prescient questioning (*prudens interrogatio*), which Bacon says is the one-half of science (*est dimidium scientiæ*). Whence, then, so great zeal for the “Inductive Philosophy” as to decry all hypothetical opinions? Whence this narrow-minded “Positivism” which calls so loudly for “rigid induction, and nothing else”? Whence this disparagement of the grandly conceptive thought-powers of our nature? *Dux atque imperator vitæ mortalium animus est*;* why then should we seek to limit its power, or circumscribe the range of its activities. Bacon recalled men’s minds from verbal disputations to an attention to facts; but he did not thereby assert that we were to neglect that “magic light” with which the soul illumines Nature. We are inclined to believe with Coleridge, that Bacon demands as the motive for and guide of all truth-search “the intellectual or mental initiative,” which is only to be found in Hypothesis. It would be strange were these sticklers for “rigid induction” to find that their “great master” was in the field against them. And we think he is so:—we think that he fully appreciated the need and value of hypothesis, and did not limit his philosophy to a mere barren catalogue of facts. We can only at present cite as evidence his aphorisms on “Inchoate interpretation, or the first vintage,” his tables “on Heat,” and the following very significant extract from his “Distributio Operis”:—*“Etenim experimentorum longè major est subtilitas quàm sensus ipsius, licet instrumentis exquisitis adjuti (de iis loquimur experimentis quæ ad intentionem ejus quod quaeritur peritè et secundum artem excogitata et apposita sunt).”*† Do not these fully

* “The soul is the leader and commander of the lives of men.”

† “For the delicacy of investigation attainable by experiments, is much greater than is possible by the senses, although aided by the most perfect instruments (we speak of those experiments which are judiciously and ingeniously devised and employed, in accordance with the intention which presides over the investigation.)”—“Distributio Operis,” pars prima, paragraph 9.

substantiate our opinion that Bacon did not object to Hypothesis when duly subordinated to subsequent verification by the inductive process? What mere cant is it, then—this zealous clamour for “rigid induction”? Who has ever gained Truth by the *mere* collocation of numberless items of observation, and brought not forth from the resources of his own inner nature the colligating conception—the idea which forms the *substration* on which the mind rests as the expression of an ultimate fact in Nature? Is there nothing more required in the investigation of phenomena than the mere sensational powers exercised in classifying objectivities? or is there an exertion of the Reason—a mental education *subponed* beneath the facts which observation yields? For our own parts, we believe that there are two elements in Knowledge—the facts of phenomenal manifestation, and the inner conceptive power which reduces these facts to law, and presents them to the intellect, no longer isolated, loose, detached, and unconnected, but conjoined, colligated, and subordinated—their dependencies determined and their relations methodized. It is from considerations such as these that we advance the assertion, that Hypothesis is a perfectly legitimate exertion of the intellection, and holds its place in the series of mental operations on which Truth-investigation depends. It must be distinctly recollected, however, that being but an assumed explanation of the phenomena, it is only a tentative process,—one which must be put to the proof, and be tested in every possible manner. “Hypotheses are susceptible of the highest degree of evidence when two conditions are fulfilled—when the given Hypothesis explains many phenomena, and contradicts none—and when every other Hypothesis is inconsistent with some of the phenomena.”*

Induction is the testing operation through which all hypothetical opinions must be made to pass. The method in which this process is performed has been already fully explained;† and here it is our intention merely to mention it briefly, as forming one of that grand series of mental states upon which the investigation of Truth depends, and from which its discovery results. Induction is systematised observation—an experiment or series of experiments to prove or disprove an hypothesis. It re-observes the facts on which the Hypothesis is founded;—endeavours to extend its view to facts beyond those which have been already presented to the mind. Sometimes, to aid its investigations, it strives to invent in miniature a model of the phenomena which it discovers, and seeks by various experiments to test the accuracy of the reports concerning external objects or internal states which perceptivity brings to the mind. Having thus, by a careful and patient survey of apparent facts, in every possible light and position in which the mental faculties can be made to view them, ascertained their actuality, it accumulates and classifies them,—compares them with the supposititious account which the Hypothesis had given,—refers them to their proximate causes, and then by specifying and generalizing these causes, subsequently arrives at a knowledge of the simple law from which all these phenomenal manifestations ultimately result. If this law and that enounced in the Hypothesis coincide, we have attained a Truth. If this Truth be arrived at by an accurate and sufficiently generalized Induction, we may from it deduce new truths, and foresee the

occurrence and recurrence of certain yet unmanifested facts; and, in the words of Dr. Whewell, "It must, one would think, strike all persons in proportion to their thoughtfulness, that when Nature thus does our bidding, she acknowledges that we have learnt her true language. If we can predict new facts which we have not seen, as well as explain those which we have seen, it must be because our explanation is not a mere *formula* of observed facts, but a truth of a deeper kind." By Observation we received the spontaneous and immethodical results of externalities operating on our senses, or the unregulated intimations of our Consciousness; but in Induction, Volition is exercised, and by an effort of our Will, the phenomena, whether of mind or matter, are detained for the inspection of the Intellect. By this energy of the Will, the Attention is aroused, the knowledge-attaining faculties are quickened, and have their powers intensified. The passivity or inertia of the mind is overcome, and activity or motivity is conveyed to the cognitive capacities. In the one case, the sensational powers are free and purposeless,—in the other, regulated and subordinated to a mentally-originated design. In Observation, even although the activities be exercised, the mental efforts are comparatively valueless, because undirected and aimless; but in Induction, no exertion of the intellect is uselessly consumed; for it informs us either of the truth or falsehood of our preconceptions. In the former process we *find* facts—in the latter, we "*go out and compel them to come in.*" The object of Induction is verification—is the establishment of some definite formula, law, or conception, under which the mind may accurately survey a series of phenomena. If our previous observation has been limited, injudicious, or erroneous, the hypothesis which we have built upon that observation will be inconformable to truth. When, therefore, the facts and the hypothesis are compared, the incorrectness will be discovered, and a new hypothesis will be rendered necessary.

Theory is an ordained account of the facts which accurate Inductive Observation has ascertained. It is the result of Intellectual Observation or reflective penetration. Theory is educed by the accurate survey of facts, in order to discern the law or laws by which they are governed, and under which they act,—the mind, abstracting the attention from the facts, and fixing it upon the law or laws by which their action is produced,—succeeds in dis severing in the intellection,—*i.e.*, contemplatively, not in reality,—the experience or facts from the law or laws of their *modus operandi*, and by expressing this in a definite formula enables the mentality to contemplate the *method* of fact-evolution disjoined from the *manner* of fact-existence;—in other words, Theory ordines experience, and then the mind can reflect upon the expression of this ordination independently of the experience from which the formula of ordination was eliminated. Theory is an organised view of the mutual relations which subsist in any series of phenomena. By it the antecedents, causative agency, and consequents of a train of facts, is determined; and the *linealities* of phenomena are sundered, in the mind's eye, from their *collateralities*. Every true theory is the expression of a *fact* in Nature,—bears reference to, and gives a solution of, the law or laws, of what metaphysicians term the *forms* of phenomenal manifestations.

Before proceeding to illustrate the preceding reasoning by an appeal to the facts of science, we may be permitted to make the following brief recapitulation:—Observation collects examples, instances; and may inform us of facts, though it cannot unaidedly

communicate any knowledge of truths. Hypothesis strives to classify the results of Observation under some general (supposititious) law; when this law is postulated, systematised observation,—*i.e.*, Induction—is called into action, to compare the results which would flow from this (imaginary) law, with the actual processes of Nature. If these agree, the Hypothesis is correct, and becomes Theory, *i.e.*, the means by which the mind may contemplatively survey any series of facts, and from the laws discovered as ruling amongst these, can deduce new facts or infer new truths. Observation, Hypothesis, Induction, and Theory, form one continuous system of mental operations, every one of which must be called into action before we can ascertain any new truth, or acquire any acquaintance with those laws which enable us to colligate the facts of Nature into systematised groups, the union-bonds of which we can perceive.

We have already more than hinted our belief that the history of Science fully confirms the opinions advanced in the foregoing portion of this paper, and we purpose to devote the remainder of our space to a brief attempt to prove that the “investigation of truth” whether in Science or in Art, has proceeded according to the plan sketched out in this article, and that the “discovery of truth” has uniformly resulted from the pursuance of the method hereintofore described. For this the following succinctly-detailed examples will suffice:—

Franklin *observed* the similarity between the spark elicited from an electrical machine and that exhibited while the lightning’s flash spread its broad glare along the arched sky; he *supposed* that they were identical—reduced his *hypothesis* to experiment; floated his kite through the black surcharged heavens—brought down the electric fluid from the gloomy cloud—and by this *Induction*, proved the truth of his hypothesis, and enlarged, if he did not remodel, the *Theory* of electric science.

Senefelder *observed* that a certain kind of compact granular limestone had the property of imbibing grease, and *knew* that grease and water have an antipathy to each other. He supposed that were a drawing or writing made on a piece of paper with an ink of a greasy nature,—*e.g.*, one composed of wax, soap, and lampblack,—placed on a stone—and then washed over with water, the stone would imbibe the greasy matter of the drawing or writing, while the wet part of the stone would resist amalgamation with the ink employed. This was an *Hypothesis*. He reduced this supposition to experiment—a process of *Induction*,—and eminent success was the result. Thus was “Lithography” discovered. The expression of the principles upon which this art is founded constitutes the *Theory* of it, and from this Theory the farther results of Chromo-lithography and Anastatic printing have subsequently been deduced.

On the first day of the year 1801, Ceres, one of a group of small planets called the Asteroids, was discovered by Piazzi of Palermo, and subsequent investigation has increased their number to fourteen. Let us inquire how this series of planetary bodies was discovered, and compare the process by which this was accomplished, with the mode of investigation and discovery of which we have been treating. The Baron de Zach *observed* that all the known planets, except those of Mars and Jupiter, revolved in orbits possessed of a definite ratio to each other, which nearly corresponded to double distances; but that between the two abovementioned there was a great gap—an abyssmal infinitude—with no known planet

occupying it. He *assumed* that Nature was uniform in her operations, and that if a planet were found in that, so far as hitherto known, untenanted immensity, the law would be completely realized, and the whole series of the orbits of the planets would be brought into definite proportions to each other. This idea led to the *hypothesis*, that a planet did actually exist, and he calculated the orbit which it should occupy fifteen years prior to the known existence of any planet in that part of the sky. In consequence of this idea, a convention of astronomers was held at Lilienthal, in 1800, who determined to map out the heavens into twenty-four zones, and by taking up one each, to search for the supposititious planet. A short time after they commenced the search, Piazzi observed Ceres moving in its hitherto unnoticed pathway, and Bode's law became an astronomical *Theory*.

From this law, discovered by Bode, a knowledge of the "law of perturbations," and the observation of the irregularities of Uranus, Mr. Adams made the *hypothesis*, that beyond the infinitude occupied by this supposed sentinel-planet, another starry wanderer had his home. To resolve this by *Induction* was, however, a difficult task;—nevertheless, with an ardour and exactness which struck the scientific world with surprise, the difficult inverse problem he had set himself was solved, and in October, 1845, he was able to say, "Look at a given point in the infinity of the celestial vault, at a given time, and a star, unseen as yet by mortal eye, will present itself to view:—that planet causes the irregularities of Uranus." The Astronomer-Royal of Britain did not make use of the *data* of discovery which Mr. Adams put into his hands, but the same, or, at least, a similar hypothesis had entered into the mind of a French mathematician—Leverrier—a similar process of computation was gone through, and the results were presented to M. Galle, of Berlin, informing him the position the planet would occupy on the 23rd of September, 1846: on that day the given space was explored, and a new planet—Neptune—was revealed to man.

Had we space, we might detail a thousand others; but the above will be sufficient to prove that the opinions contained in the previous portion of our paper are correct, and that Observation, Hypothesis, Induction, and Theory, form the links of a chain of mental operations which are needful in "the investigation and discovery of Truth."

"Let us descend now, therefore, from this top
Of speculation, for *exhausted space*
Exacts our parting."

WERE I (says Sir John Herschel) to pray for a taste which should stand me in stead under every variety of circumstances, and be a source of happiness and cheerfulness during life, and a shield against its ills, however things might go amiss, and the world frown upon me, it would be a taste for reading. Give a man this taste, and the means of gratifying it, and you can hardly fail of making him a happy man; unless, indeed, you put into his hands a most perverse selection of books. You place him in contact with the best society in every period of history, with the wisest, the witiest, the tenderest, the bravest, and the purest characters who have adorned humanity. You make him a denizen of all nations, a contemporary of all ages. The world has been created for him.

Religion.

IS SECTARIANISM CHRISTIAN?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.*

THE extreme brevity of the question has rendered it rather ambiguous. If the proposer means to ask whether the present divided state of Christ's Church is of his own appointment, or whether it may be taken as a demonstration of the tendency of his gospel, we are prepared to say—No. But if the questioner intends to ask whether the Church of Christ may exist on earth in a divided state, and whether it may be distracted with schism, without being charged with apostacy, we are ready to say—Yes. Believing that the former rendering is not the true sense of the question, we shall only say in reference to it, that so fully convinced are we of the evils arising from such a state of things in the church, that, had we understood the question in that sense, we should have been among the first to take the negative side. But believing that we are not so much called upon, in this question, to acknowledge these evils, as to apologize for them, we shall briefly attempt to show that they are necessary evils, and that they arise from the circumstances in which the church is placed, not from the principles upon which it is founded. To this end we may consider, in the first place, that Christianity, no less than Reason, recognizes the right of private judgment; and, secondly, Sectarianism naturally flows from the full enjoyment of this common and Christian right.

1st. In a world where Nature, calling into exercise the intelligent principle she has implanted in man, has hid the Truth, that it might be sought,—and having hidden it alike from all, has granted to each, in the bestowment of reasoning powers, the same means of attaining it; in such circumstances, we say, it is clear that Nature has treated us impartially—making no difference in our conditions, and therefore no difference in our rights, in relation to truth. Hence, each individual being possessed of reasoning

powers of his own, and Truth having no other test of which he can avail himself, I, as one, should feel it to be unjust on the part of another, of whose reasoning powers I could not avail myself, should he require me to believe, without the consent of my own reason, what he may have tested by his, and felt to be true. Could we imagine that Nature had set up somewhere one set of reasoning powers for the use of mankind at large, in consequence of which we might have some warrant to expect that all would take the same views, and that all would hold the same creed,—then one man might, with some show of justice, require another to believe as he himself believes. But as it is, the only assurance which a man can give his neighbour that he possesses the truth is, that the doctrine he honours with the name of truth has undergone the test of his own reasoning; and, therefore, while others find that they are equally provided with the means of discovering truth—that they are able to bring the same doctrine to the very same test for themselves, and, in so doing, arrive at different conclusions—the assumption of authority *derived from so humble a source*, can add nothing to the right the one enjoys to affirm a thing to be true, as it stands opposed to that by which another affirms the same thing to be false; and is, therefore a bubble which explodes the instant it comes in contact with the even scales in which these equal rights are justly weighed. Yet pause here, for a moment, to reflect how man, in all ages, has disregarded rights which Nature has so equally distributed, and Reason so clearly recognised. History unrolls to our view the map of the moral world, and every country is coloured with blood,—the most civilised are only distinguished by the deeper shades of crimson; while its details reveal the fact, that all the cruelties and crimes of Pagan, Christian, and Mohammedan persecutions are so many

* The printer, by mistake, added the word "Concluded" to the last articles under this head.

evidences of a latent despotic propensity in human nature, manifesting itself in man's universal disposition to reason for his fellow man, and suppress the right of private judgment.

Christianity, we have said, recognises, no less than Reason, these common rights of man. True, it calls upon us, imperatively, to believe, but, at the same time, it gives us such reasons for believing, as renders unbelief, in the sight of God, inexcusable and criminal. And here let us be careful to distinguish between the prerogatives of God and the rights of man. In my weak capacity as a man, I cannot see how another may regard those Divine reasonings which have won the full assent of my understanding. He may, for anything I know, have addressed himself with as much honesty of purpose to the task of discovering truth with respect to Christianity as I have done; but his reason may have led him to conclude it is false; or, from indolent reluctance to undertake the task, distaste to the subject, or some other motive, he may have been unwilling to believe that it is true. These are secrets known only to himself and to God; and my utter ignorance respecting them deprives me of the power and right to judge of the moral nature of his unbelief. But God, knowing every heart, has the power to trace the origin of unbelief, and therefore the right to judge of its moral nature. If I have any right to condemn unbelief in another as criminal, it is because the doctrine of the turpitude of unbelief is part of the faith I have been constrained by reason to accept, and is a doctrine which must be received, as coming from Him whose authority has been already established by evidences of which my reason has approved. God having reserved to himself the power to watch the workings of every man's mind, has assured us, upon authority we have accepted as infallible, that unbelief is sin. Therefore he that has been brought by Reason, to accept Christianity, with all its doctrines, is to be understood as giving credit to God's judgment, not using his own, when he affirms that his neighbour's unbelief is morally wrong. Truth is one—everywhere and always consistent with itself:—there cannot be two contradictory truths. Therefore, if the Christian has

accepted Christianity as truth, he cannot grant that his unbelieving neighbour may have the truth, too. He cannot, if he truly believes, even for a moment, drop his belief, to grant that his neighbour may be right and that he may be wrong:—he must believe that his neighbour is wrong, and—according to the principles of his faith—morally wrong. But through all this, it may be clearly seen, that though God regards and punishes unbelief as sin, and though the Christian believes it to be sin, there is neither on the part of God, nor of the Christian, any disposition to infringe upon the liberty of conscience or the freedom of opinion. The Christian, maintaining, as he does, that the opinions of the sceptic must be wrong, is not, in this, persecuting the unbeliever—is not thrusting his opinions upon him,—is not seeking to reason for him, or depriving him of the right to reason for himself;—it is on the part of the Christian an exercise of the right to think for himself, which leaves unrestricted, and untouched, the free exercise of the same right in every one else. And God, when he condemns unbelief as sin, does not, in this, deny to his creatures the free use of their reason. He knows how he has constituted, and where he has placed us, and he respects the work of his hands. Therefore, when he comes to his creatures for homage and obedience, he waits at the door of their hearts till reason bids him enter. He would gain the assent of their reason to the righteousness of his claims before he demands their service; and therefore he has said, "Come, let us reason together." Yea, more, he lays aside the dread accompaniments and marks of his authority, and descends to the condition of his creatures,—to meet reason at her own home, and to win her with demonstrations of his truth in every form in which she can desire to receive them. And it is not till she, of herself, is brought to bow and acknowledge his authority, that he leaves her, and ascending into the higher regions of truth, where mysteries cloud his throne, speaks with the trumpet voice of his authority, saying, "Come up hither." If, after this deference paid to the reason of man, we find God regarding his unbelief as sin, we need no other reason for it than this;—had man availed himself of the means within

his power of coming to the knowledge of the truth, *God sees* that his reason would have brought him to his footstool.

Having thus seen that Christianity does not *interfere* with man's right to reason for himself, it is easy to see that it *directly acknowledges* and secures that right. It deals with man in his individual capacity—calling upon each to “work out his own salvation with fear and trembling,” and warning us that “every one of us must give an account of himself to God;” and while its promises and threatenings come home to each heart, arousing the passion of self-regard so deeply seated there;—it bids every man “search and see,” “be fully persuaded in his own mind,” and “prove all things, and hold fast that which is good.” Christianity, we therefore say, recognizes and grants to every man, with freedom of opinion, the right of private judgment.

2ndly. Sectarianism flows from the full enjoyment of this common and Christian right. It may be said, “If the free use of this Christian right is followed by schism, is it not a proof that the church which has been thus broken up into parts, was *not the church of Christ*, else it would have borne uninjured the test of free inquiry?” We reply, most assuredly it is not. With us it rather confirms the supposition, that where a mass of human infirmity has long preserved the form of entire and unfractured unity, it has maintained this form at the cost of this precious right. In the church of Rome, for instance, were freedom of opinion proclaimed to-day, where, by the next change of the moon, would be her boasted unity? We believe that a little inquiry would show that her pretensions to an attribute which, in such perfection, can alone adorn the church in heaven, is as much a cheat upon us as the “mouldy bread and clouted shoes” of her antiquity. But Sectarianism, on the contrary, appears to us the form in which we should naturally expect to find a church in which liberty of conscience has been proclaimed to “just men” not yet “made perfect.” While it discloses the universal condition of man, in his relation to truth,—the weakness of his reason,—the narrowness of his views,—the poverty of his attainments in the acquisition of truth—in short, that “here he knows but in part”—it, at the same time, affords an

evidence of the clearness and consistency of God's truth, and of his care to be universally understood aright upon all points essential to salvation, in the fact, that its varied sects are found to hold the same views on every point essential to salvation. Being, then, agreed, in head and heart, with regard to all things God has insisted upon as necessary to salvation, and disagreeing on those points only on which he has not so insisted, there appears no difficulty in viewing those sects which so far agree, and only so far differ, as constituting a church—a temple, in which the Holy Spirit may dwell, and shed around his light and love. We are ignorant of the extent of that province of the soul to which the Holy Spirit has confined his mysterious operations; but we know, from the fact that he dwelt in the apostles, who differed and contended upon certain minor points of doctrine, that he does dwell in those who “hold the head,” and yet “see not eye to eye.” Farther, when we consider that his work is a progressive work—that under his influence we “grow in grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ,” we may understand the assurance, that “he shall guide us into all truth,” as an assurance that the work he has begun in us he will finish—that we shall “go on from strength to strength, till every one of us shall appear before God”—and that “then face to face,” and not as “through a glass darkly,” “we shall know as we are known.” “My thoughts are not as your thoughts, neither are my ways as your ways, saith the Lord.” God, in his survey of the church below, may disdain to regard the petty differences which have divided his church,—he may disdain to notice those distinctive marks *they* have set upon themselves, who, as believers in Christ, and as servants of God, are distinguished from the rest of mankind by the “seal in their foreheads.” “The Lord knoweth them that are his.” While we are unable to fix the confines of his church—while we, in our attempt to view it in its general character, may add sects that do not belong to it, and separate sects that do—he, recognizing us, not as Independents, and Baptists, and Wesleyans, and Churchmen, and distinguished by other marks, but as his children—as “sheep,” distinct and separate from the “goats”—as

"wheat," from the "tares"—as "servants" and "friends," from "enemies"—must see his church as vividly relieved from the rest of this dark world, as was the land of Goshen by the light which fell upon it in the midst of the plague of darkness which reigned around.

Sectarianism, then, arising from the liberty God has given us, to think for ourselves,—and from the ignorance within us, and the circumstances without, which, together, tend to vary the operations of our reason,—and being, as we find it, but a conscientious adherence to non-essential points of doctrine, which destroys not the "unity

of the Spirit," and the oneness of the church,—we conclude that, in the sense in which we have understood the question, it is perfectly Christian. 'Tis Christianity but ill-accommodated in her sojourn with depraved humanity:—'tis the water of life, in its onward and certain course, struggling with the inequalities of its rugged bed:—'tis the light of heaven gladdening the earth through a refracting medium:—'tis the spirit of love yearning over reviving humanity, and administering the bread of life, in varied forms, according to the conditions of its sick appetites.

J. F.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE question under consideration is one of considerable interest and importance. There is no one, we think, who has looked around upon the numerous sects which are to be found in our land,—who has looked upon the progress of some, and the gradual decay of others—but must have asked himself whether the existence of these sects indicates Christian progress, or otherwise.

Taking the question as argued by J. E. P., it would seem that because "to err is human," perfect uniformity of sentiment can never be obtained; and that it is on account of this, that Sectarianism must exist. Now, although we can readily admit the truth of the proposition made by J. E. P. respecting the impossibility of obtaining thorough uniformity of sentiment, yet we must dispute the inference drawn,—that Sectarianism is inevitable,—as illogical and absurd. What is Sectarianism? Is it merely a term to denote that differences of opinion upon theological subjects prevail, or is it rather a term signifying the existence of certain separate and distinct bodies, each possessing its own peculiar creed and bond of church government? We incline to the latter opinion. Diversity of sentiment may exist without Sectarianism. Sectarianism tolerates no diversity. It presents an immaculate creed, and asks assent to that only; and it is because the spirit of exclusiveness and denunciableness is bound up with Sectarianism, that we deem it unchristian. Sectarianism overlooks the great bond of love

to Christ, and substitutes mere doctrines or something less,—a difference of church government. What has Sectarianism done? Has it proclaimed "peace on earth, goodwill towards men"? We humbly submit not. Its history tells of fierce passions excited, and unmistakeable anathemas fulminated;—it tells of fallible men denying to one another the Christian name, and, in the heat of their sectarian bitterness, consigning each other to the dark abyss. It tells of petty rivalries, of deplorable acts, and, in short, of anything but that loving and self-denying spirit so characteristic of the disciples of the lowly Nazarene. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another," was the declaration of Christ; and applying this to Sectarianism, we find it cannot stand the test. It has produced hatred instead of love; it has made the infidel and the sceptic point with derision to the Christian Church; it has retarded instead of hastening the progress of Truth. Look at the world with its sects and parties. Have they produced that Christian feeling,—that hallowed affection amongst men, which the gospel enjoins? Verily, but sadly,—No. We have still unholy bickerings, and fierce jealousies, where we should have trust and confidence. We have lurking suspicion and expressed distrustfulness. Everything is confined and narrow. There is no pervading, heartfelt, Christian joy over the triumph of gospel principles. Everything is looked at through

a sectarian medium, and it is the interest of a cause that is sought, not the welfare of the universal Church of Christ.

Sectarianism would fetter and trammel the human mind,—would forbid the spirit of religious inquiry, and make the Scriptures themselves almost nullities. It is true, as Channing says, “that men are sent to the Scriptures, but they are told before they go, that they will be driven from the church on earth and in heaven, unless they find in the Scriptures the doctrines which are embodied in the popular creed.”

Any system which would set up for its bond of church union any other save that of love to Christ,—which would turn us from the feet of Jesus to those of Luther, or Calvin, or Wesley, must be anti-Christian. A Christian follows Jesus, and learns of him; and although sects tell us we must go to Jesus, yet their systems and their creeds are thrust upon us; and should any other sentiment, save what the system acknow-

ledges, be advocated, epithets, which delicacy prevents us from repeating, are hurled at the offender, and heaven and mercy are denied him. Many good men have seen and deplored the anti-Christian nature of Sectarianism, among others the great Dr. Arnold, who uses the following earnest language in reference to it:—“I groan over the divisions of the church—of all our evils I think, the greatest—of Christ's Church. I mean, that men should call themselves Roman Catholics, Church of Englandmen, Baptists, Quakers, all sorts of various appellations; forgetting that only glorious name of Christian, which is common to all, and a true bond of union. I begin now to think that things must be worse before they are better, and that nothing but some great pressure from without will make Christians cast away their idols of Sectarianism,—*the worst and most mischievous by which Christ's Church has ever been plagued.*

Broadway.

R. W. H.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

WE gladly avail ourselves of the opportunity thus afforded us in giving a reply to this question. We have carefully perused the articles on the opposite side, but we can find nothing in them to induce us to alter our opinion.

In matters pertaining to religion as well as politics, there ever has been, and always will be, diversity of opinion. All men do not look from the same point of observation; indeed they cannot; neither is it absolutely necessary that they should; seeing that we are, individually, responsible agents. The Bible, taken as a rule of faith and practice, is sufficient for every purpose of life—socially, morally, spiritually; and no person, strictly adhering to its precepts and conforming to its requirements, can be “an alien” from God, or regard his brother with feelings of detestation. In the Bible we have shown us the object of our worship and adoration, and the means we are to employ in order to make that worship acceptable to him. Our duties are there specifically and unmistakeably detailed, so that “a way-faring man, though a fool, need not err.”

We are not unacquainted with the history

of the Inquisition, the fires, the rack, the screw, &c.—those dreadful engines of torture, made still more dreadful by the obloquy and insults offered to the devoted sufferers; nor with the character of Archbishop Laud, of execrable memory; nor with the bigotry and intolerance of many in later times; but their conduct cannot overturn our argument in favour of Sectarianism being Christian. Let any person, resolutely determined on finding the truth, compare the lives of such persons with the Word of God, and he will find that their religious madness and bigotry—their fiery zeal and enthusiasm—could not have proceeded from any other source than a disordered brain, and a distempered heart. Such characters are not actuated by the “love of God;” they have not that charity that “suffereth long, and is kind,”—that “envieth not,” &c. They are destitute of the “wisdom” that is from above, which is “first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy.” They will not allow to their fellow-men the same freedom of thought that they claim for themselves;

and they would, if they could, prevent all who are not of their way of thinking, from entering into heaven. Such conduct is not christian ; it is, after all, but a mixture of real heathenism with imaginary Christianity. " Religion is the spirit of a sound mind, and, consequently, stands in direct opposition to madness of any kind."

We will now place in juxta-position with the characters above referred to, a few whose disinterested benevolence, and philanthropic actions, have gained for them immortal honour. Witness the conduct of John Howard, that pattern of philanthropists. Irrespective of party-feeling or interests, he devoted the greater part of his life and property in alleviating human misery : visited almost every nation in Europe, and dispensed blessings wherever he appeared ; exposed himself to the infectious atmospheres of hospitals and prisons ; and all for the purpose of benefitting his fellow-men.

" From realm to realm, with cross or crescent
crowned,
Where'er mankind and misery are found,
O'er burning sands, deep waves, or wilds of
snow,
Mild HOWARD, journeying, seeks the house of
woe.

Down many a winding step, to dungeons dank,
Where Anguish wails aloud, and fetters clank,
To caves bestrewed with many a mouldering
bone,
And cells whose echoes only learn to groan ;
Where no kind bars a whispering friend dis-
close,

No sunbeam enters, and no zephyr blows,—
He treads, unemulous of fame or wealth,
Profuse of toil, and prodigal of health ;
Leads stern-eyed Justice to the dark domains,
If not to sever, to *relax* the chains ;
Gives to her babes the self-devoted wife,
To her fond husband liberty and life.
Onward he moves ! disease and death retire ;
And murmuring demons hate him and ad-
mire ! "

Look again at the conduct of Raikes, the originator of Sabbath-schools. Who can estimate the blessed effects of these institutions ? Distressed at beholding the desecration of the Sabbath, together with the ignorance of the rising generation, he conceived the project of establishing Sabbath-schools. No selfish impulse prompted him to this course of action, but a purely benevolent purpose—the welfare of his species. We might bring out in bold relief the characters of such men as Penn, Clarkson,

Wilberforce, Venning, and others ; but looking at our limits, we must content ourselves with what has already been advanced. " In every nation, he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him."

The nature of the Christian institution obliges every follower of Christ to belong to some particular congregation. He cannot be an isolated being ; yet no power on earth can oblige him to belong to this or that denomination, except his own conscience. We must be careful to preserve the right of private judgment. It was this that brought about the glorious Reformation. If Luther and his contemporaries had not battled for this right, we probably at this moment might have been under the power of the Pope of Rome. Will any man contend that there was no need for a separation from that iniquitous church ? Nothing can be more repulsive to our feelings than using compulsory means in order to gain converts to our way of thinking. Let a person examine, think, and act, for himself, with a desire to know the truth : let his mind be free from prejudice ; unbiassed by a preconceived opinion ;—or if he has such an opinion, let him hold it in such a manner, that when superior light breaks in upon his mind, he may at once let it go, and be free to receive the truth. Lactantius says, " There is nothing that should be more free than the choice of our religion, in which, if the consent of the worshipper be wanting, it becomes entirely void and ineffectual."

Sectarianism does not destroy piety in the soul, nor prevent usefulness in the life. A heart imbued with the love of God will seek the good of all men. A Christian looks upon each individual as composing a part of a vast family whose father is God. He feels that they have interests in common with himself ; his knowledge of their affairs prompts him to acts of usefulness and benevolence ; further, having been brought into the enjoyment of God's pardoning love, he is anxious that his brethren should become partakers of the same, for they have an equal right.

We beg leave to differ from the writer of the second negative article on this question, where he asserts, " It has corrupted our very prayers, infused into them a spirit of party,

and confined them to the narrow limits of our own denomination." Such an assertion is calculated to mislead. We have sat under the ministry of men of various denominations, both in the capital and in the provinces, but we never heard prayers addressed to the God of heaven without an infusion of catholicity in them. We are not aware of any Christian congregation praying thus exclusively. Neither can we admit that "Sectarianism has greatly retarded, and still retards, the universal propagation of the gospel." With all due deference to the opinions of our opponent, we rather think that it has had quite the contrary effect; and it is our belief, that had not the church

been divided into sections as it now appears, the men who have figured most in the missionary field, would have lived and died comparatively unknown. We are willing, however, to give the right hand of fellowship to those of our brethren who, for conscience sake, differ from us; to unite with them in proclaiming to the perishing world the news of salvation; and will never cease until

"One song employs all nations, and all cry,
'Worthy the Lamb, for he was slain for us.'
The dwellers in the vales, and on the rocks,
Shout to each other, and the mountain tops
From distant mountains catch the flying joy;
Till nation after nation taught the strain,
Earth roll the rapturous hosanna round."

J. E. P.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN bringing this interesting discussion to a close, it is well that we weigh aright the various arguments, before we arrive at the "conclusion of the whole matter;" and this it is our purpose to do, as briefly as possible, in the present paper.

The subject of Religion, as living—if it lives at all—so near the inner soul of man, is always a delicate thing to deal with; and care must be taken never to arouse animosity. It is pleasing to observe the mild and gentle manner in which the writers on both sides have penned their remarks; and the thought cannot fail to arise within us, that, had religious matters never been handled with a rougher grasp, there would not have been so many sects in the world. Not less does it rejoice us, to be able to say, that though we have written on different sides, yet one spirit pervades us all; we have only chosen to dress the same truths in different-seeming garments;—the essence, the life of these thoughts is the same.

The principal difference seems to have arisen from a misunderstanding of what Sectarianism *really* is. We can scarcely see how the paper of J. E. P. should have been placed on the *affirmative* side at all. The only thing that *seemingly* bears upon the point, is his statement of the differences of opinion resulting from man's free agency. He says, with reference to man, that "he must act according to the light he has, and be fully persuaded in his own mind." No

one doubts this; but yet it does not prove the catholicity of Sectarianism. It looks a little like burlesque, when J. W. C. gravely tells us, that "every man, learned or illiterate, has his *own peculiar creed*." According to this, every man ought to form a *sect* by himself! Again: the writer in the present number (J. F.) seems to have fallen into the same, or some such-like, misconception. He very lengthily demonstrates to us the right of *private judgment*, and seems to confound it with Sectarianism, which he afterwards seeks to show, is the result of that principle. Now, this does not in the least serve his argument; for we, at first, not only *granted*, but *expressly stated*, man's right of judging for himself, and the necessary differences arising from different causes, both *mental* and *external*. In the minds of all these contributors there seems to have been a general misunderstanding as to what the characteristics of Sectarianism rightly are. The necessary differences arising from the variations of mental capacity; the right of private judgment; freedom of thought and action; the conscious responsibility of every human soul; all are, in some way or other, metamorphosed into Sectarianism, or the direct abettors of it. The question in this case, comes to be, What is Sectarianism? And at once, we have not the slightest difficulty in saying, that it is neither one nor all of those things mentioned; to a certain extent they

may be its *causes*, but, even then, not its *necessary* causes. Man may, and does, turn blessings into a curse. It is not denied that, in man's present imperfect state, there must be differences of opinion. But it is denied that the primary differences of mind do, of necessity, give rise to, and originate, Sectarianism. Though we may say with the old Romans, "*Quot homines, tot sententie*," (so many men, so many opinions,) yet we must demur to the extreme manner in which J. W. C. would give to every man his *own creed*. Sectarianism is the abuse of freedom of thought; it is the abused exercise of those rational faculties which, rightly set a-working, discover and perfect Truth. How absurd for men to establish a sect upon the most minute and puny point, and thus weaken the otherwise united energies of Christ's church. It seems as if they puzzled their brains to find out pretexts for party formation, and in their zeal for out-of-the-way distinction, had lost sight of the great end of Gospel Truth. Where principle is concerned, and where soul-saving truth is at stake, then, by all means, let a sect be formed—if you choose to call it such; for us, we call it a noble vindication of true Christianity. Such an antagonism is Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. Had philosophers, instead of mutually sifting their theories, and amalgamating the results of their experiments and researches, acted in the same way as Christians have done, where would have been the progress of physical science.

Before drawing to a conclusion this part of the subject, we shall merely notice a few stray remarks by the various writers. J. E. P., in the outset, lays great stress upon the all-pervading spirit of Love, and yet, does that Sectarianism, which he seeks to defend, bear the stamp of that mighty principle? Doubt cannot exist for a moment. Again: he says, "all Christians bear a relation to each other; and though they do differ on minor points, yet they severally recognise one God, the Father of all." Is not this the very reason why they should unite, and be at one? There is one point on which we must say a few words to J. W. C., and it is this—his seeking to find a warrant for Sectarianism in the conduct and sentiments of Jesus Christ. Never was

there goodness more misunderstood, if J. W. C. means to make Christ a *sectary*. He grounds his assumption upon the fact, that Christ was never found "casting aside any one because he belonged to a despised or sinful sect." It is, indeed, true that he went on his missions of mercy, even among "publicans and sinners;" and for this, he was reviled by the world. And why reviled? Just because the bitter, intolerant spirit of the dominant religionists, spurned at the idea of anything good being found without their pale;—they thanked God that they were "not like other men!" So far then from Christ being a sectary, it was the very openness and tolerance of his doctrines,—the very charitableness and unsectarianness of all his dealings, that laid him open to the malevolence of the Scribes and Pharisees. More than this, we find his bitterest wails were aroused by the future prospect of strifes and contentions in his church. But though J. W. C. seems thus to mystify the true tendency of Christ's teachings, we yet find him granting all we wish in another part of his article. Speaking of the exclusiveness of certain religious bodies, he says, "To such, they may appear desirable; but *it is not Scriptural*." What more do we require? Here, however, we have a passage which hinges upon the mistaken notion of what Sectarianism is—the merging it into *mental difference of power*. "Of course, with the Sectarianism of Bigotry we have nothing to do. We pronounce that as *inhuman* as it is *anti-Christian*, &c." It is rather new to hear of Sectarianism existing apart from, and without Bigotry. Bigotry is the very essence of this great evil;—it is the eating canker of which Sectarianism is the result. What he calls "the Sectarianism of Truth," is a mere shadow; for were it not for Bigotry, men would never divide themselves into various parties about trifles, while at the same time they agree in essentials. We might as well talk of unrevengeful war, as of unbogoted Sectarianism! We have only now to deal with J. F.; and having already taken up the general tenor of his argument, we will but glance at one particular. It is comprised under his second head, the whole of which should be carefully noted, from the smooth and subtle way in which he applies the reasoning in his first.

"Being, then, agreed in head and heart, with regard to all things God has insisted upon as necessary to salvation, and disagreeing on those points only, on which he has not insisted, &c." Viewing it in this light, we hesitate not to pronounce such conduct—sinful. It is humiliating to think that Christians should live in a state of disunion, and *that* solely caused by contention upon points not essential to salvation. This the more aggravates the guilt; and woe to those who sin from waywardness. Did they fight for the imperishable Truth, it were well; but they fight only, and endanger God's cause, for the baubles of earth. Once more: "Sectarianism, then, * * * * being, as we find it, but a conscientious adherence to non-essential points of doctrine," &c. This sounds like a contradiction. What has conscience to do with that for which man is not morally responsible? These minor doctrine-differences do—though J. F. affirms they do not,—destroy "the unity of the spirit," and the oneness of the church; and not only so, but besides the wrangling and disputes to which they give rise, they place Christians under the serious responsibility of retarding God's Truth, while they wage their own bitter—and, alas! too often profitless—warfares.

We hope for the day when a divided Christian world will be united and transmuted into one accordant harmony, by the benign influence of the faith of Jesus—by the full appreciation and practical application of the gospel, in all its parts. Then, but in the remembrances of the past, and by perusing the records of history, will the followers of Emmanuel "weep afresh a long-since cancelled woe, and moan the expense of many a vanished sight;" and then will they thank God that the days of darkness and of strife are over. Nature might teach man a lesson—a lesson of harmony and love—a lesson of devout and unjarring worship; for, in the words of Grahame—

"It is not only in the sacred fane
That homage should be paid to the Most High.
There is a temple, one not made with hands—

The vaulted firmament. Far in the woods,
Almost beyond the sound of city chime,
At intervals heard through the breezeless air;
When not the limberest leaf is seen to move,
Save when the linnet lights upon the spray;
When not a floweret bends its little stalk,
Save where the bee alights upon the bloom;—
There, rapt in gratitude, in joy, and love,
The man of God will pass the Sabbath noon;
Silence his praise; his disembodied thoughts,
Loosed from the load of words, will high
ascend,
Beyond the empyrean."

Would that every "man of God" could but breathe into the midst of man's busy haunts the spirit thus infused by the silent, yet so eloquent features of Nature. What are the Millennial days? Are they not an illustration of the most perfect peace? That time will most assuredly come, when men will "learn the art of war no more;" when the earth, decked with the pristine beauty of its vegetation, and a renovated nature, and an innocent and happy animal world, will be but a type of the renewed and hallowed soul of man; and when the nations of the earth shall, with one consent, worship "one Lord, and his name one." It should be the true Christian's aim to imitate, even now, this grand consummation. What is heaven? Is it not one waveless sea of light,—one never diminishing, one eternal day? Is it not a place of happiness and purity, in whose cup of perennial delight no discordant element can ever mingle? Is it not the unity of heart and purpose,—the symphonious harmony of souls in one loud-swelling song of adoration, and love?

"Hark! how the adoring hosts above,
With songs surround the throne!
Ten thousand thousand are their tongues;
But all their hearts are one."

The soul faints with delight at the anticipated glory! And shall it be said that Christians, who journey to one common haven of rest—who profess to worship one God, and to seek his glory,—that they, while on earth, and while journeying to heaven, retarded each other by bitter and useless strifes? Oh! for an unsectarian earth, in prospect of an unsectarian heaven!

Leith.

M. G. M.

Philosophy.

IS MESMERISM TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

As preparatory to some remarks on the above subject, you, Gentle Reader, will permit me to preface a few observations on the great tribunal to which a certain portion of the *soi disant* enlightenment of the present age have decided that we are to carry all the difficult and important problems that have occupied, or do occupy, the human mind,—problems of which the present, though not, perhaps, the most important, is, at least, sufficiently interesting.

Yes, Gentle Reader, all questions, all religions, and all philosophies, are henceforth to be weighed in the balances, (the best pair, doubtless, that can be selected at the Exhibition,) and their weight or levity fully ascertained, and their pretensions to plausibility finally determined, before this aforesaid high tribunal, the chief seat of which is occupied by a personage scarcely less qualified for the task than *Justitia* herself would be, were she to descend from heaven to occupy the judgment seat.

But who—methinks I hear you ask—is this *potentissimus deorum*—this wisest of the judges? Reader, herein is mystery—a mystery which we shall endeavour to elucidate. This most sapient of the Solomons is a lineal descendent of a goddess called Reason, whose age of dominion was to have been ushered in by Thomas Paine; but which, unfortunately, and thanks to the invincible stupidity of mankind, never advanced beyond the pages of its promulgator,—and her name is—*Common Sense*.

In endeavouring to describe this successor of Reason, and define her pretensions, we should not err, perhaps, a great deal, in saying with the negro, that Reason and Common Sense are very much alike, specially Common Sense; but we shall attempt to give you a more formal definition. Common Sense—as we take it—means the unassisted, native, and instinctive sagacity of the human mind,—its innate capability of determining the right or wrong, the fitness or unfitness of any impression, or series of

impressions, with which it may be presented. It is evident, moreover, that this faculty of the mind, called Common sense, belongs to all mankind; that the Bosjeman, or the Hottentot, are alike its possessors, with the Englishman, or the German. And yet the one is a wretched barbarian, bowing down to stocks and stones—shivering before the stern blasts of Winter, or scorched by the burning heats of summer—in fine, so degraded and deteriorated, that men, apparently ashamed of the relationship, have attempted to set aside his claims to the fellowship of a common humanity. And what have we to boast of? Is it our common sense that has rescued us from the brutalizing superstitions of Odin and Thor,—from yelling like demons around the burning pyre of a human sacrifice? Most undoubtedly. Yes, and it was Common Sense that dragged Galileo into the prison,—that filled the poison-cup of Socrates,—that laughed at Dr. Harvey, and sneered at Dr. Jenner, Alas, for the weakness, the ignorance, and the arrogance of man! *He*, poor worm, will measure infinitude; will grasp the measureless sun-systems of infinity—the hoary ages of eternity; will stand face to face with the Almighty, and say, Who art thou?

In thus repudiating the insane claims of man, to measure with his limited faculties that which surpasses their power, we would by no means be understood as opposing the exercise of a free and unfettered inquiry. Truth, as far as it is discoverable, must, in its very essence, be reasonable. But while we encourage all in their search after Truth,—advise all to measure the discoveries they may have made by their logical consciousness—we would vehemently deprecate that rashness which rejects every doctrine extending beyond the sphere of their own experience, as false; and limits all truth within the compass of their own understanding.

In the foregoing observations, we confess

that we have had not merely Mesmerism in view, but we have remarked upon a failing common in the present age—that of priding oneself upon one's reason. We observed in a recent publication, that in the present age all dogmas and religions must give way that are not obvious to the Common Sense of mankind. The text, we thought, a good one, and one that is patent enough to the present occasion, and accordingly, we have adopted it.

In discussing the probabilities of the Mesmeric doctrines, we would by no means bind ourselves to any particular theory upon the subject. We do not take upon ourselves to decide whether the phenomena called by the name of Mesmerism are physiological or psychological—whether animal magnetism is the establishment of a sympathy between two beings, or whether, as we saw lately maintained, it is merely the result of impressions upon the mind while the brain and nerves are thrown into a peculiar state;—that is to say, the effects produced in actuating the person operated upon with impulses contrary to those of his own will, by the operator, do not depend upon a certain sympathy or community of sensation established between the mesmeriser and the mesmerised, but upon sensations presented to the mind when in a state of coma, during which the will is less capable of exercising its functions with decision.

The phenomena of Mesmerism may be classed as follow:—

1st. Sleep induced by external agency.

2nd. Somnambulism, or the dormancy of some faculties, while others are exalted above their ordinary degree of sensitiveness.

3rd. Insensibility to external stimuli.

4th. Attraction between the mesmerised and the mesmeriser—called animal magnetism, and sympathy of sensation.

5th. Clairvoyance and second-sight.

6th. Phreno-Mesmerism.

7th. Curative effects.

As to the first of these phenomena, it is generally admitted by all but those who have obstinately steered themselves against the admission of its truth, that a certain state of the faculties may be induced by external operation. We do not think, however, with Dr. Braid, that states, differing in kind, may be produced by different means of oper-

ation. We think that what he styles neuro-hypnotism,—what is called Mesmerism—and what a Mr. Darling, lately lecturing in Edinburgh, calls electro-biology, are the same state, but producible by different means. However, as to the general dogma, that a certain state, resembling that which is usually denominated sleep, can be produced by external agency;—this, we think, is amply proved by the testimonies of Professor Agassis,* Signor Ranieri, and Miss Martineau on the subject.

In reference to the second phenomena mentioned—viz., the sleep-walking state, this does not clash with our received facts in regard to somnambulism, where it appears that certain faculties may be in a torpid state, while others are so far awake as to be capable of exercising their functions. Nay, from the testimony of Signor Ranieri, we infer that the whole nervous system may be in a state of perfect exaltation while the muscular system is in a state of absolute quiescence. In corroboration of this may be mentioned the disease named catalepsy, in which the nervous system loses all power of controlling the muscular.

We shall pass over the third phenomenon mentioned in the foregoing category, as from the very nature of the mesmeric sleep—viz., its being a *nervous sleep*, we might, if we admit the possibility of such a sleep, infer that insensibility to a certain extent in reference to outward objects would be a necessary consequence.

In relation to the fourth of the mesmeric phenomena—although this seems scarcely so well supported by facts as those formerly mentioned, yet it appears to us that sufficient evidence has been adduced to warrant a belief even in this. Hear Professor Agassis on the subject:—"It appeared to me that Mr. Townshend was endeavouring to put me in a sound sleep; my movements seemed under his control; for I wished several times to change the position of my arms, but had not sufficient power to do it, or even really to will it; while I felt my head carried to the right or left shoulder, and backwards or forwards, without wishing it, and, indeed, in spite of the resistance

* See Tracts on Mesmerism, &c., by the Rev. Chauncey Hall, Townsend, &c.

which I endeavoured to oppose ; and this happened several times.”—(See pp. 385 to 388 of Mr. Townshend’s Works.) Here we have the testimony of men where trick or collusion was well-nigh impossible ; and it appears to us that such evidence affords sufficient ground for us upon which to receive the truth of the phenomena. As to the remaining phenomena, our limited space, as well as the confessedly undigested state of the experiences by which they are supported, forbid us from entering into a more detailed account, and we shall, therefore, conclude with a few general remarks.

It appears to us that in these experiences styled by the generic name of Mesmerism, or Animal Magnetism, (which as yet remain uninvestigated, except a few outlying phenomena,) there is to be found a certain principle or principles, bearing the same

relation to organised existence as the more known science or sciences of Electricity and Magnetism bear to unorganised matter. The discoveries in the latter have informed us that the apparently dead, inert mass beneath our feet is but a nice adjustment of atoms, held together by opposed and balanced forces, and, for aught we know, the movements and operations of the heavenly bodies may be influenced by the same cause. In like manner, the revelations of Mesmerism and Animal Magnetism seem destined to unveil before our astonished gaze a few of those sublime and infinite mysteries of being which have so much occupied the attention of philosophic minds—its laws, fluxes, and refluxes ; and discover to us still deeper and loftier wonderments of Him whose path is amid thick clouds.

HAROLD.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE present age is distinguished from all preceding ones, by the number and importance of the discoveries that have been made in every department of knowledge. Some of the great laws of Nature, though as old as creation, “lay hid in night,” till men of modern days found out their existence, and made plain their operations. These laws thus discovered, in connexion with others previously known, have proved the great foundation of those numerous inventions which have added so much to our comfort, and so greatly increased our power. But the present state of society, like all others, has a danger peculiar to itself ; and this danger is of no mean kind. It is with us as with a man ascending some mountain height—the greater the altitude attained, the more need for watchfulness, and the more perilous the results if the footing be lost. Now our principal danger appears to arise from a desire to know that which is of necessity unknowable ;—to penetrate into the mystic sources or being ;—to investigate the nature of spirit ;—and to learn that which only can be known to the

and devices having their origin in deception, and the end in disappointment. Thus it has often been, and thus it will doubtless even be again ; and hence the importance of a searching examination of every new theory that is worthy of attention. But these examinations should be carried on in a spirit of candour and fairness, without prejudice on either side. We readily admit that this has not always been the case ; and further, that the advocates of Mesmerism have frequently been treated with ridicule and scorn. But let them not think that these improper manifestations have been all on one side. We have now lying before us a work which is said to dedicate itself to certain “most noble champions of Mesmerism,” “in compliment and grateful acknowledgment for having rescued from *the fangs of ignorance, envy, and self-conceit*, the science of health and knowledge—the science of Mesmerism, which unfolds the hitherto unknown wonders of the animal system.” We will not stop to inquire how far *self-conceit* is displayed in the pomposity of this language, but merely express a hope that in the pages of the “British Controversialist,” high-sounding terms will never be substituted for simple sense, nor raillery for reason. For ourselves, we have seen enough of the novel proved to be true, to forbid us to be

“Great antemundane Father, in whose breast
Embryo-creation, unborn being, dwelt.”

This desire has given birth to projects various and “devices multiform”—projects

harsh or sceptical; but still sufficient demonstrated to be false, to make us inquisitive and cautious.

In taking the negative of the question—"Is Mesmerism true?" let it not be thought that we maintain that there is no truth in it, and that every part of the system is utterly false. Not so. We believe that all false systems have contained some portion of truth, and that truth has been the source of their vitality and longevity. Thus Mesmerism may be based upon facts hitherto unrecognised by medical science; but on them it has sought to erect a structure "whose top may reach unto the heavens," and serve as an observatory of distant worlds, where man, taking his stand, may with

"His weak orbs look through immensity."

Respecting the rigidity of the limbs which mesmeric patients sometimes display, we need not say much. The effects in many cases cannot be denied, though the cause may be disputed in all. That rigidity cannot be produced in every individual appears evident from the numerous instances of undoubted failure, and where it is produced, it may arise from some peculiar state of muscular ability or irritability in the persons acted upon, and not from any principles which properly come under the designation of animal magnetism.

But it is against what may be called the "higher development" of Mesmerism that we would take our stand—viz., against Clairvoyance, in its various branches of "long vision," "opaque vision," "rapport," &c. "Long vision," during the clairvoyant state, is the recognition of objects greatly remote—sometimes at the antipodes! "Opaque vision" is the seeing through opaque bodies, such as stone walls, iron chests, intervening rocks, &c. "Rapport" is that state of intimate mental connection which is "manifested by the clairvoyant, who has the like of the sensation excited in the brain of the mesmeriser repeated or excited in his own brain; as when the mesmeriser masticates, and the sensation of the same flavour is known by the mesmerised." It is also maintained that there is between such parties "a community of thought," though it is sapiently left for further inquiry, "*Whether*

or not a community of dreaming may be effected!"

From such startling premises our readers will expect no ordinary conclusion, and they will not be disappointed; for it is gravely maintained that by Mesmerism, "the blind and eyeless would be extricated occasionally from the shadow leading to death, and be enabled to follow some useful calling!" Again: "Through Clairvoyance the geography of the globe may be improved; the northern passage discovered; the astronomer assisted in his stellar speculations beyond the possibility of mere telescopic discoveries. On ship-board, the voluntary clairvoyant may make discovery of the haze-hidden lighthouse, and the wave-hidden shoal. In the hand of the clairvoyant the telescope and the microscope will, in time, make us acquainted with other worlds, other beings, and other of the wonderful works of the great God of Nature!" Repress, gentle reader, your astonishment, for the crowning point is yet to come. "Other worlds may open to our view, and their inhabitants become clairvoyantly familiar to human observation!"* Well may the writer ask, "Why, then, should the science be opposed?" Ah! why? if these things are so;—but, then, *if*. Let it be observed that these are but mere assertions—bold ones, it is true; but still, only assertions, that come before us without any proof. Will the advocates of Mesmerism substantiate in these pages the assertions of their philosopher? We might content ourselves by waiting to see, and remaining silent until their witnesses are examined; but for the sake of our readers we will briefly hint at one or two reasons why we disbelieve these mesmeric claims.

1st. They are contrary to all experience and our knowledge of the nature of things. They not merely go beyond our present knowledge, but they are *opposed* to it.

2nd. What the mesmeric advocates declare to be *possible*, they have not demonstrated by making *actual*. The reason they will assign for this we cannot tell. In order to make the discoveries to which they refer, no assistance is required from society; if they have the power, let them use it. They boast that they can move the world:

* The "Philosophy of Mesmerism." Longmans.

the lever is in their own hands—the fulcrum and the object before them—and yet the feat is not accomplished. What are they waiting for?—"the good time coming"? Surely not. It is a significant fact that the advocates of Mesmerism have been sadly worsted in the public tests to which their theory has been subjected. Our readers will doubtless remember the case of the £100 note being placed between two plates of sheet iron, and its owner liberally offering it to the clairvoyant who could decipher its number. But it did not change hands, although the offer was "open to all England."

More recently, while public anxiety has been awakened respecting the safety of Sir John Franklin, these individuals who are *able to discover the northern passage without leaving their firesides* (?) have favoured us with the much-desired information respecting Sir John, and sundry predictions of his return, which, however, cruel fate has not fulfilled. Would, for the sake of humanity, if not of Mesmerism, it had been otherwise.

At present we will pursue this subject no further, but wait to hear our friends on the opposite side.

C. A.

Politics.

CAN THE GOVERNMENT INTERDICT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC HIERARCHY IN ENGLAND CONSISTENTLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THERE can be little question that the excitement produced by the recent, yet, by no means, novel, assumption of Papal authority, has in some measure subsided, and that there has been some reaction. The comparatively small body who comprise the genuine friends of Protestant truth ought to be quite prepared for this; for they must be conscious that a large proportion of the popular feeling exhibited had no tangibility or coherence, and was based on grounds different from those on which they feel it should be rested. Perhaps this is just the time for them to show *how* and *why* Papal aggressions should be *always* resisted; and, perhaps, also, it is the best time for the candid and honest discussion of this subject.

Now, I have the boldness to believe, that if the writer of the negative article on this subject in your January No., had previously read that contributed by "Saline," the prime fallacy which pervades and, in my opinion, invalidates it, would not have been made the basis of its argument. It is Dr. Wiseman's fallacy, and everybody else's fallacy who has defended him—*i.e.*, the total transposition, so to speak, of besiegers and besieged—the representation of the

people of England as engaged in an attack upon a meek and inoffensive something. "Had the lion painted it, the picture would have been different." And different it is, as "Saline" has ably shown. The question is, not whether we are justified in attacking, but whether we are justified in resisting; not whether we are to give an unoffending individual into custody, but whether we may handcuff one who has assaulted us.

To prove that the recent pretensions advanced by the Papacy are aggressive, it is not absolutely necessary to show that they are *literally* illegal, although this B. S. A. has clearly done; but while the constitution indisputably proceeds upon the principle, which the merest common sense ratifies as just, that the sovereign is the *sole fountain of honour*, and her sanction the only permissible source of jurisdiction, we *have no choice* but to resist a man when he says he comes "to govern, and continue to govern us," irrespective of any such sanction; and when his accomplices demand our "submission on pain of eternal damnation."

And as for any "reputation of the Roman Catholics themselves," in the first place it may be replied, no repudiations can

alter facts; secondly, if sincere, they may be easily proved by the withdrawal of the language which gave rise to unwarranted suspicions; and thirdly, it would be folly, indeed, to accept professions elicited by an outburst of unexpected resistance, as the true exponents of sentiments before expressed in so strange and haughty contrast. The novel logic of "S. H. W.," that an attack which does not effect its object, and is, consequently, "nugatory," is *therefore* no attack at all, I may safely leave untouched.

Supposing, however, we were to concede what "S. H. W." assumes, and define the present movement of the Papacy as simply an effort to extend its religious system,—the greatest part of the question still remains—we are only compelled to contemplate its recent act as one of a series, and to take a more extended view of social and historical Popery. "S. H. W." asks, whether, consistently with religious liberty, the civil power can "prevent the full development of any section of the religious world." Waiving, without allowing, his opinion of a religious man—I answer, unhesitatingly, Yes. If the "full development" of *anything* is perilous to mind, perilous to soul, perilous to happiness; if the full development of *anything* is calculated to endanger liberty and social peace—to quench enlightenment, and undermine the State, it is not only a violation of freedom not to prevent it, but it is folly, idiocy, nay, *tyranny*, to a people, not to do so. The development of Dissent, Wesleyanism, any form of Protestantism, does not and never did, produce these effects; the development of Popery does, always did, and always will. The "emancipation" of Popery, therefore, is the emancipation of agencies fatal to the well-being of any community, and which no community ever left without judicious supervision, and did not reap the bitter consequences. History speaks in one unflinching, unvarying voice on this subject. The Roman Catholic system is essentially political—it must clash with the rights of any civil power in its mildest moods; for doctrines inconsistent with those rights are part and parcel of its ecclesiasticity. Its canon law is the enemy of social liberty—its confessionals the foe of domestic peace. In its progress, so far as it extends, it is darkness; in its full develop-

ment, despotism itself. I put it, then, to "S. H. W." and to your readers, as reasonable men, whether, while granting, as we are bound to do, the fullest personal toleration, it can by any possibility be injustice, or intolerance, or illiberality, to put checks upon a *system* thus monstrous and fatal?

This general principle, however, might be correct, and yet there be nothing in the positive act we are now considering to call for restrictive measures. The development of the Romish system among us is fraught with danger; but *is this a development amongst us, rather than an arrangement amongst the Romanists themselves?* Are we, who disregarded Vicars Apostolic, justified in declaiming against Bishops in Ordinary? I think so. Setting aside the consideration that *any* authority vested in any Cardinal must be dangerous, as a Cardinal is a secular prince as well as an ecclesiastical officer—the present act is obnoxious for these brief but, to my mind, conclusive reasons. 1st—It is not purely ecclesiastical, for it vaunts of the new triumphs of Catholicity, and claims England as once more restored to the "splendid aggregate of Catholic communion." Could this possibly be said of a mere change of name—of a simple routine arrangement in one of the religious bodies of a great empire? Such an hypothesis, or any modification of it, is absurd. To my mind, there is but one rational way of interpreting such language. Let the inhabitants of any country professing the Christian faith be deemed, *ipso facto*, the subjects of a certain see, and I can readily understand how, when that see constituted its ecclesiastical government in due form in that country, it should be accounted as "restored to the unity of the faith." The Pope is thus honest, and his phrases are intelligible. But while he unquestionably does lay claim to this all-pervading authority; while the canon law, confessedly brought into operation by the erection of the hierarchy, knows no limits in its tyrannical and anti-social provisions; while the Romish system recognises, as is *undeniable*, no authority superior to the Pope's;—it is impossible, without credulity, to believe that an act of the Papal See can affect ecclesiastical things and persons only.

It may be very well to designate certa

articles which have disgraced the continental and English press as "irresponsible," and "unauthorised;" but the insufferable insolence by which they have been characterised should, at least, put statesmen on their guard, how they deal too tenderly with that which is *capable* of making such arrogant claims, and which, as history proves, has, wherever possible, enforced them. 2nd.—It is an attack upon the British Crown, for it declares "null and void" all acts whatever which shall interfere with its dictum. If the "whatever" is exclusive of so important an exception as the Crown, why was not the Crown mentioned? For supposing that nothing palpably objectionable appeared on the face of the brief itself, the bare fact of any territorial functions being assigned, irrespective of the sought and obtained sanction of authority, amply justifies its condemnation. 3rd.—It is not limited in its operation. Every feature of the controversy

goes to prove this. The mandate is issued "by virtue of the authority committed" to its author "to govern the *universal church*." The canon law is brought in, which knows only two classes—the faithful and the heretical vassals of Rome. Backed by the accumulated forgeries of ages, and the tremendous weight of credentials which, if genuine, would be overwhelming, the Pope demands the submission of the will, judgment, conscience, to his figment. This is what his system asks, or it asks nothing at all. If this be true, all England owes obedience to the Pope; if not, there is no course for England but resistance and defiance. To leave unnoticed the extravagant pretensions of the Papacy, simply because they *are* extravagant, would be both undignified and unsafe; to interdict them as inconsistent with our laws and liberties, at once consistent, wise, and reasonable.

J. S. J.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.—

It appears to me, that the settlement of this question hinges upon the point as to whether there is anything in the appointment of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy, which subtracts from its purely ecclesiastical character, and attaches to it a political and a national importance. No one will for a moment, I think, deny to our Roman Catholic fellow subjects the right to the possession of their bishops, simply considered as a necessary part of their ecclesiastical system. Indeed, their bitterest opponent, the *Times*, distinctly states, that had the bishops been appointed by the resident Catholics, there could not have been any objection to them, and grounds its objection to them solely upon the fact of their having been appointed by a foreign temporal prince. It will be at once seen, then, that, unless the case of these bishops can be shown to be an exceptional one, the English government cannot, without a gross violation of every principle of religious liberty, interdict their appointment.

Religious liberty, I take it, means the liberty to follow the dictates of conscience in all matters of religious belief and practice. Recognising the principle of individual responsibility to God, it gives every man the

right to hold and to utter whatever religious opinions he pleases, and to adopt that mode of worship most accordant with his own convictions. Consequently, every sect has a perfect right to choose its own ecclesiastical polity, and to develop it to its full extent, provided always that such development can be wrought out without detriment to the national interests and liberties.

The materials, if any exist, out of which the exceptional case just alluded to is to be created, must be sought for either in the source of the authority, or in the mode of the appointment of the Catholic Hierarchy.

The source of the power and authority of the Catholic bishops is the Pope, who combines in his own person the supreme spiritual power of the Catholic church, and the temporal dignity of the sovereignty of the Roman States. Is there in the assumption by the Pope of the power to appoint bishops to his own church in this country, anything calculated to jeopardize the liberties of the people, or to lower the dignity of the crown of these realms?

It is important to notice here, the kind of power and authority really claimed by the Pope in this country. He does not, as the bishops and the *Times* would have us believe,

claim to exercise spiritual *jurisdiction* in England. The *Times*, by making *authority* and *jurisdiction* convertible terms, has introduced a vicious element into the discussion of this question, which it is very necessary to correct. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction implies two things—the existence of ecclesiastical courts for the trial of spiritual offences, and the aid of the civil power in order to carry the decisions of those courts into effect.

Now, none but a candidate for Bedlam, I imagine, will venture to say that the Pope has laid any claim to exercise this kind of jurisdiction in this country. What he really does claim, is spiritual power and authority over the minds and consciences of those who put themselves in communion with him; and it is a fact worth noticing at the present time, that one-third of the entire population of these realms willingly submit themselves to the exercise of that authority over them.

"But he is a foreign prince," say some; and stump orators all over the kingdom have won their "tremendous cheers" by exclaiming, with due emphasis of action, "No foreign potentate shall parcel out this England of ours with impunity." Now the objection founded upon the idea embodied in this gasconade is really worth nothing, and in supporting it, a great deal of indignation has been literally thrown away. For, it appears that the indignity, now for the first time discovered, was perpetrated 150 years ago, and has not only been quietly put up with ever since, but has actually been nursed and fondled by successive courts and ministries from that time to the present. At the time referred to, the then Pope "parcelled out" the kingdom into four districts, and only ten years ago the country was again divided into eight districts; and now, in 1850, the country has been again divided into twelve districts. This is, in reality, the head and front of the offence; and what, I ask, is it which makes that a grievous indignity now which was not so ten years ago? But further: it should be borne in mind, that *Ireland* has for a long time possessed its batch of bishops, and that the principal colonies have also been favoured in the same manner, under the sanction of the present and the late governments.

It is also to be observed, that the recent

acts of the Pope cannot, with any fairness, be charged upon him as the acts of a temporal prince. I apprehend that he would have acted in substantially the same way had he been shorn of his royalty altogether, and left in possession only of the honour of being the successor of Peter the Fisherman. But, independently of this, it is evident that if the Catholics were to have bishops at all, and their right to them is generally conceded, they could only get them by an exercise of the Pope's authority for that purpose. It is well known that the Catholic body have not the power to elect their own bishops, but they have done what they could in that direction, by soliciting for their appointment; and the Pope, in listening to their requests, has only fulfilled a duty which he owed his church, and which his station demanded. I therefore, contend, that there is nothing inimical to the liberties of the people, or to the honour and dignity of the crown of England, in the fact of the Pope's interference to institute a hierarchy in this country.

As to the mode in which the Pope has chosen to exercise his authority, very little need be said. The objection most frequently urged against it is, that he did not consult the English government on the subject previous to making the appointments. Certainly, he went about the matter in an ungracious and arrogant style, quite befitting the very high pretensions of the Vicars of Christ! But while admitting that the distinguishing characteristic of the Papal manifesto was, certainly, not humility, nor charity, nor even courtesy, I cannot acknowledge that he was under any obligation to this government to ask its consent to the act, or even to apprise it of his intentions. An attempt has been made, by drawing a comparison between the Pope's mode of procedure in countries in which Catholicism is the established religion, and in our own, to convict him of a studied insult to our government. But, in point of fact, the case presents a contrast instead of a comparison. In the case supposed, where Catholicism receives the patronage of the State, certain relations grow up and exist between the two parties—the State on the one side, and the Church on the other—which it would be impolitic for the Pope to disturb withor

consulting the government of the country so situated. Now, it is evident that the Pope cannot rest under the same obligations to the government of a country in which the Catholic community stand upon the same footing as the Dissenting sects ; and consequently, he cannot on this ground, be justly chargeable with deliberately attempting to degrade the dignity of the crown of these realms.

Upon a consideration of the whole case, then, I contend that no reason exists why the Catholics of this country should be shut out from the enjoyment of the blessings of religious liberty, and that the government cannot interdict the establishment of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in England consistently with the principles of religious liberty.

A. W.

Social Economy, etc.

HAVE THE WORKING CLASSES BEEN BENEFITTED BY MACHINERY ?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

MUCH has already been said in this discussion, and said well, on the present unsatisfactory state of society, and the evils which it is believed the introduction of machinery has entailed upon the working classes of this country. The subject, however, is not exhausted, and we would still keep it before the attention of the readers of the "British Controversialist," in the hope that they may be led to take an extensive view of the question, and not be misled by some of the appearances of things. And further, we hope that the gentlemen who take the affirmative side will be induced to offer explanations, and suggest their remedies for the evils complained of. For, after all, the value of such discussions as these lies principally in their effect upon the mind in suggesting something practically remedial. Is it, then, a fact, that the working classes of this country are suffering great depression—that the artisan is not what he once was, when he had

"An independency of look,
And heart ; and, plodding in his lowly path,
Disdained the parish dole,—content, though
poor ?"

We maintain that it is even so, and that many might take up, and adopt as their own, the words of the immortal Milton—

"A voice, once heard
Delightful, *Increase and multiply!*
Now death to hear ! for what can we increase
Or multiply, but *penury, woe, and crime ?*"

Is this doubted ? Then, in opposition to the figures quoted by "Harold," we would point not to the condition of the *working* poor, but also to that large portion of the population which is reduced to pauperism—"that fearful state of dependence in which a man finds himself a blot on the universe of God—a wretch thrown up by the waves of time, without a use and without an end, homeless in the presence of the firmament, and helpless in the face of creation." But beyond the "deepest depth" of pauperism, there is a "lower depth" of crime, into which such a multitude of our fellow-creatures are sunk. And what has plunged many there but cruel poverty, and its stern attendant—want ? And where they have not done this directly, they have left the work to be performed by their true descendants—ignorance and vice ; and the result, our jails, and hulks, and penal settlements, will tell.

But there are those who, while they admit that this is a true picture of the present state of things, will deny that it has been brought about by machinery. And yet the evidence of this appears plain and conclusive. The invention of machinery—for the most part by the working classes themselves—has increased, to an incredible degree, the productiveness of labour, so that one man can produce as much as formerly required hundreds, and thus, in fact, performs the work of hundreds. This, of course, has

diminished the demand for manual labour. The master manufacturer, with a smaller number of workmen, is able to produce far more goods than he did formerly; thus the employment of machinery in manufacture has diminished the demand for labour, and produced not merely partial employment, but low wages. As this last is a point of importance, we may adduce the testimony of Dr. Longfield, who, in his lectures says, "It is evident that the wages of labour, like the exchangeable value of everything else, should depend upon the relation of the supply and the demand." It must then be plain to all, that machinery has vastly increased the supply of labour, without correspondingly increasing the demand; and hence that diminution in the rate of wages, which has long been going on, and which still must go on if the same causes continue in operation, and no counteracting ones be brought to bear upon them. It has therefore been truly said that "labour is working against machinery. Those that eat, drink, and get families, are working against those that do not eat, drink, or get families. In such a contest, the eater and drinker must be worsted. He cannot be put in a garret, and kept without food till he is wanted. He cannot be laid up for the winter. The birth of new labourers cannot be deferred, like the production of new machines, till their labour is called for. They cannot be put together one day, and pulled to pieces another day. They come forth with new faces every day, and still there is a greater troop behind. As the waves that break upon the shore never exhaust the great body of the deep, so the womb of futurity contains more myriads of germs than there are drops of water in the mighty fathomless ocean."

To all this it might be replied, that the present is only a transition state,—that the injury machinery has inflicted is only of a temporary character, and that while

wages decrease, the price of food will correspondingly decrease. While for this we ask proof, and fear that it cannot be produced, we will state the course by which we have been led to a different conclusion. Machinery, as applied to manufactures, has increased their produce to an incredible degree; but machinery, as applied to agriculture, has not increased its produce in the same ratio, nor can it ever do so; for there is nothing like a due proportion between the room for improvement in the one and in the other. But were it otherwise, it would be soon discovered that food is not all that man in a civilized state delights in, and much of which cannot be dispensed with, though it cannot be retained without cost. So far, then, as the future of the working classes is concerned, we cannot see any indication of a cloudless day, for the horizon is dark and portentous, and seems to tell of coming storms.

What, then, becomes our duty, or constitutes our hope? It were idle to wish for the destruction of machinery, and vain to attempt to retard its improvement; for

" Their course will on
The way it takes, cracking ten thousand curbs
Of more strong link asunder, than can ever
Appear in our impediment."

Nor would we wish it to be otherwise, though we would wish for something more—some new principle to be introduced into social life, which shall enable us to correct our evils, and prevent that which ought to be a blessing being turned into a curse. What that principle should be, we are not now called upon to discuss, but we hope an opportunity will be offered in these pages for the inquiry to be carried on as to whether it may not be the restoration of the land to the state, and thus its restoration to the people.

C. A.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

MR. EDITOR,—This is a question of great interest and importance. In this country, machinery has been brought to greater perfection, and is employed more extensively than in any other; it is therefore important that just views on this subject should

be held by all, but more especially by the great body of the people, the producers of wealth.

After giving the arguments on both sides of this question a careful consideration, I feel no hesitation in declaring it as my con-

viction, that although machinery might be employed more beneficially for the labourer in some instances, and has, doubtless, been productive of partial and temporary evils, yet, on the whole, its employment has been of very considerable benefit to the working classes.

I think I should not be chargeable with drawing a hasty or unwarranted conclusion, if no other machine could be adduced in its support than the Printing Press. When we contemplate the extent to which ignorance is still prevalent, notwithstanding the Press has been engaged in diffusing light and knowledge for nearly four centuries, it is most appalling to think of the probable condition of the human race at this moment had this machine never been called into existence. When books were written by the hand, they were enormously dear—a Bible cost about £30 of the money of that period, which was equal to a much larger sum of our money. It is scarcely necessary to say, few persons had books of any description. They were possessed only by the wealthy; and regarded rather as curiosities and ornaments, than for the value of the information imparted by them. The invention of the art of printing has put it in the power of the poorest of our countrymen to possess a library of which a prince of those days would have been proud. Books are no longer accessible only to the rich; they have become the guides, and comforters, and best friends of the millions now within reach of the benefits and enjoyments they bestow.

The cheapness of production is the great point to which I wish to direct attention. If the neatness and regularity of printing were to be superseded by the looseness and unevenness of writing, at least six times the amount of paper would be required. Here, besides the superiority of the workmanship, a saving of five-sixths is effected in the cost for paper. This, however, though a very considerable saving, is not the principal one. The time and labour required by the process of copying would be immense. While the writer was employed in making a single copy, the printer would be able to strike off a considerable edition. If printing were to be superseded by writing, no book could be produced for popular use. Knowledge, the

hope of the world, would again become a monopoly; and we should lose that power which is making us independent and free, and will ultimately make us virtuous and happy. The same principle is applicable to any improvement in printing machinery. The steam press has considerably diminished the cost of production:—for the same amount of money which would have been required to purchase a book before the introduction of the *machine*, a much larger book may now be procured. There will be an increased demand for paper, ink, &c., and more labour will consequently be necessary. The more the cost of books can be decreased by the employment of machinery in their production, the greater the demand there will be for them, and the greater amount of labour will be required. Will it for a moment be contended that these advantages are counterbalanced by the temporary evil which no doubt followed the first introduction of printing—viz., the loss of employment by a few hundred copyists. These men, finding it impossible to compete with the Press, would probably study the art; and, in a little time, in consequence of the diminished cost, the increase in the demand for books would be so great that more labourers would be required. If a still cheaper means of communicating thought by means of books were to be invented, although, probably, a large body of workmen would be temporarily deprived of employment, yet the ultimate and permanent result would be, that in order to meet an increased demand, additional manual labour would be required.

Let us direct our attention to machinery in connection with Agriculture. Would it be to the interest of the working classes of this country that agricultural machinery should be displaced by manual labourers? A little consideration will be sufficient to convince us that it would be exceedingly detrimental to their interests. At the present time above one million families are engaged in agricultural pursuits. They furnish a certain amount of food which is requisite and sufficient for the sustenance of themselves and their countrymen. Now, without entering into a minute calculation, it will perhaps be conceded, that if the same amount of food had to be produced without the assistance of machinery, a great increase

in the number of labourers would be necessary. Each individual would produce much less with the same amount of toil when unassisted by machinery. A sufficient number could only be procured by withdrawing them from other occupations. Some of these individuals are engaged in commerce—procuring for our use the products of other climes; some are engaged in the manufacture of various articles of utility or ornament—building our houses—making our clothes—writing and printing our books—cultivating the Fine Arts, &c.; all contributing to our enjoyment. It is evident we must be deprived of many of these articles—our comforts must be abridged. The wealthy only would be able to procure a supply of anything not absolutely necessary for the support of life.

Suppose, for a moment, that those ingenious machines employed in the fabrication of our clothing were destroyed. The effect would be, that since clothing is indispensable, workmen would be withdrawn from the production of those things which are merely ornamental, or which are, however useful and convenient, of secondary importance. The supply would be small; consequently, the price would be high. But who would suffer? it might be asked. Would the working man—the actual producer—be in a worse position than he is at present? He would. All would suffer—rich and poor, the prince and the peasant; but the poor man would suffer to the greatest extent. The best of everything would then, as now, be carried to the tables of the rich. With the same amount of labour to perform, the workman would find his comforts abridged, or in other words, and in effect, his wages diminished. Probably, since there would be the same amount of coin in existence, he might receive the same or a larger nominal value. But the real value of 20s. depends upon the amount of labour it represents—the amount of the necessities or conveniences of life which it will procure; and therefore, if I should receive £2 instead of £1, and everything I had to purchase was five times as dear as it is, I must be deprived of three-fifths of those articles I now enjoy. A day's work would not purchase so much bread: wages, therefore, would be really lower:

a less crop being produced at an increased cost.

In the earlier periods of our history, famines were of frequent occurrence. This was attributable to the wretched manner in which the land was cultivated. Thousands perished of actual hunger, and thousands more preserved life by eating the bark of trees, acorns, and pig-nuts. The condition of the labourer was very bad. The laws forbade him to leave the estate on which he was born. There was not a sufficient number to till the ground, because they were unskilful, and had exceedingly awkward tools. There was labour in abundance, but the want of agricultural knowledge kept all classes poor. The farmer had little corn to exchange for manufactures, and, consequently, he was badly clothed and badly lodged. In the present day, the position of a people destitute of machinery can nowhere be better seen than in China. The Chinese have scarcely any machinery, and are miserably poor.

Those who object to the employment of machinery, as injurious to the working classes, generally attempt to establish a difference between a machine and a tool. A tool of the most simple construction is a machine—a machine of the most curious construction is but a complicated tool. There is not the slightest foundation for any such distinction as would make it appear that the reasoning employed in the attempt to prove machinery adverse to the workmen is inapplicable to its more simple kind, denominated tools. The principle upon which the argument against the use of machinery is founded is this;—the less the amount of work performed by machinery, the greater the amount left for the manual labourer; and, consequently, as the work to be performed by manual labour is increased, the number of labourers required will be larger, and their remuneration increased. If this argument will prove anything, it will prove, that since a workman with the aid of his tools can do more than without them, if the tools be abandoned, more labourers will be required, and their remuneration still further increased. Yet who does not at once perceive how foolish and futile would be the conduct of that man, or that body of men, who should abandon their tools, hoping thereby

to improve their position? The argument amounts to this;—the more inconvenient and clumsy the method by which the workmen proceed, the less the amount of work which will be performed; a greater amount of workmen will be required, and the greater will be the amount of remuneration they will be able to secure. If the abandonment of machinery was confined to one branch of manufacture, the workmen engaged in it might gain a temporary advantage. Their wages would probably be increased, and the price of those articles for which they might desire to barter them would remain unaltered. But if generally carried out, the increase of wages, would not be in the same proportion as the increase in the price of other articles. To the workman, considered simply as a producer, there might be a temporary advantage; but considered as a consumer, he would sustain a much greater disadvantage. Let us not forget the two-fold character of the working man.

"The chief distinction between man in a rude, and man in a civilised state of society, is that the one wastes his force, whether natural or acquired; the other economises, that is, saves it. The man in a rude state has very rude instruments—he, therefore, wastes his force; the man in a civilised state has very perfect ones—he, therefore, economises it. Would you not laugh at the gardener who went to hoe his potatoes with a stick having a short crook at the end?

It would be a tool, you would say, fit only for children to use. Yet such a tool was doubtless employed by some very ancient nations; for there is an old medal of Syracuse which represents this very tool. The common hoe of the English gardener is a much more perfect tool, because it saves labour. Could you have any doubt of the madness of the man who should propose that all iron hoes should be abolished, to furnish more extensive employment to labourers, who should be provided only with a crooked stick cut out of a hedge? The truth is, if you, the working men of England, had no better tools than crooked sticks, you would be in a state of actual starvation."*

The instances given will be sufficient to convince the candid inquirer that the working classes have been benefitted by machinery. I will, therefore, bring these observations to a close, by asking those who think differently, Whether they would advise me to grind the edge off my axe, in order that a larger amount of labour might be left for others? I fear it would be necessary, if I should take this course, to file the edge of my teeth, for there would be so much less work for teeth to do, that unless they were incapacitated for doing it at the present speed, great numbers would be unemployed.

Sheffield.

E. S. F.

* "The Results of Machinery." London: Charles Knight.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. IX.

42. *Granting* is the act of bestowing without compensation or reward, generally in answer to a request, or the conceding of some point of form or opinion, without any convincing reason being asked or given. As it thus pre-supposes a sort of friendliness co-existing in the parties, it is usually expressed by a hearty, kindly, and affectionate look and tone, with some of those acts which betoken sincerity—*e.g.*, the hand laid on the left breast, or extended approbatively to the person. When, however, it is given reservedly, there is a cold, haughty formality assumed, and a general stiffness and uneasiness displays itself in the voice and manner.

43. *Dependence* is the state of being in subjection to another, and is evinced by a mixture of humility and modesty.

44. *Veneration* is a combination of esteem and admiration for the great, the good, the wise, and holy. In its lowest exercise, it is hero-worship, loyalty, and the prime element in partizanship; and in its highest modes of manifestation, it becomes the worship and adoration of the one SUPREME. In uninformed minds, it expends itself in idolatry and superstition. Its general tone and manner is that of dependence, inferiority, and gratitude. It imparts meekness and submissiveness to the deportment, lowers the head, declines the eyebrows, half shuts the eyes, spreads serenity over the countenance, and closes the mouth. Sometimes, however, the head is slightly elevated, the eyes reverentially opened, and the hands imploringly raised to a level with the chest; the voice low, equable, timid, diffident, anxious, and somewhat hesitating; while in the ascription of praise or thanks, a degree of cheerfulness may be imparted to the tone. Adam and Eve's Morning Prayer (Milton's "*Paradise Lost*," book v., line 153) pronounced when the scarce-risen sun,

"With wheels yet hovering o'er the ocean brim,
Shot parallel to earth his dewy ray,"

is a most sublime and soul-elevating specimen of this sentiment or feeling of the mind, verbally expressed. To it—being too lengthy for extract—we would direct our readers. We may speak in terms of equal praise of Coleridge's magnificent "*Hymn before sunrise in the vale of Chamouni*."

45. *Hope* is that passion of the mind which contemplates enjoyment as future and attainable.

"Still it *whispers* promised pleasure,
And *bids* the lovely scenes at distance—hail!"

It bends the body forward, raises the head, brightens the eye, and makes it eager and wistful—spreads a glow of joy over the countenance—inclines the mouth to dimple into smiles—spreads the arms—and opens the hands as if to clasp the object of its longing aspirations. The voice is joyous, yet unequal—eager, yet anxious—full of anticipation, yet unnerved by doubt.

"But the witch—Hope—forbids me to be wise;
And when I turn to these—Woe's only friends—[pointing to his books]
And with their weird and eloquent voices—soothe
The lulled Babel of the world within,
I can but dream that my vexed years at last
Shall find the quiet of a hermit's cell;
And far from man's rude malice or low scorn,
Beneath the loved gaze of the lambent stars,
And with the hollow rocks and sparry caves,
And mystic waves, and music-murmuring winds—
My oracles and co-mates—watch my life
Glide down the stream of Knowledge, and behold
Its waters, with a nursing stillness, glass
The smiles of Nature and the eyes of heaven."

—Bulwer's "*Eugene Aram*," *A fragment of a Tragedy*.

46. *Desire* is that internal act or emotion of the mind towards an object which appears

worthy of being sought, and possessed of some pleasure-giving quality, on account of which we wish to obtain it, which, by influencing the will, induces us to attempt to acquire it. It is less confident in the attainment of its object, and, consequently, more eager and ardent than Hope. It is expressed by the bending forward of the body, and the outstretching of the arm as if to grasp the wished-for pleasure, the mouth is half-open, the nostrils inflated, the eyeballs stretched, the eyebrows corrugated to the middle of the forehead, the eyelids expanded, and the whole demeanour characterised by wistfulness—the voice is cheerful and gay, though supplicative.

47. *Love* is Desire moderated by Veneration and Respect, or, as it is defined by Shakespeare—

“ It is to be all made of sighs and tears—
It is to be all made of faith and service—
It is to be all made of phantasie—
All made of passion, and all made of wishes—
All adoration, duty, and obedience—
All humbleness—all patience and impatience—
All purity—all trial—all observance.”

No passion is more difficult to describe, for none exhibits itself in such a variety of phases. In general, however, its external expression may be thus described:—when successful, it crimps the mouth with smiles—makes the eyes look languishingly and doatingly. The wistfulness and ardour of Desire are slightly subdued by Admiration and Esteem. The tone is soft, persuasive, tender, and winning—sometimes rising even to rapture. The hands are occasionally pressed to the bosom, then suddenly outstretched towards the beloved object. The forehead is placid, and the eyebrows are arched. Unsuccessful love frequently runs into other passions, as Melancholy, Jealousy, Revenge, or Despair.

We can only find space for the following examples, referring to “Romeo and Juliet,” “Venice Preserved,” “The Lady of Lyons,” &c., for further specimens of this passion in all its shades, degrees, and variations. We may likewise mention Leigh Hunt’s “Story of Rimini,” Crabbe’s “Tales of the Hall,” and Coleridge’s beautiful ballad—“Ginevra.”

“ I cannot prate in pining strain,
Of ladye-love and beauty’s chain.
If changing cheek and scorching vein—
Lips taugth to writhe, but not complain—
If bursting heart and maddening brain,
And daring deed, and vengeful steel
And all that I have felt, and feel,
Betoken Love—that Love was mine.”

—Byron’s “Giacour.”*

“ I remember when I was in love, I broke my sword on a stone, and bid him take that for coming a’ night to Jane’s smile; and I remember the kissing of her batlet, and the cow’s dugs that her pretty chopped hands had milked; and I remember the wooing of a peasecod instead of her, from whom I took two cods, and giving her them again, said, with weeping tears, “Wear these for my sake.” We that are true lovers, run into strange capers; but as all is mortal in nature, so is all nature in love mortal in folly.”—*Touchstone* in “*As You Like it*.”

* Pronounced *Djowr*.

"The world I love not, therefore I love *thee*.
 Come, shall I tell thee—'tis an oft-told tale,
 Yet never wearies—by what bright degrees
 Thy empire rose, till it o'erspread my soul,
 And made my all of being—Love? Thou knowest
 When first thou cam'st into these lone retreats,
 My years yet dwelt in childhood, but my thoughts
 Went deeper than my playmates. Books I loved,
 But not the books that woo a woman's heart :—
 I loved not tales of war and stern emprise,
 And man let loose on man—dark deeds, of which
 The name was Glory, but the nature, Crime;
 Nor themes of vulgar love—of maidens' hearts
 Won by small worth, set off by gaudy show.

All that I dreamed of sympathy was given
 Unto the lords of mind—the victor chiefs
 Of wisdom—or of wisdom's music—song.
 And as I read of them, I dreamed, and drew
 In my soul, colours, shapes, my soul might love,
 And loving, worship. They were like to thee.

Then as time won thee frequent to our hearth,
 Thou from thy learning's height didst stoop to teach me
 Nature's more gentle secrets—the sweet lore
 Of the green herb, and the bee-worshipped flower;
 And when the night did o'er the nether earth
 Distil meek quiet, and the heart of heaven,
 With love, grew breathless, thou wert wont to raise
 My wild thoughts to the weird and solemn stars :
 Tell of each orb the courses and the name;
 And of the winds, the clouds, the invisible air,
 Make eloquent discourse; until methought
 No human life, but some diviner spirit,
 Alone could teach such truths of things divine."

—*Bulwer's "Eugene Aram," A fragment of a Tragedy.*

LAW OF DEBATE.

DEBATE is the mighty alembic which men have consented to employ for the separation of Truth from Error in that highly sublimated and subtile article—opinion. Through this, Facts, Hypotheses, Theories, Maxims, "wise saws and modern instances," are, with similar impartiality, made to pass, and by this they are subjected to the same process of elimination. Debate is the assayer-master, by whom the coin of opinion is tested, as to whether it is worthy of being admitted into the currency;—the balance

in which thought is weighed;—the refiner's fire in which the gold ore and the dross are disunited;—the winnowing process by which the chaff is sifted from the wheat :—in short, the means by which the mind is enabled to discriminate verities from falsities—the real and permanent from the unreal and evanescent. It is of some importance, then, that those who engage in the attempt to expurgate the false and seeming from the true and real—to distinguish between the "fine gold tried in the fire," and the

"baser dross"—between the counterfeit and the genuine,—should follow some definite plan for the direction of their conduct, and some settled rules for their guidance in the management of this mental process; and it is our purpose in the present paper to supply the untrained mind with some general hints on "the conduct of the understanding" in this important department of intellectual exertion. We respectfully request that we may be pardoned the presumption which the endeavour implies, for the motive which leads us to make the effort—the furnishing of the members of Debating Societies with a few directions which, if duly attended to, will, we think, materially advance the purposes for which such associations have been instituted.

Debate, it will be seen from the preceding paragraph, has, in our opinion, a lofty purpose to subserve, not only in its power of exciting and testing the mental activities, but also on the destiny of humanity; for if Truth be the all-sufficing requisite of human happiness—be the grand promoter of those enjoyments which arise from the due exercise of our purer nature—be the indisputable "liege lord and sovereign" of the soul of man; and if Error be the well-spring of misery and woe—the chief agent in the demonizing of our race—and the usurper of a throne on which a happiness-dispensing power should sit, then, any means by which the advancement of the one might be furthered, and the progression of the other retarded, should be highly esteemed and worthily employed. We protest, then, against that perversion of this grand instrument for the effectuating of such mighty purposes, in which logical subtlety and skill combined with sophistical chicanery, would seek to prove that *Nought is everything, and everything is nought.*

We think that honest conviction should be the basis of every debater's theme, and that in all sober earnestness and reality, he should then nerve himself with all his powers of acquired knowledge and mental acumen, for strenuous and unflinching wrestling for the inner-lying Truth of his intellection. In our succeeding remarks we will suppose the debater to be animated with the love of Truth, and to speak the convictions which he feels tugging at his soul for utterance, and panting for a vent.

At some future period we may, perhaps, occupy our reader's attention with the subject "Debate," in which we will detail more at large its nature, uses, and advantages. At present, our object is confined to one particular point—the elucidation of the "Laws of Debate"—to a brief notice of which we now devote our space.

1st. All the essential terms involved in a debate should be carefully defined.

This is necessary to the clear understanding of the point at issue. Unless this be done, we may pass our time and expend our strength Don Quixote-like, in valorous attacks on windmills, but we shall neither storm the citadel of Error, nor advance the cause of Truth. The definition of terms enables us to discriminate at once the amount of difference existing between us and our opponent; it erects a common ground on which we can both meet, and a central point from which we may set out in the prosecution of our researches. It prevents all ambiguity of meaning, and all dishonest attempts at what is vulgarly, but significantly, called "shuffling"—all endeavours to unwind ourselves out of any difficulty in which we find ourselves, by tampering with the signification of our terms. There is the greater necessity for this, because most of those terms which are used to express debateable ideas are of an abstruse nature, and are frequently employed with so much vagueness as to render it difficult to keep the meaning fixed and uniform. By following this rule, however, this dilemma is escaped, and the opponents of any opinion are able to "charge home" upon their adversaries with effect, for their camp is rendered stationary, and they have been obliged to "nail their colours to the mast;" there is no flying from the one, nor deserting the other, without defeat and disgrace. It frequently happens, too, that seeming diversities, like equal magnitudes, viewed at different distances, disappear on closer and more accurate inspection, while not unfrequently, apparent agreements, as some stars in the jewelled canopy of night, appear tingle, although binary, upon a more attentive view, show themselves dissimilar. It is by Definition alone that clearness and accuracy of argumentation can be effected. The chief subjects upon which debate can

occur are those in which words have a vague, loose, and indeterminate signification; *this* at once, and distinctly, exhibits the points in which that divergency of ideas which creates the necessity of debate, consists. It is quite evident that any error in the early stages of discussion—any neglect of the means by which particularity and definitude may be given to the opinions which we have espoused, or those which we oppose, will lead to greater perplexity in the subsequent steps, and render the final unravelment of the subject more complex, intricate, and involved than before. If we have Truth upon our side, or the love of Truth in our heart, we shall consider definition essential to the perfect discussion of any question. Those only who are in error, and love it, or who wish to entangle us in the meshes of sophistry, will eschew definition. Definition should convey exactly the whole of the intended meaning, and neither more nor less. For further information on this topic, we cannot do better than refer our readers to the remarks on this topic contained in "The Art of Reasoning," No. III.

2nd. All personalities should be carefully avoided.

Nothing so much tends to blind the judgment, and pervert the reason, as the awakening of the rancorous passions of our nature. They hurry us on, with the force of an unrestrained current, until we drift far out of view of the object which we sought to gain, and spread a misty vapourous veil before the mental eye. If Truth be our aim, *ideas*, and not *persons*, are the just objects of attack. Anything affecting the appearance, qualifications, &c., of an opponent cannot, in the least, affect the truth or falsehood of the proposition he affirms; so that any personal reflections which may be cast out do not impugn the accuracy of the opinions he entertains, or the principles he advocates; and there is much more honour in refuting the arguments of an opponent than in defaming his character. Some people seem to take as a maxim in discussion, "throw plenty of mud, some is sure to stick,"—as if there were no distinction between the man and his opinions. How true is the saying, that "no orator can measure in effect with him who can give good nicknames." So far as a man's opi-

nions are concerned, the only way in which you can successfully convince him of his errors is, not by showering ridicule on his physical defects—loading his name with opprobrious epithets or sly insinuations—raining wrath-torrents of invective against the character of his party or sect—or treating his position in society with scorn; but by carefully analysing, honestly refuting, or calmly objecting to, and arguing against, the principles which he espouses, and the reasonings with which he defends them. Never meet undeniable truth with the rebuff, that the person who utters it is unworthy of notice. It is our duty not to notice *him*, but to reverence truth.

3rd. Egotistical expressions should be studiously eschewed.

There is a sort of repellent feeling which springs up in the minds of hearers, which inclines them to be disgusted with and to resent any arrogation of superiority. No one, however he may tacitly admit the superiority of another, is gratified by that super-excellence being brandished in his face; and hence all phrases of self-sufficiency have the effect of supervening a prejudice against the person who employs them, and make them unwilling to admit his opinions to be true, even when they are so. If you address an audience, remember that for the time being they are the jury by whom your opinions are to be judged;—if you insult their judgment by arrogance, will they not avenge it by neglect? The true art of conciliating an audience is to place them on a footing of perfect equality—nay, to allow them a conventional superiority. Besides, such expressions must excite the egotism of your opponent, and, instead of a warfare for truth, Debate is apt to degenerate into a mere trial of personal skill in the art of wielding the weapons of a wrangling, sophistical, strategical logic. To speak egotistically is, as it were, to give a verdict in our own favour:—there is a want of true dignity and confidence displayed in it—it has more of the appearance of brow-beating and prejudgment—more of a disposition to maintain one's own infallibility, than a sincere desire for truth-acquirement. It wants that appearance of dispassionateness and impartiality, which has so great an influence on the popular mind. No man can

be esteemed an honest Truth-seeker, whose interest, station, fame, or egotism, are so preposterously obtruded into the debate.

4th.—The consequences which we deduce from the opinions of an opponent should not be charged against him.

It is a very common error amongst debaters to make their own deductions from the premises laid down by an opponent, and by hunting them into absurdities concocted only in their own brain, assert their ridiculousness, pass them unanswered, and thus overwhelm him with ridicule, leaving his reason unconvinced. In a mere contest for victory, this might be excusable; but in discussion originated with the ostensible object of honest investigation, it is obviously inadmissible. There is doubtlessly great force in a witticism—immense power in a *double entendre*. A sly insinuation—an arch remark—a keen sarcasm—or a jocular *argumentum ad hominem vel verecundiam* can raise a laugh at the expense of an adversary, but it can neither prove the truth nor falsehood of any fact, theory, or principle. It is a double-edged weapon, which cuts equally well on whichever side it is employed. The consequences we may deduce from any set of principles may be, and very often are, such as the originator of those principles, or the supporter of them, has neither seen nor would admit. As well might we ascribe all the inventions resulting from the discovery of any law of Nature to the discoverer of that law, as ascribe all the consequences of any opinion to the person who suggested or upholds it. These consequences may exist *potentially* in the premises which he asserts; but as he has not inferred them, they ought not in justice to be charged against him—*e.g.*, the principles a man espouses may, when carried out to their utmost logical results, be favourable to infidelity, atheism, or licentiousness; but if he has not so carried them out, it is most unjust to charge him with being an infidel, an atheist, or a licentious man. In arguing, it is quite legitimate to *prove* that they may lead to such results, and thus confute the principles which our adversary maintains, but to insinuate that his personal character is tainted by these principles, is an unjustifiable stretch of the freedom of speech.

5th.—Our opponent should never be accused of acting from wrong motives, and all his arguments ought to be answered, whether we consider him sincere in the utterance of them or not.

To act thus, is to forsake argumentation and betake oneself to invective—is to distract the mind from the truth of his assertions, and by the aid—it may very likely be—of calumny, to darken the mental vision of the hearers,—is to give up rationality, and employ aspersion. It may be very advantageous for one who has the wrong side of the question, and knows so, to debate after this fashion; but he who is “armed with truth and honesty” needs no such weapon, and will not stoop to the employment of any such artifice. To do this, is not to reason, but to recriminate. Our business is, not what are the motives of the man, but are his assertions true or false?—his reasoning valid or invalid? To intermix motives and opinions in one mass of verbiage is not argumentation—leads not to the elucidation of truth, but tends to introduce confusion and difficulty into our inquiries; and with regard to the audience it is like stirring up the sand at the bottom of a fountain before inviting your friends to drink:—it is not a purifying but a defiling process. Diatribes, volubly uttered, in well-rounded phraseology, may deceive the vulgar, but cannot make men wiser, or impart more accurate opinions on any topic. If the above opinions be correct, it will naturally follow that each argument should be fairly, honestly, and candidly met, and calmly, yet clearly answered. A respectful tone and gentlemanly demeanour should be preserved,—Billingsgate should be eschewed, and everything savouring of the “fancy” should be carefully and sedulously guarded against.

These, we think, are the chief laws which should be kept in view while engaged in controversy. The *minutiae* of debate is generally settled by the mutual agreement of the respective parties, or by the rules of the societies which are established for this purpose. We would willingly enlarge upon the advantages which may result from well-conducted discussion, in aiding the mind to form correct opinions, and to detect erroneous ones—in increasing the power of thought and the acumen of the intellect—

in forming decision of judgment and readiness of expression—in calling forth the mental capacities, and inclining men to engage in intellectual pursuits, and thus furthering the advancement, elevation, and gradual improvement of our race. To do so, however, would lead us beyond the limits assigned us, and add another heavy page to

the tedious infliction with which we have this month wearied our readers. We cannot, however, conclude without recommending to them the aspiration of the poet-philosopher—Xenophanes—

“Oh! that mine were the deep mind, prudent,
and looking to both sides.”

S. N.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

41. Having paid some attention to Phrenology, and being persuaded of its truth, I wish to study it more, and shall feel obliged if some of your correspondents would inform me what are the best works on the subject, and their price?—J. N.

42. Will some of your correspondents kindly furnish a list of the best works for a young man commencing the study of History, with some advice upon History as a study?—A. S.

43. What is the best plan to adopt, to obtain proficiency in English Orthography?—J. W.

44. What course of study is requisite for a young man who is about to enter the Navy? and what is the best and cheapest work on Navigation?—F. H. F.

45. How is A. B., who is desirous of showing courtesy to C. D., (an equal), to act under the following circumstances?—A. B. holds, and has long held, daily intercourse with C. D.; but a propensity in C. D. to insult and cast contempt on A. B., *entirely unprovoked*, causes A. B. some anxiety to know what course should be taken, so as to spare the feelings of C. D., and at the same time to cure the evil complained of.—A. B.

46. What are the best Class Books, Dictionaries, and Grammars, in each of the following languages:—French, German, Italian, Spanish? and what, in the opinion of your readers, are the merits of the Robertsonian method of learning these and other languages?—AN EDINBURGH SUBSCRIBER.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

32. *Chemistry*.—The chemist, while pursuing his researches, becomes acquainted with elementary bodies which have hitherto been unknown, and consequently nameless; he is, therefore, for convenience in speaking, writing, or thinking, constrained to give each of these a name. This he does by combining Greek or Latin words together, so that in that union they may express the prominent characteristics of the elementary body; and his reason for adopting these lan-

guages is, that they are, somehow or other, supposed to be universal languages, known to all learned and scientific men, and consequently the name is as capable of being understood by his fellow-experimentalist on the Continent, as here, or among his Saxon transatlantic brethren. The superior coalescing power of these tongues in word-formation, and the greater euphonianness of these compounds, form other arguments for their systematic use. This constitutes the Chemical Nomenclature. We give below, in an alphabetical arrangement, the names of the chief elementary substances, with their symbols and atomic weights or combinative equivalents annexed.

NAME.	SYM.	A.W.	NAME.	SYM.	A.W.
Aluminum	Al.	13	Mercury, or Hy-		
Antimony, or			<i>drargyrum</i>	Hg.	202
<i>Stibium</i>	Sb.	64	Molybdenum	Mo.	47
Arsenic	As.	37	Nickel	Ni.	29
Barium	Ba.	68	Nitrogen	N.	14
Bismuth	Bi.	71	Osmium	Os.	99
Boron	B.	10	Oxygen	O.	8
Bromine	Br.	78	Palladium	Pa.	53
Cadmium	Cd.	55	Phosphorous	P.	15
Calcium	Ca.	20	Platinum	Pl.	98
Carbon	C.	6	Potassium, or		
Cerium	Ce.	46	<i>Kalium</i>	K.	39
Chlorine	Cl.	35	Rhodium	R.	52
Chromium	Cr.	28	Selenium	Se.	39
Cobalt	Co.	29	Silicon	Si.	22
Columbium, or			Silver, or <i>Ar-</i>		
<i>Tantalum</i>	Ta.	185	<i>gentum</i>	Ar.	108
Copper, or <i>Cu-</i>			Sodium, or <i>Na-</i>		
<i>prum</i>	Cu.	31	<i>trium</i>	Na.	23
Fluorine	F.	18	Strontium	Sr.	43
Glucinium	G.	26	Sulphur	S.	16
Gold, or <i>Au-</i>			Tellurium	Te.	64
<i>rum</i>	Au.	199	Thorium	Th.	59
Hydrogen	H.	1	Tin, or <i>Stannum</i>	Sn.	58
Iodine	I.	126	Titanium	Ti.	24
Iridium	Ir.	98	Tungsten, or		
Iron, or <i>Fer-</i>			<i>Wolfram</i>	W.	94
<i>rum</i>	Fe.	28	Vanadium	V.	68
Lead, or <i>Plumbum</i>	Pb.	103	Uranium	U.	217
Lithium	L.	6	Yttrium	Y.	32
Magnesia	Mg.	12	Zinc	Zn.	32
Manganese	Mn.	27	Zirconium	Zr.	33

(To be continued in our next.)

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

We have much pleasure in being able to state, that the first examination-papers of those students who have entered our logic class, have been highly creditable to themselves; and exceedingly gratifying to us. It is true no one of them has reached that point in executive ability which we wish should be attained;—no one displays that accuracy and sequency of arrangement—that correctness of phraseology, and knowledge of the *minutiae* of composition, which we desiderate; yet, it is but justice to add that they all contain evident marks of *thought*, and that, in many parts, great care and caution seem to have been taken in the composition. Many of them, we delight to mention it, are the results of the few spare evening hours which protracted and exhausting toil leave at the command of our students, during which, they burn "the midnight oil" at study, in preference to pursuing the routine of vulgar amusements, entering the haunts of vicious indulgence, lolling in listless and do-nothing indolence, or wandering with stupid stare, empty minds, and vacant countenances through the streets of our manufacturing towns or villages. Surely, it is much more pleasant, useful, and agreeable, to be engaged in the resolute endeavour to cultivate the intellect, and thus "to bring the mind up to one's own esteem," than to allow the hours of youth to fly overhead unimproved, or, perchance, mispent. We need have no hesitation in saying that we are disappointed in finding that these exercises have been performed by so few of our readers, convinced as we are, of the great advantage which would accrue to them, by the mental employment which they would necessitate, and the improvement in intelligence which would result from these intellectual efforts. Dr. Blair very truly remarks that, "When we are employed after a proper manner, in the study of composition, we are cultivating Reason itself. True Rhetoric, and sound Logic are very nearly allied. The study of arranging and expressing our thoughts with propriety, teaches us to think, as well as to speak accurately. By putting our sentiments into words, we always conceive them more distinctly." Such being the case, we would earnestly recommend our young readers to avail themselves of the opportunity herein afforded them. It is a very prevalent error amongst the young, that reading is itself a perfect means of acquiring knowledge. It is not so. It is only when we have mastered the meaning contained in the book, and made its treasures part of our own mental capital, that we can be truly said to *know* what it contains; now no possible means of discovering the real amount of knowledge which we possess, can be better than that which tests the exchangeable value of our intellectual wealth, and proves that we are always able to "pay on demand," whatsoever may be justly required of us. What matters all the accumulations which we may heap together, if we cannot employ them when circumstances call for their use, if they are amassed in confusion, disorder, and irregularity? Composition conduces to orderliness of intellect,

accuracy of thought, correctness of expression, increase of mental energy, readiness of inventive resource, quickness of apprehension, clearness of perception, and general intelligence. Professor D. Stewart while impressing similar views upon his students, remarks that, were this plan adopted, "it would add greatly to the stock of useful and solid knowledge, and by rendering our acquired ideas, in some measure our own, would give us a more ready, and practical command of them; not to mention that if we are possessed of any inventive powers, such exercises would continually furnish them with an opportunity of displaying themselves upon all the different subjects which may pass under our review;" and Locke, in his "Thoughts concerning Education" asserts, that "to speak and write correctly, gives a grace, and gains a favourable attention, to what one has to say." Let each one of our young readers then enter the lists, let him strive after mental improvement, and exert himself assiduously in self-elevation, and self-culture. Let each labour and toil, assured that he will reap the reward of his exertions, and that in exercising his own penetration, his own reflective powers, his own capacities of thought, in cultivating facility of expression, perseverance in thinking, and beauty of style, he will find that he is adding new graces to his character, and new capacities of social intercourse and acuteness of pleasure-appreciation to his mental faculties. But some of our readers, whose modesty retards them from presenting their exercises, may ask us, *What do you consider as the true requisites of a good style?* We cannot answer this question more briefly, more accurately, or more comprehensively than in the words of Quintilian, (Just. Orat., Book VIII., ch. 3.) "The first requisite is a vigorous conception, the next is propriety of expression, and the third consists in the embellishment of both, or what is properly termed, ornament." Let no one be afraid, however, of finding us a hard task-master; we will judge justly, so far as in us lies, but we will avoid severity or harshness. Hoping these observations will not be lost on our young readers, we will proceed to explain the use of the marks as employed below.

We have agreed to designate the point which we should like our students to attain, by the sign 100, and each inferior grade will be marked with a lower figure. We have thus, we think, attained a series of signs which may in some sort serve for—if you will pardon us the coinage of a not very elegant word—an Intellect-ometer for our students: 50 of course designates the average, and on examining the marks below, it will be found that all the communications yet received exceed that mediocral-line. Instances of a few sentences, from a few of these papers, have been subjoined, not because they are the best, but because they could be consecutively arranged to form intelligible answers to the queries proposed, and serve as incentives to others "to go and do likewise":—

M. G. M. Leith, 85, (5 queries answered);
J. R. E. Ipswich, 78, (5, queries answered);

Ruth, 75, (1st. query); Juvenis, Leeds, 73, (1st. query); C. J. D. Norw ich, 72, (1st. query) R. K. Kilmarnock, 71, (1st. query); J. C. Pontefract, 70, (3rd. query); J. H. Manchester, 70, (5 queries answered); R. G.'s paper manifests attentive reading, but the whole of the queries are answered in such a synoptical manner, that we are unable to give any opinion on the composition. A few came to hand so late that we cannot, according to our rules, advert to them.

Query 1st.—Of what advantage has the faculty of Reason been to the human race, and in what does it employ itself?

Man is essentially an inquisitive being, he must search, he must be continually finding out, he must ever be penetrating into the mysteries which on all sides surround him. Whence this ardent, this irrepressible desire? It issues from the Divine mind within him, it proceeds from the vital spirit which animates his material frame, and which manifests itself in every word and action. The manifestations of this indwelling thing, if such a word may be used to designate it, are exhibited in Reason; and what has this not done for man? It has raised him above surrounding objects and influences, and enabled him to assert a proud superiority. Without Reason man would have been the most defenceless of all animated existences, and would have been the prey and sport of every being and circumstance. What would his form, fragile and delicate as a tender plant, have availed him against the wild fury of the tempest, or the relentless fury of savage beasts? How could his numerous and ever recurring wants be supplied, and where would he find shelter and support? * * * Reason jogs along by the side of the artisan, directing the teeming brain of the inventive mechanic, sits by the side of the reflecting legislator, labours in the counting house of the merchant, guides the man of science, and soars aloft with the metaphysician and the poet.—M. G. M.

In almost every physical qualification man is inferior to many of the lower animals, some excel him in swiftness, others are superior to him in strength, his vision is weak, compared with that of the eagle, and his frame is generally more tender and susceptible of the influences of climate and accident than theirs; yet, by the aid of Reason, he constructs conveyances whose velocity exceeds the swiftest courser, and through the creatures of his invention he performs labours requiring the exertion of enormous strength. By means of the telescope he looks upon worlds far far beyond the confines of his own, and his microscope reveals to his astonished gaze, hosts of wonders, where nothing appears to the most acute vision of his superiors in that faculty. When the inclement elements threaten to injure or annoy him he builds dwellings to protect himself, and the lightning which terrifies alike the brute and the savage, becomes the harmless messenger of intellectual man. * * * The use of this faculty is not confined alone to the man of science—the statesman—the theologian—is not employed exclusively in evangelizing the world—in devising and carrying on systems of government, or in effecting dazzling results in scientific discovery. Every operative following the humblest occupation, is constantly

exercising this faculty, and in proportion as it is properly cultivated, will his occupation become pleasant and profitable.—JUVENIS.

Reason is our aid and guide in religion, in government, in politics, in philosophy, in thought and in action. It is the fountain of all our notions of justice, of truth, and of propriety; the origin of virtue, and the teacher of moderation. We may, therefore, see that the faculty of Reason has played a very important part, not only in the formation of the human character, but also in the constitution of society in general. For let us suppose, for a moment, that man had never possessed the power of Reasoning, and that all his actions were produced by instinct alone, or some other similar agency; what would have been the result? Can we believe that institutions—such as now exist—would ever have become known to the world? Would progress ever have been either aimed at, or effected? Would those great truths which in successive ages have been discovered, ever have seen the light? In fact the search after truth which springs from that imperishable desire of knowledge implanted in the human breast, if it were ever begun, would soon be altogether abandoned, since it would be useless to seek for truth when we possessed no faculty enabling us to distinguish the true from the false; and assuredly the virtues could never have existed, for were the actions which we in our present state consider virtues performed by the guidance of instinct alone, there would be no merit in them, and they would cease to excite admiration. * * * The man who acts without being able to give a reason for what he performs, is universally blamed and despised, and justly so, for such a man is generally not only ignorant and careless, but stands upon the very brink of the abyss of crime.—C. J. D.

Query 2nd.—What must be considered as bearing a share in the production of vice? Why? with examples. What is the natural inference?

Error arising from unreflectiveness—because examination (or the use of the Reasoning faculty) indicates the track of error, and concealed deceit. The inference justly derivable is,—that as this faculty is of so great importance to the welfare of man in every condition of life, its cultivation ought to be carefully attended to.—R. G.

We should study the "right use of Reason" that we may be able to guard ourselves against error and disappointment. We must be apprized how to guard the inlets and outlets of our souls, and how to detect the ingress of any forbidden guest. We must be capable of tracing the workings of our thoughts, so that we may not deceive ourselves. We must be able to search for truth in the right way, and how shall we do this if we do not study the difference between *true* and *false*—between sound reasoning and subtle sophism. * * * Deceiving influences lead men away from right thinking, and from thence the path of wrong doing is not far distant. And shall we not say that *unreflectiveness*, as well as *misguided reflection* goes far to strengthen the iron throne of vice. * * * That we may guard against falling into vice, as well as that we may be armed for the battle of every-day-life, we must study "the art of Reasoning."—M. G. M.

Query 3rd.—What is Theory? give illustrations of its use, and shew the necessity of accurate Theory in the perfection of science.

Theory is a mental plan or view, existing in the imagination, and not yet brought into practice. Thought and the inventive genius of man is at work, but practice must tell whether his theory will bring out the perfect thing he wishes. Had it not been for Theory, the wonderful discoveries in astronomy, optics, and other branches of philosophy brought to light by the illustrious Newton, would never have been heard of. Had it not been for Theory those remarkable, and immensely useful improvements in machinery, which were perfected by the ingenious and indefatigable Arkwright, would never have existed, would never have brought their alleviating influence, and ameliorative power, to bear upon the working classes. Had it not been for Theory, steam-engines and railways would have been yet unknown, and had not that great man Stephenson—theorised, shewed and planned, and afterwards put these theories, etc., to the test of experiment, those grand and wonderful inventions which have immortalized his name, and the immense benefits of which are felt and acknowledged by every one, would never have been perfected. * * * It is evident, however, that if the presiding theory be incorrect, all attempts to put them in practice will be unavailing and futile. The sciences would not be perfected, but crippled by such abortions. * * * Yet, without Theory, there could have been little invention—few discoveries—little advancing civilization, and no literature weaving fresh garlands for the brows of science and furthering the progression, interests, and welfare of mankind.—J. C.

Query 4th.—With what should man live at perpetual enmity, and why? With illustrations.

Upon an examination of the customs and practices of mankind,—antique, and time honoured as many of them are,—it will be found that they originated in an age when Reason was weak, unsettled, and swayed by impulse, and that, when once established, they have been adhered to, not because they were *right*, but because they were *customary*, and so by this unreflective ignorance have vicious habits and practices been perpetuated. Now it can only be according to the amount of the wisdom which a man possesses, that his desires will be rightly directed, and that he will be able to accomplish his desires; *e. g.*, if a man be ignorant of his nature, powers, and capabilities—ignorant of what happiness is, or should be, he will be likely to mistake his way, and fall into vice and error. * * * Now if ignorance makes men follow bad customs—makes them mistake the way to happiness, and keeps them from seeing the true manner of moral duty, it is plain that we should live at perpetual enmity with *it*. And if we are still pressed for further confirmation, we would say, that answers and illustrations, in too great numbers, unfortunately, will be found amongst the stolidly ignorant.—H. J. Manchester.

Query 5th.—What is Logic? what are its various divisions? and of what do they respectively treat?

Logic is defined by Whately as “the science and art of Reasoning.”—the Science when treating of the “principles on which all argumentation is conducted;” taking the action of the mind in Reasoning in varied cases, observing the manner in which the process is conducted, reducing this to law, and laying down this law for our guidance and instruction;—the art when it “furnishes rules to secure the mind from error in its deductions.” It collates and classifies all kinds of argumentative propositions, shows in what *form* all true reasoning is, and must be, expressed, points out the various deceptive forms in which sophisms may be up-wrapped, and supplies rules for testing their arguments, enabling us to see the fallaciousness of bad reasoning, and to repudiate the sentiments embodied in the fallacy-containing propositions. Hence it becomes of great importance, that men should strive to understand it as a *science*, and apply it as an *art*.—J. R. R.

The operations of the intellect have been commonly divided as follows Perceptivity, Judgment, Argumentation, and Disposition.

Perceptivity is the conscious reception of any thing offered to the mind, either outwardly, or inwardly. These *perceptions* are the food of the mind, and give birth to *ideas*.

Judgment is that proceeding of the mind whereby, when two simple perceptions are presented to it, they become joined together either by an affirmation or negation. This affirmation, or negation, expressed in words, is a *proposition*.

Argumentation is exercised, when we infer one thing from two or more expressed propositions, or bring to light some hidden truth by the comparison of others which are clear and evident. An act of argumentation, when complete, is called a *sylogism*.

Disposition or Method is one of the most important things, for it arranges the intellectual stores, so that they shall be most easily found when wanted.—M. G. M.

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. III.

1st—What is Language, and what are its uses and advantages?

2nd—What is Generalization, and how is it employed in the operation of “Naming”?

3rd—What are the classes into which names may be divided;—define them, and give examples?

4th—What are the “Objects able to be named,” and how are they made known to the mind?

5th—What are the Predicables;—define them and give examples?

6th—To what general rule ought we to attend in the use of Language?

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XII.

.RATIOCINATION.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE SYLLOGISM.

"I pretend to no sagacity capable of striking out uncommon discoveries: my dependence must rest solely upon my care and vigilance, which keep me constantly upon the watch for such sparks of light as occur from time to time, spontaneously. I shall present the reader with nothing but what he may have had in his view before:—I pretend only to remind him of things that may have slipped his memory, or to point out to him objects that may have escaped his notice."—*Tucker.*

"Le raisonnement consiste à déduire, à inférer, à tirer un jugement d'autres jugemens déjà connus."—*Marsais.**

IN proposing to fill the present paper with an attempt to expound "the doctrine of the Syllogism," we know that we shall have a large amount of prejudice and misapprehension to encounter. It has become so fashionable of late to treat the defenders of "the syllogistic mode of reasoning," as some people call it, with ridicule, that we can scarcely expect to be exempted from a share of the same dignified and convincing method of argumentation. There is such an air of superior wisdom supposed to be evinced in decrying old-world notions—in rejecting as "foolishness" that which for so long a time was esteemed by "the world's grey fathers" as the true philosophy of thought—in possessing the capacity of perceiving the "triviality" of "the quips, the cranks, and learned quilllets" which prevailed during the lengthy reign of Scholasticism—in being able to detect the blundering irrelation which subsists between the *true* "art of Reasoning" and the "syllogistic mode"—and in being competent to resist, having the mind warped and the strength of the intellectual faculties restrained, by the absurd dialecticism of the stout Stagyrite, whose vain and futile "invention" held the mental powers of man so long in thrall, that we do not wonder at the existence of a wide-spread antagonism and a sturdy contempt of the Aristotelic Logic. If, however, we have been successful—as we hope we have—in convincing our readers of the inexpediency and error of offering worship at the secret shrines of the "Idols of the Intellect," we confidently expect that they will peruse this paper with the same attention, impartiality, and critical thoughtfulness as they have bestowed upon its predecessors. We are perfectly cognizant of the fact, that the great names—names endeared to every student of the "philosophy of mind"—of Locke, Reid, Campbell, Stewart, &c., may be cited against our opinion. We do not

* "Reasoning consists in deducing, inferring, or drawing one conclusion from others already known."

wish, however, to be influenced in our decisions by the wisdom of the past alone; nor to entrust our intellectual guidance to any set of men, however highly endowed with the heaven-gift of genius. We do not wish to rest our belief of any great philosophic truth merely upon the basis of the greatest collection of great names which may be quoted in support of it. Much as we revere the mighty masters in the science of human thought, we revere Truth more; hence it is that we most earnestly desire to employ our own reasoning powers in the impartial and unbiassed investigation of the evidence adduced in favour of any opinion, and thus, as far as in us lies, by a careful balancing and assaying of arguments, to acquire, if possible, the most accurate ideas upon any topic which may occupy our minds. Man's real position upon this earth is that of a *Truth-seeker*;—not always, however, does he, or can he, become a *Truth-finder*. This may partly result from the limitations of his nature, but far more frequently does it result from the adoption of erroneous methods of search; and more frequently still, from the neglect of all method whatever. Our object in this article is not to advance a mode of truth investigation but to attempt to unfold and explain what is *the* method which the mind itself, by the very constitution of its nature, is necessitated to employ. In so doing, we have no intention of being the apologists of Error in any of its multiform disguises; but we do wish to retain any truth, by whosoever elaborated, which may be useful to man, and capable of aiding him in the work of intellectual culture. Let it not be imagined, however, that we place our thoughts on this subject before our readers merely for the purpose of their being unthinkingly assented to by them, but rather that they may read and judge for themselves as to the accuracy of the reasoning which we bring before them. We wish to write didactically, not dogmatically. Believing as we do that “the grand and, indeed, only characteristic of truth is its capability of enduring the test of universal experience, and coming unchanged out of every possible form of fair discussion,”*—we cannot fear that our investigation will result in evil. No one of our readers we hope, will rashly and unphilosophically prejudge the matter, and decide upon the erroneousness of our opinions before he has carefully read the proofs we offer, and subjected them to a fair, candid, and unbiassed criticism; and in all their meditations on this subject, let them hold in remembrance the oft-repeated maxim of Locke, that “Reason must be our last guide and judge in everything.” If after such a course of thought, the opinions to be advanced hereinafter shall appear to be accordant with, and agreeable to, the process of mental action which self-consciousness makes known, let them be accepted as true; but if they shall seem incoincident with, and incommensurable to, the operations which by the revelations of consciousness are perceived going on in the mind while employed in the act of reasoning, let them be accounted in error. By this means, they may be subjected to experiment, and made amenable to the laws of a strict and rigorous induction. Such criticism we do not fear to invite. We have no intention of homologating all that Aristotle and the Schoolmen have written on this subject, or of defending the verbal subtleties and useless logomachies by which the latter-mentioned parties gained such distinguished honours and eminence-denoting titles; but we do seriously

* Herschell's “Discourse on Natural Philosophy.” p. 10.

believe that, as a philosophical exposition of the *form* of the mental act called Reasoning, "the doctrine of the Syllogism" is not only a tenable account, but is, besides, really and truly explanative of the necessary and essential laws by which the mind is governed in the performance of that operation; and this view of the matter we will now hasten to lay before you.

Let us, then, clearly and distinctly understand on what basis the Syllogistic Logic rests—on what fundamental truths it reposes—why it results from them as a *formal science*,—one which derives its being from the essentialities of the mental constitution itself. Every science exists under conditions—is built upon the subsumptions that there are laws which determine the facts upon which its inquiries are expended; and that if we could look upon these facts in the light of these laws, an orderly, harmonious, and consistent whole would be presented to our view. Hence it is of primary importance in the study of any science, to gain an accurate, definite, and precise acquaintance with its laws. Then it is that facts—the inarticulate, but truth-continent language of Nature—become expressive! Then it is that the mysterious hieroglyphics written with a Divine finger on the fair page of creation cease to be meaningless—become translatable—become words of wisdom, oracular in their multi-significance! The light of law reflected on the mind from the objectivities which surround it, reveals their union-bonds, causative agencies, qualities, relationships, &c.; and the immense multiplicity of truth-rays which emanate from them are, by one grand master thought, converged into a mental unity. The *φῶς νοερόν*—the light of the understanding—being thus kindled, flashes forth its illuminating radiance in all directions. From this consideration it will appear obvious that if we desire to appreciate the full power of any science to afford a complete and satisfactory account of the *rationale* of the phenomena of which it is cognizant, we must look upon these phenomena in the light which the laws of that science emit, and watch the harmonizing effects which these produce on the whole of the objectivities which come within the range of its influence. It is only by such a method of study that we can acquire accurate notions of the nature, purposes, capabilities, &c., of any science;—any isolated and external point must give incorrect and inadequate ideas of its efficiency. It is from this central—this light-forth-giving point that we wish you to look upon the phenomena with which Logic concerns itself.

Language is the exponent of thought, and ideas are the exponents upon which it operates. But it is only as we are impressed by objectivities that we can perceive them—only as they reveal themselves to our minds can we know them; so that if we attend not to the *forms* of our thought-powers—the manner in which our intellect operates under the rules and conditions which limit it—how can we expect that we can fully comprehend the art of thinking—the philosophy of thought? Now, between Logic and Language there obtains this great distinction;—that the former exerts itself to unfold and elucidate the manner of thought—to describe *how* we think; the latter employs itself in explaining the matter of thought—in making known *what* we think. By Language, men aim at the transference of their ideas in the speediest and most intelligible manner. The great object, therefore, which they keep in view is to express so much of *their* mental operations as will make the matter of thought perfectly understood, and in

more. The general intellectual endowments and characteristics of all men—however much they may differ in power—differ but slightly in their nature; and consequently, the process of thought-evolution is nearly similar in all; it is not necessary, then, that the whole of the mental operations which are gone through by one mind should be verbally unfolded to another. It is in general quite sufficient that a similar train of thought is excited in the other's mind, and then the whole process will be instinctively gone on with by that party; "for," to use the significant language of Hobbes, "thought is quick." It is on this account that common language abounds in elisions—that men leave many of the steps of the mental ongoings without explicit utterance, well knowing that they must be performed implicitly by the thinker, as they are the mere results of the excitation of the intellectual capacities of our nature. This elusive method of communication is eminently fitted for ordinary intercourse, because then the only object before the mind is to convey to others the matter concerning which the thinking powers were employing themselves—is to add its share to the general fund of remark upon business, instruction, &c., according as the circumstances demand; but it is quite evident that if we wish to attain a knowledge of the *modus operandi* of the thought-powers, in all its exactitude and methodicality, we must not rely upon that which is merely the adventitious dress or outward covering of our thoughts, but must look beneath the surfacism of verbalized expression—fix our mental eye upon the internal workings of the intellectual faculties, and by careful scrutiny and watchful investigation, become acquainted with the laws which regulate their action, and the manner in which thought-germination proceeds. When this is performed with accuracy and care, a formal science will be educed, which will be as invariable as the constitution of the human mind, and as incapable of being in error in its principles of evolution as the intellectual faculties are unable to overstep the limits which in the Creator's wisdom have been assigned to them.

We do not, by any means, assert that an analysis so accurate, searching, keen, and clear, has ever yet been made; least of all, do we wish to insinuate that we have accomplished so great and important a task. "The investigations thus proposed have obviously many analogies to a voyage of discovery. In these, no individual is completely successful; but the enterprise of many adventurers is required; while the observations of each may be useful to all who follow; and even the errors and failures of some may put others on the right track. In taking the present course, accordingly, I have endeavoured to avail myself of the experience of those who have pursued different courses, both when it follows and when it departs from theirs; and have thus recorded my observations for the benefit of others, who may hereafter be more successful, and who may derive useful suggestions from my very mistakes. For even when the main object of a voyage is missed, valuable discoveries may still be made. The Pole, perhaps, may never be reached, yet every advance towards it is an important achievement. The course now taken, I am persuaded, lies in the right direction, and, if skilfully followed, is likely to lead so far into the surrounding regions as to give more correct ideas of their general aspect, and of their bearings upon the point which is ultimately in view."*

* Cairns on "Moral Freedom." Preface p. ix.

Returning, however, from this digression, we may observe, that the difference between the purposes of ordinary discourse—viz., the expression of *the matter of thought*, and the ends which Logic seeks to attain—viz., a knowledge of *the manner of thought*, being so distinct, an equal distinctness must be pursued in the mode of investigation. We cannot, it would seem, confide in the utterances of vocal speech, nor in the idea-symbolization of writing, as full, clear, and accurate expositions of the operations of the mentality; for this would be to confound the casual and variable *forms of expression* with the necessary and invariable *forms of thought*—would be to hold language as a complete and perfect representative of the processes of thought, notwithstanding its clear want of any scientific elaboration. But we cannot, surely, accept the method of explaining *what* we think, as identical with the scientific exposition of *how* we think! It is necessary, therefore, for us to abstract our attention, as much as possible, from the forms of thought-expression, and rivet it upon the forms of thought-evolution; or, if this be impossible without the aid of words, we must be allowed to include and express in the verbal symbols we employ, all that may be found in the thinking process. In this attempt to translate into visible or audible signs the procedure of the mind, however, we must carefully abstain from allowing any one of those elisions, which ordinary discourse permits, to be omitted in our verbal representation, as it is quite evident that the whole scientific value of the knowledge thus attained will depend upon its being complete and perfect in its analysis.

Before proceeding to attempt to give an analysis of the reasoning process, however, it strikes us that it will be necessary to premise the following observation—viz., that all objectivities may be arranged into three great classes, according to the kind of impression which they make upon the mind. 1st—Those which are perfectly simple, or which make a unical impression on our Perceptivity; concerning these, no erroneous opinion can be formed, except through a defect in the inlets of knowledge; 2nd—Those which are always united and inseparable, and *vice versa*, which are never united and always separate; it is with these that the Mathematical and Physical sciences chiefly concern themselves, and from which, what are usually denominated “necessary truths” are deduced; 3rd—Those which may exist either separately or unitedly, or whose conjunctions and disjunctions are contingent; these are the kinds of phenomena in the investigation of which Morals, Politics, and Sociology are principally engaged. In Article V. we detailed the principal classes of relations which objects bear to each other; referring to it, therefore, for what farther information may be required on this topic, we proceed to remark that it appears from the above general, though rude, classification of objectivities, that the laws of Mathematics and the mathematio-physical sciences, are much more easy of discovery than those of the sciences which refer to the moral, civil, or social state of man; and this arises not only from the greater facility which they afford for experimentation, but also from the greater invariability of the conjunctions and disjunctions which obtains in the former as compared with the latter; so that we may be prepared to find a less degree of certainty in any reasoning concerning the latter than we do in the former.*

* Xenophon, in his “Memorabilia,” makes Socrates point out the distinction between the two

Ratiocination is the synthesis of two judgments, or the comparison of two distinct—*i.e.*, diverse, ideas, through the intermediacy of another *known* or hypothetical idea. The verbal expression of such an act of the mentality is called a Syllogism. The whole process is founded upon the mind's power of perceiving identity and diversity. It is the comparison by the intellect of idea with idea; but there are and must necessarily be, many ideas whose relations cannot be observed at a mere glance by the comparing faculty, in which case it will be found requisite that some intermediate and known idea should be placed before the mind, in order that a more ready perception of their agreement or disagreement may be attained. This fact may be illustrated thus;—suppose the proprietor of two fields to be desirous of discovering the relation of equality or inequality which they bear to each other, it would be necessary, in order to accomplish his purpose, to fix upon some definite mode of comparison—say the adoption of some known dimension-sign, as a yard, which could be applied to each—the relation which each field bore to this dimension-sign would be readily gained, and thus the relation in which they stood to each other would be easily comprehended. Exactly so is it with Logic,—so much so, that this might be called a practical syllogism.

The whole of these cognate operations which are necessary in an act of reasoning, appear to be the result of a power of comparative survey possessed by the mind, the complexity and difficulty of the process increasing as the intellect pushes its inquiries farther. In Perceptivity, we find the comparison of the qualities of one object with those of another, in order to arrange them into classes;—in Judgment, the comparison of one class of objectivities with another, conjoined with the assertion of their congruence or inconformability;—in Ratiocination, the comparison of two Judgments, in order to discover *their* relation or *relation*, and an assertion which embodies this mental decision. Each one of these forms of the intellect educes a new idea, and each idea differs in complexity from the one which preceded it;—*e.g.*, Perceptivity comparing a number of the heavenly bodies, finds that they agree in the possession of a certain quality, and forms of them a class of objects under the name Planets. Judgment, continuing the process, farther compares the ideas expressed in the words, “all planets” and “revolve round the sun,”—and predicates their agreement in the proposition, “all planets revolve round the sun.” Again: a newly-discovered body appears in the heavens—Judgment is called on to exercise its functions: it compares the ideas which the words

latter classes in these words—for the sake of unlearned readers, and to save space, we give only a translation:—

“Ippias answered and said, ‘Do you still say the same things which you said when I heard you many years since?’ And Socrates spoke: ‘Does it appear strange to you to say the same thing of the same things? Perhaps it would appear more singular to you to say the same thing of the same things.’ And Ippias said: ‘I would strive to say something new always.’ And Socrates spoke: ‘If then any person should inquire of you, concerning the size and appearance of Socrates would you try to say one thing to-day, and another thing another day? And if any one were to ask you how much twice five were, would you endeavour one day to say one thing, and another thing on another day?’ And Ippias said: ‘As to these things, I, as you do, should say the same things at all times; but as to what is good, and what is right, I think I could find something to say which could neither be contradicted by thee nor by any one else.’” Mem. iv. 4. 13.

“Neptune” and “planet” express, and asserts their congruency thus;—“Neptune is a planet.” Furnished with these materials, Ratiocination arranges these for further comparison, and proceeds in this manner:—

All planets revolve round the sun.

Neptune is a planet;

Therefore it revolves round the sun.

There are contained in this syllogism three, and only three, terms—viz., “Planet,” “revolve round the sun,” and “Neptune;” and three, and only three, propositions. It is the same with all valid Syllogisms; for the two ideas concerning the relation or irrelation of which the mind is as yet *formally* undecided, are both compared with another idea which bears a known or hypothetical relation to each. In one proposition, therefore, there is contained an assertion of the congruency or incoincidence of the known or hypothetical idea with one of the doubtful ones; the other asserts the same concerning that idea and the other doubtful one; and then there is the conclusion, in which the mind, now freed from doubt, asserts the agreement or disagreement between them. These three propositions, when definitely related and consecutively disposed, constitute a Syllogism, which may be defined as *a verbal representation of that act of the mind by which we ascertain that two ideas stand to each other in a certain relation of agreement or disagreement, through the knowledge that they stand in that same relation to a third.* We subjoin the following instances:—

“It is beneath the glowing rays of a tropical sun,” says Humboldt, “that the noblest forms of vegetation are developed.”

The Banian tree is one of the noblest forms of vegetation;

Therefore the Banian tree is developed beneath the rays of a tropical sun.

The Fine Arts soften the manners of men.

Poetry is one of the Fine Arts;

Therefore, Poetry softens the manners of men.

The radii of the same, or of equal circles, are equal.


The lines A B, B C, and C A, are the radii of the same, or of equal circles;

Therefore, they are equal.

An equilateral triangle is a figure that has three equal sides.

The lines A B, B C, and C A, constitute a figure with three equal sides;

Therefore, the figure composed of A B, B C, and C A, is an equilateral triangle.



The first two assertions are technically denominated the *premises*, and the last the *conclusion*. The premise which contains the larger assertion is called the *major premise*, and that which contains the less assertion the *minor premise*.

From the mere consideration of what argumentation is, it must appear obvious that these three parts are involved in every act of it. There is, first, the thing to be proved; second, the medium of proof; third, the conclusion. It is true that in ordinary discourse, reasonings and arguments are stated much more briefly, and frequently in such a manner that it is difficult to discriminate these various parts; but we shall find, that if we wish to test the soundness of any argument, the best method of procedure is to decompose it into these three elementary propositions, so that we may clearly see the general principle—*i.e.*, major premise; the assertion of relation or irrelation—*i.e.*, the minor premise; and the conclusion or inference. The mind is thus put in the best possible position for guarding against the admission of error; because it can now examine the argument both in the whole and in its several parts; and thus, as in chemistry, when an analysis is performed, adulteration is more easily detected than otherwise. For example, let the following argument be presented to the mind:—"He is dishonest, and should be shunned." Will we not much more clearly perceive the truth or falsehood which it contains by giving it the full mental development?—*viz.*,

Every dishonest person should be shunned.

He is a dishonest person;

Therefore, he should be shunned.

Or, if a fallacy is sought to be palmed upon us—*e.g.*, this sentence from Locke, "Innate ideas cannot be enumerated, and, consequently, cannot exist"—shall we not more readily discover the error when we place the whole argument at full length before the mind? Let us see.

Things which cannot be numbered do not exist.

Innate Ideas cannot be numbered;

Therefore, they cannot exist.

Here the lurking fallacy is unearthed; for who will seriously maintain that the innumerability of any series of objects—the stars for instance—is a proof of their non-existence. We think that this will make much clearer the assertion which we advanced before, that though human language does not explicitly exponentiate the whole of the mental evolutions, yet implicitly they are always performed; for were this not the case, it would be impossible to antedate the reasoning in the manner we have done above, to some foregone proposition.

To add still another stone to the evidence-building we are engaged in erecting, let us revert to what we established in our last article—*viz.*, That there are three distinct and different steps in "the investigation and discovery of Truth." Observation, which is an act of the Perceptivity—Hypothesis, which is the result of the presentation of facts to the mind, on the perception of which the faculties of knowledge-acquirement instinctively spring into activity, and form a product, which product our readers will now perceive is equivalent to a major premise or a general principle-enunciative;—and Induction, the elaborative faculty, which *leads in* this, that, and the other fact to be compared with the effects deducible from the (suppositious) law, and thus enables the mind, by a clear process of verification, to evolve from the particular and the contingent, a knowledge of the necessary and essential. Besides this, too, when the verificatory comparison is com-

pleted, and the Theory of any series of facts has been settled, the law which contains an expression of that Theory becomes the major premise, by which farther discoveries are progressed with. As the morning sun, when it arises, first dawns faintly, and illuminates with a dim light a few prominent objects, but gradually diffuses a greater and a greater quantity of radiance, till "all is light" within the horizon of our ken ;—so it is with Truth :—When it first arises in our mind we cannot have universal experience of its certitude ; but we can unfold in our intellect what consequences are deducible from it ; and when we have gained a knowledge of these, we can try their re-applicability to the actually existing facts as they present themselves. If these deductions, when subjected to verification, are not confirmed by realities, we must retrace the steps taken. Error has certainly crept into our mind :—either the judgment has been rashly formed—the particulars adopted for experiment have not been rightly included in the subject—or our comparison of the fact with the major premise has been illogically proceeded with. In either case the argumentation is invalidated.

Were man destitute of the power of Ratiocination, there would be no transference of the knowledge obtained by Induction, from one series of objectivities to those of a class possessed of identical properties—no carrying forward of already attained experience as applicable to our guidance in the future. Of the continual cataloguing of facts, what good would result? Would not the mind become overwhelmed with their innumera-bility? Would not its burden be greater than it could bear? But when we bind a number of facts together in the union-bond of one common idea, or one general law, the mind does not so readily faint and fail. Then the separate and individual facts are ordi-nated and subordinated by one grand general conception—some master thought—which gives them unity, and makes them all mere parts of one integral idea. But how is this done? Recall to your memory the distinction formerly asserted to obtain between the intuitional and the logical consciousness, and it will be plain. The Intuitional Consci-ousness, by the juxtaposition and comparison of the objectivities presented to it, strives to evolve some conception which may colligate the seemingly diverse and detached phenom-ena which tangentiate upon it, into the unicity of law ;—a law which when adequately received by the mentality, gives it the power of anticipating and foretelling the conse-quent, on the perception of the antecedent ; and from a knowledge of the property to infer the effect it will produce. This conception must be suggested to the mental powers by the excitation of certain facts ; and before it can be accepted as true, its re-applicability to these facts must be made evident. This latter exercise is the work of the Logical Consci-ousness. It unfolds the conception, and brings under it the various facts, and endeavours to verify the accuracy of the idea or law, by the comparison of the effects deducible from the ideal-law, and those manifested by the actual existences with which that law concerns itself. The Intuitional Consciousness, by Induction, endeavours to integralise and impart unicity to our knowledge ;—the Logical Consciousness strives to certeriorate it. The former, by grouping phenomena together in new points of view, attempts to gene-ralise the ideas which they excite, and thus produce in the mind a generic formula under which they may all be classed ;—the latter seeks to re-apply this formula to the objectiv-ities of that class ;—measures, as it were, their capacity of being contained within it ; and

thus, by the mutual action and reaction of the Hypothetical and the Real upon each other, the sciences attain perfection. In the first dawn of light upon the mind, an "Hypothesis merely performs the function of an unknown quantity in Algebra, and is assumed for the purpose of submitting the phenomena to a scientific calculus;" but when the Hypothesis, by reference to the facts, is proven to be correct, and thus becomes a scientific truth, we can apply it to a thousand other facts of which we previously knew nothing:—we can clear away many errors which hung like cobwebs in the chambers of the mind, and can march on "from strength unto strength," in gaining a fuller, a higher, and more complete development of Truth. Thus we see it is possible to discover, or at least to make an approximation towards the discovery, of the central point of a circle of truths, while we may not be capable of finding out the whole of the facts *outlying* that centre, yet *inlying* the circumference;—e.g., Nicholas Copernicus (born A.D. 1473, at Thorn, in Prussia,) taught that the sun was the centre of our system, and that the planets moved round him in elliptical orbits proportioned to their size and distance, long before the discovery of the Asteroids, Uranus, and Neptune—nay, prior to the grand discoveries made by the illustrious Newton. This, it will be found, is the usual course of *ratiocinative* speculation; and if it be so, why this contempt of the Syllogism? why this attempt to underrate its efficacy? One would almost imagine some men were proud of being divested of their mind's most dear and glorious privilege. No general truth can be acquired—no process of reasoning can be prosecuted—no scientific discovery can be properly carried out without the use of reasoning; and that reasoning, as invariably as the laws of the mentality operate, may be reduced to Syllogisms; and then only can its real significance and worth be fairly expressed to the mind.

Ratiocination, however, it must be recollected, undertakes to inform us *how to reason*, and not *how to know*. Knowledge and Reasoning are each distinct; for it is only when we have attained Knowledge—either real or imaginary—that we can begin the process of Reasoning. Knowledge supplies the *matter* on which Ratiocination is to operate; and the Syllogism is a correct expression of the *manner* in which from Induction-derived facts, we can deduce other facts, which as yet *outlie* our Experience, and which gives us the means of accurately applying the test of Induction to Hypothetical opinions. This is not, of course, the *whole* process of Truth-acquirement; but it must be admitted to form an important and an essential part of it. Is it, then, a valid argument against Syllogistic Logic—in fact, there is *no other*—that it assists only in a *part*, and is consequently useless, and unworthy of study?—Because it is not the means of obtaining, clear, definite, and precise ideas upon all knowledge and all mysteries, is it therefore to be discarded as valueless? Is any other science contemned because it cannot do more than it pretends? Of Logic it may be said, that it is looked at askance because it is misunderstood—because it cannot perform impossibilities—because it will not do more than it purposes—because it is not a complete organon, by which, all other sciences apart—unaided and alone—it cannot enter into the *penetralia* of Nature's temple, and compel the oracle to give forth utterances. In a future paper we will show the *absurdity* of this,—explain the real use of the science,—describe the processes of "Formal Logic," and thence—our student will learn the truth of what we have stated above, and that

"The head and front of its offending
Hath this extent—no more."

We have then, we consider, said sufficient to prove that the Syllogistic Logic is not—as Dr. Campbell and Professor Stewart have termed it—a "vain invention;" but the true and veritable type of all reasoning;—that it presents a full, clear, and accurate analysis of that process;—that it is an indispensable agent in the "investigation and discovery of Truth;"—and that it really is not

"Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy."

Philosophy.

IS MESMERISM TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

"The awful shadow of some unseen power
Floats, though unseen, among us."

It visits with unconscious glance
Each human heart and countenance."
—*Shelley*.

"To every form of being is assigned
An active principle, howe'er removed
From sense and observation."
—*Wordsworth*.

If we had followed our first thoughts, we should have treated the science of Mesmerism as one so little known as scarcely to be regarded—so little believed, as scarcely to be worthy of debate. Our reason for this mode of treatment would not have been what the reader may imagine—want of implicit reliance on its truth; but rather, a desire for a clear stage on which to present our case. Upon reflection, however, two objections presented themselves,—first, that the cause might have suffered by this kind of advocacy; secondly, that these assumptions would have been contrary to facts; for Mesmerism has obtained many friends among the intelligent classes, notwithstanding the assertion, that "popular opinion is against it," and the fact, that its claims are ridiculed by many, and its advocates persecuted by some. But then, we remember how, in days gone by, Galileo was subjected to grievous persecution for declaring that the earth revolved round the sun, contrary to the old notion of the sun traversing the earth. That Newton was pronounced a

"mad man," for believing it. That Harvey was "pitied and condemned," for proclaiming his theory of the circulation of the blood. That even more recently, Stephenson was thought an "insane enthusiast," for expressing his belief (after the first trial in the Clyde) that steamboats might some day ply the Atlantic! And also that within our own recollection, the locomotive engine and the electric telegraph were deemed "stern impossibilities"! In the face of these things, and now that Galileo, Newton, and Harvey are universally acknowledged to have been correct; and Stephenson outlived the short-sightedness of his adversaries; and the locomotive engine and the electric telegraph have become "great facts"—the former spreading the blessings of civilization throughout the world—the latter binding as with "friendship's silken threads," neighbouring nations—we feel that we have not much to fear from the force of popular opinion. But to the point.

The supporters of the science of Mesmerism profess to recognise in human beings the power, at will, of

"Imparting sympathies from soul to soul."

They discover in human physiology a principle enabling one person (under certain conditions) to obtain an influence over the will and actions of another, and to transmit to such other person, qualities and sympathies corresponding with his own. As if A

possesses a larger amount of health-principle than B, the former may impart to the latter some portion of his superfluity,—nay, may even call into existence an increased supply (so to speak) of the quality he desires to transmit.

Now one of the first points to be determined, in testing the reasonableness of this proposition, is, whether, under any circumstances, human beings have the power of imparting or receiving sympathetic influences one from another. The immediately occurring answer is in the affirmative; for in certain cases of disease, the power both of imparting, and therefore receiving, influences, is fully illustrated—the slightest touch of the suffering party, or even a breath of the atmosphere by which he is surrounded, being sufficient to establish the connecting link. This applies to influences of the body. But there are equally perceptible influences of the *mind*, or more correctly, of the *feelings*, although not so generally recognised. For instance, if we enter into society where gloom or melancholy, grief or suffering, prevails, a sympathetic influence gradually steals over us, and we become gloomy and desponding, we know not why. It is involuntary and irresistible. Again: if we enter the society of mirth and gaiety, (unless under the immediate influence of grief and distress,) we also partake of the general buoyancy of spirits, although scarcely cognizant of the process affecting us. This sympathy with the persons and circumstances surrounding us, seems to be implanted in our social nature, and very wisely so,—for without it, society would lose many of its charms, and much of its loveliness.

If, as we have seen, disease can be transmitted from one to another, why should not *health* also be transmitted? We know that many have been the endeavours of the enemies of Mesmerism to show that while the one is possible, the other is not; or, at least, that if health be at all transmitted, it is not upon the sympathetic principles mesmerists contend for. But such endeavours have proved futile. It has, indeed, been said, that the influences arising out of a diseased state of the system ought not to be taken as an illustration of principles to be applied to persons in a healthy state. If this objection be admitted, it certainly cannot

reach those cases of sympathetic feeling to which we have referred, nor account for the sympathy of tastes and inclinations in persons having frequent intercourse with each other; upon which latter circumstance Mesmerism throws considerable light.

It will, of course, be asked—

“What, and wherein it doth exist,
This light, this glory, this fair luminous mist—
This beautiful and beauty-making power?”

Let us premise a little before endeavouring fully to answer the inquiry. Mesmerists generally, we believe, are of opinion that an important principle in human physiology yet remains to be developed; and we make pointed allusion to this, because until such development shall take place, *some* points in connexion with the subject before us must remain involved in partial obscurity, as did the relationship between electricity and magnetism, until the experiments resulting in the perfection of the electric telegraph cleared up the mystery. Of this, those who have thought upon it have little doubt that Electricity has a much greater connexion with our earthly existence than has yet been generally supposed. And it would further seem equally clear, that both Electricity and Magnetism have much to do with Mesmerism. The phenomena of the respective sciences are remarkably similar. An able writer has said—“We are familiar with the powers and application of the loadstone, which it, no doubt, derives from its affinity to the electrical currents passing between the earth’s poles; yet the needle does not more surely point towards the north, or follow the motions of the magnet, than does the head or hand of the mesmerised that of the mesmeriser.”* From these premises we draw the conclusion, that there is in unity with, and belonging to, our nature, a principle which, for the want of a better or briefer designation, we shall term *electro-magnetic vitality*—that it pervades, in a greater or lesser degree, every human being—that its chief seat and source is the brain—that it was implanted in man by his Creator for the highest and noblest of purposes,—of which the power of imparting health to the afflicted, and energy to the depressed, stand pre-eminent—that the degree of its presence

* “Letters on Mesmerism.” By Silurius.

at all times depends upon the health of the individual, or rather, that its presence at all times forms an essential element of perfect health. Lastly, that the individual has a *creative* power at his command, and by concentrating his energies to one focus, he is enabled to originate a supply either to support him through his own requirements, or to transmit to others for their benefit.

We could wish that our subject were less dry, or that it could be treated in terms more intelligible; but these disadvantages invariably attend theories and principles not fully developed. We do not desire to assume for Mesmerism more than it is fully entitled to. The cures which it has been instrumental in effecting have sometimes been heralded forth too much after the manner of miracles, and without due regard to the actual principles involved. We regard Mesmerism rather as an instrumentality than a direct curative agent. The great secret of health is admitted to lie in the harmonious adjustment of the various functions and powers of the system; but if the balance be not carefully maintained, and held "in due course and order," disruption is the result. The system being once disarranged, some means are required to restore it to "harmonious action." This, we claim, as the province of Mesmerism. The operator being in health, imparts an influence to his patient, which touches the springs of action—the equilibrium is regained, and health restored. The creative power of the brain (assuming it to be the seat and source of the property of which we are speaking) has been, not inaptly, compared to an electric machine, which, when brought into operation, will produce an electric current; and the same may either be reserved for the performance of its specific operations or by the establishment of a conducting medium, transmitted to some other body, the supply ceasing with the stoppage of the machine, as the mesmeric influence ceases at the will of the operator.

The process of *individual influence* has been thus clearly set forth by the writer before referred to:—"If I am stronger than you—that is, have more of this energy than you—whether there is a constitutional difference, or one induced by disease, the moment I am brought into mesmeric con-

nexion with you, provided there be no natural repugnance between us, this subtle fluid passes from me to you, until our relative electric states are more nearly equalized. Supposing we are naturally in nearly equal states, *I can still mesmerise you, by stimulating my own brain, so as to produce or elicit more of this influence than I want*; and if in connexion, or *en rapport*, with you, it passes off from me to you, my brain then only differs from its ordinary state just so much as a revolving electrical cylinder differs from a stationary one."

There are abundant historic evidences showing that this power, although not fully understood, has long been recognised as existing, and on the continent it is made far more generally available than with us. In France, Prussia, Russia, and many other places, Mesmerism is acknowledged and practised by the highest medical authorities. Its power was also known to the ancients, for Solon makes unmistakable allusion to it in the following lines:—

"The smallest hurts sometimes increase with rage

More than all art of physic can assuage;
And yet the hand's soft touch will soon appease
The utmost fury of the worst disease."

The cure of diseases by the "laying on of hands," mentioned in the Scriptures, is believed by many to refer to mesmeric power. Shakespeare makes several pointed allusions to the existence of this power—

"When the mind is quickened, out of doubt,
The organs, though defunct and dead before,
Break up their drowsy grave, and newly move
With casted slough and fresh legerity."

Butler, the talented author of *Hudibras*, makes the following witty reference to mesmeric power:—

"He therefore sent out all his senses
To bring him in intelligences;
Which vulgar, out of ignorance,
Mistake for falling into trance;
But those who trade in geomancy
Affirm to be the strength of fancy,
In which the Lapland Magi deal,
And things incredible reveal."

Shelley, Bailey, Wordsworth, and many other of the poets, make frequent reference to this "healing art."

But even more powerful and conclusive than all these allusions is the long record of facts, embracing nearly every order of dis-

ease, which have either been modified or completely cured by the mesmeric art. We have the impartial and unsolicited testimony of patients, regarding the "streams of health" which have been imparted to them by its power; and many such testimonies are from persons of high standing in society. The remarkable restoration of the talented authoress, Miss Martineau, after every other means had failed, is a circumstance which will not soon be forgotten in the literary world. The rational and conclusive advocacy of Spencer Hall, and the facts recorded in his "Mesmeric Experiences;" the impartial investigation of the subject by ministers of the gospel, philosophers, and philanthropists, and their published testimonies, are far more than sufficient at once to cast down the obloquy and ridicule which has been heaped upon Mesmerism by the igno-

rant and the prejudiced; and certainly sufficient to claim for the science the impartial investigation of the readers of the "British Controversialist," many of whom, as we have the means of knowing, are desirous of taking a foremost position in the ranks of intellectual greatness, as earnest inquirers after Truth, irrespective of her "outward garb, or exterior similitudes."

We therefore leave the subject in the hands of our readers, merely adding a passage from Abercrombie, which seems well suited to the present moment—"While an unbounded credulity is the part of a weak mind, which never thinks or reasons at all; an unlimited scepticism is the part of a contracted mind, which reasons upon imperfect data, or makes its own knowledge and extent of observation the standard and test of probability."

C. W., Jun.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

ASTONISHED at effects before unheard of, and no less confounded than astonished at the impudence and effrontery of jugglers and charlatans, in whose hands even the most probable facts ought to excite suspicion, the English public has determined in one of its not unusual freaks to be convinced of the veracity of a theory in support of which, the scientific professors of that mystic art can alone adduce facts, which have been known for ages, and effects whose causes no one has been able to divine. Like their Egyptian predecessors, who listened in admiration and wonder to the dulcet tones which proceeded from their idol god, and which a cunning priesthood would fain have persuaded them were produced by the rays of the luminary of day; the credulous and unscientific of Europe, without considering whether their arguments adequately accounted for what they had ocular demonstration of, have unhesitatingly enrolled themselves in the ranks of Mesmerism and the Animal Magnetists.

This, we think, on examination, will be found to be the true state of the case. There cannot be the slightest doubt in a reflecting mind of the unreality of the claims of Mesmerism to rank amongst the

sister sciences, with a name (Animal Magnetism) drawn from a slight and unfortunate analogy to a power, of whose reality every one is convinced, but whose present adaptation, we fear, rests upon very obscure and insufficient grounds.

Animal Magnetism has existed in its simpler forms for ages,—a fact not generally known. We have indubitable evidence of its having been practised by the Fakirs of India, who exercised it on themselves, and who by gazing continuously on some object, or on some portion of their person, threw themselves into the primary stages of memeric sleep. The fact once known of the existence of a principle which conferred on the human system such unheard-of powers, was doubtless investigated, and the discovery made of the possibility of exercising this influence on another. Hence the origin of this science, which, like many a nobler and better one, has to trace its rise to an obscure fountain head. From the Indians, it most probably passed to the Egyptians, and through them, to the Israelites, amongst whom it was exercised by the wizards and possessors of familiar spirits, of whose expulsion from the land of Canaan by Saul, we are well acquainted. And to

an unprejudiced mind, on reading 1 Samuel chap. xviii., the fact cannot but suggest itself, that it must only have been by means of clairvoyance that a woman in the position of the Witch of Endor could have made such pretensions as induced the king of Israel to visit her for information which had been withheld from him by God, whose interposition was so signal on that day.

Here, then, we see that Animal Magnetism is of no modern date—no offspring of the brain of the German enthusiasts; but something which has existed from time immemorial, amongst nations who have been famed for their insight into the workings of Nature, the key to whose Arcana has in many instances perished with them. By taking up these plain and simple facts, and by framing the most unlikely hypotheses, the Magnetists have constructed a theory to explain definitely effects which are likely to remain unsolved to the end of time,—appertaining, as they do, to the working of Nature's secret laws. What, for example, can be more absurd, than to suppose that by the mere motion of the arms, and the equalization of temperature at the extremities of the operator and patient, an invisible, ethereal essence is, as it were, bodily communicated to the sensorial faculties of the mesmerised person? Whence does this arise? Does it exist in the operator? If so, how is it that he feels not the effect of it on himself? Does it exist in the atmosphere? This hypothesis is no less absurd than the former. It may be asked, How then do you account for these effects? We answer, We cannot satisfactorily do so:—we have often endeavoured to explain them to ourselves on various theories, but have as often failed. The probability is, that they arise from a stimulus conveyed to the sensorial organs of the brain, through the medium of the optic nerve, exciting the system to an intense degree, and producing in an unaccountable manner the effects observed. The power of the eye in inducing various emotions is well known, such as love, nervous trepidation, fear, &c.; the latter of which is exemplified by the fact so often related of the scaring away of beasts of prey by the steady gaze of an unarmed man. From the obvious connection of these various effects,

we are led to conclude that they are merely modifications of the working of one great principle—viz., an influence exerted in the nervous system,—a system whose adaptation to the wants of man, and the variety of whose actions, have excited the admiration and wonder of mankind. And we think that on these grounds, nothing is required to be believed—nothing unlikely to be taken for granted. The conclusions rest solely on the analogy of one fact with many others well known to all men. On the other hand, the theory of Mesmerism is not only complex and unsatisfactory, but involves the most impossible hypotheses—impossible both physically and physiologically.

A word on Clairvoyance. This power, so unheard of in its action, and so presumptuous in its claims, as to have obtained for itself the epithet of Satanic, would be, we think, if all that is said of it were true, the most fearful realisation of the attempt of man to acquire for himself the fruit of that forbidden tree which cost his first parents so much,—the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. The claims to, at least, an imperfect omniscience—to invoke the powers of heaven and hell,—and to reveal the dark things of the future, are, we conceive, proofs of a mind fearfully and wonderfully made. Were such the case,—could the creature rival the Creator, and arrogate the power which formed him at first out of nothing, no other evidence would be necessary to convince the world of the wickedness and insanity of the system. But such we cannot believe it to be;—could any rational being for a moment entertain such an idea? If such were indeed the attributes of the clairvoyant, how are we to account for the frequent perambulations of those itinerant jugglers, who are everywhere to be met with, exhibiting their assumed powers, with pretensions as lofty as the clouds, yet eking out a scanty living by the miserable earnings of such a compound of wickedness and knavery? These are the men to whom we must look in a great measure as the originators of claims which have caused Mesmerism to be regarded on the one hand as an instrument of evil, belonging to the Prince of Darkness; and on the other, as a fit subject for the amusement of the illiterate.

That Clairvoyance has an existence is indubitable; but that that existence is limited in extent, we have not the slightest misgiving. Here then lies the difficulty, where to draw the line. Is Clairvoyance a miraculous gift with which some particular persons are blessed? or is it an immense exertion of the intellectual faculties? We think the latter supposition the most probable; and there are many circumstances which tend to strengthen our position. Whence those strange coincidences so often met with in every-day life, and which are too frequently passed over unheeded, or remembered but to be forgotten? Are they mere *coincidences*—the fortuitous concatenation of circumstances? Or are they the evidences of some great principle affecting the intellectual faculties in an unknown and un conjectured manner;—links of a vast chain, few, and far between?

What are dreams? How are we to account for the strange course the Imagination sometimes takes, while careering through the realms of thought? What are presentiments? Do they really exist, or are they

mere phantoms, conjured up by the excited brains of too credulous persons? These and sundry other like interrogatories would present themselves on an investigation of this abstruse and mysterious subject, contesting the path inch by inch, and impeding most effectually anything like progress. It is unphilosophical to object to the solution of Clairvoyance on these suppositions, as being contrary to the received ideas of the workings of the human mind; as much so as to deny the possibility of transmitting our ideas quicker than light to the farthest ends of the world, because the transition from the four-horse mail to the lightning steed seems so unnatural and impossible.

Here, then, we think ourselves justified in giving a qualified negative to the question, Is Mesmerism true? Qualified, because we are convinced that Mesmerism in its present garb, with its unsuitable name and preposterous theory, is not true; because we also have no doubt of the truth of those facts upon which the superstructure of Mesmerism has been raised.

VINCLUM.

History.

WAS OLIVER CROMWELL A FIRST-RATE GENERAL, A GREAT STATESMAN, AND A VIRTUOUS MAN?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE—I.

"The Republic was not without glory abroad, or virtue, liberty, and justice at home. The usurpation of this great man was a glorious one."
—Chateaubriand.

"In the state of desolation to which we were reduced, you, O Cromwell! alone remained to conduct the government, and to save the country."
* * * * *
Nothing in the world is more pleasing to God, more agreeable to reason, more politically just, or more generally useful, than that the supreme power should be vested in the wisest and best of men."—Milton.

In writing on a subject like the present, one cannot but feel convinced that a great amount of prejudice must needs be encountered, and much misrepresentation exposed, from the fact that the majority of the histories which have emanated from the press

since 1658, have associated with the name of Oliver Cromwell, the terms—a tyrant, a "hypocrite," and a "cruel man." But such epithets are not unfrequently bestowed on those heroes who have been instrumental in raising their country in civil and religious liberty. Milton, glorious Milton, first among our country's bards, has not escaped this odium—nor has Hampden, Pym, Sir John Elliott, Dryden, and others,—men possessed of great talent, eminent virtues,—who adorned both their domestic circles, and the senate house, and who apart from all political animosities, religious restrictions, and civil hindrances, fought the "great fight," with a zeal and determination which

evinced their earnest sympathy with the cause in which they had embarked, and at a time when kings urged their "Divine right" to govern as they pleased, and offered the most strenuous opposition to the people receiving any redress of any kind whatever. Such men as these, whose chief desire was to forward those things necessary for the well ordering of this life, and to prepare us for the life to come, are worthy to be placed amongst those who have raised England to her present high position, and strove to make her name and destiny great and glorious.

History, however, which God intended to be "a lamp unto our feet, and a light unto our paths," often sheds its light through a distorted medium. Historians have not been zealous for truth. "History may be compared to a mirror, in which we see the past. But as there may be a bad mirror, so there may be a bad history. An historian should be faithful. *Facts* should be his *only* data." He should accustom himself to the most rigid modes of investigation, regardless of everything but truth, and he should allow himself to be convinced by nothing but evidences of truth. Dryden well says, "we find but few historians of all ages who have been diligent enough in their search for truth; it is their common method to take on trust what they distribute to the public, by which means a falsehood once received from a famed writer, becomes traditional to posterity."

I have made these remarks simply to indicate that neither truth nor justice have been meted out to Oliver Cromwell and his partizans. Some historians have described Oliver as a hypocritical, tyrannical, bigoted, intolerant, and ambitious man. Others, on the contrary, have given the reverse,—describing him as a sincere, humble, plain, blunt man, who raised himself partly by his own industry, aided and pushed forward by the solemn times which were fast approaching, to be one of the greatest statesmen that has adorned the senate-house of England, and who maintained, and preserved inviolate, (as far as the character of the times would allow) the law, constitution, and religion of England; and not only vindicated her supremacy, but made her name and people respected throughout

Christendom. The latter definition of his character I am prepared to prove is correct, and will now proceed to lay before my readers extracts from the most accredited, authentic, and trustworthy histories, aided by the light which recent researches throw upon his character.

But I wish not to be understood as condemning historians who have judged harshly of Cromwell, no; in the words of Shakspeare

"Innocence shall make
False accusations tremble."

Histories have in many instances, contained the most startling discrepancies, and the most inaccurate accounts; and were this the time or place, I could prove the assertion to the satisfaction of all. History therefore, being so incomplete, it behoves us to be careful and at the same time judicious in our selection.

Every reader of the history of the civil wars must be aware, that recourse to arms was only made on the side of the Parliament and the mass of the people, after all other means had failed, in order to deprive the monarch of the despotism and arbitrary rule, which had been so tenaciously maintained by his predecessors, and to compel him to govern his kingdom according to the constitution. The iniquitous Star Chamber, and High Commission Courts, the perverted and corrupted state of the law, the baseness, depravity, and cowardliness of the judges, who had lost all sense of administering justice, the unjust taxes, which were levied without the least consideration for those who had to pay them,—these and other abuses, were the cause of the civil wars. It was then as with a coming storm, the thunder was heard afar off, and those who had the welfare of England most at heart, saw that when the storm burst it would be with redoubled fury on those who had abetted and aided the monarch in binding the people in shackles, the readier to make them the servants of the desires, and the sport of a degraded and debased king, and ministry.

Strong, bold, decisive, and uncompromising measures; men possessed of talent, ability, and above all, a determination to obtain the redress of their wrongs, were necessary at this important crisis, and, therefore, Oliver Cromwell must not be

ceusured for having associated himself with those who, regretting the necessity for such severe means, were not blind to the fact, that if England were to be saved, they, like a physician, must not shrink from the application of unusual remedies.

Without narrating the history of our hero, which would be useless as the question stands, I will proceed to adduce facts to prove that Cromwell has been misrepresented, and as I can only prove this by evidence from the page of history, the reader must excuse my numerous extracts, as the calumnies cast on Cromwell's character, demand an emphatic, and unmis-takeable refutation.

Hypocrisy is the most prominent accusation brought against Cromwell. I will endeavour to prove on the contrary, that sincerity was his chief characteristic.

Milton, who, be it remembered, was Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Protector, and whose opportunities of testing his sincerity were frequent, thus speaks of Cromwell in private life,—and I may be allowed to observe that, I think the domestic fireside the best place for ascertaining the sincerity of a man's character. Milton thus writes:—"He had grown up in peace and privacy at home, silently cherishing in his heart a confidence in God, and a magnanimity well adapted for the solemn times that were approaching. Although of ripe years, he had not yet stepped forward into public life, and nothing so much distinguished him from all around as the cultivation of a pure religion, and the integrity of his life."*

This is the testimony of a bosom friend of the Protector, but I will quote an extract from one who must be regarded as an enemy,—Lilburne.—He says, "I have looked upon you, (Cromwell) as among the powerful ones of England,—as a man with heart perfectly pure, perfectly free from all personal views."

Another eminent individual, a great favorite of King Charles 1st, and consequently a desperate foe to Cromwell; thus writes of him: "Oliver passed his leisure hours in singing psalms with the officers and soldiers who participated in his religious convictions,

and in attending with them, on the preaching of the Word. His strict and unsociable humour would not allow him to keep company with the other officers in their jollities and excesses, which often made him ridiculous and contemptible." What strange notions of Christianity Clarendon must have had, when he applied such words as "strict," and "unsociable," to men who were better acquainted with good breeding than himself, for we find that he was often guilty of the excesses which he condemned in others.

Another, more remarkable testimony to the sincerity of Cromwell, is by a disinterested witness. Sir John Goodriche tells us of a story related to him by the midwife who attended his mother. "When Cromwell came to lodge at our house, in Knaresborough," says the woman, "I was then but a young girl. Having heard much talk about Cromwell, I looked at him with wonder. Being ordered to take a pan of coals and air his bed, I could not, during the operation, forbear peeping over my shoulder, several times, to observe this extraordinary person, who was seated at the far side of the room, untying his garters. Having aired the bed, I went out, and shutting the door after me, stopped, and peeped through the key-hole, when I saw him rise from his seat, advance to the bed, and fall on his knees, in which attitude I left him for some time, when returning again I found him still at prayer, and this was his custom every night as long as he staid at our house, from which I concluded he must be a good man, and this opinion I always maintained afterwards, though I heard him very much blamed, and exceedingly abused." Her conclusion was I think a just one, for it was much more likely that had he made a show of religion, he would have at once fallen on his knees, in the woman's presence. But doubtless, he treasured up in his mind the passage, "When thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites, for they love to pray standing in the synagogues, and in the corners of streets."

But Cromwell was not only religious himself, but required the same from his soldiers. A journal of the day thus comments on the conduct of his soldiers, "No man swears but he pays his twelve pence, if he be drunk

* *Religione culta purior et integritate vitæ cognitus.* 106 Hugo. 1654.

he is set in the stocks, or worse, if one call another roundhead, (a word of contempt much used at this time,) he is cashiered, inasmuch as the counties where they come leap for joy of them, and come in and join with them." The same paper very properly adds in reference to the disorderly and riotous manner in which the king's troops conducted themselves, How happy were it if all the forces were thus disciplined."

Having given contemporary testimonies of Cromwell's sincerity, I may refer to the remarks of an eminent and learned Swiss divine; J. H. Merle D'Aubigne, who says, "His piety was sincere, but it was not always sober." And again, "Delicacy of sentiment, his domestic virtues, and paternal love, are among the features by which

Cromwell is best characterized." Finally, Dryden adds his attestation to Cromwell's piety, in the following touching lines:—

"His ashes in a peaceful urn shall rest;
His name a great example stands to show
How strangely high endeavours may be blest,
When piety and valour jointly go."

I will add no more at present. In my next, I shall consider the claim of Cromwell to honour as a first-rate general, and a great statesman; in the mean time, I trust that which has already been advanced will receive due consideration, and that false opinions will be corrected, for

"No falsehood can endure
Touch of celestial temper, but returns
Of force to its own likeness."

Manchester.

J. G. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

In venturing to take up our pen to write upon the negative side of this question, we feel that we are meddling with what may justly be termed "a very knotty subject." We cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that we are rushing into a combat in which will be arrayed against us many a doughty champion, who, armed cap-a-pie, will be ready with drawn sword to dispute every inch of ground, and if possible, to make us fly from the contest, with little honour for our pains. But the perils, the personal risks, and the dishonour which may thickly beset our path, must not deter us from entering upon our march, nor make us shrink from breaking a lance with a Goliath, should one stand in our way. These discussions have not triumph for their object,—Truth is what we are in quest of, and those who seek for her must ever and anon expect many hard blows, and often meet with much that may seem at the time very unpleasant.

But to proceed to the subject under discussion. In arguing this question,—or this series of questions—our contracted limits obviously prevent anything like even a brief review of the great facts which make the history of Cromwell so marvellously astounding. We can do no more than give a rapid glance at the footprints which mark the course of that most singular man. And here we wish to give the reader a gentle

hint, that while using the pen to detract from Cromwell's fame, we are not the less sensible of this fact—viz., that Cromwell was a remarkable—a marvellous man. But singularity, or that which partakes of the marvellous, and which, of itself, may be of such a nature as to arrest and command the wondering attention of the human race, may exist in an individual without constituting that individual one of the great or good. That man who for notoriety burnt the temple of Diana, has arrested the attention of his race; but his deed was not great. He, who, in the height of his folly, leaped into the burning crater, has left a name which will be handed down through all time; but the deed was unworthy of man. So then, a name may live throughout all ages, but the individual who bore it may have been worthy of the scorn of his fellow-men.

We have no wish to hold up the character of Cromwell to desecration; but we wish to rob him of that false halo which certain modern writers have flung around his name. They are not content that he should be thought a wonderful or extraordinary man; but must needs try to palm him off as a first-rate general, a great statesman, and a virtuous man. This, his history, as we have read it, will not permit us to do. We judge not the man by the measure of his success, or the lustre of his exploits;—we have tried

to see, and we imagine that we do see, that his success shows more of the low cunning of the mediocre mind, than the results of the planning of a brilliant genius. But was not Cromwell a great soldier? Undoubtedly he was—but not a first-rate commander. He had most of the qualities which are necessary for the leader of a troop—daring enthusiasm and indomitable courage: he knew how to form, to discipline, and excite the troops under his command; but we have yet to learn that Cromwell ever displayed those qualities which have distinguished the most eminent of military men. Space will not permit us to adduce the numerous proofs we might bring forward to establish our position; we therefore leave it to the candour of the reader to judge of what we say, by his knowledge of the military career of our hero.

We consider that we do Cromwell justice when we state, that he was precisely the man to take part in the fierce strife which rent this land in his own day. He found that a blind courage, and a fierce enthusiasm were the qualities needed in the Parliamentary army;—these he was eminently qualified to instil. But are they the only qualities which go to make a first-rate general? We can see a wide chasm intervening between a good leader of a troop, or a courageous and daring commander, and a first-rate general. We have searched, and searched in vain, through the history of Cromwell's battles for the intricate and brilliant combinations, those flashes of genius, and that cool and calculating foresight, which has given such renown to the genius of Marlborough, Napoleon, and Wellington.

Cromwell's military career betokens more of the genius and tact of the wild border chief, executing sudden and fierce strokes, than of those brilliant and dazzling achievements which mark the doings of the masters of war. Who can help seeing that Cromwell trusted to brute courage and wild enthusiasm to perform what great generals command by means of their knowledge and skill? Cromwell's success is no proof of Cromwell's genius. It was often the rashness of his foes that saved him from destruction, not the force and power of his own genius. Need we an illustration of this, look to Cromwell at Dunbar.

Cromwell in Ireland proves Cromwell was not a great master of the art of war. There, his doings betoken the fierce and bloody nature of the half-civilized chieftain, rather than that of the great captain. What great general needs the massacre of conquered garrisons to give a prestige to his name? A great mind in war, as well as in anything else, will trust to its own efforts, and not to terror, to achieve that which he wishes to obtain.

But we leave the military genius of Cromwell, of which our opinion is of little moment, and view this chameleon in his character of statesman. It is becoming the fashion to speak of Cromwell as a perfect master in the art of guiding a nation's destinies. If he was, where are the proofs of his success? Surely a tree could not be good unless it bore some fruits. What are the fruits of Cromwell's statesmanship? We answer, the aggrandisement of himself. Self was the polar-star around which all Cromwell's genius revolved. Did he concert the overthrow of the tyrant Charles, self was in the distance. Did he advise in the army, self was the ultimate and hidden object. Did he play at parliaments, did he negotiate, did he make peace, or did he make war?—self was the all-absorbing object. Cromwell seemed a man created to do great deeds, just to show men, how great an idol is self.

It is true that Cromwell made his country the dread, if not the admiration of foreign states. But here again we see the workings of the secret principle of all his actions. He had every reason to wish to divert from himself the eye of his people, whom he oppressed, to fix it upon the idol, conquest. But see if you can, what real advantage accrued to this land by his foreign wars. His foreign policy was anything but wise. He crippled the power of one kingdom, Spain, for the advantage of another, France. He waged a bootless war with the Dutch States, which did nothing but add to England's renown. Those who value military glory, will call this a proof of Cromwell's statesmanship, but we look upon that which robs a country of blood and treasure, as no proof of anything of the kind. A great statesman we hold to be, the man who sinks self, and self-aggrandise-

ment, to increase the prosperity and happiness of his country. That is not worthy of the name of statesmanship, which seeks only to prop up the power and honor of a dynasty, or a name. Cromwell's statesmanship evinces little else than self-seeking. His domestic policy is open to even more rebuke than his foreign. His whole reign, as Protector, proves him to have been an arbitrary tyrant. He acted as though the English people were his base-born slaves. In vain we look into his domestic policy to discover the traces of great statesmanship. There are all the signs of a vast ability, but that ability was displayed in suppressing or cajoling the people; not in leading forth the virtues of a noble, generous, and patriotic nation. Where is the Code-Cromwell—those laws which would of themselves immortalise his name? The laws promulgated by Cromwell were laws intended to perpetuate his own power. His mind does not present that noble greatness which could lift him above the paltry feelings of a debased ambition, and make him the educator of a people's rights. No, a foul ambition kept Cromwell from the performance of those noble virtues which stamp their performer "Great." In a word, as a statesman, Cromwell obtained a nation's curse. At his death, the people gave a fearful rebound, when loosened from the gripe of his iron grasp. Yes, that people who had fought and bled to rid themselves of tyrant kings, went and threw themselves at the feet of one of the vilest of men; so glad were they to feel that they were free from Cromwell's yoke. Would this have been so, had Cromwell been what many represent him.

We now turn to the last topic under our consideration: and here our task is one of the simplest and easiest kind. But we must again remind the reader, that he will receive only reasons from our hands: we refer him to history for all proofs of what we advance. To show that Cromwell was not sincere in his professions, we have only to compare him with himself. It is not reason to urge, that his opinions changed. The man who kills a tyrant that he may be a tyrant himself, cannot expect

to be thought a lover of freedom. The one half of Cromwell's life is a flat contradiction of the other half. The republican in the senate, and the soldier in the army, are only to be understood by Cromwell in the Protector's chair. We do not imagine that Cromwell deceived all his foes. They often discovered the man through the hypocritical dress he wore. He was one of the most consummate hypocrites that ever breathed. He desired the crown though afraid to accept the proffered boon. His double dealing, and his apostacy from his early principles, stamp him with the appellation of an insincere man. The only sincerity we can discover in him is, the sincerity with which he sought his own aggrandisement.

It may be said, that much which Cromwell did, was forced upon him by circumstances. But did circumstances lead him to corrupt the army, to draw away its allegiance from the parliament to fix it upon himself? No, Cromwell chalked out his path to power, and he cared not what were the steps which led to the same. The wiles of art, or the force of arms were alike the ready means in his hands of accomplishing his ambitious designs.

By some it is made to appear, that after all he wished for his country's good. So he did, but only so far as that country's good was serviceable to himself. What cared he for the welfare and comfort of the people, so long as he could insure his own. Mark the way in which he arrogantly takes to himself the power of king, lords, and commons. What sincerity does this betray? Is it not the sincerity of an egotistical mind? That Cromwell was sincere in thinking he only ought to reign, we cannot doubt, but as for the sincerity of an honest man, we hesitate not to affirm, he had it not. Such then, are briefly our reasons for taking up our present position. That they will, by some one or more champions, be all knocked about our ears, we cannot doubt. So much the better, if the parties who do so can only succeed in convincing us, that Cromwell was a "first-rate General, a great Statesman, and a sincere man."

Thornclyff.

W. T.

Politics.

CAN THE GOVERNMENT INTERDICT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC HIERARCHY IN ENGLAND CONSISTENTLY WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

I REJOICE in the opportunity which has been afforded of discussing this question in the pages of the "Controversialist," inasmuch as many persons arrogating to themselves the title of the most truly loyal and patriotic, are professing to see much that is wrong, much that is opposed to religious liberty, in the mighty and sublime spectacle of a united nation, lifting up its voice against the presumptuous arts of that imbecile despot the Pope.

Men of one idea are bold to tell us, that the subject is indifferent to all who are not within either the fold of the Anglican or the Romish Church! Such an assertion is a flat contradiction of obvious facts. Is it the Hierarchy of England alone that is attacked in that blasphemous pretension of Rome, which foretels eternal damnation to all who do not live and die in the bosom of that church? But let us, to please these "one idea men," admit that the present mighty contest, is only between the rival hierarchies, we shall still be able to show, that then, it is incumbent upon all lovers of truth and freedom, to come forward, and prevent the one assailed, from being supplanted by that spiritual despotism which now assails it.

Dissenters of all shades of opinion, may find much to deplore in the Establishment of England, and no wonder when her own most trusty and affectionate sons, are laboring for a reformation. But in candour, let us admit what truth demands, viz. that dissent in England has spread and flourished, though there is an Establishment and an English Hierarchy. Again, candor compels us to acknowledge, that the English Hierarchy has not prevented this great nation from rising to the highest pinnacle of greatness. The English established church has not prevented the expansion of the

intellect, nor the cultivation of the mind. No, some of her sons stand forth on the page of history, as men who have done most to cast from the English the manacles which had made them slaves. But behold the contrast. The Hierarchy of Rome, what has it done for the nations where it has obtained a recognised power? Shall I pollute the pages of the "Controversialist" by a recital of some of the facts, which attest what a Romish Hierarchy invariably does for that people over whom it obtains a sway. We have no need to traverse the countries of the continent, or of the Spanish and Italian peninsulas, to learn to what depths of degradation the superstitious grasp of Romanism drags a yielding people. We, alas, behold the sickening picture presented to the mind, by the condition of those parts of Ireland, under the fell sway of the Romish law. What Englishman with that love of liberty which he has derived from his progenitors, does not feel his cheek burn, and his breast distend with indignation, when he beholds an ignorant Romish Hierarchy, headed by a man who has attempted to reduce the glorious orb of light, to the dimensions of a few feet in circumference, forbidding all Romish votaries from an attendance upon enlightened schools of learning, liberally devised by the Parliament of a generous and liberal people. See, I say, ye "men of one idea," how a Romish Hierarchy does enslave the people, wherever it gains a footing. Are ye prepared to see the sons and daughters of enlightened England bow the knee abjectly before the imperious mandate of a freedom-hating, and ignorant priesthood? If you are not, own, as candour bids you, that a Romish Hierarchy is a far worse thing than an Anglican; and that self interest behoves you to see well to it, that you allow not a

Romish priesthood to establish its unblushing and ambitious pretensions, upon the free soil of this first of lands.

But we are not prepared to admit, that a companion of the two Hierarchies is called for, nor that the establishment and existence of either in this realm is the matter at issue; if it were, we have we think, made it obvious which it is our duty to tolerate. We maintain, as we are willing, and prepared, to prove, that it is the duty of every patriotic Englishman, to expel from these shores, all who are prepared to carry out any of the decrees of the pope, which are contrary to the spirit of our laws. That the laws of this realm have been broken by the late aggression of the pope, is made clear by what has already appeared. And that Cardinal Wiseman and his fellow bishops have trampled English law under their feet, by obeying the imperious mandates of the pope, is equally clear: therefore the inference is inevitable, that as breakers of the law, justice requires that they should not be permitted to carry on their malpractices.

But there are other, and more forcible reasons, why it behoves us, at once, and for ever to rid ourselves of the interference, and proud assumption of the creatures of the pope. Our dearest and best interests are at stake, just as long as we permit the pope to hold any sway in our land. Shall then the cry of bigotry drive us from using lawful diligence in the protection of all that is truly dear?

Does religious freedom call upon us to be indifferent whether or not we allow a false pretender to enslave the souls of our offspring, and bind their bodies in a galling yoke, when a little energy and manly determination, can rid us of the foe for ever?

It is one thing to be tolerant, and quite another to allow an intolerant and superstitious despot to enthrall the subjects of this realm. Religious freedom does not call upon us to cease from resisting the encroachments of that despotism which knows no will but its own. Religious freedom does not call upon us to permit those to go unmolested, who claim the power to act above, and independently of all law, human and divine. No, it is no bigotry, it is no in-

tolerance which urges the lovers of freedom to resist those who are prepared to stand up in defence of such blasphemous pretensions as the following, as belonging to the pope. "The most *Holy* and most blessed, who hath the heavenly empire, who is *Lord on earth*, the master of the universal world, the *Father of kings*, the light of the world, the most high and sovereign bishop, Martin, by divine providence."^{*}

"We may according to the fulness of our power, dispose of the law, and dispense above the law. Those whom the bishop of Rome doth separate, it is *not a man that separateth them, but God*, (!) for the pope holdeth place on earth, not simply of a man, *but of true God*." "His will is his reason, and no man questioneth him." "For he can dispense above the law, and of *injustice* can make *justice*."[†]

Can it be said that we are acting intolerantly towards Romanists, when we refuse them a hierarchy which claims such blasphemous rights for its supreme head? Common sense dictates, that the peace and safety of this realm demand, that men professing to obey such a chief, shall not find a home herein. If men will obey the pope, they must go where the pope rules; but it is not for Englishmen to tolerate an "*imperio in imperium*." We will not have men in this land professing allegiance to our sovereign, who have solemnly sworn to obey the despot of a foreign land; and who claims to have the power to make evil, good.

Are Englishmen come to that pass, that they are ready to submit to such a state of degradation, as that which disgraces Italy at the present time? Are we to succumb to that decrepid power that hires foreign bayonets to crush the liberty of its own subjects? Shall we permit this free soil to become polluted again with those vile abominations, which centuries since were purged away by the blood of our forefathers? Shall we forsooth, because some raise the hollow cry of bigotry against us, allow the very spirit of bigotry itself to ride rampant along, and convert this happy nation into a mind-degraded and superstitious serfdom?

^{*} Pope Martin V.'s instructions to his ambassador at Constantinople.

[†] 1st Book of Gregory, 9 dec., c. 3.

God helping us, the day shall never dawn on Britain, which shall see it priest-ridden, and bowing in abject submission to him of the seven hills. Englishmen, you ought as you love your country, as you love your homes, your children, and your God, to banish at once and for ever from your shores, those creatures of a foreign power, who compose the hierarchy of the Romish church in this land.

But in driving out the hierarchy, we do not infringe upon the rights of conscience. We are willing to let the papist believe, if he will, that his pope is infallible, he may, if he has the mind, believe with Cardinal Wiseman, that the pope sits in St. Peter's identical chair; he may if it pleases him, believe that the pope can grant him indulgences; he may abstain from meat on Fridays, and eat fish and eggs; he may make ever so long pilgrimages, wear hair shirts, and carry peas in his shoes; or he may believe in winking virgins, and bleeding pictures, and worship a lifted host; any and all of these, or a thousand other things, he may believe and do, but to set up a power within this realm he must not.

The cry that it is a part of the Romish system to have a hierarchy, is not to be listened to. It is a part of a religious system in India, to cause the burning of widows.

Would Englishmen permit it here? It is a part of another system to strangle all it can make its victims. Are we obliged to allow religious devotees to carry out all their systems in our land, just because we tolerate their opinions among themselves? No, we permit and tolerate Roman Catholics, but we will not permit them to carry out all their abominable system. It is a part of their system, to imprison, burn, and hang, all who oppose or deny their dogmas. It is a part of their system to keep the people in blind ignorance, and to pamper hundreds of thousands of priests, upon the spoils of an ignorant and besotted nation. It is a part of their system to cover a land with dens of infamy and vice, in the shape of nunneries and monasteries; and to send swarms of wandering and licentious mendicants to fatten upon the hard earnings of the poor. Must we then, to be consistent, absolutely tolerate all that that system upholds? Are we bigoted if we do not? We think otherwise. Therefore it is that we have lifted up our voice, and through the pages of the "Controversialist" we call upon thinking, fair-dealing Englishmen, to rid themselves of that pestilential scourge, the Romish hierarchy, at once and for ever.

W. T.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

RELIGIOUS liberty has been generally understood to mean, the privilege on the part of any sect, of holding and disseminating its own peculiar views, provided always, that such privilege be exercised in such a manner as not to interfere with the morality, or the political tranquillity of the state. If these conditions are violated, it then becomes the duty of the state, to protect itself by legislative enactments. The late measures of the court of Rome have been considered by many, to be a breach of the latter of these conditions, and great stress has been laid upon the introduction of the canon law, which it is said contains clauses inconsistent with the allegiance which a subject should bear to the constituted authorities. Now whilst I

would admit that the canon law does contain these seditious and treasonable doctrines, yet I think before a case is made out for legislative interference, it should be proved that the Roman Catholics of England have both the inclination and the power, to put them into practice. The mere holding in the abstract of certain tenets, by no means implies, either the disposition or the ability to carry them out.

Either Cardinal Wiseman and his colleagues will attempt to carry out the canon law, or they will not. If they will, then any punishment short of death, will be futile and insufficient. How shall banishment intimidate those, whom the penalties of high treason were found incompetent to restrain from conspiring to depose an her-

etical queen, and to kindle once more the fires of Smithfield for her heretical subjects. But if they intend that these clauses in the canon law should remain, as the Catholics in England for the last two centuries and a half have allowed them, a dead letter, what necessity is there for interfering with them at all? It has never been the practice of the English government to punish men for theories, however dangerous, unless there was some chance of their becoming realised. The doctrines of Robert Owen, the socialist, for example, are far more offensive to public decency, and injurious to social order, than the most seditious opinions which Jesuits ever promulgated. But Owen is allowed to make as many converts as he may, to organise his system if he can, and to talk about the natural equality of man, and the community of goods, provided he makes no actual attempt to deprive Queen Victoria of her style, title, and dignity, or to lay violent hands upon his neighbour's goods. And does any man feel less secure, either in his person or property, because he is permitted without interruption to preach his peculiar tenets? Why have we not taken alarm at what the socialists have done in France, and gone to Parliament to demand their expulsion from the realm? Because we have full confidence, that the calm and steady course of the ordinary law, and the plain sense and manly integrity of Englishmen, are adequate guarantees for the stability of our institutions, and the security of our property. And why should not the same guarantees be a sufficient protection against the attacks of the emissaries of a monk, who has been obliged to call in the aid of scoffers at his creed, to defend him against his own subjects? Is not the danger from socialism far more to be dreaded than that from Popery? On the one side we see a system which but two years since made Paris a battle-field, and which yet threatens that unhappy city with convulsion and bloodshed,—on the other, an effete and worn-out superstition, existing only in form among the educated classes, and maintaining its sway among the lower, only till the sun of civilization shall enlighten their ignorance, and consign it to as utter an extinction, as the worship of Jupiter and Minerva.

But even supposing that circumstances should at any time render the power of the Pope formidable, and that he possessed the inclination to interfere in our domestic policy, what reason have we to infer that he would be seconded in his attempts by the laity of his communion, our fellow subjects? Are not historical facts against such a supposition? In the reign of Queen Elizabeth, when the Roman Catholics had every reason to be exasperated, by the penal laws which affected their liberty, their rights of conscience, and their property, that sagacious sovereign showed her reliance in their loyalty, by placing a Catholic in command of that fleet which was to repel an invasion authorised by the Pope's bull, fitted out by a Popish Prince, and having as its principal object, the conversion of the English heretics to the true faith. Again, within the last hundred and forty years, we have had two rebellions, with the avowed intention of placing a Popish sovereign on the throne, and in both instances the insurgents numbered but a very small proportion of Roman Catholics. The great bulk consisted of Anglican churchmen, and Scotch episcopalians, who held in its strictest sense, the doctrine of the divine right of kings. To revert to earlier times, when all England acknowledged, in theory at least, the supremacy of the Pope;—when Popish barons, and a Popish arch-bishop, had wrung from their tyrant king, the great foundation of our liberties, the terrors of excommunication did not deter them from compelling the traitor to keep his solemn engagements at the point of the sword. These are not the only instances which might be adduced, but I think they are sufficient to show, that loyalty to the crown and attachment to our liberties, are qualities not monopolised by Protestants. Why then should we deviate from the course of religious toleration which it has been the boast of England for so many years to have pursued; or why should we give to the enemies of our purer faith, an occasion for saying, that our religion has no other security than what acts of Parliament can afford, and that we are afraid to admit of the perfect organization of their system in our land, lest its advantages should be discovered by being placed in juxtaposition with our own?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"An agitation, unparalleled in our times, has been raised by the constitution of a Catholic hierarchy in this island. Its violence has been that of a whirlwind."* It has swept over the face of the country, and stirred the blood of every truly British heart. A foreign despot, whose vile machinations have despoiled the fairest land in the European continent;—who claims the most unlimited submission in all temporal and spiritual things, not from the land of Italy alone, but from the whole of the dwellers on the earth's broad surface;—a despot who, like a foul and unclean thing, scatters despair, and woe, and misery around him;—bear me witness, ye grief-wrung hearts,—ye freedom-desiring sons and daughters once so famous in the world's history,—bear me witness, the groans of agony, the writhings of pain, the half-stifled wail of despair, the wildly-bursting cry of those whose souls are almost goaded to madness by the tortures inflicted in the Holy (?) Inquisition,—has ignored our Sovereign, her Cabinet, the Christian church of our land, the Parliament of our country, the public opinion of the nation,—has, in despite and haughty contempt of the rights and power of our Queen, or the privileges and opinions of our people—been bold enough to issue his pseudo-infallible edict for the permanent setting of this realm of ours as a diadem in the Papal tiara; and published to the astonished world, that the mightiest empire on the globe has at length become a satellite to circle round the pontifical sun, in obedience to the great law of papistry-ward gravitation,—has dared to set his heel upon the Protestantism of this realm, and seeks to crush it underneath his tread. In such circumstances as these, we feel bound to say, that in our opinion there has been too great an anxiety evinced by some of the influential members of society to cry, "Peace, peace, where there is no peace." It is in vain to shut our eyes to the fact, that the Roman Catholic hierarchy now established, is the enemy of our liberties,

our faith, our fireside happiness, our independent national existence. This is truly a warfare *pro aris et focis*. Some of our invaders are bold, blustering, haughty, and defiant; others are whining, wily, subtle, and crafty: but both are possessed of all that deeply-designing cunning—that ingenious double-faced deceptiveness, which Jesuitism and Popery combined, are able to impart. Well skilled are they in the guileful sophist's artifices;—deftly can they recite "the rhetoric of tyranny;" and artfully, with "words of eloquence,"

"Can gild

The bitter poison of a nation's woe."

Shall we then be flattered into acquiescence? shall we—betrayed by our generous nature and unsuspecting disposition—permit ourselves to be deceived by a Spanish Jesuit's laudations,—hollow-hearted praises of our intelligence, honesty, liberality, equity, firm faith, and "charity to all mankind?" Shall we be duped into inactivity, carelessness, and submission, by "Appeals," however eloquent—"Remonstrances," however affectionate seeming—"Pastorals," however elegantly indited, or ambiguously phrased? There could not be greater folly:—there could not be infatuation more insane. We may give up our vigilance, but will their "right hand forget its cunning?" We may generously permit them to whet their appetite for worldly glory with the mere semblance and tinsel of power; but will that appetite not "grow with what it feeds on?" Can the despot who sits in the temple of the seven-hilled city be satisfied while we are free? Can the priest-tyranny be safe while in Britain there is a secure asylum from its oppression? Must the children of the "islands of the western sea," with all humility, succumb to the behests of the Pontiff of Rome, and tamely acknowledge that a greater than our Queen is there? Can we—dare we—consistently with the preservation of our own civil and religious freedom, permit this unexampled aggression to pass on in unresisted triumph, or shall we not rather "snap his bands asunder, and cast his cords from us?" Verily, we think

* Cardinal Wiseman's "Appeal."

our duty is clearly pointed in these lines from England's immortal bard—

"Be stirring with the tune—be fire with fire;
Threaten the threatener, and outface the brow
Of braggag horror."

In proceeding to defend this opinion, however, it will be necessary to notice some of the arguments employed and the statements made by the aggressors, and those who defend them. As the chief party in the recent movement, we will, with all due deference of course, remark upon the sayings of the would-be Cardinal of Westminster. It would seem, from the language of the prelate, that he is grievously oppressed—that he is laden with a burden of woe almost too heavy for him to bear. A "whirlwind of contumely" has been raised about his ears; and in the innocence and guilelessness of his heart, he cries out in the pathetic language of an injured man, "Why all the clamour that has been raised? On what ground does the attack made on us rest? Why have we been denounced?—why held up to public hatred?—why pointed out to popular fury?" and after squeezing some ocular moisture from the lachrymatory of his holy eyes, he contrasts the usage which Catholics have received from the hands of Protestants, with that which the latter have met from the former thus:—"With us the cause of Truth and of faith has been held too sacred to be advocated in any but honourable and religious modes." Hear this, ye shades of the martyred Huguenots, and deny the truth of the assertion. Tell how 30,000 of you met death at the mandate of a pope-goaded tyrant in a few days. Hear this, ye victims of the Duke of Alva, who boasted that during the short space of five years, 18,000 heretics had been consigned by him to the hands of the common executioner, and deny the truth of the assertion. Departed spirits of those 150,000 whom the tortures of the Inquisition, within thirty years, sent prematurely to your graves, rise from your tombs, and brand the assertion as a falsehood. Toledo, tell of the days when the *auto da fe* blazed in your square. Smithfield, recite one chapter from your history. Torquemada, thou arch-infernal inquisitor of Spain,—rise from the dead, and tell of the 6000 which during a

period of fourteen years you hurried to the blazing fagot pile. History, open your crime-stained page, and give your evidence; and then let us ask St. Pudentia if these be the "honourable and religious modes" in which the Papal church advocates the "cause of Truth and faith?" Is this a bye-gone tale?—is this a mere page from a romance written by an over-heated brain? Alas, no! They are written in characters of fire and blood and smoke in the historic tome, Are such deeds but the dark miasmata of the double night of ages, and of her—Night's daughter—Ignorance, which are now dispersed by the rays of the sun of Knowledge? We trow not. Is the Holy Office abolished? Are there no victims immured within its dungeon depths? Is now no use made of the wheel, the rack, the thumb-screw, and the thousand other nameless and, *to us*, unimaginable utensils of priestly love, and tolerance, and mercy, which constitute the "honourable and religious modes" of advocating "the cause of Truth and faith" in that gigantic hell-invention—the Inquisition? If so, show us the bull by which "a consummation so devoutly to be wished" has been effected. Are a rigid censorship—an *index expurgatorius*—a fettered press—no right of private judgment—no public meetings—a Jesuitical *espionage*—no toleration of diverse creeds—and a sealed Bible,—“the honourable and religious modes” in which the Papal hierarchy advocates “the cause of Truth and faith.”

I will say nothing of the religiousness or honourableness of such modes; but that they are *the* modes, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Austria can prove. And it is a church like this that St. Pudentia, in his eloquent "Appeal," has the *modesty* to ask Englishmen to be quietly and unresistingly "carried out, perfectly and properly," in their midst. And it is such a church which A. W. contends that the "English government cannot without a gross violation of every principle of religious liberty interdict from developing its polity to the full extent."

Let us clearly understand, then, what is implied in the full development of the Papal church. It implies the "supremacy of the Pope" in things *temporal* and *spiritual*, as the following extracts from the

Canon Law* will prove—viz., “The Bishop of Rome is not bound to any decree; but he may *compel* both clergy and laymen to receive his decree as Canon Law.” “Princes’ laws, if they are opposed to the canons and decrees of the Bishop of Rome, are of *no force or strength*.” “The Bishop of Rome is judge in temporal things, and he hath two swords—the one *spiritual*, and the other *temporal*.” It implies compulsory unity of faith, as per Canon Law is also proven, “The Bishop of Rome may give authority to arrest men, and imprison them in manacles and fetters;” and “He that acknowledgeth not himself to be under the Bishop of Rome, who is ordained by God to have primacy over *the whole world*, is a heretic, and cannot be saved, nor is he of the flock of Christ.” It implies the abolition of the right of private judgment; for listen to the Canon Law again—“The Bishop of Rome hath authority to judge all men, and especially to discern the articles of faith; and he may absolve those the council has damned; but no man hath authority to judge him, or to meddle with anything that he hath judged—neither emperor, king, or people, nor even the clergy—and it is not lawful for any man to dispute his power;” and all the decrees of the Bishop of Rome ought to be kept perpetually, by *every man*, without any repugnance, as God’s word spoken by the mouth of Peter; and whosoever does not receive them, neither availeth him the Catholic faith, nor the four Evangelists; but he blasphemeth the Holy Ghost, and shall have no forgiveness.” It implies the unresisting and unreserved surrender of our whole powers and faculties to the Papal head of the church: for, as the Canon Law explicitly teaches—“The Bishop of Rome may be judged of God only: for although he neither regard his own salvation or any other man’s, but draw down with himself *innumerable people*

in crowds to hell, yet may no mortal man in the world reprehend him; for inasmuch as he is called God, he may not be judged of man: for God is beyond the judgment of any man; and the Bishop of Rome may open and shut heaven unto men.” It implies the arrestment of the progress of the human race—the gathering again of the clouds of ignorance over the mental horizon—the spread of superstitious observances—the abrogation of all fealty to the sovereign—the unloosing of the moral ties of society—the breaking up of all confidence and trust, all true friendship and love, by the establishment of the spy-system and the confessional—the open sale of indulgences—the establishments of monasteries and nunneries—places into which the public eye cannot penetrate, nor learn the dire secrets of vice, of abject despair, and still more frantic remorse which dwell within them—the levying of contributions and dotations—death-bed peculation and deception—masses for the dead—the abolition of all national feeling—the abstraction of the wealth of the provinces to “heap the shrine of luxury and pride” within the Papal dominions—the centralization of all talent, power, wealth, influence, grandeur, pomp, magnificence, in Imperial Rome—the investing of the Pope with supreme power—and the impoverization of the extremities of the Papal empire to maintain the armaments, the naval and military forces—the Inquisitorial officials—the Jesuitical spies—the pampered priesthood—the monastic drones—the conventual buried-alives, if haply not the children of vice—and all the other ramifying, though silent and hidden influences of enslavement, the mainsprings of which would be worked at St. Peter’s. To this system we can find no parallel;—it is in vain for S. A. J. to attempt to contrast it to advantage with Socialism; for whatever may be thought of the *principles* of the latter, it is not an *anti-national organization* like the hierarchy of the former. We believe that Socialism teaches errors which must be met only by Truth; but that Roman Catholicism has been guilty of a political offence in breaking our laws—insulting the Crown—and introducing into this country the influence of a foreign prince,—and that this justly calls for the interference of the civil power.

* The remarks of S. A. J. in the present No. of the Magazine upon the Canon Law, do not at all weaken our position, when the subject is fully understood. It is quite true that the Canon Law was for a long time a dead letter to the English Roman Catholics. And why was this? Because there was no hierarchy in this country; but if the present attempt to establish one be successful, the Catholics will be compelled to acknowledge the Canon Law, upon the very principle that has led them hitherto to disregard it.

With respect to the effects of Roman Catholicism, is there anything fanciful in the picture we have drawn? Have we not seen it once before developing itself in secret, like a pestilential exhalation; until for ages the gloom of despair, and misery, and ignorance rested upon the earth like a death-pall; and until, in the very delirium and paroxysm of their grief and madness, the nations made one convulsive effort to burst the chains which bound them. One part was successful, and there the sun of freedom and intelligence shines;—there free institutions, progressive humanity, moral action, heart-felt worship, scientific acquirements, and cordial reciprocity of feeling may be found. One part was unsuccessful; and there the darkness yet broods, the canker yet eats into the soul, the fetters still gall, ignorance yet triumphs, and the Papal power is glorious. If religious freedom necessarily requires us to permit the full and complete development of the polity of Roman Catholicism, where is the religious liberty which will be granted us? Can we be called upon to sacrifice our own freedom—to yield up ourselves to mental enthrallment that we may give liberty to those who shall oppress us? Have our former tolerance and lenity been successful in changing the spirit of the Papal power? Has our former generosity been reciprocated—or rather, has not every benefit conferred been an additional incentive to farther encroachments? Surely there is a point at which concession should cease, and resistance begin. So wily and insidious a foe it is difficult to

watch! So long as the hierarchy is not established, the Canon Law cannot be enforced; but once established, it begins its operations, and creates a law running counter to the religion, faith, Crown, government, domestic comfort, and progress of the realm; which proceeds, in the estimation of Papists, from a higher authority, and is sanctioned by more dreadful penalties and more glorious rewards than the law of the land. It will be seen, therefore, that to the acceptance of either horn of the dilemma which A. W. invites, we respectfully demur. We do not so much object to the “source of the authority,” or “the mode of the appointment of the Catholic hierarchy,” as to its *nature*. Referring to our former paper, we recommend a reperusal of its yet unanswered arguments; and conclude, on our part, the present debate with the exhortation of the poet—

“Oh, now, fair England, learn,
Thou fairest jewel in Europa's crown!
Thou Neptune's great vicegerent, and his
queen!
Thou nurse of future empires; and thou cit-
adel
Framed to defend the worth of all mankind!
Thou Reason's temple—Freedom's garden!
learn!
Never let foreign fiends approach thy heart;
Or foreign syrens sing thee to repose;
Or foreign vampyres suck thy sleeping blood.
They are thy foes that smile, and hate, and
envy,
And would bring harm to thee: while all thy
good
Flows in thy own rich veins.”

SALINE.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

IN replying on this question, I find myself placed in a rather difficult position. The three writers who have opposed the establishment of the Roman Catholic hierarchy seem to have forgotten the terms upon which the matter was to be discussed—namely, whether the Government can oppose the establishment of this hierarchy *consistently with the principles of religious liberty*? Indeed, B. S. A., on page 57 of the “Controversialist,” goes so far as to say, “If in the foregoing statement I have established the law, that no one has a right

to appoint bishops within this realm of England, save the King and the Chapter, then I contend, 2ndly, that the Government are not only justified in punishing, but bound to punish any breach of the law. And this principle, I hold, *overrides that of religious liberty*;—it is a principle interwoven with the Government.” I was greatly surprised, I must confess, when I read this extract. What does it mean but this;—that we are bound to obey all the decrees of Government, however unjust they may be? Now, surely B. S. A. will not contend

for this? I think I can show him the unsoundness of such an argument. Suppose that by some means or other, the Government of this country was to come into the hands of men who professed no religious principles, and they were to pass a law forbidding the further use of the titles now held by the Anglican hierarchy and clergy, under certain pains and penalties; would he argue that the holders of those titles must quietly resign them, because, forsooth, the Government had interdicted them, on a "principle interwoven with the Constitution, which overrides that of religious liberty?" Would he not demand for them, as I do for the Roman Catholics, perfect freedom to call their spiritual overseers by what name soever they might consider most appropriate? Would he not consider such an enactment an infringement of the religious liberty of the Anglican church? And in such a case, would the argument of his against the Romanists, which I have quoted above, be considered by him a fair answer to their claims for perfect liberty of action in this matter? I think not. If our forefathers had acted on this principle, where would have been the Protestantism which we now possess?

In my introductory article, I endeavoured to prove that the so-called "agression" was not illegal; and then to show that it could not be interdicted consistently with the principles of religious liberty. I will now, as briefly as possible, give my reasons for still adhering to those opinions, notwithstanding I have had the opportunity of reading "Saline's" article, which J. S. J. thinks would, had I been able to read it previously to penning my article, have altered my opinions.

The legal portion of the question may, I think, be soon settled. Indeed, my opponent, B. S. A., has done this for me, in the following extract from the Emancipation Act:—"That if any person, other than the person thereunto authorised by law, shall assume the name, style, or title of archbishop of any province, bishop of any bishopric, or dean of any deanery in England or Ireland, he shall for every offence forfeit £100." B. S. A.'s attempt to apply this to the sees erected by the Pope in his late act, is certainly more amusing than

successful. He argues, "the words are bishop of any bishopric in England; not, any *existing* bishopric;—and as the Roman Catholic dioceses take their names from England, I contend that they are bishoprics within the meaning of the act." To contend is one thing, to prove another. How can those be bishoprics "within the meaning of the act," which had no existence when that act passed? Why, it would be just as reasonable to argue, Change the name of the circuits into which the Wesleyans have divided this country for ecclesiastical purposes into *bishoprics*,—and they immediately become bishoprics "within the meaning of the act." But the most complete answer to this argument is, that the legal officers of the Government were too "wise in their generation" to prosecute under it, but rather preferred to appeal to Parliament for extra power.

Proceeding, then, to the other point at issue, I may remark, that as my opinion, that religious liberty consists in "granting to others the same freedom that we claim for ourselves" has not been controverted, I do not hold myself bound to re-enter into the question so fully as, had this position been assailed, I should have felt myself compelled to have done. I endeavoured, in my former article, to keep the question before your readers as a matter of principle. I regret that those who have opposed me should have thought fit to ground their arguments so much on *expediency*. This is peculiarly the case in the article of "Saline." Sum up his arguments in a few words, and they amount to this;—Rome always has been corrupt and profligate where she has not been kept down by the hand of the law: *ergo*, we must keep her down here. He does not attempt to show that it is consistent with the principles of religious liberty to do this: I contend it is not. His article presents no other point of legitimate comment.

B. S. A. confines his argument chiefly to the legal part of the question, which I have previously dealt with. On the point now at issue, he contends, that the Pope, by his recent bull, has trenchanted upon the rights of the Established Church; and, therefore, the Government of the country can, consistently with the principles of re-

ligious liberty interdict what he has done. But how B. S. A. makes out that the division of this country into dioceses, and the appointment of bishops thereto, under titles *never before heard of*, is an infringement of the rights of the State-Church of this country, is beyond my powers of divination to discover.

Leaving B. S. A. to make this apparent, I proceed to notice the article of J. S. J. This writer objects to my way of putting the case, and says, "the question is not whether we are to give an unoffending individual into custody, but whether we may handcuff one who has assaulted us." But I cannot see how one man can assault another by any action which is not punishable by the law of the land; and if I have shown that the Pope has done nothing contrary to the law, which I think I have, then this position of his, falls to the ground. His argument that Government can, consistently with religious liberty, prevent the "full development" of "anything that is perilous to mind, perilous to soul, &c. might have some point, if the question under discussion was the right of individuals to profess the Roman Catholic faith, in this country. That right being granted, I really cannot see the application of his argument to the appointment of the officers required by that sect for the "full development" of their *religious*—only *religious*—operation. Further on he remarks:—"It is impossible, without credulity, to believe that an act of the Papal See, can affect ecclesiastical things and persons, only." Now, I ask any reasonable being how the late bull can affect other than ecclesiastical matters in this

country. Let this be shown, and I will confess to the incredulity which J. S. J. charges upon those who differ from him in this matter.

Much high-sounding indignation has been expended on the terms in which this measure of the Pope's has been introduced. But this does not affect the act itself. I am not going to defend those expressions. I consider them to have been very impolitic and uncalled for. But if a man chooses, in terms not the most consonant with my ideas of what is correct or courteous, to call me a liar; am I, therefore, to appeal to the law to punish that man? If my conduct will not show that he is wrong—if my whole life will not defend my character from his aspersions—will any one believe me guiltless of the charge, even though a jury of the country should pronounce me to be a pattern of probity? Does any one believe this country more inclined to Roman Catholicism *now* than it was *before* the publication of the Papal bull? Most decidedly not. Let the Protestants of England, then, show by their lives that they are *not* Roman Catholics, and refrain from asking Parliament to punish the Pope and his agents for asserting that they are.

Refraining from entering upon the very tempting theme which the determination to legislate upon this subject by the Government holds out, in its having been, as the *Daily News* remarked, the chief cause of the recent overthrow of the Whig Cabinet, —I conclude this discussion with the expression of a hope that the cause of Truth may have been furthered by it.

S. H. W.

Social Economy, etc.

HAVE THE WORKING CLASSES BEEN BENEFITTED BY MACHINERY?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Ill fares the land, to hastening woe a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay."
—*Goldsmith*.

THE wise and witty, though withal, unfortunate Oliver Goldsmith, expressed in the above couplet a great truth, or we might

say, the solution of a great problem in relation to social science, although it has been but little regarded. It would seem to have been, to a very considerable extent, the custom of the past, as it is of the present, to look at things in their *immediate* tendency:

to the almost entire neglect of the remote. One of the evils of such a course is, that ideas and notions, superficial in their character, occupy the mind, and usurp, undermine, and weaken the powers which should be devoted to calm and conscientious reflection. Festus has well said—

“Man, alas ! alone the recreant spirit of the universe,
Loves surface knowledge.”

and experience proves it so. Another evil is, that superficial views lead to one-sided opinions. The mind does not dwell sufficiently long on the facts before it, to discover the *disadvantages*, as well as *advantages*, and *vice versa*. The fascination of the first glance, or the prejudices of early impressions, are too often relied on, and false conclusions drawn therefrom. It is well, therefore, to remember that

“Things are not always as they seem ;
Delusions soft, and soothing shades, oft-times
Steal o’er us, and blind our minor senses ;—
Thus being blind, or partly so,
We see things only in a partial light,
And hence conclusions draw which are not
based upon
The enduring principles of Truth and Justice.”

While the advocates of the benefits of Machinery put such great stress on the advantages the working classes have derived from the decreased rates of production, by which the common necessities of life are made more accessible to all, they should first stop to inquire at what cost such changes have been brought about, that both sides of the case may be laid open to view. It cannot but occur to many of our readers that anything having a tendency to depreciate the demand for manual labour, and thereby to lessen or contract the sphere of the operative classes, must be, in a corresponding degree, detrimental to their social advancement, and calculated to hasten on that state of things to which the poet we first cited refers.

That Machinery has given rise to increased competition in trade—that this increased competition has in many cases ended in rash and ruinous speculations—and that such speculations have been followed up by disastrous consequences to the working, as well as to other, classes, few will be disposed to deny. Indeed, that the working classes,

as a body, from their limited resources, are the first to feel the injurious effects of fluctuations in trade, is generally admitted. Are we not then justified in asking for more conclusive arguments than those which have yet been adduced to prove the real benefits the working classes can have received from the introduction of Machinery ?

Again : what is to become of our increasing working population, if improvements in Machinery continue in the same ratio of progression as they have done during the past half century ? The means of production have certainly within that period, in many cases, been multiplied a hundredfold. But has the population increased at the same rate ? Certainly not. If, then, production continues so far to exceed demand, total stagnation of trade must sooner or later follow. The period of adjustment *must* come : and woe unto those who continue to neglect the warning symptoms—who fail to give ear to the cries of the oppressed—or who shut their eyes, and regard not the “signs of the times.”

“The land is sore with travail, and broad-brained men
In eager silence wait the coming birth ;
But some, more mad than wise,
By ways Cæsar’s would relieve her woes.”

Is it not more than probable that those who seek to alleviate or remove the distress at present acknowledged as existing among the working classes, by bringing to bear increased mechanical inventions, are rather extending our national woes than effectually overcoming and rooting them out ?

What do the working classes themselves say upon the subject ? for surely they are likely to know something of the influences which tend either to promote or retard their prosperity ? If we may venture an opinion from our own limited experience, they look with an exceedingly suspicious eye upon all the innovations from time to time being made by Machinery ; for short work and short wages, or *decreased* remuneration for *increased* toil, has made an impression upon their memories not easily to be effaced.

We should do violence to our feelings and belief were we to contend that the results which have followed the introduction of Machinery have been necessary and inevitable—the only ones which could have fol-

lowed. We are even willing to admit that much, perhaps most, of the evil has resulted from the avarice and injustice of employers. They have, in too many instances, even at the expense of the flesh and blood of their toiling operatives, sought, out of inventions which were destined to be of benefit to the whole human family, merely the pomp and glory of increased individual aggrandisement, and the accomplishment of their own selfish ends. The question, however, as it stands before us, is—Have the working classes been benefitted by Machinery? The answer, therefore, must be Yes or No, irrespective of other considerations. If, either by the abuse of power on the part of the employers, or any other cause, the working classes have *not* been benefitted, then the reply must be in the negative. But if on the other hand the advantages have actually outweighed the disadvantages, then the verdict will be on the affirmative side. We own ourselves more desirous of seeing the question impartially discussed than of hazarding, too soon, our own opinion.

By way of conclusion, it may not be out

of place to give a brief quotation or two from an authority which certainly deserves honourable mention while speaking on such matters. Ricardo, in his "Essays on Political Economy," expresses it as his decided belief, "that the opinion entertained by the labouring classes, that the employment of Machinery is frequently detrimental to their interests, is not founded on prejudice and error, but is conformable to the correct principles of political economy." And again, he says, "I am convinced that the substitution of machinery for human labour is often very injurious to the interests of the class of labourers." To these considerations we would invite serious attention. There can be little doubt that the united and deliberate efforts of earnest seekers after Truth will be well rewarded, not only by the outward satisfaction of arriving at a just conclusion, but by the inward joy of having lent aid in the discovery and solution of a problem affecting a large and important class of our fellow-creatures—the toiling millions of this our habitable globe.

JUNIUS.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

GREAT BRITAIN occupies a proud position among the nations of the world. Her social and political laws seem well-nigh brought to the highest point of practical perfection; and she stands incontestibly at the head of the European States. We, as Britons, may pride ourselves justly on the feats of our forefathers; but we look back in vain for that superiority now enjoyed. An impulse, and a fortunate circumstance may have added to their triumphs of blood, and to the catalogue of our national heroes; but it is amid internal and external peace that our country's power increases like that of a youthful giant, in proportion to the freedom enjoyed.

And what, we may inquire, is the cause of this national superiority? A glance at the map of Europe affords no satisfactory answer to the query. Great Britain there occupies a comparatively diminutive space. We look at the population tables, but there we find numerical inferiority. We look at our armies and our navies, but they do not

help us out of the difficulty. The cause is neither locality, population, naval nor military strength. France, for instance, occupies a larger geographical space,—she has a greater population,—and her available war power is more extensive than ours. In Great Britain, according to M. Balbi the statist, there is one soldier to every two hundred and twenty-nine inhabitants; while in France, there is one to every one hundred and thirty-eight. The answer to the question, we think, can only be found in the comparative social economies of the two states. We will venture, therefore, a brief inquiry—1st, The *occupations* of the productive populations. There are two great sources of national wealth falling under this head; first the *agricultural*, and secondly, the *commercial and manufacturing*. Now it is calculated on sure data,* that in France two-thirds of the population are employed

* See "Popular Cyclopædia," vol. 1, article "Britain."

in agriculture, and one-third in commerce and manufactures; while in Great Britain, one-third only are employed in agriculture, and two-thirds in commerce and manufactures. Thus France, while more of an agricultural, is less of a manufacturing and commercial nation than Britain: and the clear inference to be drawn from these facts is, that British superiority lies with the

latter sources of national wealth. But another consideration arises—2nd, What, in regard to commerce and manufactures, are the respective *productive powers* of the two countries? To elucidate this point, we give an ingenious calculation of M. Dupin, as to the comparative animate and inanimate productive forces, in commerce and manufactures, in the respective countries:—

	France.	Great Britain.
	Men Power.	
Animate Force	6,303,019	7,275,497
Inanimate Force:—		
Mills and Hydraulic Engines . . .	1,500,000	1,200,000
Windmills	253,333	240,000
Wind and Navigation	3,000,000	12,000,000
Steam Engines	480,000	6,400,000
Total Force	11,536,352	27,115,497
Ireland		1,002,667
Total for the United Kingdom		28,118,164

“Thus, the total of the inanimate force applied to the arts of all descriptions in France scarcely exceeds the fourth of the same power applied to the same purposes in Great Britain; and the whole animate and inanimate power of Great Britain, applied to manufactures and commerce, is nearly treble the amount of that so applied in France, notwithstanding that the population of France is to that of Great Britain nearly as three to two.”*

Have we not now found the cause of British superiority? Do not these facts prove that it lies in the greater productive powers of the British nation in those arts in which Machinery has its operations? It is a law in human nature, that society, to be healthy, must be progressive; and it is an axiom in political economy, that one great condition of social progression must be a never-ceasing increase in productive forces, and in the skill of the producer. The true social economist points to the time when man, in his social infancy, obeying the law of progress, invented his first instrument of labour;—the rudely-constructed spade lessened the labour of the hands; and the plough, with its team of oxen, while limiting the physical, increases the intellectual capa-

city of the labourer; and like an accurate philosopher, he traces civilization as it ascends the social eminence, moving proportionately with the exercise of man's inventive genius, until he arrives at the culminating point, to which the inventions of such labourers as Watt, Stephenson, Hargreaves, Arkwright, and Jacquard, have brought toiling humanity.

We are prepared to show that the working classes of Britain have been benefitted by Machinery, directly or indirectly, in almost every point of view; but space forbids our treating the question thus elaborately. We propose briefly to deal with the first two opponents in the present debate,—leaving the last, with any points we may omit to notice, for the opener of the debate in his final reply.

After a succinct allusion to the changes effected by Machinery, G. N. affirms that they have been “far from beneficial to the working classes, principally, because they have tended to annihilate those friendly relations which formerly existed between them and the wealthy classes.” Without fixing the date of the first introduction of Machinery, he observes, correctly enough, that previously, “the wealth of our country was for the most part distributed throughout the land;” and he goes on to show that

* “Popular Cyclopædia,” article “Britain.”

Machinery, having created new branches of national wealth, and centralised the productive powers, destroyed the "friendly" connexion formerly existing between the baron and the serf, and unhinged the dependence of the obsequious labourer upon the despotic squire. Now this argument is based on three assumptions;—1st, That the agricultural is the greatest source of national wealth; 2nd, That a state of serfdom or dependence is the most beneficial to the working man; and 3rd, That the working classes, if not wholly agricultural, originally sprung from the condition of labourers on the soil. The first assumption we pronounce fallacious, seeing that France, an agricultural nation, is less wealthy than Great Britain. The second is not less so, for this reason:—that slavery, in whatever form, is the most degrading of all possible conditions. And the third is untenable; because we suspect G. N. to date the influence of Machinery so very recently, that its effects in drawing country labourers into towns, and swelling the urban population, would be so small as to embrace but a very limited portion of our working classes, the majority of whom have not only been born in towns themselves, but their fathers generations before them. The time

"Ere England's griefs began,
When every rood of ground maintained its man."

has so long since passed away, that the possibility of all the labouring classes being agricultural, is chimerical and unnatural. G. N. forgets the question of population in his arguments. The so-called "friendly" connexion between the squirearchy and their dependents, supposing these dependents to be the majority of the working classes, might have been feasible some hundreds of years back; but the changes necessarily following increased population would have made that friendly connexion a difficult and monstrous thing. This "friendship" could never have fed the children, or clothed the whole of the working population of Great Britain!

G. N. pathetically depicts the *evil* consequences of the country labourer leaving his home for "love or money," (*necessity*, we presume, having no influence,) and migrating to the town, unfriended, unprotected,

and isolated among thousands; but then—admitting this to be the rule, which is by no means the case—the labourer is surely responsible for his actions; and considering that he had such a "friend" as the "squire—the hereditary sovereign of the place—to warn him of the dangers of town-life—of the crime-polluted atmosphere of the factory and the workshop. Machinery, certainly, cannot, with very good logic, be accountable for human waywardness. But, alas! not only has Machinery caused the country labourer to leave his home, and his friend, the squire; but it has been the cause of "severing the tie which formerly existed between the labouring population and the wealthy." And how? Why, Machinery having centralised manufacturing labour, and increased the size of towns, has offered such temptations to the landed proprietors as to induce them to follow their recreant dependents to the comfortable cities, and neglect their country friends. But is not this a benefit, according to G. N.'s own showing? Does he not tell us that the working classes are a migration from the country? and are not their late friends, the squires, not only countenancing them by following their example, but patronising and assisting them, by spending their leisure and their money in smoky cities?

Very unnecessarily, we think, has G. N. entered into a lengthy description of the dark shades in the history of the working classes. We sympathise in his abhorrence of the crimes he enumerates, and in regret at the apathy sometimes evinced by the monied classes to the physical and moral welfare of the working man; but we cannot attribute evils such as these to Machinery, —and from our knowledge of human nature, we look not to masters for the workman's elevation, but rather to those tastes which that noblest of machines,—the Printing Press—has fostered; and above all, to the will of the working classes themselves. That such a desire for improvement exists, is abundantly evident at the present time. For proof, we point not only to their Savings' Banks and their Friendly Societies, but also to their contributions to Literature itself.

Our next opponent's (S. A. J.) principal argument is, that Machinery, or "the

command of mechanical power, has made the capitalist more independent of the multitudes" by causing small fortunes to be absorbed in larger ones, so "that the man of moderate means has no chance of competing with his neighbour who can bring Machinery to his aid." In answer to this, we would observe, that Machinery also has made the working man as independent of the capitalist as the capitalist of him—seeing that without his workmen the capital of the employer would be nought, his machinery valueless, and his former profits probably exhausted in the support not only of himself and his household, but in the maintenance of the machinery itself. Society must have its workmen, and production is a social necessity: but capital is the mere consequence of labour; and if this view be correct, the independence of the capitalist is only secondary to that of the working man. It is undeniable that large profits absorb small ones, in the same way that small profits naturally increase to large; but so long as this increase or absorption is brought about legitimately, we have yet to learn in what way it hinders the development of trade, or lessens the benefit of machinery. S. A. J. appears to think that employers with large capital are disadvantageous to trade, and to the working man; and this he sufficiently indicates in his allusion to the profits of labour going "to swell the already bursting bags of the mill-owners." But supposing the profits of the great capitalists were divided among the working classes, would the benefit to the mere producer be proportionably great? "Perhaps the number of working men (says John H. Burton*) above twenty years of age may now be fairly stated, in round numbers, at four millions; and if the sum set forth as the estimated gains of the great capitalists were divided among this class entirely, without women and younger workers participating, it would afford between £6 and £7 a year to each." And what would this yearly profit—the divided product of the capitalist's gains—avail the working classes? Capital, when legitimately employed, is a "power for good;" and when increased, gives a healthier impulse and stability to trade, from a larger command of

materials and labour; but, weaken it by lessening the great capitalist's resources, and the equanimity of the labour and money market would be destroyed, and the working classes, as a consequence, would be the severest sufferers.

S. A. J. next directs attention to what he calls "the political results of machinery"—viz., the despotic power of the great capitalist over his workmen. "That power (he says) which the capitalist exercises over his workmen is more unlimited than any other, except, perhaps, that of a military chieftain." And how does he prove this? Because the operative "is dependent on his employer for every morsel he eats;" and because, unlike the tenant of the landed proprietor, when dismissed his situation, "he has no capital to fall back upon." But we would ask how the case stands with the agricultural labourer? An analogy between the factory operative and the tenant-farmer, though perhaps convenient in the negative argument, is not, we think, the fairest that could be drawn. What capital has the agricultural labourer to fall back upon more than the factory operative? We think scarcely so much. The operative, so long as he possesses honesty of character and productive skill, has capital less cumbersome and more in demand than even that of his employer. And what are the direct advantages of machinery,—fuller employment and higher wages,—if virtue, temperance, industry, and frugality, are not its accompaniments? Capitalists, as well as operatives, have duties to fulfil; but if these are neglected, the fault lies not certainly with the machinery, but with the employers themselves. But, moreover, if Machinery is the cause of the present form of society in Great Britain, the "political results" accruing to the nation are, as compared with former times, so great and manifold in the way of social improvement, as to sink the imaginary despotism of capitalists into utter insignificance.

The indisputable influence of Machinery on the centralisation of labour comes next under S. A. J.'s review; and by a skilful and graphic description of the vices of towns, and the consequences of female and infant labour on the moral and intellectual condition of the working classes, he makes

* "Social and Political Economy," p. 39.

out an apparently powerful case against Machinery. But there is a great fallacy in his argument. It is true that in populous districts a greater amount of crime naturally prevails than in less populated regions. Among a greater number of human beings there would, of course, be a larger amount of crime; but are we therefore to conclude that isolation is conducive to morality? But S. A. J. says, "Vice acts like heat;" and vice being the concomitant of city life, immorality is the necessary consequence. Is not this argument clearly fallacious? Virtue, surely, is as much a principle in human nature as vice; and should, at least, have a corresponding influence. In the congregating of large numbers of people in one particular locality, are we to suppose that evil principles alone are active? and is it not true, that each person acts as a check upon others? And farther, when so congregated, is not knowledge more easily disseminated, and law maintained, than in a scattered population? But ethical discussion is not

our province at the present moment; and we dismiss the subject.

Our negative friend contrasts "the artisans of our towns with the ploughmen of Westmoreland or Cumberland," as an evidence that Machinery promotes "physical degeneracy;"—in like manner we would compare the artisans of Manchester, Sheffield, and Birmingham, with the "boors" of the midland and south-western counties, as a proof that Machinery is promotive of intellectual supremacy.

In conclusion, we cannot but maintain, that as Machinery has been the great cause of our national wealth; as it has materially tended to bring the British people to their present high state of prosperity in art, commerce, and manufactures; as it has given so powerful an impetus to the intellectual, moral, and social well-being of the masses;—Machinery has been of incalculable benefit to the working classes.

R. L. G.

The Societies' Section.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

London.—Jamaica Row Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society.—The Fifth Anniversary of this Society was recently held in the commodious vestry adjoining Jamaica Row Chapel, Bermondsey. Rev. George Rose occupied the chair, and presided with his accustomed ability. About 200 persons sat down to tea and dessert. After tea an appropriate glee was sung by a select number of friends with much taste and expression, when the chairman made a few introductory remarks, and called upon Mr Leach to speak to the first sentiment, "The Past—May we derive wisdom from its teachings, both by acknowledging its truths, and avoiding its errors," after which, the meeting resumed for a short interval the lively conversation of the tea table. This was soon exchanged for a more harmonious combination of sounds;—that over,—Mr Philp spoke to the second sentiment "The Present—May the increasing intelligence of the age be strenuously exerted for the reform of our institutions." This was followed by another piece of music. Mr Adams spoke to the third sentiment, "The Future—May we anticipate its disclosures and prepare for its events in the true spirit of Christianity," and after another glee had been sung, and votes of thanks passed to the Ladies and

the Chairman, the meeting wound up with the National Anthem and separated in evident good humour, and apparently well satisfied with the evening's entertainment.

Liverpool.—Mount Pleasant Mutual Improvement Society.—This Society was established in November last in connection with the United Presbyterian Church in this town, and already numbers about 40 members. The object of the society, as stated in its constitution, is the mental and moral improvement of its members by means of books, essays, criticisms, and conversations, and it is divided into two sections, namely:—

Section 1. Enjoying all the privileges of the society, including the use of its books, and attendance at all its meetings.

Section 2. Being entitled only to the benefit of the meetings, for essays and conversations.

The members of the former pay a quarterly subscription of 1s. 6d., with an entrance fee of not less than 1s. 6d., and the latter an annual subscription of 1s. 6d. With the funds of the first section a book has been bought for each

member, and these books are circulated fortnightly until the whole are read. Great care is exercised by the committee in introducing books and none but standard works are admitted.

The society meets monthly, when an essay is read by one of the members followed by conversation in which all join. At the first of these meetings which was held in December, the Rev. W. Graham delivered a very able lecture upon the importance of Mutual Improvement Societies, and he is to be followed by the Rev. Hugh Crichton, D.D., who intends giving a sketch of the manners, customs, and religion of the Swiss, as noticed by himself in a tour through Switzerland.

It may be well to mention that it is intended that every third meeting be a tea party, to which strangers are invited, and that at the end of the year a *soirée* of the members and their friends be held, at which, in addition to the usual reports and addresses, the books which have been read shall be sold *by auction*, and thus the society having the funds arising from this sale and the subscriptions of its members, will be able to purchase works of a more expensive class than those at present in circulation. A. M.

Leith Young Men's Society.—This Society was established upwards of six years ago, for the religious, moral, and intellectual improvement of the young men of Leith. Composed originally of only 8 members, it struggled on through many difficulties, until, from one small society, have originated 4 large and flourishing associations, with 72 members. It seeks to accomplish its great objects, chiefly by the composition and criticism of essays;—by debates conducted in a friendly spirit, and by addresses, in many cases extempore, in which a clear and unaided expression of ideas is sought, by which the members are fitted to speak in public. There is also another important means, which is seldom seen in such societies, and which in the absence of such an excellent periodical as the "British Controversialist," was found necessary, namely, manuscript magazines, conducted by the members only and issued monthly, these have been completely successful in improving the literary tastes, and critical acumen of the contributors. It would be well if this additional means of improvement were generally introduced into such societies.

The four associations, though separate and independent, and forming so many centres of influence for drawing together new members, and diffusing intellectual and religious activity, yet for the purpose of keeping up feelings of intimacy and brotherly kindness, aggregate bi-monthly meetings are held, at which, general business is transacted, and scientific lectures delivered by the members. Not only so, but we have larger re-unions at our half-yearly *soirées*, which tend to promote social intercourse, to bring the society before the public, and to form a new starting-point for increased activity. We thus have combined in one society all the elements of a truly intellectual system, of elevated and pleasing education, which supplies to many instruction, and originates friendships before unknown.

The Sixth Anniversary *Soirée* of the society was held on Friday evening, the 27th December. After tea, the President, Mr. Buchan, delivered an opening address on "Excitement," in which he shewed its utility, and illustrated its most instructive and pleasing phases. The report was read by Mr. G. Smith, the Secretary, and its adoption was moved and seconded by Messrs Moodie and Fotheringham. Mr. G. Manson then delivered a masterly speech on "Christianity—its adaptation to the wants of mankind," in which, by comparing it with other systems of religion, he proved that it alone, from the purity of its doctrines, and its universal application to every condition of life, every stage of civilization, could truly refine the intellect and purify the heart. After fruit had been served, Mr. R. Sinclair spoke at some length on "Laughter," which he treated in a philosophical manner, and illustrated by appropriate anecdotes. The concluding address was delivered by Mr. W. Anderson on "The Harmony between Science and Religion." During the evening, addresses were delivered by deputations from similar societies, and several anthems sung by an excellent choir.

Colchester Literary Institution.—*Second Lecture on Chemistry.*—We attended the second lecture by Mr. Coleman, on Monday, January 6. The subject on this occasion was the chemistry of the metals. The lecturer entered with spirit into his subject, ably treating it in the following order:—

General properties of the metals.—Gold, native, a large mass found—in what state usually found—where—its uses—not necessary for money—how separated from other substances—prodigious malleability—properties. Silver—Mercury—how obtained—properties—when first frozen—a mine discovered. Copper—how procured—properties and uses—tests for in sweetmeats. Lead—how procured—properties—employed as paint—alloys. Tin—how and where procured—qualities and uses. Iron—how extracted from the ores—furnaces for extracting described—ore, analysis of—meteoric iron. Antimony—how procured—nature and properties—curious effect on gold—anecdote connected. Bismuth—how and where obtained—properties. Zinc—nature—its alloys and uses. Arsenic—properties—effects on the human body—tests. Cobalt—Nickel—economical preparation described. Platinum—when and where discovered—how purified—properties. Palladium,—Rhodium,—Iridium,—Osmium,—Potassium,—Sodium,—Lithium.—Conclusion.

Masbrough Mutual Improvement Society.—This society held its second annual meeting on Tuesday evening, January 14th, 1861, in Masbrough chapel school-room, about one hundred friends sat down to tea. Mr. George Bell took the chair. The meeting was addressed by several of the members and friends. Resolutions affirming the importance of knowledge, and expressive of sympathy with every attempt to diffuse it, were submitted to the meeting by various speakers and unanimously adopted. The meeting was highly interesting, and gave great satisfaction to all the friends present.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

47. Will any of your readers advise me as to the best mode of pursuing the study of Geometry and Algebra at the same time?—G. R.

48. Will some of your correspondents have the goodness to furnish a young man who desires to improve his mind, with a brief exposition of the principles upon which the ordinary method of finding the greatest common measure is founded?—S. S.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

29. *Dyeing Woollen Cloth.*—The best book we are acquainted with containing information upon this subject is "Dr. Ure's Dictionary of Arts and Manufactures." The articles on Woollen Cloth, Dyeing, &c., are full of such information as H. R. S. requires. For instruction on this and kindred subjects, the work we have mentioned may be always consulted with confidence. The work is designed to instruct the Manufacturer, Metallurgist, and Tradesman, in the principles of their respective processes;—to afford Merchants, Brokers, &c., characteristic descriptions of the commodities which pass through their hands;—to present to Students and Gentlemen of the law a source of practical information;—and to give the general reader, intent chiefly on intellectual cultivation, a view of many of the noble achievements of science, in effecting those great transformations of matter to which Great Britain owes her paramount wealth, rank, and power among the kingdoms. The published price of the work is 50s., but it may be seen in the libraries of most Mechanics' Institutions.—C. A.

32. *Chemistry*—(continued from page 117).—In explanation of the figures arranged along with the names of the elementary substances of matter, we shall require to allude briefly to the famous "Atomic Theory" of Dalton.

Amongst many chemists, an idea began gradually to obtain, that there was some fixed and definite law which regulated the combinations of the elements of matter, and especially Wenzel, Richter, and Higgins, had experimented and written upon the probability of the truth of this idea, with a certain degree of success and accuracy; but it was not till the publication of Dalton's "New System of Chemical Philosophy," in the years 1808 and 1810, that this theory was fully developed, and inductively demonstrated. The theory may be briefly stated thus:—In all cases of chemical composition, the particles, or atoms of matter, combine in certain definite and mutually related ratios, and follow, in their combinative equivalents, a certain numerical law, and this "law of definite proportions" shows that bodies combine in the equivalent qualities mentioned in the table, or

in any multiples of them, but in no other ratios, e.g., in looking at the table, we shall observe that the combinative equivalents of sulphur and oxygen are respectively 16 and 8. Now, these will combine in the definite proportions under-shown, namely,

16 sulphur + 8 oxygen, form hypo-sulphuric acid;

16 sulphur + 16 oxygen, form sulphurous acid;

16 sulphur + 24 oxygen, form sulphuric acid; and so with all other compounds.

It will be seen from this, that the proportions of bodies which are combined, all possess a peculiar relative uniformity, and that wherever one equivalent of an elementary substance is presented, there must be one, two, three, etc., equivalences of the other element brought into contact with it, according to the particular combination which it is desired should result; less will fail to produce the effect, more will only encumber the operation. This much it was necessary to explain, previous to attempting to unfold the law of affinity, which we will do after having introduced one other explanatory remark concerning the marks found in the table above-given.

The symbols, too, are of great practical utility, and though, to an unpracticed eye, they rather seem to add intricacy to the study, they will be found very greatly to increase facility of communication, and to give brevity to experimental directions, e.g., the table will inform you that the symbol of hydrogen is H, and that of oxygen O; but, oxygen and hydrogen combined, in the ratios of equivalency annexed, namely, 1 atom of hydrogen to 8 atoms of oxygen, constitute water, so that H+O, or simply HO, signifies water, which is merely an oxide of hydrogen. Again, S+O³ or SO³ means sulphuric acid, which, as we have seen in the paragraph immediately preceding, is composed of one equivalent of sulphur, combined with three of oxygen.

Chemical Affinity is the name given to that species of attractive power in matter by which dissimilar substances, without the sensible influence of any external agency, and by a mutually spontaneous power, combine, so as to form a new compound substance possessed of new properties. Berryman (1775) who earliest developed the theory of Affinity, reckons three kinds of it—1st, *Simple*, when two pure elements enter into combination—e.g., Oxygen and Hydrogen, which in union produce Water. 2nd, *Elective*, when one pure element, and another constituent part of any compound, unite together, and reject the other—e.g., Magnesia dissolved in Nitric Acid forms a perfect combination; but if Lime be subsequently added, the Nitric Acid will elect the Lime, and forsake the Magnesia, which will be found precipitated—i.e., thrown to the bottom as a sediment. 3rd, *Complex*, or *double-Selective Affinity*, when both the elements are united with other substances—e.g., if a narrow tube be filled with Cyanuret of Mercury, and a stream of Sul-

phurated Hydrogen gas be made to pass through the sulphur will combine with the mercury, and black sulphurate of mercury result; while the cyanogen will unite with the hydrogen, and produce hydrocyanic or prussic acid. Berthelot and Dalton have done much towards the perfecting of our knowledge of the theory of affinity. Chemists are now generally agreed that it depends in a great measure on the electrical states of the combining bodies. The laws of affinity were given in our first notice.

Chemical Decomposition is the resolving or disuniting of a compound substance into its constituent elements, and the exhibition of these, either pure or in some new combination. This process is essentially distinct from mechanical reduction—*e.g.*, If two marbles be pounded in a mortar, until reduced to a very fine powder, that powder will still retain its constituent character. If, however, they be put into diluted sulphuric acid, (oil of vitriol) the liquid will begin to effervesce, and the marbles will be reduced to a much finer and more impalpable powder than could possibly be produced by any kind of mechanical attrition. The former powder will consist of lime and carbonic acid, as at first—the latter will have had the carbonic acid expelled, and its place supplied with sulphuric acid, and now compose sulphate of lime (plaster of Paris). If we recollect aright, we detailed the operations of this power at some length in the first volume of this work, and we need not at present pursue the subject.

Nature presents to us all its substances or agencies in four states—*viz.*, solid, liquid, gaseous, and imponderable, hence a twofold division of chemical agents—*viz.*, I.—Imponderable agents, or such as possess no appreciable weight—as, Light, Caloric (Heat), Electricity, &c. II.—Ponderable agents, or such as are possessed of appreciable weight, and these may be subdivided into four classes—*viz.*, 1st, Supporters of Combustion, as Oxygen, &c.; 2nd, Combustibles, not metallic, as Hydrogen, &c.; 3rd, Metal-

loids, as Magnesium, &c.; 4th, Metals, as Gold, &c.

The word combustible, in chemical usage, is synonymous with oxygenable, and is applied to all simple (*i.e.*, homogeneous) substances, which can be made to combine with oxygen; for this union is always accompanied by the evolution of heat—though sometimes this may be imperceptible—and frequently of light. The substance so combined with oxygen, is called burnt, or oxygenated. The compound (*i.e.*, heterogeneous) substances which result from oxygenation, are called oxides or acids. When the oxygen will combine only in one proportion with any simple body, it is called an oxide, and the substance with which it unites is called its radicle—as oxide of zinc. When, however, oxygen combines in one, two, or three proportions, the resulting compounds are called respectively, protoxide, dutoxide, or tritoxide; and when a body is oxidized to the highest degree, it is named peroxide. A similar law holds in the nomenclature of acids, if the oxygen forms with the body but one acid—*i.e.*, is added to its radicle or base—as Boracic acid; but if it forms more than one compound, the lowest proportion is expressed by the affix *ous*, and the highest by *ic*; besides these affixes, the prefixes *hyper*, *more*, and *hypo*, less, are employed to denote, in the one case, a proportion of oxygen higher than that expressed by the affix, and in the other a less proportion than that which the affix denotes, respectively. In our next, we shall endeavour to conclude this notice.—S. N.

34. *Italian and French Grammars.*—Veneroni's Italian Grammar is one of indubitable excellence. As to Falck Lebahn's German Grammar, we can say nothing; but it appears to us that it attempts *too much* in a small compass to answer the ends of a student in a language so complex as the German. We should rather recommend O. R. L. to adopt "Ollendorff's Method" for both languages. The genuine work is published by Whittaker and Co.—S. M. F.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

We are happy to be able to award the following marks to the students whose initials are subjoined; and we hope that these will have the effect of making some others of our young readers prune their wings for an attempt at self-improvement and self-elevation, and of inciting them to try, as they have done, and go on in a course of study which will lead to such important results as those indicated in our last:—

H. T., 82 (1st and 2nd queries answered); R. K., 76 (5th query); F. J. D., 72 (1st and 2nd queries); J. H. 72 (5 queries); J. N. 70 (3rd query); O. L., 70 (1st query); R. G. is as formerly, concise, clear, and accurate in his replies. We intend to indulge in a little criticism and remark in our next. We have hitherto abstained from this, because we were not sufficiently acquainted with the style adopted by each writer; to some we shall forward a few private observations.

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. IV.

- 1st—Wherein does our liability to Error lie?—Why? with illustrations.
- 2nd—What is the distinction between the ordinary and the philosophic use of the word "Judgment?"—subjoin sentences in which this distinction is illustrated.
- 3rd—What are the two modes of operation of the faculty of Judgment?
- 4th—What is definition?—What are its uses?—and on what species of observation do they depend?
- 5th—Mention the different kinds of definition, and give illustrations?
- 6th—How many relations do words bear when used in the expression of thought?
- 7th—What are the rules to be attended to in Definition?

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XIII.

RATIOCINATION.

FORMAL LOGIC.

“Γίνεται δε τεχνη όταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων καθολοῦ μια γένηται περὶ ἐμοίων ὑπολήψις.”—Ἀξιστοτέλης.*

LITERARY history presents to the student no phenomenon more singular than that of the rise and progress of Formal or Scholastic Logic. Originating, as it did, amongst the most intellectual people of ancient times;—being embodied, as it was, in a scientific treatise by one of the most eminent philosophers of Greece—Aristotle, the *mind* of Plato's school; wielding, as it did, a sway over men's minds more lasting and permanent than the dynasty of the “Imperial Cæsars;” and interwoven, as it is, with the web of human thought and language,—one would think that, even as a literary curiosity, or, as Dr Reid styles it, “a venerable piece of antiquity, and a great effort of human genius,” marking “a remarkable period in the progress of human reason,” it should excite some interest, and merit some attention. But the uses and advantages of a true and genuine logic are so great, in so far as the direction and government of the human mind while employed in thinking are concerned, that these, of themselves, should be powerful enough to induce us anxiously to inquire whether the “*Organon*” of Aristotle is capable of supplying us with that all-important desideratum. To enable our readers to form a judgment on this point for themselves—to give a fair, candid, and impartial outline of this great work—to epitomise and explain the doctrines it contains, and thus to clear the way for a correct estimate of its teachings,—are the objects of the present paper. We have no desire to raise our voice in absurd laudations or extravagant and preposterous praises of the science—we have no intention of subscribing to the fantastic encomiums of the Schoolmen, who represented it as “the Divine art”—“the irrefragable canon”—“the eye of the intellect”—“the art of arts—the science of sciences—the organ of organs—the instrument of instruments—the servant—the key—the containing vessel—the bulwark of philosophy—the chief master in teaching and in speaking—the umpire and judge of the true and the false;” but we are anxious to place the labours of this great genius in their true light; and thus we hope we shall at once advantage his fame and aid the intellectual progression of our readers.

* “Art begins when from many experiences one general conception is originated, which will be replicable to all similar things.”

Nothing is so adverse to the ultimate and permanent success of any cause as over-zealousness on the part of its friends, or an injudicious advocacy of it; and in no one instance in the world's history has this remark been more evidently verified than in the fate of the science of which we seek to be the exponent. It was Aristotle's ill-fortune to be too highly idolized—to be too flatteringly heralded by the trumpet tongue of fame—to be elevated to too lofty a pinnacle of glory. In all this, it is true he was *passive*—he made no extravagant assumptions—he sought no aristocratic power; it was by other voices than his own that the acclaim was raised; it was to the interest of others, rather than his own “insatiable ambition,” that his exaltation was due; and yet the world must be revenged on him; men have now cast his statue from its pedestal, and visited the teachings of this “tyrant of their thoughts” with retributive neglect. Had he been judged as he desired—had the science he originated been looked at through any other media than the praises of bigoted admirers, who would see nothing less than a perfect “organon” of truth-investigation in it, or the depreciatory criticisms of virulent and jealous contemners of his supposed usurpations, how different would have been the judgments pronounced on his analysis of the thought-process. Listen to the affecting appeal which he makes to his contemporaries and posterity, and then judge if it can be said, with justice, of him, as has been said by Lord Bacon, that “as though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, he thought he could not reign securely unless all his brethren were slain.” “We have had,” he says, “no works of predecessors to assist us in this attempt to construct a science of reasoning; our own labours have done it all. If, therefore, the work appears to you not too inferior to the works on other sciences, which have been formed with the assistance of successive labourers in the same department, you will show some indulgence for the imperfections of our work, and some gratitude for the discoveries it contains.” Let us then set ourselves to inquire what were the “discoveries” which he made, for which he claims our “gratitude;” and let us in our judgment honestly adhere to the motto

“*Palmam qui meruit, ferat.*”*

The Greeks were a most remarkable people—intelligent and debate-loving. Among them, wisdom-worship attained its fullest development. Their intellect seems to have been peculiarly scientific, and to them can be traced the earliest attempts to accomplish the systematization of knowledge. To them at an early period the fact became apparent, that man is possessed of many endowments peculiarly his own—endowments which are unshared by the objectivities around him. The origin of their being—the purpose of their existence—the occult nature of their future fate—the Whence, Why, and Whither lay before them, dark, inexplicable enigmas. These they set themselves about anxiously to solve. But Mystery refused to lift her veil—the Sphinx was unwilling to “read her riddle”—the Oracle was dumb. Yet they did not succumb; they determined to persevere. One sage after another rose to explore the hidden ways of wisdom, that he might become master of her treasures. Every avenue was attempted—every apparent outlet was tried; and yet “shadows, clouds, and darkness” rested as before upon their

* “Let him who merits it, bear the palm.”

path. Nothing could they perceive "about, above, around," but the hideous and intolerable gloom of Ignorance. "All that is known is, nothing can be known," seemed to be the only answer their questioning could elicit, and the wail of Empedocles seems to be but an improvisatore version of the heart-feeling of the Greeks at that time.

"Swift-fated and conscious, how brief is life's pleasureless portion !
Like the wind-driven smoke, men are carried backwards and forwards,
Each trusting in nought save what his Experience vouches,
On all sides distracted ; yet wishing to find out the whole truth
In vain ; perceptible to man neither by eye nor by ear,
Nor to be grasped by his mind : And thou, when thus thou hast wandered,
Wilt find, that the knowledge of mortals no farther forth reaches."

Then began the several attempts to "cut the Gordian knot" which Philosophy was unable to unloose, which led to the popularity of the Sophists, and the prevalence of a general spirit of disputation. At this crisis in speculation—in this dilemma—in this time of eager inquiry, when each one was greedily thirsting to learn how and where the Truth on these matters could be found, and none were able to answer, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle successively appeared, and each after his own fashion strove to satisfy the craving appetite of their countrymen. With the speculations of the first two we cannot now concern ourselves : the opinions of the latter constitute our subject. How did he answer the query ? He said, Truth is the natural product of correct thought : if then we can ascertain the precise process in which the mind invariably performs the operation of thinking, and in all our cogitations follow that method, the problem will be solved. This, then, is the task he sets himself—let us see how he proceeds in the execution of it. Words are the signs of ideas, the formulæ in which we express our notions, judgments, and reasonings. Hence arises the necessity of Definition, of Categories, of Predicables. Words must be bounded, so that the limits of their signification may not be overstepped. Sensation gives the elements of thought, and is correct and trustworthy as sensation ; but thought is predication :—every individual idea which Sensation yields is true ; but when we predicate one idea of another, that predication may be false ;—Error then lurks in affirmation or negation. Each affirmation or negation, however, constitutes a proposition ; the *false* is therefore an incorrect predication, the true a correct one. Speech is of two kinds—predicative and non-predicative. Logic concerns itself with the former, Rhetoric employs the latter. Reasoning is just a series of predicative propositions, so put together, that from the truth or falsehood of the premised propositions the proof of the new inference inevitably results. In the adjustment and disposition of these propositions, therefore, lies another source of Error. There are therefore two sources of Error 1st, Our affirmation may be untrue—may be an incorrect expression of the fact ; 2nd, Our method of conjoining propositions may be incorrect, and thus our deductions will be spurious. With regard to the first, "every man is to be believed in his own art," for with it he is best acquainted ; respecting the second, a method of security may be devised if we can number the legitimate modes in which propositions may be arranged. To Demonstrate is to show the dependence of one truth upon an anterior one : these prior truths are Axioms, Definitions, Hypotheses, &c., as they are self-evident, limitative, pre-

supposed, &c., as the case may be. All human knowledge is made up of two parts—viz., the *τοῦ ὅτι*—knowledge *that* things are, and are in some manner; and the *τοῦ διότι*—knowledge *why* they are so. We can know *about* things, though we cannot know them *per se*—i.e., as they are *in themselves*. All Demonstration therefore is of two kinds—viz., *a posteriori*—from the *effect* observed, to the *cause* unknown; and *a priori*, from the *cause* observed or assumed, to the resultant *effect*. There are thus, it would appear, three parts, and only three parts, virtually present in every act of Demonstration or ratiocination—1st, the prior truth; 2nd, the experienced, imagined, or defined, thing; 3rd, the thing proven. This constitutes a syllogism. But all the qualities of substances are either necessarily or inseparably inherent in them—contingently conjoined to them—or so disjoined that certain properties can never by any possibility be connected with certain substances. In the first and third, experience is our informant; and when we understand our experience sufficiently well to make correct predications regarding what it tells us, no error can evolve itself; in the second, we are always liable to mistake as our reasonings can only result in probability. There is therefore a necessity for care and attention, so that we may not deceive ourselves in accepting *probable* reasoning where *certainty* is attainable; and it is a mistake to demand certainty where probability alone can be acquired by the mind.

Such is in general terms a roughly-sketched outline—a rude draft of the Reasoning of Aristotle, and the way in which he attempted the solution of the question—How and Where may Truth be found? We have been induced to give this running abstract, in order that our readers, seeing the tendency of our journey and the purpose which presides over its adoption, may follow us with eagerness and zeal—rough as the pathway, steep as the ascent may be. Now, however, we must proceed to a more minute examination of the several items which we shall meet upon our journey.

The Categories.—The mind, in the formation of notions or conceptions, is subject to laws, which are independent of and superior to the appearances which Sensation makes known to it, and to which these appearances must conform. To these general conceptions, or necessary mental laws, all particular and individual conceptions must be referred, and under these they must be ranged; for the mind has limitations and methods of action from which it cannot free itself. These general conceptions are denominated the Categories, and are the highest predicates, or *summa genera*, one or other of which is capable of being truthfully affirmed of every “object able to be named.” Some notion of the method in which they originate in the mind may be formed from the following observations:—All the impressions made on the human mind may be either a *substance* or an *attribute*: but attributes may be either essential or circumstantial. Essential attributes are those without which objects could not exist or become comprehensible. Circumstantial attributes are such as are incidental or casual, and are of minor importance as compared with those which are essential. The Categories may be thus defined;—I., Substance, that which is in itself—which can be thought of *per se*—i.e., by itself—that in which attributes inhere; II., Quantity—the how much, the how great, and the as much as—or Number, Magnitude, and Time. Of Magnitude there are three species—viz., line, surface, and solid; III., Quality—that which describes the kind or sort of

which a thing is; of this there are four species—1st, Habit, or that adventitious quality which is acquired by the influence of custom or frequent repetition—as, Virtue, Vice, &c.; 2nd, Natural Power, or that which inheres in the kind of being—as, Reason, Will, &c.; 3rd, Patible quality—that which can be superinduced in or on a subject—as, sounds, colours, &c.; 4th, Shape; IV., Relation, or the ordination or subordination which one idea bears to another,—the prior idea is called the relative, the latter the correlative—as, prince, subject; master, servant; parent, child; V., Action—the production of an effect—as, to anger; VI., Passion—the endurance of an action—as, to be angered; VII., The Where, the place in which a substance is, to which it is going, or from which it is coming—as, In Paris, To Rome, From Athens; VIII., The When, or *the point of time* as distinguished from the time mentioned in II., which is time *how long*, or duration. The *When* is denoted thus;—to-morrow, a month ago, on the 1st of May: the *how long* thus;—an hour, a day, a year, a century, &c.; IX., Position in Space. This does not refer to the *where*, as VII., but to the *how*—as sitting, standing, oblique; X., Habit or Dress—that which is put upon another,—Attire, as in the poet—

“Why look you there! see how it steals away!

My father, in his *Habit* as he lived!

Look, where he goes, even now out at the portal.”*

The II., III., IV., and V. are essential attributes—the VI., VII., VIII., IX., and X. are circumstantial.

From these Categories the sciences are evolved; for under these, every art or science, and every object of human thought is comprehended. Substance is the basis of History, whether Natural or Civil; Quantity, of Mathematics; Quality and Quantity conjoined, of Optics and Medicine; Relation, of Ethics; Action and Quantity, of Astronomy, Music, and Mechanics; Passion and Action, of Electricity; the Where, of Geography; the When, of Chronology; Position and Quality, of Sculpture; Habit and Position, of Painting; and other arts and sciences similarly. Now when any one thinks upon this attempt to classify, arrange, and systematize the objects of knowledge, imperfect and unsuited to the scientific wants of our own age, as it undoubtedly is, he cannot but be struck with the masterly character of that mind which could thus map out the several elements of knowledge. And though it has been compared to a classification “of animals into men, quadrupeds, horses, asses, and ponies;” yet it would be difficult to point to any attempt at classification which has been more successful, or is more complete, whether it be that of Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, or Brown. No one can be blind to the importance of such an arrangement and orderly disposition of the objectivities of thought: it marks an era in thinking; for when the mind begins to apprehend not only objects, but their relations and attributes, it is easy to see that the elements of a *μεθοδος*—a *transit-path* from the idea of one object to the knowledge of another, have been attained. Prior to this, the conceptions of men must have been somewhat chaotically mingled—“an undistinguishable throng;” but after this, distinction becomes possible, and methodical thinking has begun to acquire the indispensable condition of practicability. The strivings of the human

* “Hamlet,” Act iii., scene 3.

thought-powers seem about to become successful in subduing surrounding objectivities to its own laws and thus making Reasoning possible. Such an endeavour to learn the laws of the ideative powers is worthy of being signalized. It for the first time shows that all is not confused, transitory, fleeting, and immethodical; but that there are fixed mental laws which limit and reduce the apparent infinity of objects.

To the Categories succeed the theory of the Predicables; but as these have been already defined and explained,* we need not enlarge upon them here. Then follow a few remarks on distinctions of terms, such as Relative, Privative, Contrary, and Contradictory. A Relative term signifies one which, besides denoting its own object, connotes another idea, which is called its correlative—as master, which connotes servant—teacher, which connotes pupil. A Privative term is one which expresses an object considered as not employing one of its capacities—*i.e.*, being, as it were, for the time deprived of it—as a man not speaking, a horse motionless. Contrary terms denote different and opposite classes of the same series of objects—as *rich* and *poor*, *great* and *low*, &c. They cannot be predicated of the same object at the same point of time. Contradictory terms are such as are directly opposed to each other, and such that if any object be incapable of being included in the signification of the one, it must be included in that of the other—as, being and not being, living and not living. Other distinctions of terms will be found in a previous article.†

We may add a few sentences in explanation of two words employed in reference to terms which are to be found in all logical treatises, and which will frequently recur in the subsequent portions of these articles—Extension and Comprehension;—by the former is meant, the aggregate of all the individuals of which a term may be affirmed or denied; while by the latter is signified the aggregate of all the simple ideas which unitedly make up the complex idea which the term denotes. They are both significant of aggregates; but in the former the parts are *individuals*, and taken separately; and in the latter the parts are *ideas*, and taken collectively—*e.g.*, the term “dog” may be applied to every individual of the species of animal of which that word is the name-sign—as, mastiffs, greyhounds, beagles, terriers, foxhounds, &c.; and this is the *extension* of the term. Again: the same term may be considered as including in its signification the ideas of life, sensation, voluntary motion, four-footedness, &c., which constitute the properties of that kind of creature; and these united ideas are the *comprehension* of the term. Hence results the logical rule, *the greater the extension the less the comprehension of a term, and the greater the comprehension of a term, the less the extension of it*—*e.g.*, the term “animal” has a greater extension than the term “man,” because it can be predicated of man, bird, beast, &c.; but the term “man” has a greater comprehension; for it not only contains all the ideas included in the word “animal,” but also those of speech-power, risibility, moral perception, progressiveness, rationality, &c., which belong to that “paragon of animals”—man. So if we take the Series—Being, Material being, Animal, Mammal, Man, European, Englishman, Londoner, John Smith; John Smith, Clothier; John Smith, Clothier, Charing Cross;—we shall find that each is greater in extension and less in comprehension than its sequent.

* Article III., vol. i., p. 76.

† Article V., vol. i., p. 144.

Of Interpretation.—Much of what this book contains is now considered to belong more properly to Grammar than to Logic; these parts we will pass over, and speak of those which are pertinent to the subject of these articles. Language is articulate sound made significant by the common consent of those who use it. It is of two kinds, predicative and non-predicative. The former we use in Reasoning, and with it Logic concerns itself. The consideration of the latter belongs to Rhetoric and Poetry. Predicative speech consists of propositions. Definitions of the chief distinctions of propositions we have already given, in the article last referred to, and as they are essentially similar to those contained in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, this reference will save time, space, and repetition. These Propositions are now, however, to be considered in a new point of view—viz., that which in logical phrase is denominated “the Affections of Propositions.” These are of two kinds—1st, Absolute; 2nd, Relative. The Absolute Affections of Propositions are Quantity and Quality. The Relative ones are, Subalternation, Opposition, and Conversion.

Quantity.—Quantity is the determination of the extension of the subject of a proposition; it is either universality or particularity. Propositions with regard to quantity are therefore Universal or Particular. A Universal Proposition is one the subject of which is distributed—*e.g.*, taken in its entire extension. If it be a Universal name, the universality will require to be indicated by some sign—as, “all, every, none;” but if it be a Proper name, no such mark is required, because being applicable to one individual only, it must always be taken in its entire extension. A Particular Proposition is one whose subject is not distributed—*i.e.*, is not taken in its entire extension. The subject must be a universal name; and to show that it is taken particularly, it has usually a mark of particularity placed before it—as “some, many, a few,” &c.

Quality.—Quality is denotative of the kind of predication made in the proposition: it is either affirmative or negative; and with regard to their quality, propositions are so called. An Affirmative proposition is one in which the predicate contains the entire extension of the subject of the proposition. This will happen when the entire comprehension of the predicate is included in the entire comprehension of the subject. A Negative proposition is one in which the entire extension of the subject is excluded from the predicate. This will occur when there is one idea or more contained in the entire comprehension of the predicate than is contained in the entire comprehension of the subject.

The four properties of propositions thus deduced from Quantity and Quality are, for the sake of brevity and ease of remembrance, denoted by the four vowels, A, E, I, O,—which are employed respectively thus;—A, Universal Affirmative; E, Universal Negative; I, Particular Affirmative; O, Particular Negative; and the following monastic couplet has been constructed as a mnemonic aid:—

“Asserit A, negat E, sed universaliter ambæ,
Asserit I, negat O, sed particulariter ambo.”*

* A asserts, E denies, but both are universal;
I asserts, O denies, but both are particular.

The following table will show the different relations of Quantity and Quality in Propositions :—

<i>Kinds of Propositions.</i>	<i>Subjects.</i>	<i>Predicates.</i>	<i>Examples.</i>
A, Universal Affirmative.	Universal.	Particular.	Every oak is a tree.
E, Universal Negative.	Universal.	Universal.	No horned animal is carnivorous.
I, Particular Affirmative.	Particular.	Particular.	Some men are just.
O, Particular Negative.	Particular.	Universal.	Some flowers are not fragrant.

If this table be attentively considered, the correctness of the following rules regarding Quantity and Quality will become evident :—

1st, All *universal*, but no *particular*, propositions distribute—*i.e.*, take in its entire extension, the subject.

2nd, All negative, but no affirmative, propositions distribute the subject.

3rd, Anything whatever affirmed or denied respecting any term distributed, may with equal truth be affirmed or denied of anything contained in the entire extension of that term ; for, as in the extension of a term *every* individual is included of which that term may be predicated, that which may be predicated of *all* must necessarily be capable of being predicated of each—*e.g.*, Let it be affirmed that “ animals have the power of voluntary motion ; ” that affirmation must be equally true of Lion, Man, John Smith, or Pompey (a dog).

Subalternation.—Subalternation is the deduction of a particular proposition from a universal one, without the transposition of its terms—*e.g.*, All human laws are imperfect ; *ergo*, Some human laws are imperfect. The universal proposition is technically called the *subalternans* ; the particular one deduced, the *subalternate*. There are two rules of subalternation, which require particular attention—*viz.*,

1st, The truth of the universal implies the truth of the particular, and the falsehood of the particular the falsehood of the universal.

2nd, The truth of the particular does not imply the truth of the universal, nor the falsehood of the particular the falsehood of the universal.


Opposition.—Opposition is the disagreement, either in Quantity or Quality, or in Quality alone, of propositions having the same subjects and predicates. It is of three kinds—Contradiction, Contrariety, and Sub-contrariety.

Contradiction is opposition both in quantity and quality in propositions whose subjects and predicates are the same—between universal affirmatives and particular negatives, and universal negatives and particular affirmatives—*e.g.*, A, Every oak is a tree—O, Some oaks are not trees ; E, No horned animal is carnivorous—I, Some horned animals are carnivorous. Two contradictory propositions can never be both true or both false. One is always true, and the other false ; it follows as a consequence, therefore, that if the one be true, the other is false, and if the one be false the other is true.

Contrariety is opposition in quality alone—between universal affirmatives and universal negatives, having the same subjects and predicates—*e.g.*, A, All Planets revolve round the sun—E, No planets revolve round the sun. Contrary propositions may both of them be false, but cannot both be true. From the *truth* of the one, the *falsity* of the other may be inferred ; but the *falsity* of the one is *no datum* for the *truth* of the other.

Sub-contrariety is opposition in quality alone—between particular affirmatives and particular negatives, having the same subjects and predicates—*e.g.*, I, Some men are just —O, Some men are not just. In sub-contrary propositions both may be true, but both cannot be false. From this it is evident that from the *falsity* of one, the *truth* of the other is deducible; but from the *truth* of the one, the *falsity* of the other cannot be inferred. The correctness of the one does not imply the incorrectness of the other. In opposite propositions, the following rule holds good—*viz.*, *In necessary matters—i.e.*, what cannot be otherwise—all affirmations are true, and all negatives false;—*in impossible matter—i.e.*, what cannot be—all negatives are true, and all affirmatives are false;—*in contingent matter—i.e.*, what may or may not be—all universals are false, and all particulars true.

An attentive study of the following scheme, which we have copied from “Whateley’s Logic,” will readily illustrate the truth of what is asserted in the above paragraph on “Opposition” :—



The letters *n*, *i*, *c*, signify respectively, necessary, impossible, and contingent matter; and *v*, *f*—*verum*, true—and *falsum*, false.

Conversion.—Conversion is the inference of one proposition from another, by the transposition of the subject into the place of the predicate, and of the predicate into the place of the subject, in such a manner as to preserve the truth of the proposition. The transposed proposition is called the *convertend* or *exposita*, the inferred one is denominated the *converse*. No Conversion is permitted *except the truth of the converse is implied in the truth of the convertend*. Then it is called *Illative Conversion*.

Illative Conversion is of three kinds—Simple, Accidental, and Contrapositional.

Simple conversion takes place when the quantity and quality of the *convertend* are preserved in the *converse*, so that if the one is universal or particular, affirmative or negative, the other is so likewise. All universal negatives or particular affirmatives admit of conversion, and yet preserve the truth—*e.g.*, E, No horned animal is carnivorous

No carnivorous animal is horned. I, Some statesmen are not Protestants; Some not Protestants are statesmen.

Accidental conversion, otherwise called conversion *per accidens*, or by limitation, occurs when after the transposition of the terms the quality of the *convertend* is preserved while the quantity is limited or lessened in the converse. In such conversion, the affirmation or negation remains unchanged, but a universal *convertend* is *converted* into a particular *converse*. Universal affirmatives and negatives allow of accidental conversion—the latter sort by the use of subalternation. The converse always becomes particular—*e.g.*, A, Every oak is a tree, is changed into I, Some trees are oaks; and E, No horned animal is carnivorous, by subalternation becomes, No carnivorous animal is horned, whence O, some carnivorous animals are not horned.

Contrapositional conversion, or conversion by negation.—This takes place when the terms are transposed, and the *contradictory of the predicate* is put for the *subject*, and the *quality* of the proposition is changed. Particular negatives and universal affirmatives admit of such conversion. In particular negatives the quality is changed by transposing the negation-sign from the copula to the predicate, and then employing simple conversion—*e.g.*, O, Some stars are not planets, becomes I, Some things not planets are stars. In universal affirmatives the terms are transposed, the negation-sign is attached to the new subject, and thus forms its contradictory—a universal negative; the converse will then be exactly equipollent to the convertend—*e.g.*, A, All men are fallible, becomes, E, All infallible beings are not men, which bears an exact equipollency to E, None but fallible beings are men. This Mnemonicism has been constructed as an aid to the mind in recollecting the laws of conversion.

Simpliciter E, I convertitur; E, A, per accid; A, O, per contra; sic fit conversio tota.*

Philosophy.

IS MESMERISM TRUE?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

IN the consideration of this question, it is necessary that we should forsake the airy regions of fancy and speculation, and carefully investigate the facts and phenomena on which the science of Mesmerism is based. It is very desirable that facts should form the staple article of this discussion; and that those who engage in it should, as much as possible, confine themselves to the results of their own observation and experience.

The term Mesmerism includes every variety of mesmeric phenomena, from simple

Rigidity to Clairvoyance and Electro-biology. It is, however, clearly impossible, within our limits, to discuss the merits of every branch of this subject; nor, in fact, is it necessary we should. As I understand the question, we have to discuss the validity of the primary facts and principles upon which Mesmerism is professedly based, and not to pick out a branch of it here and there, according to our estimation of its weakness, in order to render an apparent victory easy and secure.

* E, I, are converted simply; E, A, per accidens; A, O, by contraposition; in these ways all conversion is done.

Without pretending to a scientific exactness, the following description of the fundamental principle of Mesmerism may be accepted as sufficiently full for the present purpose. Stated in its simplest form it is this:—That any man, subject to certain conditions, can exert a certain specific influence upon other men, also subject to the same conditions. The conditions refer principally to temperament, and the results of the specific influence are various, according to the circumstances under which it is exerted. Now if this exposition of the principle be accepted as correct, the question, I conceive, will be answered, if it can be shown that the principle is, or is not, founded in truth, and supported by credibly attested facts. It will be evident at a glance upon what kind of evidence the question must be decided. It is not enough, for instance,—but it is both unphilosophical and absurd—to argue that the principle involved is false, because it is beyond, or opposed to, our present knowledge. Every discovery is necessarily beyond the “present knowledge” of the age in which it is made, and more frequently than otherwise, involves conclusions opposed to such knowledge. In support of this view, I need only refer to the cases of Astronomy and Steam, and numberless other instances will immediately recur to the mind. In fact, the history of nearly every physical science we have is full of such cases.

But while contending that personal experience is the most sure basis on which to rest a decision in this case, I may remark, that even in this respect we have the weather-gauge of our opponents. They cannot prove a negative. If their own experiments have failed, they cannot in fairness adduce therefrom the conclusion that no one else has succeeded, or can succeed; or even, that they may not yet succeed, by observing the conditions necessary to success. As the case rests, however, the only course left them is to burnish up their critical powers for an examination of the evidence laid before them. It necessarily happens in the present case, that the evidence depends for its weight, not so much upon the number and variety of the facts adduced, as upon the amount of concurrent testimony to one or two leading and essential ones.

My own testimony to the truth of Mesmerism is this:—I have witnessed many, and assisted at some, privately conducted mesmeric experiments. In all the cases, the *subjects* were intimate friends, and great care was always taken to ensure *bona-fide* results. The principal results were briefly these:—The subjects were thrown into a state of unconsciousness, outwardly resembling, but essentially different from ordinary sleep. While in this state their bodies were rendered perfectly rigid. Distinct organs of the mind were put in action, independently of the rest; and they were made to perform various actions, involving great muscular exertion, at the will of the operator, of which, as of the previous results, they were altogether unconscious when restored to their normal state.

The number of these results might be multiplied; but the above are sufficient, I think, to prove that the principle in question rests upon a foundation of facts, and, consequently, upon truth. Of course, all this may be treated as simple assertion; but the candid reader, in estimating its value, will weigh well the probability of any one volunteering false or distorted statements for no conceivable advantage to himself or any one else. I should be glad to see any subsequent writers adopt the hints here thrown out, and corroborate the testimony now given, by the results of their own observation and experience.

In concluding, I wish to make a remark or two upon the paper signed C. A., in your March No. There does not appear to be much difference of opinion between us upon what I conceive to be the main point at issue;—for C. A., though undertaking to assert and defend the negative of the question, yet professes his belief that Mesmerism is based upon facts, though they may not yet be recognised by medical science.

But C. A. says it is with the higher development of Mesmerism—with Clairvoyance—that he especially finds fault. C. A. should have known that Clairvoyance is not the subject of discussion. It is part of it, no doubt; but he is not therefore justified in substituting a part for the whole, and condemning the whole because the part selected is conceived to be deficient in evidence. I should be unwilling to char-

C. A. with having singled out this particular branch of the subject, because he thought it a weak point, because that would imply a partiality and want of candour not consistent with a sincere inquiry after Truth; but if he has done it for any conceivable reason apart from that, I say, that for the *same reason*, and with the *same propriety*, he might undertake to write a treatise on the Solar System, and confine his remarks to a description of the Planet Neptune.

I make these remarks, not because I really think Clairvoyance is deficient in evidence, and shrink from its discussion, but because I think its discussion is unnecessary to the settlement of the question, and because I deprecate the raising of extraneous questions, in the dust of idle controversy,—excited by which, we are apt to lose sight of the main point of inquiry, and thereby miss the truth.

A. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

MESMERISM, a few years ago, excited a great deal of interest in England. Its advocates told us that by its influence diseases would be cured, pain alleviated, and unknown events ascertained. But the interest has, in a great measure, subsided, and we now hear little about it;—we may, perhaps, stumble upon some “striking occurrence” (striking, more for its want of accuracy than for its marvellousness) in the corner of a newspaper; it may afford a topic for discussion at some debating society, or the subject of a drawing-room conversation; but it is treated as one of the tricks and quackeries of the past, and is regarded, like other nostrums, as having had its day. Mesmerism is effete, and appears to be dying of *decline*.

The inquiry may be made, where did Mesmerism take its rise? Mesmer, a German, from whom the art derived its name, obtained his knowledge of it from a Jesuit, named Jacob *Hell*—rather a significant designation. From whence Hell had his information is not certain. But there is strong evidence to prove that Mesmerism had its origin, in the days of antiquity, in Egypt—that land of sorcery and dark deeds. Miss Martineau surmises that it was of Egyptian birth; and this is confirmed by this singular fact, that in one of the rooms of the British Museum, there is an ancient picture in *relief*, representing a venerable old man reclining, and a female making the famous “passes” of the mesmeriser. Its revival, in modern times, took place in Germany, that fruitful land of wild theories, cloudy mysteries, and metaphysical *isms*.

A German writer divides the mesmeric influence into six kinds, which, for our purpose, we will arrange under two heads;—1st, the simple magnetic sleep; 2nd, clairvoyance and its similarities.

Now we admit that the mesmeric sleep is genuine, but a peculiar *physical* state of the body is necessary before it can be induced. Only those who have weak nerves can be operated upon by those who have strong nerves. More than this, it is said to depend upon the *mental* condition of the patient. He must have faith in the mesmeriser, and surrender his will to him. If this be so, we may ask, has any man the moral right to entirely surrender his will to any one save God? Again, the sleep is not *natural*. It is not “tired nature’s sweet restorer.” It is not *refreshing*. On the contrary, we have seen a person faint on being awaked from the magnetic nap, and taken into the open air to recover! It is stated by a writer on the subject, that if the patient be suddenly roused there is great danger of insanity resulting.

As to clairvoyance, from what has already been advanced, it may be inferred that we deem its claims to reality as very doubtful. There is not the least question that a vast deal of roguery and cheating have been perpetrated under pretence of this asserted marvellous power. If a man when under the influence of the mesmeric sleep can give information concerning events, circumstances, or occurrences of which he had no previous knowledge, if he can read books through a board or wall, divine diseases, and describe places he has never visited, he

ought to be able to tell by what agency this knowledge is imparted to him.

Some attempt to account for this professedly singular phenomenon, by stating that the mind of the mesmeriser is conveyed by means of an electric influence and mirrored on the mind of the mesmerised—that there is a sympathetic movement of the mind of the one to the other—that for the time being the two minds are equal—and that the mesmeriser has only to *will* a thing, and the patient performs it. Electricity or animal magnetism is said to be the cause. But this is an unsupported hypothesis. What proof have we that electricity is the link which connects minds? It is contrary to nature and experience; for *how can an active intelligent mind be conveyed by an inanimate agent to an unconscious person?* Nature here affords us no analogy. The pretended similarity of the electric telegraph does not touch the question. An electric shock is communicated to the wires of the telegraph, and it moves certain needles on a dial-plate at some distant station, and these movements are made arbitrarily to represent letters and words. No *mind*, nor thoughts actually travel along the wires; but the movements of the needle are like so many hieroglyphics, which represent words to the initiated. Again, how singular it is that the knowledge gained by the mesmerised during sleep should vanish into “thin air,” directly he opens his eyes—and thus the “baseless fabric of the vision dissolves and leaves not a rack behind.”

Again we press the question, supposing the cases of clairvoyance related are genuine, by what power are they produced? We expect that the supposition about to be hazarded will be assailed by a storm of ridicule. But as a sandbank we will preface it with an observation or two. There are two characteristic errors in society at the present day—scepticism, on the one hand, and superstition, on the other. And by the way we may remark, and it is not inapplicable to the matter in hand, that those who are sceptical respecting facts which have a pile of evidence to support them, are often found believing cheats and impostures. Now we think that there exists a wide-spread disbelief, even among religious

people, of the direct agency of Satan,—a fact which is plainly declared in the book of Job. We read in the first chapter, that Satan obtained permission and exercised an interference in the temporal affairs of the patriarch. Lord Byron, sceptic as he was, admired the sublimity of the description of this truth. Satanic agency is portrayed in dark and indelible colours in the New Testament, was wonderfully manifested during Christ's sojourn on earth, and we are told by an apostle, that Satan yet “goeth about seeking whom he may devour.”

Now such being the case, we would ask is there not much reason on our side for thinking that spirit is more likely to act on spirit, than that matter should convey mind? It is a favorite argument of mesmerisers that clairvoyance proves the existence of spirit to be independent of matter. When the spirit is free from all control, is there not opportunity for Satan to exercise his evil influence?

And thus we believe Satan has used it. Miss Martineau, has insinuated that our Lord's miracle was nothing more than a mesmeric delusion. She states that her servant girl was mesmerised, and the operator *willed* that some water which he gave her when asleep should taste like porter. The girl drank the *water*, and on being asked what she had drank, said “Porter,” and afterwards he willed the water should be wine,—and the girl said it was “wine.” She states that in this way the senses can be deceived by means of the power which the will of the mesmeriser has over the mesmerised. And mesmerisers have asserted that by means of clairvoyance and mesmerism, all the miracles of the Bible can be explained. Must we not judge of the tree by its fruits?

That clairvoyance is not contrary to experience, and that it is produced by *natural* causes we have no evidence to prove. But *if it be true*, it must be the result of some *supernatural* power, and this power must be good or evil. We conclude that it cannot be good because all prying into futurity is forbidden. Soothsayers, sorcerers, and witches—i.e., those who have attempted to unravel the future, are anathematised in the Scriptures. Bearing in mind, then, the Egyptian origin of clairvoyance, its close

connection with sorcery and prognostication, remembering that it *professedly* gives information concerning the future, that men have resorted to it as they would to fortune-telling or witchery, and that by its means

discredit has been thrown on the word of God, we pronounce it false in its professions, or evil in its origin.

Newport, I. W.

W. M.

History.

WAS OLIVER CROMWELL A FIRST-RATE GENERAL, A GREAT STATESMAN, AND A SINCERE MAN?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE—II.

"I know God has been above all ill reports, and will in His own time vindicate me."—*Oliver Cromwell, Letter to Colonel Norton, March 28, 1648.*

"To you our country owes its liberties, nor can you sustain a character at once more momentous and more august than that of the author, the guardian, and the preserver of our liberties, and hence you have not only eclipsed the achievements of all our kings, but even those which have been fabled of our heroes. But if you who have hitherto been the patron and tutelary genius of liberty, if you who are exceeded by no one in justice, in piety, and in goodness, should hereafter invade that liberty which you have defended, your conduct must be fatally operative, not only against the cause of liberty, but the general interests of piety and virtue."—*Milton's Defensio Secunda.*

GENERALSHIP.—To narrate the battles and skirmishes in which Cromwell evinced his skill as a General, would be to give the whole of his military career, not only in England, but also in Scotland, and Ireland, and such a course would fatigue the reader, and occupy too much space. When we consider, however, the forethought, sagacity, promptitude, and indomitable perseverance, which were conspicuous in his conduct through life, the remarkable manner in which he disciplined his troops, and the resoluteness and unflinching daring which always distinguished them in the field, we cannot marvel at his success, though this did not arise from his military qualifications alone; he always depended on God for support, assistance, and guidance, in his encounters; and in his letters, when describing the defeat of his opponents he says, "Give the glory, all the glory to God."

Having another, and more important subject to notice, I shall be brief in quota-

tions, but I beg to assure the reader that this is not an apology for want of evidence, for should necessity require, I shall bring it forward on a future occasion.

First,—touching Cromwell's military training of his soldiers. After several encounters with the enemy, in which the Parliamentarians were defeated, Cromwell at once discovered, with his characteristic clearness of thought, that a great and important requisite was wanting in the popular troops, and thus addressed himself to Hampden, who had rendered signal service to the popular cause both in the senate and in the field, he says, "How can we be otherwise than beaten? Your troops are most of them old, decayed men, and tapsters, and such kind of fellows, and theirs (referring to the Royalists,) are gentlemen's sons, younger sons, and persons of quality. But I will remedy that; I will raise men who have the fear of God before their eyes, and who will bring some conscience to what they do, and I promise you they shall not be beaten." Cromwell took the necessary steps, and the result was seen in the following campaigns, in which his men were never beaten, but on the contrary, struck terror to the heart of the enemy, who could not refrain from expressions of admiration at the courage, intrepidity, and valour of their opponents. Such was the conduct of Cromwell's troops in the battle of Marston Moor, that they received the strange though expressive appellation of "Ironsides," and which they always retained through succeeding ages. I would refer the reader to Carlyle's *Letters and*

Speeches of Cromwell, for accounts of his military skill, there being abundant evidence in those books alone, to justify his claim as a General.

Cromwell distinguished himself in the battles of Edge Hill, Marston Moor, Naseby, Worcester, Dunbar in Scotland, and more effectually in Ireland. "Cromwell's actions" says Chateaubriand, "had all the rapidity and the effect of lightning," and Milton observes, "From his thorough exercise in the art of self knowledge, he had either exterminated or subjugated all his domestic foes, his idle hopes, his fears, and his desires. Having thus learnt to engage, and subdue, and triumph over himself, he took the field against his outward enemies, a soldier practised in all the discipline of war." Such important and triumphant services had he rendered to the popular party, that the king was heard to say, referring to the damage received from Cromwell and his troops, "I would that some one would do me the good fortune to bring Cromwell to me alive or dead!" And in 1645, when the self-denying ordinance was passed, which excluded all members of Parliament from holding commands in the army, (Cromwell having a seat in the House of Commons would thus be incapacitated from holding his command,) General Fairfax declared that he could not possibly dispense with the military services of Cromwell. And Neale leaves his testimony to Cromwell's services in the following astonishing words: "He was a soldier who had gained more laurels, and done more wonders in nine months than any age or history could parallel."

In conclusion, on this head, I may mention that Mr. Vincent, in a lecture on this subject, stated that he had, in company with a Polish officer, trodden the ground occupied by Cromwell's troops in the famous battle of Dunbar. Cromwell's army was enclosed on a small slip of ground which jutted out into the sea, and the army of the enemy, commanded by General Leslie, an old and experienced officer, occupied the hills; consequently the army of Cromwell, having such a bad position, could only escape by retreating to their ships in the fire of the enemy, or by dashing through their lines. Cromwell ever on the alert, endeavoured to entice the enemy to change their position;

he ordered part of his force to retreat; the bait was eagerly taken; Leslie ordered immediate pursuit. Cromwell having obtained his object, gave battle, and although the forces were very disproportionate, (Cromwell's army having fallen rapidly a prey to the weather and sickness,) totally routed the enemy, gave chase eight miles, and took ten thousand prisoners. This decisive battle laid Scotland at once in the hands of the victor. The Polish officer before mentioned, assured Mr. Vincent that nothing short of a miracle could save an army occupying the position which Cromwell's did. But Cromwell, by his military talents, and supported by a confidence in God, obtained a glorious and crowning victory.

STATESMANSHIP.—In approaching this subject, it is gratifying to those who are conversant with the history of these perilous times to know, that there existed in the seventeenth century, a man whom an ordinary observer would have supposed was not endowed with any of those prominent traits of character which were destined to shine forth so luminously in after life, and to astonish yet terrify those who not even versed in the art of *self* government, had undertaken the responsible task of the government of an empire, and who legislated for kings, and not for kingdoms, forgetful, or heedless of the maxim, that "kings are made for kingdoms, and not kingdoms for kings."

Cromwell was sent forth to rule three nations wasted by war, and distracted by dissension and commotion. Other difficulties and obstacles dangerous to the safety of a nation, had to be encountered. Spain, that great friend and ally of Italy, had long looked on England with jealousy and hatred, enhanced by the annihilation of the Spanish Armada, and was endeavouring not only to foment the divisions already so disastrous, but also to equip the enemy for a renewed assault. Despite these drawbacks on the restoration of peace, Cromwell, zealous for the glory of England, and heart-broken at her distressed condition, assumed the reins of power; and cherishing the hope that God would be with him, he proceeded without delay

First—To take effectual means for en-

abling England to withstand foreign enemies.

Secondly—To quell the strife and contention of the various parties concerned, and to obtain a reconciliation for and with all classes.

Thirdly—To erect a form of Government which would be best calculated to merit the approbation of the people; to alter and amend it as defects appeared and experience suggested, and at the same time to be the best protection from foes abroad.

Fourthly—After having effected that which was most urgently required, he instituted immediately a rigorous and well-conducted enquiry into the *law* and its *administration*, dismissed those Judges who had held office in Charles's reign, repealed unjust statutes which infringed the liberty of the subject in matters appertaining to religion and otherwise, and abolished that most odious and detestable engine of tyranny and bloodshed, the High Commission court, and also its powerful auxiliary, the Star Chamber. The Chancery, as it entailed great expense on those who carried their cases to that court, shared the same fate, and was abolished. He also repealed several acts which levied unjust taxes, and by which the late king had derived a considerable revenue, as, the sale of the offices attached to the Crown, and also a practice commenced by Charles, of making Barons for money, the expenses attendant upon which being so enormous that many refused to accede to the demand, when in the language of a court historian, "they were excused by way of a heavy fine." Such are a few of the abuses which Cromwell expunged from the statute book when they were to be found there, for in many cases the judges contended that such and such things were law although they were not to be found in the records of Parliament.

Some of the Protector's speeches to his Parliaments, show that something more was to be done than reforming the law, and he assures them, that should they at once proceed to the discussion of those matters which were required to be discharged, without delay, they would always find in him a zealous and faithful friend.

Respecting law and its abuses, he thus addresses his first Protectorate Parliament: "The Government hath had some things

in desire, and it hath done some things actually. It hath desired to reform the laws. I say to reform them, and for that end hath called together persons, without offence be it spoken, of as great ability, and as great as are in these nations, to consider how the laws might be made plain, and short, and less chargeable to the people, how to lessen expense for the good of the nation. And these things are in preparation, and bills prepared, which in due time will be tendered unto you. In the meanwhile, there hath been care taken to put the administration of the laws into the hands of just men, (Matthew Hale, for instance,) men of the most known integrity and ability. The Chancery hath been reformed, hath been reformed to the satisfaction of all good men." Further reform is requisite, and he says to his second Parliament, which sat in 1655. "There is one general grievance in the nation: it is the law. Not that the laws are a grievance, but there are laws that are, the great grievance lies in the execution and administration. I think I may say it, I have as eminent Judges in this land as have been had for these many years. Truly I could be particular as to the executive part of it, as to the administration of the laws, but that would trouble you. The truth of it is there are wicked and abominable laws, which it will be in your power to alter. To hang a man for six and eight-pence, and I know not what, to hang for a trifle, and acquit murder,—is in the administration of the law through the ill framing of it, and to see men lose their lives for *petty* matters, this is a thing God will reckon for. And I wish it may not lie on this nation a day longer than you have an opportunity to give a remedy, and I hope I shall cheerfully join you in it." Respecting finance and the appropriation of the public money, he addresses the same Parliament thus: "To add to our misery, whilst we were in this condition we were in a foreign war. Deeply engaged in war with the Dutch, whereby our trade ceased, the evil consequences by that war were manifest and very considerable. And not only this we had a war with Holland, consuming our treasure, occasioning a vast burden upon the people; a war that cost this nation as much as the whole taxes

came unto, the navy being one hundred and sixty ships, which cost this nation above £100,000 a month, besides the contingencies which would make it £120,000. Other nations took advantage of our war to improve their own and spoil our manufacture of cloth, which is the great staple commodity of this nation. Such was our condition, spoiled in our trade, and we at this vast expense, thus dissettled at home and having these engagements abroad." Again, "as I said before, when this government was undertaken, we were in the midst of those domestic divisions and animosities, engaged also with foreign enemies. That is the reason the taxes do lie so heavy upon the people, of which we have *abated* £30,000 for the next three months, £60,000 after. When the Long Parliament sat, this nation owed £400,000. We know it hath been maliciously dispersed, as if we had set the nation into £2,000,000 debt, but I tell you you are not so much in debt by some thousands, by some hundreds of thousands. This is true that I tell you. We have honestly—it may be not so wisely as some others would have done, but with honest and plain hearts laboured and endeavoured the disposal of treasure to public uses, and laboured to pull off the common charge £60,000 a month, as you see. And if we had continued the charge that was left upon the nation, perhaps we could have had so much money in hand as now we are in debt." Cromwell shows clearly, that had he held the reins of power earlier, he would have commenced economizing the use of the public money. It is remarkable that in all his speeches he enjoins his parliaments to keep peace with all nations. His abhorrence of war was great; he looked upon it as

"Most unjust, most odious in our eyes,
Inhuman discord is thy dire delight,
The waste of slaughter and the rage of fight.
No bound, no law thy fiery temper quells!"
—Pope.

I must quote an extract relative to one of Cromwell's acts which was not much relished, and historians have not been wanting to represent in exaggerated terms that hostility, though, as will be seen from the speech, much good resulted from it.—I refer to the establishment of Major Generals. Cromwell thus vindicates himself.

He says, "Truly when that insurrection was, and we saw it in all the roots and grounds, we did find out a little poor invention which I hear has been much regretted. We created your Major Generals to have a little inspection on the people, thus divided, thus discontented, thus dissatisfied. * * * I say it again, our endeavours by those who have been appointed, by those that have been Major Generals, I can repeat it with comfort, they have been effectual for the preservation of your peace. It hath been more effectual towards the discountenancing of vice and settling religion, than anything done these fifty years. I will abide by it notwithstanding the envy and slander of foolish men. You had not peace two months together, and how instrumental they have been to your peace and preservation by such means, which we say was—necessity." It will be seen however that unlike most rulers, Cromwell abolished the system, as being obnoxious to the nation, and the satisfactory state of the country not requiring their aid any longer. After having commented on various topics, he concludes his speech by asking a question, which he suggests as a remedy. It is both logical and forcible. He says, "However, if they (the enemy) seek the eradication of the nation, if they be active as you have seen, and as it hath been made manifest so as not to be denied, to the carrying out of their designs, if England must be eradicated, complicated with the Spaniard, if this must be brought upon us through distempers and falseness of men among ourselves, then the question is no more than this,—Whether any consideration whatsoever, shall lead us for fear of eradicating distempers, to suffer all the honest interests of this nation to be eradicated?"

Having given Cromwell's sentiments, I cannot but give the remarks of some well known writers relative to his Government.

Southey says, "Lord of these three kingdoms, and indisputably the most powerful potentate in Europe, and as certainly the greatest man of an age in which the race of good men was not yet extinct in any country, no man was so much worthy of the station which he filled." Walter Savage Landor says, "The shadow of Cromwell's name overawed the most confident

and haughty." Doctor Hetherington, the Scottish historian, writes, "throughout the whole of Scotland, during the period of Cromwell's domination, there prevailed a degree of civil peace, beyond what had almost ever been before experienced." Bishop Burnet informs us, "The country was kept in great order during Cromwell's government, good justice was done, and vice suppressed and punished, so that it was always reckoned a time of great peace and prosperity."

In looking over the page of history since his day, and upon those who have held the supreme power, I discover an absence of that knowledge of government which Cromwell possessed, and which, despite the plots and rebellious opposition of its adversaries, raised England to a high position in the history of the world. His home policy was distinguished by many excellent traits—the laws were revised and improved as experience suggested—judges noted for their eminent piety and wisdom were selected—the taxes were made as easy as possible—the revenue was appropriated in an economic manner—art, science, and literature were encouraged—and peace, concord, and those principles of Christianity, which alone will exalt a nation, were cherished by the Protector. But his home policy was but a shadow of his glory abroad. His influence and renown on the continent was such, that it was difficult to discover which dreaded him most, France, Spain, or the Low Countries. He humiliated Spain;—the Roman Pontiff, before whom the greatest emperors bowed in subjection, trembled when the sound of Oliver's mandates reached his ears;—his imperial injunctions arrested the sails of the pirates who infested the sea;—Turkey acknowledged his supremacy;—in a word, all the countries of Europe with which he had any connexion admitted his sovereign power by acceding to his demands. No power, however great, durst refuse obedience to his will, and withhold respect for his high station. Cromwell's fame was so universal, his power and influence of such an extent, his uncompromising defence of religious toleration, always ready to defend the weak and oppressed (witness his protection and demand for justice to the Swiss, Portuguese, and Piedmontese), and his go-

vernment so wise and effectual in promoting all things necessary for the elevation of England to prosperity, that in the distant plains of Asia, the descendants of Abraham, in agitation, inquired of one another whether this was not the Servant of the Lord whom they were looking for, and the branch promised to David. Such was the reputation which Cromwell obtained abroad by the lofty tone of his government, and the rigour of his arm, that an Asiatic Jew is said to have come to England for the purpose of investigating his pedigree, thinking to discover in him the Lion of the tribe of Judah. Cromwell legislated not only for England, but also for the world; and had he not held the reins of government, Liberty, both in England and on the continent, would have fallen; but while he lived, the persecuted and oppressed depended on him alone for protection, redress, and justice; and when their plaintive cry came to him, he steadfastly refused to complete negotiations until speedy and sufficient satisfaction was made for injury done. The Protestants whom he protected have ever since looked to England for the same defender as they found in the Protector. But her kings and queens have not proved themselves worthy of him. A Swiss divine, grateful for the protection which his forefathers received from Cromwell, has nobly entered the lists, and asserted the injustice done to his memory, by writing a book, entitled "The Protector: A Vindication." He is not alone; other eminent individuals, Continental and otherwise, have raised their humble tribute to his memory. But England, after a lapse of two hundred years, has done nothing in honour of one who wielded the sceptre with such prudence, wisdom, forethought, and statesman-like sagacity.

In conclusion—I have endeavoured to set before my readers, as far as space would permit, a small and imperfect tribute to Cromwell's character, as one having every right to be called "a first-rate general, a great statesman, and a sincere man." Perhaps my readers may be inclined to think that I have been loud in his praise, but blind to his faults. My admiration for him is increased by the character of the men and times which distinguished the seventeenth century. My respect for his memory

is the more increased because tyranny ruled in his day. But Cromwell dethroned it in England, and placed liberty in its stead. His faults are hidden by his good works: and singular to say, he seems to have had a presentiment that his name would be slandered, and his deeds and intents misinterpreted, as will be seen from the extract placed at the commencement of this paper. But other ages have to reap what he has sown; and if we, in the nineteenth century are not worthy to reverse the judgment of the past, posterity will do it. In judging of this question, I would urge the reader to transport himself to the seventeenth century, and then I would ask him if he cannot join with the immortal Milton when he says—

“Cromwell, our chief of men, who through a cloud,
Not of war only, but of detractions rude,
Guided by faith and matchless fortitude,
To Peace and Truth thy glorious way hast ploughed,
And on the neck of crowned fortune proud,
Hast reared God trophies, and his work pursued.
While Darwen stream with blood of Scots imbrued,
And Dunbar field resound thy praises loud,
And Worcester's laureate wreath. Yet much remains
To conquer still; Peace hath her victories
No less renowned than War; new foes arise
Threatening to bind our souls with secular chains!
Help us to save free conscience from the paw
Of hireling wolves, whose Gospel is their maw.”

Gentlemen of the Jury, this is my case.
Manchester. J. G. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

IN our endeavour to arrive at a correct view of the character of any of those great men whose renown fills the page of history, we have great difficulty to surmount; and this difficulty is magnified a hundred fold when the individual under review happens to have figured at the head of any powerful faction. However impartial the mind which is in search of truth may be, it is always in danger of being biassed by the opinions of this writer, or unduly influenced by that; and the student who may wish to avoid the Scylla of prejudice and depreciation, is liable to fall upon the Charybdis of fulsome adulation.

The misfortune is, that historians are men with like passions to ourselves. They too often see facts through the discoloured medium of their own prejudices or predilections. The consequence is, they fill their pages with historical facts, dressed up in a garb not their own. Thus we often find a good action evil spoken of, and a bad one lauded to the skies. Such will ever be the case until men learn to mount as upon eagles' wings, far above their narrow prejudices; and reaching the sacred arch of truth, care only to chronicle the facts of the past, without exaggeration or distortion. How sad it is, to the reflective mind, to see the atrocious deeds of Alexander of Mace-

don, related with such a fervor of admiration, as to obtain for that worst of men the appellation of “Great.”

The love of war and martial glory, as it is falsely named, leads many authors to term those men who have gained victories at the expense of myriads slain, as admirable and illustrious. Such writers forget that one murder makes a villain, a thousand a hero. The consequence is, that those who read the works of such authors, are under obligation of taking good heed, lest they judge of the deeds of the man placed before them, as their author would make him appear, and not as his acts attest him to have been. On the other hand, the student meets with a set of authors who, having fallen out with the principles of the hero of their tale, cannot record his acts without gently reminding their readers that such deeds, however good at sight, were only the offspring of the vilest intentions, and sprung from the basest motives. That the above is a faithful picture of some of the difficulties presented to the student when seeking for the true character of the heroes of history, those who have read most can best affirm.

The character of Cromwell, as presented to us by one class of writers, is made to present hues of the blackest dye; while

those from whom J. G. R. has so largely quoted, would fain persuade us that their hero was a man endowed with qualities of the most virtuous and admirable order. We dissent from both these views. We do not believe that Cromwell was the monster some would represent him; while, on the other hand, we find about him those properties which repel anything like admiration, or even approval.

If it were not so, the Hannibals, the Alexanders, the Tamerlanes, and the Napoleons, would be the men most deserving of our admiration. These human butchers unquestionably possessed minds endowed with the most brilliant parts: their mighty schemes, and their no less mighty achievements, attest that their powers were almost superhuman. But, ought men to admire those principles, and those men who have deluged the earth with blood? Most of the boasted men, the heroes of history, were nothing less than demons in human shape, who, to arrive at their wished-for ends, hesitated not to march forward over whole hecatombs of slain.

When we find the powers of Alexander's mind called forth to assist him in his lust of conquest, and Napoleon's for power, we are constrained to acknowledge that the most brilliant faculties are prostituted to the basest of purposes. How can we hide our abhorrence, when we see ambition stalking forward, regardless of the injustice inflicted in accomplishing its aims? And how can we refuse our meed of admiration, when we perceive our fellow men using their talents, not to aggrandize themselves, or enhance their personal pleasures, but to give pleasure and profit to all mankind? To such a class belonged the famous Roman general, who, after driving out his country's foes, thrust from himself all the proffered honours his grateful country would have forced upon him, choosing rather to return to the plough from whence he came. The Consul Regulus is another instance of a truly great man. His was a patriotism that sought not its own, but its country's good. Who can help feeling the most sacred admiration, when beholding Regulus banishing himself to perpetual exile, and a cruel death, rather than sacrifice the best interests of his country? The Cromwells

and the Napoleons fall into a dark shade when compared with Regulus and the immortal Washington. Washington had all their virtues, but none of their vices. It may be said his parts were less brilliant than those of either of the two last mentioned; but his soul was vastly superior to all the grovelling lusts and ambitions which degraded theirs. He fought to deliver his country from slavery, and when the victory was gained he was satisfied to leave his country as free as the air its people breathe. Not so did Cromwell; his egotism led him to suppose that the only reward sufficient for his patriotism was supreme power.

Cromwell can never rank with the Washingtons, the Tells, or the patriotic Romans. Doubtless his career was marked with much that wore the garb of the highest patriotism. We find him mingling in the thickest strife, both in the legislative hall and the battle-field, warring against tyranny and oppression: but he was only treading on the steps of that ladder by which he hoped to attain to the height of his inordinate ambition. Cromwell destroyed one tyrant to establish another, and that other himself.

With respect to Cromwell's sincerity we need not say much. J. G. R. evidently understands this part of the question to refer to religious character, but that is a province on which we have no desire to enter, the power not being given to us to be "a discerner of spirits." But so far as his political sincerity is concerned, we have said enough to express our opinion, and to indicate the grounds on which we base that opinion.

It matters not that we help to break a galling yoke, if, when that yoke is broken, we use our talents to forge another. Thus did Cromwell—he fought to free his country from the despotism of Charles, only to bring it under the iron hand of himself. His patriotism was bounded by his own selfish glory. He professed a love of freedom, that he might be able to make his countrymen his slaves. His whole life is a grand hypocrisy, wearing the habiliments of freedom in his youth, that he might wield the sceptre of despotism in his age.

When freedom is despised, when despotism and tyranny become virtues,—then,

and not till then, will the character of Cromwell merit commendation and esteem.

With respect to his first-rate generalship, we are at a loss to conceive on what ground our opponents will build their arguments. To us, his military character appears largely composed of wild enthusiasm and heartless cruelty. What truly pious mind is there but turns away with disgust from the records of his profanation of Scriptural language on the battle-field; and who that has a spark of humanity left in his bosom but sickens at the recital of the barbarities of his Irish campaign? What will be said in palliation of his savagism at Wexford, and especially at Tredah, where the town was carried sword in hand, and by his command no quarter given, so that only one person escaped to tell the tale of this havoc and destruction! Surely J. G. R. and his friends will find some difficulty in justifying these acts of their hero. We are pleased to find that the author of a *New and Popular History of England*—written, however, in a very partial spirit—is compelled to confess that this “is a dark blot on the escutcheon of Cromwell. No time will wipe it out; it is indelible. It will detract from his name, and tarnish his glory, till the years shall cease to be numbered!” And then giving expression to the cherished wishes of his heart, the writer adds—“Would that we could have thrown the veil of eternal oblivion over this scene in the hero’s life! It is written in blood, and nothing but an act of heaven’s love can wash it out. *Let us forget it.*” No, Dr. Ferguson, this will not do. It might be *convenient* for you to forget it, but it would not be *consistent*; and, for our parts, we are desirous of learning the whole truth on this and every other matter of debate.

Before attempting to estimate the character of the statesmanship of Oliver

Cromwell, it may be well to inquire what are the high qualities which are the essential constituents of true “greatness” here, and we think they will be admitted by all to be—an extensive knowledge of public business, great wisdom to supply the public wants, consummate skill to guide public affairs, and unimpeachable consistency to merit public confidence. These qualities, “rare in their separate excellence—wonderful in their combination,” all go to make up the character of a “great statesman;” and not one can be wanting and the character be complete. Now, without bringing Cromwell to the bar on all these counts, we take the last as being the most important, and we maintain that in this he was evidently deficient, as W. T. has already shown. Instead of carrying his reforms in a manner accordant with the English Constitution, he treated as nought every statute that opposed his course, did violence to every principle of law and order, and then sought to justify his conduct by some pretended pious declaration—“that he had sought the Lord night and day that he would rather slay him than put him upon the doing of such work.” Cromwell was a perfect paradox; a man who loudly declared his love for liberty, truth, and justice, while in practice he entirely opposed them. The name of civil and religious liberty was employed by him only to delude the people while he set up the most grinding and despotic tyranny. Follow Cromwell from his first appearance on the stage of public life, till you find him firmly seated in the Protector’s chair, and you will perceive that all his steps lead to that iron despotism which made the man the hated of his fellows.

That Cromwell had extraordinary talents we do not deny, but these do not always entitle their possessor to esteem.

W. H.

A thorough-bred soldier is the mere creature of command. His warrant is, in all cases, the order of his superior, to whose views he blindly conforms, however adverse they may be to the peace and happiness of society; while the occupations in which he is engaged, have a natural tendency to produce, in the lower orders, a disdain and impatience of peaceful industry;—in the higher, a restless and turbulent ambition;—and in both, a brutal contempt for the comfort and feelings of every other description of men.

Politics.

OUGHT GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE A SECULAR EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THERE is, perhaps, no subject which requires a greater amount of caution in its treatment than the one under consideration. It is a subject to which some of the greatest intellects of our day have for a long time directed attention, but nothing like a general decision has been come to, nor does such a decision, at the present moment, appear probable.

After all that has been said on both sides and said so ably, we can scarcely hope to throw a single ray of light upon the subject, or to introduce a new idea. Should we succeed in so doing, our labour will be amply repaid; but if not, we shall at least have the satisfaction of raising our feeble voice on the side of what we regard as truth and justice, declaring our attachment to the principles of civil and religious liberty, and thus performing a solemn duty.

The question before us relates to *Education*—i.e., the drawing out and development of the powers of the mind: but it is *Secular Education*, or the development of the mind in worldly matters; and the question is—Ought government to provide such education?

Now secular education is distinguished from religious education as having to do with matters of this life in contradistinction to those of another. A secular education, then, implies education in mere worldly matters, to the exclusion of matters spiritual—an education in things temporal, to the exclusion of things eternal—a preparation for this life, to the exclusion of the life that is to come.

1st.—We must say, that we do not think it the duty of any man, or of any body of men, to give such an education as this, and for the following reasons:—

It is impossible to give a *complete* secular education without, at the same time, giving a religious education. A complete secular education is such an education as is calculated to fit men to become useful members of society; but in order for a man

to be useful—really useful—in the highest sense of the word, he must be virtuous; in order to be virtuous, he must possess religious principle in such a state of development, as to be able to overcome all temptations to vice; and in order to the development of religious principles, there must be religious education. Secular education, without this, is perfectly incompetent to deal with fallen human nature, so as to prepare that nature for grappling with its own wayward tendencies, or with the temptations to a dishonourable course which men meet with in passing through the world. Without secular knowledge, a man is unable properly to discharge the duties of life; but without moral principle he is unworthy to be trusted. The only true ground of morals is religion, and hence the absolute necessity for religious training, in order to a complete secular education. To give a secular education to the exclusion of religion is Atheism. If there be a God, it is certainly desirable that man should understand his relationship to him, if it be only that he may the better understand his relationship to his neighbour. If there be a hereafter, an eternity, to which we are hastening, it is certainly more important than time. But to give a secular education to the exclusion of religious training, is to inculcate, in the most efficient manner, that time is of more importance than eternity—that man, and our duties to him, are more important than God and our duties to him. It is, in fact, to repeat, by actions, the assertion of the fool, “There is no God.”

2nd.—It is perfectly unnecessary that Government should at all interfere with general education. The work is being done by other hands. Scarcely a year has elapsed during the present century, without witnessing considerable additions to existing facilities for the education of the young. All classes have been benefitted: from the highest, who avail themselves of the uni-

versity and the college, to the lowest, who are allured out of the street to the ragged school;—every age, from the lisping infant that receives instruction in the guise of amusement, to the young man preparing for the learned professions; and each, not merely in regard to the elements of knowledge, but to some extent in the industrial qualifications that enable the man to win the family's bread, and the woman to keep her husband and children decently clad. Besides this, numerous institutions have arisen for the instruction of youth and men of mature years, such as mechanics' institutes, with lectures, libraries, reading-rooms, and evening classes; philosophic and literary societies, brotherly societies, etc. Various societies have likewise been formed whose object is to extend and improve the education of the children of the masses. These have established Normal schools; and then, to crown the whole, cheap literature, in an endless variety of attractive forms, at once to create and gratify an appetite for knowledge, has been issued both by enterprising publishers, and by numerous societies established for that purpose. In these ways have the people been educating themselves. True it may be that the work has not been performed so efficiently as is desirable. The work is not indeed *done*, but it is *being done*, and being done by the parties most interested in it, and therefore done with heart—in earnest. It may not be perfectly managed, but we have the pledge of improvement, which no Government scheme can ensure. The fact that society is engaged competing with society, committee with committee, and teacher with teacher, will ensure improvement far more than if Government should get the entire machinery into its own hands. In proof of this, we might direct attention to almost everything with which Government has had to do. One or two examples, however, must suffice.

There is the State Church established for the express purpose of instructing the people in the truths of Christianity, and supported at an expense per annum of about ten millions of public money. For three centuries it has existed; and what was the state of public *morals*—to say nothing of religion—at the middle of the last century?

What, in fact, is the state of public morals, in the present day, in some of our rural districts, where no other agency is admitted but that of the parish clergyman? Pass through such villages in the evening, or on the Sabbath, and you will soon ascertain. But how is it that in some places we find Sunday schools, day schools, and altogether a different state of things in connexion with the Church? How? It was from the pressure without, not from the Government, that the impulse came. The clergy found that if they did not perform their duty some one else would, and they might lose not only the credit, but perchance the living too. But we will refer to another example still more to the point;—the fact that Government has had at its disposal, for a very long time, property producing an estimated annual income of about five hundred thousand pounds, which was originally designed for the education of the poor, but which, for the most part, has been diverted to other purposes. If the Government were really desirous of educating the people, and fully competent to the task, we should have supposed that some time within the last three centuries they would have set about it, especially as they had such enormous funds at their disposal, and that now we should have been a well-educated nation. But no; Government did not interfere until they saw that the people were doing the work for themselves, and were likely to accomplish it. Then it was, and not till *then*, that Government interfered.

3rd.—It is undesirable that Government should interfere with education, inasmuch as such interference would tend to the destruction of the liberty of the subject. As Englishmen, possessing free and liberal institutions, we are apt to pride ourselves. Yet it is a fact, that even now it is not without difficulty that the voice of the people is heard and appreciated in the legislative halls. Though the Government is professedly subject to the people, it cannot be denied that many of its acts are calculated to make the people blush; abuses have been continued from age to age, and maintained in the most unblushing manner on account of their antiquity, public money has been squandered in the most extravagant

way, whilst many, who have borne the burden, have wanted bread. But how is it that when these matters are canvassed that Governments are able to lift up their heads and set those at defiance who dare to name them? How is it that the people do not rise *en masse* and demand redress? The answer is obvious. Large numbers of those who make the laws are themselves interested, either directly or indirectly, in their existence. It is by them they live. Remove the abuses and they perish, or become so small as to be imperceptible. The greater the amount of money or patronage at the disposal of the Government, the more independent it becomes of the nation. That the British Government has a vast amount of both money and patronage at its disposal (especially the latter), in the church, the army, the navy, the customs, the excise, &c., no one can deny; and that this is a principal cause of its deafness to the voice of the people, and blindness to its interests, a reference to the present constitution of Parliament would easily prove. And is it desirable, under such circumstances, to add to the power of Government, and diminish that of the people? We think not. It may, however, be questioned, whether a Government education would produce any such results. In our own mind there is no question on the subject. It must add to the power of the Government. It must weaken the influence of the people. It *must* add to the power of the Government; for Government education, whether secular or religious, implies a staff of teachers, throughout the length and breadth of the land, in Government pay, pupil teachers engaged to assist them, and inspectors to look after them. All this, *at least*, is implied by Government education. But teachers dependent upon Government from year to year for their bread, would certainly not be in a position to take any very decided part against the Government, whatever views they might entertain of the conduct of the Government. But the influence of a teacher in his particular sphere of labour is often very great, and his opinion, interested though it might be, would do much (especially in rural districts) to satisfy the

people with almost anything that Government might prescribe. Nor is this all. Government education not only implies a staff of masters, but pupil teachers to the extent of one to twenty-five or fifty of the children under instruction. These, too, would be in Government pay. Now, supposing every family to contain three children, and that one in a hundred were set apart for this work, such an arrangement would bring under Government influence one family in every thirty-three. Nor does this exhibit the entire extent of the evil. Generally speaking, it will be found that children who are capable of taking the office of pupil teachers, possess intelligent parents; and those who know anything of the working-classes, know that the more ignorant portion are influenced in their opinion by the more intelligent of the same class. Hence it will be seen, that by placing the more intelligent part of the working-classes under Government influence, the almost entire mass is virtually so placed.

4th.—It would be unjust to large classes of the British subjects for Government to provide education for the people.

It would be unjust to private schoolmasters. These persons, like men of other professions, have been of the greatest service to the public, inasmuch as they have brought within the reach of the middle, and many of the working-classes, the means of education. Should the Government provide education, these persons would be thrown out of a livelihood, and, at the same time, taxed to provide for the education of others. This would be unjust.

It would be unjust to a large class of our fellow-subjects who could not accept of such an education. Such persons are to be found both in the Church of England, and also in the various denominations of Dissenters. We say it would be unjust to such persons to be obliged to furnish what they could not themselves conscientiously enjoy.

These, then, are some of our reasons for thinking that the Government ought not to provide secular education for the people.

G. N.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

MR. EDITOR,—No problems in Social Science are so deserving of the earnest attention and anxious deliberation of the forethoughtful men of our own day, as those which relate to the amelioration of the condition of the people, and their moral and intellectual elevation. How are crime, pauperism, and the great and glaring vices of our present social state to be lessened? How is the *virus* of depravity to be mitigated? How are superstition and prejudice, with all their progeny of evil consequences, to be eradicated? How are property, character, and life to be duly protected? How are self reliance, prudent habits, moral tendencies, and higher and holier aspirations, to be imparted to the several members of the state? How may each individual of the community learn to decide upon the intricate questions involved in the ideas conveyed by the words—the pure, the just, the true, and the useful? How may man be best fitted for fulfilling the duties of life,—prepared for battling with adverse circumstances which arise from the changes and fluctuation, to which each one is liable,—enabled to stand firm in rectitude, and unshaken in honesty amid the contingencies of existence, and qualified to resist moral contamination with whatsoever inducements and allurements the temptation may be accompanied? How may *adaptability* be most easily realized in the mind, so that amidst the mutations of labour arising from the exercise of inventive genius, men may gain the capacity of readily passing from one form of employment to another, and thus avoid the miseries consequent upon the glut of labour in an unremunerative occupation? How may men be most readily induced to practice self-restraint and self-control? What is the best preservative against those fearful eruptions of viciousness with which the body corporate is afflicted,—the plague spot of pauperism,—and the general deficiency of moral *stamina*, which form barriers so potent, to the progress of humanity and the realization of the highest, because most intellectualized and Christianized civilization? In answer to these and other similar queries, the conviction has

been gradually forced upon the intelligent men of our country, that the basis of every other successful reform is to be found in Education,—that without this all other ameliorative measures are nugatory and vain,—with this, a ready success would be secured for all other great social reforms. The almost unanimous conclusion is therefore, that regarding Education “something must be done,” but when practical efforts are proposed, unanimity ceases, and discord and dissension sow their “dragon’s teeth” in the minds of men. The paltry and pitiable ambition of victory to certain sectaries and parties, is sufficient to check exertion, to freeze the warm tide of benevolence, to blind the eye to duty, and to close the ear to the call of humanity; and because of the animosities of religious rivalry, the vast tide of human woe and crime is permitted to flow unchecked through our land, spreading its moral malaria—its moral pollution and spiritual death amongst our population. Is there not something fearful in the thought, that thousands are speeding onwards to an inevitable and eternal perdition, while the contagion of vice is everywhere spreading, and preparing a new criminal population to follow the footsteps of their forerunners, and yet no hand is “stretched forth to save,” but each one is in effect saying, Better that society should suffer from its legions of criminals,—its multitudes of paupers—and its vice-propagating thousands; better that these parties themselves should suffer the endlessness of woe to which sinfulness consigns them, than that *any other sect than ours* should have its ranks recruited with these “brands plucked from the burning.” Really, religious men, is there *no* criminality in your doings in this matter? Are *ye* guiltless of your brothers’ sins, who having the means at hand to arrest vice, as it were at the very fountain head, neglect in your vain babblings and sectarian contentions, to apply remedial measures until the inoculation of vice is complete—until the taint is effected—until the contamination is manifest—until the disease has become virulent, and then instead of having sent them to *state schools* to be

educated, and thus to secure the prevention of crime, hand them over to the tender mercies of the outraged law, where they are sent to *state prisons* to be punished for having become the victims of that malady the spread of which ye could have prevented but did not?

So much for exordium and as generally indicative of our own opinions on this topic. Let us now proceed to a more orderly consideration of the subject, which appears to us to involve the three following points of debate:—1st, Is Education necessary? 2nd, If necessary ought it to be provided by the Government? and, 3rd, If the Government should provide an education, ought that education to be secular? These we will now proceed succinctly to consider.

1st, Is education necessary?

The assertion of Lord Bacon that “knowledge is power,” is stamped with such indubitable truth that it has now been accepted as an axiom by the nations; it has been reserved however, for the acute, the brilliant, the philanthropic, the humorous, and genial hearted novelist of our own day,—“the master of our sunniest smiles and our most unselfish tears,”—Charles Dickens—by one of those seemingly intuitional flashes of his genius, to embody in language the previously unimagined fact, that “ignorance is power.” In his speech at the *soirée* of the Leeds Mechanics’ Institution, he said, “*Why reflect whether ignorance be not a power and a very dreadful power.* Look where we will, do we not find it powerful for every kind of wrong and evil—powerful to fill the prisons, the hospitals, and the graves—powerful for blind violence, prejudice, and error, in all their gloomy and destructive shapes?” Who are they that are the most numerous inhabitants of our penal settlements—who tenant our jails, bridewells, and penitentiaries, most frequently—who form the dangerous classes of our population? Who are the least thoughtful, the most improvident, the nearest to the brink of crime. Who are the most clamorous and frequent applicants to the poor-law boards? who are they who by the neglect of due precautions, the want of knowledge of simple remedies, their unacquaintance with the “laws of health,” the general heedlessness and inattention, their unre-

strained lust-gratification, through the halls of our hospitals, and occupy the rooms of our infirmaries? Who are the demagogues’ tools, the incendiaries’ co-conspirators, the lawless rioters, the ready engine of rebellionists, the obstructors of the authorities in the execution of duty? Chiefly the ignorant. Who fired the house of Priestly, —Who burned the Jacquard looms in the market-place of Lyons,—Who were the great body of the rioters in Manchester and Glasgow in the anti-power-loom agitation? —Who were the constituents of the monster meetings of Ireland, and still more recently, the armed agents of insurrection there? Chiefly the ignorant. If these things be true, and if it be true likewise that the educated classes are those who most strenuously endeavour to preserve the peace, stability, and freedom, of the state, then we think we cannot hesitate in admitting that education is necessary. Again, the imperative necessity of mental culture will appear, if we consider that the last half century has witnessed what may, not inaptly, be termed the creation of a new race of industrial agencies. This result of British mechanical ingenuity, has ejected our uneducated human labourers from their former employments, and so long as men remain uneducated, the “*thews and sinews*” of men must be preternaturally strained in vain and profitless competition with the iron-muscle steam-engine; for viewed in the light of economical science, these mechanical labourers are more steady, more serviceable, more easily managed, less liable to fatigue, cheaper, and consequently preferable, to those classes of workers which they have superseded; but if, by Education, the superior portion of man’s nature be called into action, the competition will be no longer that of iron *versus* muscle, but of intellect *versus* non-intelligence, and men will then become the masters of, not the co-labourers with, machinery; will become the directors of its mighty physical energies, not the weak and impotent antagonists of its power and progress.

But surely it is needless to pursue this portion of our subject farther; the prevalence of superstition, the liability of the people to be led into violations of the law, their proneness to listen to quack-, political

and religious, as well as medical, the extent of vice, profligacy, and pauperism, and a thousand other evils which are rampant amongst our population, are they not proofs sufficient of the assertion we have made, that "education is necessary."

2nd, Ought Education to be provided by the Government?

We advocate the affirmative, 1st, because the advantages resulting from the spread of Education in the diminishment of crime, pauperism, and vice, are societarian; and the evils resulting from the present defective and inefficient system, are more especially hurtful to the body politic. If it be right in Government to punish the transgressors of the laws, it is a duty which they owe, to give to each the power of knowing the laws. If it be politic to vest the avenging of injuries to society, in the government, it must be equally so to place in them the power of prevention. If the Government are justified in ordering taxes to be levied for the erection of Workhouses and the support of the poor, it must be equally justifiable to order a levy for the erection of schools and the education of the poor; for this would only be to remedy a social evil by the representative agency of society. 2nd, Government alone can give that permanency and stability to a really useful scheme, which is required for success. For it must be admitted, that voluntary efforts, however amiable in themselves, are liable to many objections on these points,—they depend upon the life, residence, patronage, or interest, of certain parties; they are subject to embarrassment from many causes, the failure of a public subscription, the withholding of a donor's grant, the fluctuations of trade, the success or non-success of the monetary affairs of a congregation, etc. Often has the private pique of a patron at the teacher; the quarrel on some trivial matter, of the managing committee, with the chief supporter; or the lukewarmness of the trustees; been the occasion of a school being closed for ever. Besides voluntary exertions will always be most successful where wealth is most abundant, and where in consequence of this, they are least required, while the really destitute locality will be left to wither in neglect, or struggle on in a languishing condition, disheartening

to all concerned. But were a Government Education tax to be imposed, there would be none of those sudden and unexpected difficulties to be met; no untoward collision could leave the district destitute of the means of attaining knowledge, and no spasmodic efforts for success would be required. 3rd, A Governmental Education scheme is the only just method of supplying the social want, for it would make each member of the state, according to his ability, contribute towards the commonweal in a matter of the most vital importance; whereas, voluntary exertions leave the whole burden to fall on the benevolent, whose interest in the state is not greater than that of those whose acquisitiveness freezes their charity at its fountain source. 4th, In the end it would be a decided monetary saving, for were the people educated, crime and pauperism with all their concomitants would decrease, not only in quantity but in quality, and it would be cheaper to educate the whole nation well, than to maintain in their present state our police force, law courts, station houses, bridewells, jails and workhouses; and thus most efficiently would the Government perform the very difficult duties involved in the criminal and poor-law departments.

Let us however before concluding this department, briefly sketch what we think should form the principal features of a Government Education-measure. It should provide for local taxation and local management, with local and governmental superintendence conjointly exercised, somewhat after the manner of the Scottish Poor Law Board of Supervision, and it should enact that no child be permitted to enter any employment whatever, until it could receive a certificate from the local and governmental examiners, that it had received a certain *minimum* of instruction.

3rd, Ought Education enforced by Government to be only *secular*?

Before proceeding to defend the affirmative of this question, it will be advisable to define the sense in which we employ the term *secular*. This word, which is derived from the Latin *seculum*—an age, does not as some suppose, signify earthly in opposition to heavenly or spiritual, but rather serves as a distinguishing appellation by

which we differentiate the things which relate to time, from those which have reference to eternity. Now these cannot be said in any sense to be opposed, for the duties, the interests, the real enjoyments of *time*, run parallel with those which man must feel and do in order to arrive at a blessed eternity. To place these two words in antagonism is unjustly to prejudice the question. Secular education then, we define as that species of instruction by which man is fitted for the proper discharge of his duty as a member of the state, by which he is qualified to understand and act upon certain principles and rules, which, by the common consent of men, are conducive to the general welfare of the state, and the intelligence, usefulness, and comforts, of its members. It makes us acquainted with the objects which surround us, their properties, their uses, etc., and the means of attaining temporal happiness and prosperity, and avoiding social misery and individual suffering. Recollecting, then, that the Government is a merely temporal institution, it can have no right to teach anything else than what refers to secular affairs. The church in all its several branches, being the spiritual or religious institution, is the proper source of religious instruction. The relative duties of the church—*i.e.*, including each several branch,—and the State, may from these considerations be easily deduced; for it is clearly the duty of the State to

provide a secular education, and of the church, each sect for itself, to supply that spiritual or religious knowledge which the Gospel came to superadd to the secular knowledge which man may naturally, and unaided, supernaturally acquire. The only objection to this is the jealousy of sects; but surely it is preferable that men should be educated *in part*, than that they should not be educated at all, and better that knowledge should be spread, than that crime, superstition, vice, stupidity, quackery, and pauperism should abound. We shall of course be told, that such a system as this, is, in the present state of society, impracticable. In the words of John Foster, we will answer this objection: "Impracticable! and does the case come at last to this, that from one cause and another, from the arrogance of the high, and the untowardness of the low, the obstinacy of prejudice, and the rashness of innovation, the dissensions of the friends of a beneficent design, and the discountenance of those who are no better than enemies,—a mighty state, triumphantly boasting of every other kind of power, absolutely cannot execute a scheme for rescuing its people from being what a great authority on this subject has called 'the worst-educated nation in Europe.' Then let it submit with all its pomp, pride, and grandeur, to stand in derision, and a proverb on the face of the earth."

PHILOMATHOS.

Social Economy, etc.

HAVE THE WORKING CLASSES BEEN BENEFITTED BY MACHINERY?

NEGATIVE REPLY.

MANY and important remarks have been elicited on the present subject, and yet, for the most part the different parties have not crossed the path of their opponents. We say, "for the most part;" for in the course of our remarks, we shall have occasion to notice, at least, one exception.

It has been shown, and shown pretty clearly, that advantages of an important nature, have, by Machinery, been conferred upon the working classes, as well as others.

Among the first of these stands the printing of the Bible, which, but for Machinery, must have remained unknown, and perhaps unheard of by the mass of these classes. We are not insensible of the importance of this fact to our opponents. The Bible, the best boon of God, (except his Son,) to man; —the Bible, which opens up the way of salvation to the human race, is certainly a benefit upon which they may well dwell with delight, since that boon, as far as its circula-

tion among the working classes is concerned, has been derived directly from Machinery. The printing-press, however, is not an unmixed blessing. It is a fountain that has proved itself capable of sending forth waters that are bitter—yea, poisonous—as well as sweet. True, it has sent forth the Bible in such a form, that every man in our country may possess it. It has, however, sent forth other works, not only of a doubtful character, but absolutely calculated to debase the heart, and unfit it for the reception of those hallowing truths which the Bible has to communicate. The Bible, we say, is a boon, but it is to those, and those only, who receive it as a friend, and offer to its truths the asylum of the heart. To those who reject it, we learn from its awful testimony, it is the “savour of death unto death.” Now, that the masses of the working classes have not given the Bible such a reception, we think it unnecessary to attempt to prove, and we believe, moreover, that in many cases, the press may be said to have been the cause of its rejection.

But Machinery has done much towards the extension of scientific research. In many cases it has been directly useful, in testing the various properties of matter, and the laws of motion, and has thus been found beneficial in preparing the way for the extension of the conveniences of civilized life. In these improvements, the working classes have been interested:—in connection with these they have found the means of existence:—by their means they have obtained better wages than they could otherwise have obtained, and consequently a larger amount of the necessaries and comforts of life than they could otherwise have enjoyed.

All this is, doubtless, true,—at least, to a limited extent. It is true that the working classes have derived various advantages of this kind from Machinery. It is not the less true that Machinery has in many cases been the cause of the withdrawal of many comforts which the working classes formerly enjoyed. While on the one hand, the working classes may be better fed—i.e., their bread and meat may be of a finer quality, they have, in too many cases, far less of home comfort than formerly. The wives and daughters of working men were formerly

early initiated in domestic duties, and thus fitted to manage their earnings with economy. Very different is the training to which they are subjected at the present time, as will appear from the following extract from the minutes of the Committee of Council on Education, for 1846, Appendix F.:—“The aggregate weekly earnings of a family are large, and yet families are often destitute not only of comforts but necessities—the produce of their labour is spent without thought, and without limit, in the ale-house or in the eating-house; and it can hardly be otherwise among those who are not only ignorant of their moral and social duties, but whose wives and daughters are ignorant of the commonest and most essential of domestic duties—cooking, baking, brewing, washing, mending, sewing, even in the coarsest and most inefficient manner. It is painful to know that such is the case, but it would be marvellous if it were not, when the female children at the earliest moment that age and strength will admit of, are forced into shops and works, to add by their labour to the family income.”

A tradesman of great experience, and better versed in the habits of the working classes than any one I have met with, lamented to me the utter ignorance of household duties prevailing among the women of the working classes. He tells me that it is a matter of not unfrequent occurrence to him to have to point out the pots and pans absolutely necessary for household purposes; and to hear and witness, during the progress of the outfit, the painful ignorance of his youthful customers as to the duties and responsibilities they are about to incur. So imperfectly is household economy understood, that the members of a family, as they come in after the Saturday night's marketing has been accomplished, will cut their respective steaks from the leg of mutton, or the loin of beef, throw them with the tongs upon the fire, and broil and devour them. All comfort, all economy, all the kindly feeling of the social meal unthought of and unknown.

Such, then, is a brief summary of some of the advantages and disadvantages which machinery has, in a material and social sense, conferred upon the working classes—advantages, inasmuch as it has supplied

them with food of a better or finer quality ; disadvantages, inasmuch as it has deprived them of good domestic management, by diverting the female part of the community from their proper sphere to the workshop and the manufactory, and thus rendering them totally unfit for the discharge of those duties for which Providence designed them. As a consequence of all this, the *home* of the working man has lost its charms, the social affections are at a sad discount, the saloon, the gin-palace, the theatre, or the tavern is preferred to the domestic hearth, the home education of the working man's children is entirely neglected, and all those ties which bind parent to child, and the child to his parent, and which render the one happy in the company of the other, are either snapped asunder, or so far weakened, as to leave but the shadow where the substance ought to exist.

It will be sufficiently evident, we think, from the foregoing remarks, that we agree with much that has been said by our opponents. We are ready to acknowledge that, in a material point of view, the working classes have been benefitted. Our principal objections are founded upon the moral aspect of the subject; and hence it will appear that our opponent, R. L. G., was incorrect when he based our assertions—that the changes which have been effected by machinery have been far from beneficial to the working classes, principally because they tended to annihilate those friendly relations which formerly existed between them and the wealthy classes,—upon the assumption, “that the agricultural is the greatest source of national wealth.”

And here we must beg to note a fundamental point on which we and our opponent are directly at issue, viz.,—What is to be taken as the index of a nation's prosperity? R. L. G. seems to think that this index is to be found in the extent of its trade, and the amount of its wealth. We think the true index is to be found in the social aspect of its people. If the masses of the people are happy, then, we say, that the nation is prosperous; but if not, then, we say, it is not prosperous, although the few may be hoarding gold by millions. But in order to happiness there must be virtue, and in order to a growth in happiness there must

be growth in virtue. The changes, however, which have been brought about by machinery have been inimical to virtue as far as the working classes are concerned, and hence opposed to their happiness. “But,” says our opponent, “machinery cannot, with very good logic, be accountable for human waywardness.” This may be quite correct, and yet through “human waywardness” it may have done more harm than good, and if so we have truth on our side. The point under discussion is, not whether machinery *is calculated* to benefit the working classes, but whether it *has benefitted* them.

R. L. G. is not more happy in his second assumption than in his first. Unfortunately, the present state of the working man is as much a state of dependence as the former one. This, we think, has been amply proved in the able article by S. A. J. The choice, then, lies not between dependence and liberty, but, if S. A. J. be correct—and we see no reason to question his statements—between dependence and slavery, for certainly the “friendly” connection which our opponent so much ridicules, is in every sense far preferable to that abject dependence which S. A. J. has depicted.

As it regards the third assumption of R. L. G., it is unnecessary that we should say anything, for his whole answer is founded on a suspicion.

“But alas!” says R. L. G., “not only has machinery caused the country labourer to leave his home and his friend the squire, but it has been the cause of severing the tie which formerly existed between the ‘labouring’ population and the wealthy.” Here we have a complaint to make. R. L. G. has misquoted our words, put “*remaining*” in the place of “labouring,” and it will be correct, but the meaning is obviously different, for it includes not only the labouring population, but also the trading population. But is not this a benefit, that “Machinery having centralized manufacturing labour, and increased the size of towns, has offered such temptations to the landed proprietors as to induce them to follow their recreant dependents into the comfortable cities?” Doubtless, as far as the towns are concerned to which they have gone, it has been a benefit; but has it been

a benefit to the places which have been left behind? With this point our friend has not ventured to deal. But we very much question whether the system of *centralization* could be shown to be a benefit as far as the working classes are concerned. Though it is true that the wealthy have patronized and assisted them by "spending their leisure and their money in the smoky cities," it is also true that the working classes of the country have lost more by the change than those of the towns have gained. Those of the country have lost both morally and financially, whereas those of the towns have only gained financially. In a moral sense they, too, have lost. In

nothing, perhaps, is this so evident as in the large increase which is constantly taking place in the criminal class.

But we must conclude by maintaining that though machinery has produced the wealth of our nation, by enabling the people of these lands to compete with those of other lands in the various manufactures, and though it has tended to promote the development of intellect, yet since it has been, on the whole, derogatory to the social and moral well-being of the masses,—The working classes have not been benefitted by machinery.

G. N.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

The very sea they cross with steam—

The land with trains of fire ;

Wheels fright the naiads from our streams—

The sylphs and fawns retire :

The Indian genii quit their caves,

And fly where woods inspire.

Mills go by galvanism !

—*New York Literary World.*

Come bright Improvement on the car of time,
And rule the spacious world from clime to clime ;
Thy handmaid arts shall every wild explore,
Trace every wave, and culture every shore.

—*Campbell.*

WE would not have it thought, from the fact of our now sitting down to write a reply, that we deem this subject exhausted. Such is not the case. Much has been said on both sides, but on a question involving so many considerations as the present ;—a question in which the interests even of the different grades of the same class appear somewhat diversified ;—and above all on a question, the right understanding of which will tend very materially to unravel a great problem in social science,—much, very much more remains to be said. So far, however, as we are concerned, we have fulfilled our mission. We have assisted in laying before our readers a general statement of the case, and in furnishing the facts and data from which they may draw their own conclusions. In a word, we have provided the materials for thought, for future reflection and digestion, and as we deem no purpose more useful than this, so we deem no end more noble. To aid in the development of truth is to accomplish a double purpose.

We perform one of the most sacred duties of our earthly existence, in rousing to activity the mental faculties of others, while, at the same time, we may cultivate and expand our own ; thus verifying the assertion of the poet—

"Teaching we learn, and giving we receive."

We now proceed to review the arguments of our opponents in this our "literary campaign," to rebut those that we consider erroneous, and to adopt those that we believe to be just.

The opener on the negative side, G. N., commenced well by remarking, that no one who had watched the course of events, could doubt that the introduction of machinery had produced, in the course of a few years, very great changes in the habits and occupations of society. These changes had even affected the aspect of our towns and villages. Occupations formerly confined to particular districts, had been transplanted elsewhere ; or others which were once generally followed throughout the kingdom, are now confined to particular districts ; "while other occupations had rapidly sprung into existence and been the source of wealth to many." Lamentable fact, that new sources of productive power should be called into existence, affording employment, and even competence, to thousands ! Who shall sit calmly and hear it proclaimed that "such has been the extent to which wealth has been amassed by manufacturers, that we

find some who are capable of vicing with our princes of noble, and even of royal blood!" Treason most consummate! Where and when are such things to end? But the magnitude of the evil does not rest here. Thousands of petty despots, and village tyrants, have vanished into "utter nothingness;" yea, have ignominiously perished, since these changes have been brought about. Oh! unheard-of usurpation! The "village parson," the "country squire" are no longer enabled to watch over their lowly flocks—to direct their steps—to guide their actions—to *think* for them, or to draw the boundary line of their *liberties*; and it is this circumstance G. N. so deeply mourns! Men have believed themselves capable of judging of their own actions, guarding their own rights, protecting their own liberties, and seeking employment and independence where they were to be found, in preference to remaining *serfishly* located on one gloomy spot; but disease, intemperance, and crime have been their meet reward;—prostitution, sacrilegious habits, and premature deaths have been the sequel. Oh, unguarded man! that thou shouldst thus jump from the *frying-pan* of thine hereditary guides and protectors, into the consuming *fire* of thine own kindling—kindled, in fact, by thy too eager desire for the unrestricted exercise of those reflective and reasoning powers with which the Almighty Creator has alike endowed every reasonable and accountable being!

But the reader will pause and ask what these considerations have to do with the results of machinery. Let him turn to the paper under review (in the January No.), and he will there learn the nature of the accusations we have to clear away before we can finally sum up.

We have, until now, been so enveloped in simplicity, as to congratulate ourselves and our fellow-creatures upon the departure from this, "our native isle," of feudal customs, feudal restrictions, and feudal tyranny. But alas! we find we have been committing a grievous mistake in so doing. We forgot the enormity of the offences, the seducing influences which power-looms, stocking-frames, steam-engines, printing presses, and a hundred other inventions possessed, unless warded off by those sa-

pient personages the village parson and country squire. The temptations of a "town life," we are seriously told, are too great for those reared in "rustic innocence," and of course in rustic virtue! But G. N. has laid too heavy a charge at the door of machinery—it has required too much "propping;" and one of the props, after the manner of a "rotten stick," having broken, the enormity of the weight has increased the greatness of the fall. Thus we are told that even the gentry themselves were eventually, in many cases, seduced from a country life to live in towns, where "they discovered attractions which the country could not afford," "and (pass it not by) facilities for the gratification of *their selfish desires* which they could not find in the comparatively isolated position they occupied in the country,"—and these the former guides and protectors of village morals, who have so unscrupulously sought the gratification of "their own selfish desires!" Verily the old proverb, "like master, like man," applies; and earnestly we may ask

"If such the tutors are
What *must* the tutored be?"

If no more potent objection can be urged against machinery than that it has tended to a separation of the labouring classes from *these*, their preceptors, we, the supporters of the opposition, are not yet in the "forlorn hope."

Now a word or two as to S. A. J., who follows on the negative side. He, too, seems to think that "old England's happy days" are at an end, or at least at a considerable discount. But while attributing *some* blame to the same cause as his predecessor, he attributes a far greater share of blame to the "mill-owners" and other manufacturers employing large numbers of operatives. If, indeed, he has not too highly coloured his picture, the tortures of the Inquisition were as trifles compared with the tortures these large employers habitually inflict upon their workmen! If S. A. J. can substantiate the statements he has made, we are sure he has only to do so, in order that Joseph Hume, or some other humane member of the House of Commons, may move for the appointment of a committee to inquire into the "cruel

and oppressive practices of *Mill-owners*, and other large manufacturers, towards their operatives!" And we should earnestly recommend the suffering parties not to cross the thresholds of their employers until this has been done. But we must not be led away from the point. He admits that *all* mill-owners are not so bad, and laments the evils resulting, both morally and physically, from the employment of children and females in mills and manufacturing factories.

A. C. and "Junius" respectively follow on the same side of the question; and the chief point of their argument seems to be that, if such rapid strides continue to take place in the adaptation of machinery to manufacturing purposes, the day *may* arrive when the supply will so far exceed the demand, that utter prostration and stagnation of trade will follow. They, too, also lament the social evils which at present exist in the manufacturing districts.

Such is an abstract of the arguments against us. Now for a brief but general reply. The reader will probably agree with us that the host arrayed against us, although sufficient to call us out to battle, is not so overwhelming as to cause us to seek a truce. The evils which have been stated as resulting from machinery are, for the most part, to be ascribed to other, and far different, causes. Machinery has been charged, on the one hand, with causing great social evils over which it could have no control,—on the other hand, with fostering vices which originate in man's debased and fallen nature, and which remain by him, constantly extending their pernicious influence, unless early and earnestly eradicated by the hallowing influences of sound moral and religious education, and the inculcation of virtuous habits. So long as IGNORANCE reigns paramount over any class, so long will disease, drunkenness, famine, prostitution, and irreligion raise their venomous heads in fierce and awful array against those who compose it. But when the cheering rays of education begin to be felt, then one by one these evils pass away, as surely and as gloriously as the mists of midnight darkness fly before the morning sun. This assertion applies as much to the denizens of country villages as to those of

crowded towns and cities. The fact of thousands of our fellow-creatures existing in cellars and garrets, arises from the debasement which inclines them to live in such dens;—the fact that vice stalks abroad in our towns—aye, and in our villages too—is because men have not yet conquered their own evil propensities;—the fact that women and children toil laboriously in our mines, our mills, and our factories, is because men have not yet attained sufficient self-respect to protect their wives and their offspring from such unseemly drudgery! It is one of the most prominent and useful purposes of machinery to lessen human drudgery, and thereby to increase self-respect. But men abuse its privileges, and add condemnation to abuse. As well might we attribute the periodical eruptions of Vesuvius to the results of machinery, as to attribute to it the social evils at present existing in our manufacturing districts. Besides, while speaking of the evils of a town life, its advantages were entirely overlooked. We say that the fact of every town of the least pretension having evening schools and literary and mechanics' institutions, where the toiling mechanic, bent upon the acquisition of knowledge, may share the same facilities for the accomplishment of his ends, as the learned lord, was entirely passed over by the negative writers, and this affords a further proof of their one-sidedness.

To our mind, the only argument which calls for further remark, is one we have before referred to,—namely, that production *might*, some day, greatly overstep demand, when some dread calamity would ensue. At the onset, however, we anticipated this objection, and adduced facts to show that in the same ratio as the facilities for the production of the common necessities of civilized life had reduced the cost of such production, and thereby placed such commodities within the reach of all classes at a reasonable outlay—had the demand for them *increased*. And why, we ask, is it feared that the demand should fall off? Is it because the great majority of our countrymen have a superabundance of the necessities and luxuries of life? Enter the dwellings of our mechanics, of our labourers, and see if there be not room for the

increase of their domestic comforts? With the increase of temperate and frugal habits, will the requirements for articles of comfort, use, and ornament also proportionately and permanently increase. Much, very much, remains with the productive classes themselves.

On both sides it is acknowledged that the avarice and unguardedness of manufacturers, causing them to embark in mad and delusive speculations, have been followed by injury to the labouring hands. But abuse of advantages is not to be reckoned as against their use, or many of the most noble privileges we now enjoy would

be open to condemnation; nor are they to be supposed to have a permanent duration.

“Earthly these passions are of earth,
They perish where they have their birth.”

Looking, then, the question fairly in the face, remembering the many advantages which have accrued to the whole human family, how labour has been abridged, and how manifoldly human comforts have been increased, and civilization advanced, we still adhere to our former conclusion, that the working, as well as other classes, have been benefitted by machinery.

C. W. J.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. X.

48. *Respect* is only a less degree of Veneration,—which see.

49. *Giving*—see Granting.

50. *Wonder* is, to a certain extent, a silent passion—it agitates the mind so suddenly and violently as for a time to suspend the action of its powers, and among others, the faculty of speech. When, however, the tongue is freed from the paralysis which impeded its exercise, it becomes loquacious with exclamatory phrases. When it is a simple passion, it opens the eyes wide and staringly—either raises them to the skies, or rivets them on the object,—spreads the hands outwards and upwards; the body becomes rigid, and the mouth gapes slightly. It combines with other passions, and forms Fear, Amazement, Horror, Perplexity, &c.

51. *Admiration* is a complex passion, partaking of the nature of Wonder and Esteem. The flow of speech is copious, ready, and figurative; the tone elevated and rapturous. The eyebrow is raised; the eye widened gradually, and fixed pleasingly on the object. The hands are held out about the height of the breast, in the direction of the object. The face is glowing, expressive, and animated. The following beautiful extract is supposed to be spoken by Titus while looking upon Jerusalem from the Mount of Olives during the period of its besiegement:

“How boldly doth it front us! how majestically!
Like a luxurious vineyard, the hill side
Is hung with marble fabrics,—line o’er line,
Terrace o’er terrace, nearer still, and nearer
To the blue heavens. Here bright and sumptuous palaces,
With cool and verdant gardens interspersed;
Here towers of war that frown in massy strength.
While over all hangs the rich purple eve,
As conscious of its being her last farewell
Of light and glory to that fated city.

And, as our clouds of battle, dust, and smoke,
 Are melted into air, behold the Temple
 In undisturbed and lone serenity,
 Finding itself a solemn sanctuary
 In the profound of heaven ! It stands before us
 A mount of snow fretted with golden pinnacles !
 The very sun as though he worshipped there,
 Lingers upon the gilded cedar roofs ;
 And down the long and branching porticoes,
 On every flowery-sculptured capital,
 Glitters the homage of his parting beams.
 By Hercules ! the night might almost win
 The offended majesty of Rome to mercy."

—*Millman's "Fall of Jerusalem."*

52. *Gratitude* is a feeling of thankfulness which springs up in the heart towards any one who has bestowed kindness upon us, and seems to us to be a compound of Love, Admiration, and Respect. The mien should be submissive and respectful ; the tone of voice should be sincere and hearty ; the right hand laid upon the left breast, to express the reality of the emotion which is felt. Several instances may be found in the Tragedy of "Douglas." We may also refer to the beautiful episode of Palemon and Lavinia, in "Thomson's Seasons."

53. *Curiosity* gives a keen, pert inquisitiveness to the countenance—sharpness to the eye ; opens the mouth ; extends the neck ; inclines the body forward ; and frequently imparts volubility to the tongue and extravagance to the gesture. It is compounded of Inquiry, Admiration, Desire, Perplexity, and often Envy. It is busybodyish and chattering. Our readers will remember the instances of Paul Pry, Peeping Tom of Coventry, Sandy Mc Screw, &c.

54. *Persuasion*. How admirably true to Nature are the lines in which Anacreon gives the following order to the painter who is to create on the canvass the ideal of his mistress—

Γράφε χεῖλος, οἷα Πειθοῦς,
 Προκαλουμενον φίλημα.*

This implies the flattering attractiveness which this passion calls into the countenance. The tone is kind, soft, winning, insinuating and emphatic. Every effort which can work upon the feelings is exerted by it.

"Nay, dearest, nay ; if thou wouldst have me paint
 The home to which—could Love fulfil its prayers—
 This hand would lead thee, listen !—A deep vale
 Shut out by Alpine hills from the rude world ;
 Near a clear lake, margined by fruits of gold
 And whispering myrtles ; glassing softest skies
 As cloudless—save with rare and roseate shadows—
 As I would have thy fate !
 A palace lifting to eternal summer
 Its marble walls, from out a glossy bower

* "Paint her lips like Persuasion's,
 Provoking a kiss."

Of coolest foliage musical with birds,
 Whose songs should syllable thy name ! At noon
 We'd sit beneath the arching vines, and wonder
 Why Earth could be unhappy, while the Heavens
 Still left us youth and love ! We'd have no friends
 That were not lovers ; no ambition, save
 To excel them all in love. We'd read no books
 That were not tales of love,—that we might smile
 To think how poorly eloquence of words
 Translates the poetry of hearts like ours !
 And when night came, amid the breathless heavens
 We'd guess what star should be our home, when love
 Becomes immortal ; while the perfumed light
 Stole through the mists of alabaster lamps,
 And every air was heavy with the sighs
 Of orange groves and music from sweet lutes,
 And murmurs of low fountains that gush forth
 I' the midst of roses !—Dost thou like the picture ?"

—*Claude Melnotte, in Bulwer's "Lady of Lyons."*

55. *Tempting* is, of course, only a dishonest application of the above, and is expressed much after the same fashion,—only heightening the flattery, and imparting greater cunning to the manner.

Goneril—

Sir, I

Do love you more than words can wield the matter,
 Dearer than eyesight, space, and liberty ;
 Beyond what can be valued rich or rare :
 No less than life, with grace, health, beauty, honour ;
 As much as child ere loved, or father fond,—
 A love that makes breath poor, and speech unable ;
 Beyond all manner of so much, I love you."

—*King Lear.*

56. *Promising* is an act of the benevolent affections, and consequently displays a degree of good-will, suavity, and kindliness. The tone of voice is gentle and pleasing ; the face cheerful, and expressive of benevolence. The head nods assent ; the hands are held out towards the party addressed ; and the hand may be laid upon the breast in token of sincerity.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Greenwich Lecture Hall.—The annual soiree of the "Discussion Class," in connection with the above Institution, took place on the evening of Wednesday, Jan. 15th, 1851. David Bass, Esq. (secretary of the Greenwich society) occupied the chair ; Ebenezer Neville, Esq. (secretary of the class) the vice chair. At six o'clock upwards of two-hundred partook of "the cup that cheers, but not inebriates," after which W. C. Connor, Esq., M.A., gave as a sentiment, "The development of the Human Mind ;" W. C. Bennett, Esq., "Our Lady Guests ;" D. G. Paine, Esq. (author of "The Task of our Age,")

"The education of the people ;" Henry Mutch, Esq. (secretary of the Woolwich Athenæum) "The Greenwich Society and all kindred institutions ;" and the vice-chairman, "The Discussion class," and "The poets of England." The toasts were interspersed with recitations, and the meeting enlivened in addition with some very excellent vocal and instrumental music, by Miss Felton, and Mr. T. Somerford (late organist of Canterbury cathedral). We hope to have the pleasure of chronicling in the "British Controversialist," again and again, many similar feasts both for the body and the mind.

Manchester.—Dalton Club, Cheetham.—The third quarterly meeting of this Association, was held on Saturday, March 29, at the Club-room; Mr J. G. Royle in the chair. After the reports of the hon. secretary (Mr W. F. Peacock), and the treasurer (Mr T. H. Johnson), were read, and which showed a steady increase in the prosperity of the club, the chairman opened the business of the meeting by congratulating those present, and the members generally, on the satisfactory condition of the club, and the interest taken by the members in promoting their own intellectual and social improvement. He was confident that nothing was more productive of good results than such societies as theirs, if conducted properly. Education was the great question of the age; and there were parties in that town who had taken the question up, and who were endeavouring to obtain an act of Parliament for the "establishment of a system of national secular education, to be supported by local rates levied on the same assessment as the poor-rate," &c. Her Majesty's judges, in their charges, stated that education was the best barrier to crime; and that crime would not decrease until a national system of education were adopted, in which all might participate. He gave his adherence to the association, which was at present carrying out its projects in that town, and he was glad to see that it was obtaining more sympathy every day. He next referred to the incalculable advantages derived from Discussion Societies, and mentioned a new periodical, called "The British Controversialist," to which he particularly directed the attention of his auditory, as it was a work well-conducted, and ought to be read by every member of discussion societies. During the evening, speeches were made, and songs given, by Messrs W. F. Peacock, T. H. Johnson, A. Wright, J. Whitehead, — Hampson, &c. Votes of thanks were then cordially passed to the retiring committee, the officers, and the chairman for the evening,

and the meeting separated; the chairman exhorting those present to promote the interests of the club, as far as lay in their power.

Manchester.—Elm Street Second Mutual Improvement Society.—The first annual meeting of this Society was held on Thursday evening, March 6, on which occasion, the members and some of their friends partook of tea together. A report of the past year's proceedings was read by the secretary, from which it appeared that twenty-eight meetings had been held, and the time occupied by the reading of essays on important subjects, the discussion of great questions, and a review of passing events of the day. The object of this society is to afford means for self-improvement, on the mutual principle, to the junior teachers and elder scholars of Elm Street Sunday school; and it is pleasing to be able to state that this object has in a great measure been realized.

Pontefract Mechanics' Institute.—The third anniversary soirée of this Institute, was held in the Town Hall, on Tuesday evening, April 1. The Rev. R. Stainforth, the vicar of Pontefract, occupied the chair, and opened the meeting with a talented and pleasing address on the advantages of knowledge, and the benefits of Mechanics' Institutes. The Hon. and Very Rev. the Dean of Ripon was present, and with Mr. S. Wilderspin, of Wakefield, and other gentlemen, afterwards addressed the meeting. We understand that Mr Wilderspin has kindly consented to give a course of four lectures to the members and friends of the Institute, on "The Mind, and the means of improving it." A band of music was in attendance, and contributed much to enliven the meeting by playing several select and appropriate airs. The meeting was highly interesting, and passed off with the greatest *acclat*.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

49. Will some of your correspondents kindly inform me what periodical would best aid me in the study of the Law, as I am just articled to a solicitor, and am truly anxious to become proficient in my profession?—W. L.

50. I am a young man desirous of becoming a Parliamentary reporter; will you be good enough to mark out a course of study which would enable me to arrive at proficiency in that profession?—H. B.

51. Can any of your readers inform me what is the best and shortest method of committing the propositions in Geometry to memory? Any person acquainted with Geometry is aware that the letters change position very frequently, and it is troublesome and laborious to bear in mind the manner in which they are arranged, so as to demonstrate the problem properly?—J. G. R.

52. Dryden's celebrated ode is entitled, "An Ode for St Cecilia's Day." Who was St Cecilia?—J. M.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

32. *Chemistry*—(concluded from page 180).—Chemical agents may be classed under two grand divisions—Imponderable and Ponderable. The Imponderable agents are Caloric (heat), Light, Electricity, etc.

The Ponderable are such as are possessed of an appreciable weight. Of these there are four classes—1, Supporters of combustion; 2nd, Non-metallic combustibles; 3rd, the Metals; 4th, the Metalloids.

Caloric exists in all bodies, although in different degrees; in different bodies, and at different times. The chief sources of heat are the

sun, electricity, chemical and mechanical action, &c. Heat is communicated to the different parts of the same body, and to near, though distant, bodies by *Conduction*, to distant bodies by *Radiation*. Conduction signifies the power of transmitting heat from one part of the same body to another, or from one contiguous body to another. Bodies possess this power in various degrees—e.g., if one extremity of an iron rod be placed in the fire, it will become gradually heated along its several parts to the other extremity, while a rod of dry wood may be burnt at one extremity without being sensibly heated at the other. Radiation signifies the power which bodies possess of diffusing heat by *radii* or rays—i.e., straight lines proceeding from a common centre. Radiated heat is capable of undergoing three operations—viz., Reflection, Absorption, and Transmissiion. Heat causes expansion and contraction, and consequently a change in the Densities of bodies, Liquefaction, Vaporization, and Ebullition, &c.

Light, the agent by which objects are made visible, possesses the properties of Reflexibility, Refrangibility, Polarization, Decomposability, and Chemical Action, &c. The last mentioned manifests itself, among other things, in the human frame, the colours of flowers, the development of the forms of some of the lower animals. It has begun to attract so much attention as to be studied under the name of Actinism.

Electricity exerts an important influence in producing chemical changes—so much so, that Electro-Chemistry, as we have previously said, forms an interesting subsidiary science;—to give even an epitome of its chief teachings, would require more space than we can at present allot to this already extended notice. We may, however, give an instance.—If a strong current of electricity be passed through slender wires of the finest flattened steel, they will ignite, melt into globules, and be slightly oxydized.

The chief *Supporters of Combustion* are Bromine, Chlorine, Fluorine, Iodine, Oxygen, &c.

The principal agents comprehended under the class *non-metallic combustibles* are Boron, Carbon, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Phosphorus, Sulphur, Selenium, etc.

The general characteristics of the class denominated *Metals*, are simplicity and fixedness of texture, brilliancy and opacity, insolubility in water and infusibility by heat. The principal *metals* are Platina, Gold, Silver, Mercury, Copper, Iron, Tin, Lead, Zinc, etc.

Metalloid, is a word which signifies having a resemblance to a metal, the termination *oid*, being derived from the Greek *ἴδος*, appearance, form, species. Metalloids are in the strict sense of the term, metals, but they differ from those mentioned under that class, in their greater affinity for oxygen, and the difficulty of gaining and keeping them in a pure state. The illustrious Sir H. Davy was the first discoverer in this field—having, by a most intricate but convincing experiment, decomposed potash by means of a Voltaic pile, and thence obtained at the one pole a quantity of oxygen, and at the other, the metal denominated potassium. The chief metalloids derived from Earths, are, Aluminum, Glucinum, Magnesium, Silicon, Thorion, Ytria, Zirconium, etc. The principal

of those derived from Alkalies are, Borium, Calcium, Lithium, Potassium, Sodium, Strontium, etc.

We have now taken as extensive a survey of this Science as our space will permit; we have pointed out the utility of it in the various relations of life, and the multiplex relations which it bears to human necessities; we have glanced at the most important of the branches of which it consists, and given a brief abstract of the course of instruction which it yields; it now remains for us to point out to our reader, the best sources that we know from which further information may be gained:—Pinnock's Catechism of Chemistry; Rudiments of Chemistry, Chambers' Educational Course; Chemistry for Beginners, by Lebrun; Scofield's Chemistry no Mystery; Griffith's Recreations in Chemistry; Brande's Manual of Chemistry; Daniell's Introduction to the Study of Chemical Philosophy. The three latter mentioned are published by J. W. Parker; A Chemical Catechism, by T. J. Graham, M.D. etc., Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.—S. N.

32. *Astronomy*.—As it is not probable that T. S., in seeking information as to the best method to be pursued in order to gain a knowledge of this science, means more than the attainment of a certain amount of information, with regard to the laws deduced, and facts accumulated, by the researches of practical astronomers,—a very different order of mind, be it observed, from the *dilettanti* student, who receives with but a vacant kind of apprehension those wondrous laws, and marvellous data, the results of calculations and reasonings, which none but minds trained with mathematical severity, and gifted with large intuitional precision could possibly make;—assuming this to be his object, we should advise him to employ the usual subdivisions of mathematical and physical astronomy; or, first, so far as his mathematical attainments will serve him; and these, unless he be very deficient, in conjunction with the numerous explanatory treatises now published, will be sufficient to enable him to investigate the values and forms of the heavenly bodies, their distances, magnitudes, and motions. And secondly, let him study the nature of the forces that carry on these motions, the laws they observe, and the calculations obtained from a knowledge of those laws. A slight sketch of the starry sphere, as presented to our view and apprehension by astronomical research, may assist the beginner in his realizations of the primary facts in the first division of this study; and with this belief, we enter on the following detailed outline.

The most common-place observer has perceived in the circling motion described by the stars, a point, in the neighbourhood of which the stars' orbits are of very limited extent. This point is called the North Celestial Pole, and is of the first importance for astronomical references. No visible star is actually located in it, but the well-known pole-star revolves near it. On turning our gaze in an opposite direction—to the south point, we discover that stars just appear above the horizon, and then almost immediately disappear, and at the end of twenty-four hours repeat the same movement. From this we infer

(and astronomical observation justifies such inference) that there is a large region of stars out of sight, corresponding to those which meet our nightly gaze; and that the centre of the movements of this southern division will form the South Celestial Pole. An imaginary line drawn from this north celestial pole to the south celestial pole is called the Axis of the heavens.

Having ascertained the position of the poles, and axis of the heavens, it is necessary to divide the sphere thus found into two equal parts; and this is done by drawing an imaginary plane at right angles with the axis of the sphere; this equal boundary line is called the Equator.

The point in the heavens directly over our heads is termed the Zenith, and is a sort of middle point in the visible half of the heavens. The point directly beneath our feet, could the earth be seen through, is called the Nadir. Now if this zenith or summit point were the true pole, and the axis of the heavens stood vertically, and the earth's movement took place in this position, the horizon and the equator would be the same; for the stars of the upper hemisphere would move round in one level, and be always above the horizon; and the stars of the northern hemisphere, consequently, would never be visible in our northern climes.

Another artificial circle supposed to be drawn in the heavens is the Meridian, and is represented by a circle of brass on the artificial globe; this line cuts the equator at right angles, and passes through the north and south celestial poles. The principal value of the meridian is to determine the greatest declination of the stars. Hence when the sun or moon passes the meridian, we know that it has reached its culminating point; and as it continues its course to the south-west we soon find that it is declining.

Now if T. S. will get a clear notion of the value of these lines, he will have little difficulty, if he prosecute this study diligently, in obtaining a good idea of the relative positions and movements of the stars. The limits of this paper forbid our entering on even a list of the varied courses of the heavenly bodies; and the facilities for obtaining works of reference in the present day, render such a descriptive list quite unnecessary here, even were the space at command.

In entering on the study of the physical division of this science, T. S. must direct his attention to a thorough apprehension of the theory of Gravitation, the Laws of Motion, and the Resolution of Forces; and the little book published by Chambers, "Matter and Motion," will assist him very much at the outset. These three sections, with the Laws of Kepler as applied to modern discoveries, will enable him to gain a tolerably complete knowledge of this science. A large and extensive acquaintance with this subject is, of course, only to be obtained by close, patient, and thoughtful study. The press teems with books on this and cognate subjects, so that it is a matter of some difficulty which to point out as best; but Chambers' "Astronomy," a volume published by Orr and Co., entitled, "Mechanical Philosophy, Astronomy, and Horology," together with Narrien's "Geodesy," part of the Sandhurst Course, may be especially recommended to students. —T. I.

36. *Improvement of the Memory.*—In the Feb. No. of the "Controversialist" I observed the question of J. M. C., asking to be informed of a remedy for a weak memory. It is true, that with a bad memory the student retains not half his reading, and therefore much of his labour goes for nought. My belief is, that in many cases want of memory arises from want of attention, and not from a natural defect. This opinion is corroborated by that of many eminent mental philosophers. (See Abercrombie on the "Intellectual Powers," Reid, Dugald Stewart, Brown, &c.) I should by no means advise J. M. C. to apply a too artificial remedy, for by such a course he will lose the power he still has. Let him exercise his memory constantly, but not overburden it. Let him try to remember ideas, not words—the substance of what he hears or ideas, and not the form. This is the most simple and dangerless method of improvement.

Again: if he be a reader, and cannot remember the substance of what he reads, there is no better plan than to keep a common-place book, although Dr. Johnson could not see its use. In this book he should enter the substance of what he peruses. Dr. Abercrombie speaks in favour of this method, and so does Locke. The first-named author says, "Memory and attention are greatly promoted by writing, provided it be done, not merely in the form of extracts from books, but in one's own words; in history, for example, in chronological tables, and on other subjects, in clear and distinct abstracts, neatly and methodically written." The mental advantages that accrue from such a plan are incalculable; for by noting down the important parts of what we read, the extracts are impressed upon our minds; for, as Sir William Jones says, "writing is the chain of the memory," and there in one page of our notebook is presented, in a concise form, facts, arguments, and authorities—indeed, everything that can aid us in forming our opinions.

In pursuing this plan, it is amazing to see how small a space the gist of a long-winded sentence occupies, especially if the notes studies brevity. For such a task, the brevity of Tacitus is desirable. I can sincerely assure J. M. C. that if he adopts this plan, the result will be satisfactory and beneficial. —Derox.

38. *Regulations for Debating Societies.*—Perhaps the following regulations, adopted by a society with which I am connected, may be of service to J. R., and other readers:—

I.—That any member be at liberty to propose a question for discussion, by entering it and his own name in a book to be kept for that purpose; but that all such questions be referred to the committee for approval.

II.—That arrangements be made with two members to open each debate;—one taking the affirmative and the other the negative of the question. That any person engaging to open a debate, *pro or con*, and failing to do so, and not providing a substitute, be fined one shilling.

III.—That the opening addresses shall not exceed fifteen minutes each; and that subsequent speakers be limited to ten minutes each. That the openers of a debate be allowed ten minutes each to reply, but that no other persons speak twice in a debate, except by way of explanation, or at the request of the meeting.

IV.—That at the close of each debate, the opinion of the members be taken upon the question by a show of hands, after which the chairman for the next evening be chosen.—L. S.

39. *Self-Knowledge*.—We think we understand your want, although you feel a difficulty in expressing it:—it is ignorance of human nature, and a consequent lack of self knowledge. We should recommend you to direct your attention—at least for a time—from Natural to Mental Philosophy; transferring your thoughts from the external to the internal, and endeavouring to discover the hidden

mysteries of your own being. There are many works that will aid you in the mental analysis; such, for instance, as Moore's "Man and his Motives," 8s.; Fichte's "Vocation of Man," 4s. 6d.; "Outlines of the History and Formation of the Understanding," 2s.—C. A.

41. *Works on Phrenology*.—The best elementary works on Phrenology are "Combes's Elements," Chambers' two Nos. on the subject, and "Bridge's Phrenology." The last is an eminently practical, unmetaphysical book.—R. E. C.

Notices of Books, etc.

A Progressive Course of Inventive Drawing, on the principles of Pestalozzi, for the use of Teachers, and for self-instruction; also with a view to its adaptation to Art and Manufacture. By Hermann Krüsi, Teacher at the Home and Colonial Normal Schools, and W. J. Whittaker, Teacher of Drawing. London: Ward and Co.

This is eminently an age of books—for "turn the leaf to read" where'er you may, a new book is sure to stare you in the face. Nor are they confined to one set of subjects, but everything has now its manual—from Egyptian Hieroglyphics down to the cure of corns and bunions. But one sign, which we think is an indication of the faithfulness of the times in which we live—of the earnestness of the men of the present, and of their bright hopes of the future—is the vast increase of books for the young,—school books, technically called, and otherwise. Even our literary men are turning their thoughts to the young, and the result is, that instead of those morbid, sickly things which were called children's books, stuffed as full of nonsense as the heads from which they came,—we have now books of real worth—books which, while they record facts, deal out sterling principles of morality: and a child may now pore over the dreams of sages in an attractive and delightful form. Nothing will long be shut out from childhood. For them all things are brought together. Even Dickens turns his pen to write a history of England for children; for which, we have no doubt, many will yet have cause to thank him. But among the many books brought forward for the instruction of children, this is one of the most delightful we have met with. And not only children, but adults would do well to study it: they may spend many pleasant hours over it, as we have. The idea of *inventive drawing* is new and attractive:—given so many acute, curvilinear, convex, concave, mixed angles, &c.; and then to work with your inventive faculties to put them together into all sorts of designs;—and beautiful designs we have seen, too, from boys only eight years of age. The various shapes and forms they will put together from a few simple lines is truly astonishing.

We would strongly recommend this book to

schoolmasters and schoolmistresses, and to all who wish to teach themselves the beautiful art of designing. They will find that they have not thrown away their time. "Many of the illustrations in this book (says the introduction) have been designed by a class of poor children, who were previously ignorant of drawing." And this we can readily take for granted, for what we have seen.

The plan of the work is thus stated:—"We purpose to arrange the following Lessons in Elementary Design in two courses. The aim of the first will be the development of simple forms, and their elementary combinations with straight and curved lines. The aim of the second will be the development of Perspective on the inventive principle, with a view to its application to Arts and Manufacture."

The second part, we understand, is in progress, and will shortly appear, when we shall be happy to resume our notice of the work. With regard to the price, we need only say, that it is within the reach of all classes.

Easy Lessons in Geography. By A. M. Sargeant. London: Dean and Son.

We reckon it as one of the pleasing signs of the times, that so many ladies have taken the pen in hand to prepare school books for the young. They always succeed in presenting their subjects in an attractive form, and in giving their lessons in a pleasing manner. It is thus with the writer of the little work before us. She explains the outlines of Geography in pleasing conversations between a father and his children—conversations which open with the honest juvenile exclamation—"Oh, I hate Geography!" and close with the gratifying acknowledgement—"I don't hate it now!" The work, as might be inferred from this, is intended for children; and yet we think it could be read with profit by some "children of a larger growth." In confirmation of this opinion, we may enumerate the contents of the first chapter;—"Cardinal points of the compass—Semi-cardinal points—Causes of day and night—Twilight—Causes of the seasons—Proofs of the Earth's rotundity."

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XIV.

RATIOCINATION.

FORMAL LOGIC.

"It will be readily acknowledged that many of the maxims of the School Logic are founded in Truth and Nature, and have so long obtained universal approbation, that they are now become proverbial in philosophy."—*Beattie*.

"The scholar of the first ages received into him the world around; brooded thereon; gave it the new arrangement of his own mind, and uttered it again. It came into him—life; it went out from him—truth. * * * It was dead fact; now it is quick thought. * * * In proportion to the completeness of the distillation, so will the purity and perishableness of the product be. But none is quite perfect."—*Emerson*.

Prior Analytics. This book, as well as that which succeeds it, received its title from the fact that the object which its author had in view in its composition, was to *analyse* the process of the reasoning faculty, and by this means to explain the elemental parts of which an act of reasoning consists. It begins by treating of the "conversion of propositions;" but this portion of its contents we thought proper to lay before our readers in our last paper, in order that they might have, in one continuous, comprehensive, and consecutive whole, an abridged account of the Aristotelic doctrine of Propositions; and that we might be able, on commencing this article, to enter at once on a consideration of the Syllogistic Theory. We hope this will be deemed a sufficient explanation of our having appeared to treat of the "conversion of propositions," as if the teachings of Aristotle on that topic had been contained in the book *Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας*, rather than in the *Ἀναλυτικά Πρότερα*.

A syllogism is an enunciation, in which, from certain admitted propositions, a necessary conclusion is drawn distinct from them, yet employing the same idea. When a doubt is entertained on any topic, it becomes, before we can proceed to solve it, a question. To resolve this doubt, and determine the question, we must proceed to compare the ideas contained in the question with some other idea to which they each bear a similar and mutual relation. When this is done correctly, the doubt will be cleared away, and, in the conclusion, the question will be answered. There are, thus, in every process of argumentation, three parts; 1st. The thing concerning which the question is asked; 2nd. The question asked concerning it; 3rd. The mutually agreeing common term with which they are compared. These are denominated respectively the *minor*, *major*, and *middle* terms; and the sentence in which the *first* and *third* are compared

together is called the *minor premise*; that in which the *second* and *third* are compared, the *major premise*; and the one which contains the comparison of the *first* and *second*, the conclusion; e.g., question, Does the moon shine by her own light?

(*Middle Term.*)

(*Major Term.*)

No body which changes its phases | shines by its own light. (*Major Premise*)

(*Minor Term.*)

(*Middle Term.*)

The moon | is a body that changes its phases; (*Minor Premise*).

(*Minor Term.*)

(*Major Term.*)

Therefore, the moon | does not | shine by its own light. (*Conclusion.*)

Figure is the technical term employed to designate the classification of syllogisms according to the various positions the *middle term* is able to occupy. This position, it is evident, can only be varied fourfold, as it can only be, I. The subject of the major proposition, and the predicate of the minor; II. The predicate in both; III. The subject in both; IV. The predicate of the major, and the subject of the minor, proposition. These, then, respectively, as numbered, constitute the *four* syllogistic figures.

Mood is also a technicalism. It expresses those *modifications* or changes which take place in syllogisms, in consequence of their differences in quantity and quality. Now, as there are four different kinds of propositions marked with the symbols A, E, I, O, and as each one of these four kinds may form any one of the three propositions, which, unitedly, form a syllogism, from a merely arithmetical view, it would appear that there would be sixty-four moods, as all the possible methods of combining them by threes amount to that number ($4 \times 4 \times 4 = 64$). This is only true numerically, however, for fifty-four of these either violate the rules which govern the formation of syllogisms, or are unnecessarily intricate, irregular, and involved, and have, in consequence thereof, been discarded. Some of these ten, again, are employed only in certain figures, as they contravene some one or more of the rules of these figures. This causes certain other retrenchments; so that, in all the figures and moods together, the valid forms of syllogism amount only to *nineteen*.

The undershown table will exhibit at one view the position of the terms in each of the figures and the moods validly employable in them.

FIG. I.

Moods.

	1	2	3	4
<i>Middle, Major</i>	A	E	A	E
<i>Minor, Middle</i>	A	A	I	I
<i>Minor, Major</i>	A	E	I	O

FIG. II.

Moods.

	1	2	3	4
<i>Major, Middle</i>	E	A	E	A
<i>Minor, Middle</i>	A	E	I	O
<i>Minor, Major</i>	E	E	O	O

FIG. III.

Moods.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Middle, Major</i>	A	I	A	E	O	E
<i>Middle, Minor</i>	A	A	I	A	A	I
<i>Minor, Major</i>	I	I	I	O	O	O

FIG. IV.

Moods.

	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Major, Middle</i>	A	A	I	E	E
<i>Middle, Minor</i>	A	E	A	A	I
<i>Minor, Major</i>	I	E	I	O	O

* The following monastic, doggerel quintet, has been composed, in order, among other purposes, to show the various kinds of propositions entering into each valid syllogism, and the moods which belong to each figure. The other mysteries which it contains will be explained hereafter. Meanwhile, we may intimate that the following words bear the translation which we place after them, viz., *dato primae*, give ye to the first; *secundae*, to the second; *tertia habet*, the third has; *quarta insuper addit*, moreover, the fourth adds.

The words untranslated show the number of the moods, and the italicised vowels in them the kind and order of the propositions:—

- Fig. I. *Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio dato primae*;
 Fig. II. *Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroko, secundae*;
 Fig. III. { *Tertia Darapti, Disamis, Datisi, Felapton,*
 Bokardo, Ferison habet: Quarta insuper addit.
 Fig. IV. *Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapo, Fresison.*

The dictum on which the *rationale* of the syllogism is founded, is, that “whatever is predicable or predicated concerning any term distributed, whether affirmatively or negatively, is predicable, or may be predicated, in the same sense, concerning any or every thing contained under that distributed term.” The following axioms, too, are worthy of being remembered, namely, 1st. If two things agree, in the same sense, with one and the same third, they agree with one another, in that sense. 2nd. If, of two things, one agrees, and the other disagrees, in the same sense, with one and the same third, they disagree, in that sense, with each other. 3rd. If, of two things, neither agrees with one and the same third, in the same sense, no inference is deducible. 4th. Particular terms are contained in universals, but universals are not contained in particulars. 5th. The aggregation of all the particular terms contained in a universal, is equal to that universal. From these axioms are deduced the following *seven* general rules, by which the validity of syllogisms is to be judged. The syllogism which violates *any one* of them cannot be accepted as *formally* true. It is in consequence of their not fulfilling the requirements of these rules that the great number of moods before mentioned have been rejected.

I. The middle term must be distributed, i.e., taken in its entire extension, at least once in the premises, else the conclusion will be illegitimate. When the middle term is undistributed, it stands only in an ambiguous and equivocal relation to the other terms, and is thus virtually equivalent to two middle terms, the other terms not being compared with one and the same third, but with different parts of the same whole. The first axiom is thus contravened, e.g., from the premises, *coal is a mineral, granite is a mineral*, it is not at all inferable that *coal is granite*.

II. No term must be distributed in the conclusion which was not distributed in, at least, one of the premises. This would produce an *illicit process* either of the *major* or *minor term*. It would be equivalent to the introduction of a fourth term. It would violate the fourth axiom, by considering a universal contained in a particular, e.g., *All men educated in universities are intelligent. Artizans are not educated in universities*, will not at all warrant the conclusion, *Artizans are not intelligent*.

III. From two negative premises no conclusion is deducible. This is a mere repetition of the third axiom; the premises do not assert any agreement, they only state the fact of the disagreement of their terms with the middle, and, consequently, nothing can be determined regarding the agreement or disagreement of these terms between themselves, e.g., though I assert *Syrius is not a planet, Procyon is not a planet*, these dicta prove nothing.

IV. From two affirmative premises a negative conclusion cannot follow; for, if there be but one middle term, both terms agree with it, and cannot therefore disagree by axiom first.

V. One negative premise necessitates a negative conclusion. In a negative premise, the middle term disagrees with the other term, it follows from rule III. that the other premises must be affirmative, i.e., it must express the agreement of the middle term with the other term, by axiom three, then they must disagree, and the expression of that disagreement constitutes the conclusion negative.

VI. From two particular premises nothing can be inferred. For, if they are both affirmative, the middle term will be undistributed, which contravenes rule I. If the one is negative, and the other affirmative, the conclusion must, by rule V., be negative, but the predicate of the negative conclusion must be universal; if it be so, there is no distributed middle term, and rule I. is again violated. By rule V. they cannot both be negative.

VII. If either of the premises be particular, the conclusion will be particular. If they are both affirmative, to draw a universal conclusion would give an *illicit process*, for a term would be taken distributed in the conclusion which was undistributed in one of the premises in opposition to rule II. If one be affirmative, and the other negative, there will be two particular terms in the premises, namely, the *predicate* of the *affirmative*, and the *subject* of the *negative proposition*, the *predicate* of the *conclusion* will consequently be *universal* and the *subject-particular*, and hence would result a *particular conclusion*.

These rules are also expressed in the following lines, namely,

Distribuas medium; nec quartus terminus adsit;
Utraque nec praemissa negans, nec particularis,
Sequitur partem conclusio deteriorem;
Et non distribuat, nisi cum praemissa, negativ.*

The following are examples of all the Valid Syllogisms as they appear in each Figure and Mood.

FIGURE I.

BAR- All persons possessed of irresponsible power are incapable of bearing opposition, or the assertion of the self-rights of others.

BA- All autocrats are possessed of irresponsible power;

RA. Therefore, all autocrats are incapable of bearing opposition, or the assertion of the self-rights of others.

* Thou shalt distribute the middle, nor let four terms be present;
And neither may both premises be negative or particular;
The conclusion must always follow the weaker part,
And it shall not distribute or deny unless when (one of) the premises do so.

- CE- *No delinquency deserves free pardon.*
 LA- *All forgery is delinquency ;*
 RE-NT. Therefore, no forgery deserves free pardon.
 DA- *All things productive of social amelioration deserve attention.*
 RI- *Some sanitary measures are productive of social amelioration ;*
 I. Therefore, some sanitary measures deserve attention.
 FE- *Nothing which impedes commerce can be ultimately advantageous to the revenue.*
 RI- *Some taxes on exports impede commerce ;*
 O. Therefore some taxes on exports cannot be ultimately advantageous to the revenue.

FIGURE II.

- CE- *No vicious conduct is praiseworthy.*
 SA- *All instances of generous devotion are praiseworthy ;*
 RE. Therefore, no instance of generous devotion is vicious conduct.
 CA- *All virtuous actions are lastingly beneficial.*
 MES- *No act of deception is lastingly beneficial ;*
 TRES. Therefore, no act of deception is a virtuous action.
 FES- *Nothing is right which will ultimately produce evil.*
 TI- *Some kinds of company-keeping will ultimately produce evil ;*
 NO. Therefore, some kinds of company-keeping are not right.
 BA- *All the truly noble are virtuous.*
 RO- *Some who are called noble are not virtuous ;*
 KO. Some who are called noble are not truly so.

FIGURE III.

- DA- *All kinds of lightning are attracted by trees, water, metallic substances, etc.*
 RAP- *All kinds of lightning are dangerous ;*
 TL. *Some dangerous things are attracted by trees, water, metallic substances, etc.*
 DI- *Some things which increase the difficulty of gaining foreign articles cause smuggling.*
 SA- *All things which increase the difficulty of gaining foreign articles are high import duties ;*
 MIS. Therefore, some high import duties cause smuggling.
 DA- *All taxes not proportioned to the condition of those who pay them are unjust.*
 TI- *Some of the taxes which are not proportioned to the condition of those paying them are the window tax, the advertisement tax, the income tax, &c.*
 SI. Therefore, the window tax, the advertisement tax, the income tax, &c., are unjust.
 FE- *No ruler who attempts to restrain what is beyond his control, e.g., thought, is wise.*
 LAP- *Some rulers who attempt to restrain what is beyond control, e.g., thought, are Hierarchs of the Church ;*
 TON. Some Hierarchs of the Church are not wise.
 BO- *Some truly noble-minded men are not philosophers.*
 KAR- *All truly noble-minded men are worthy of admiration ;*
 DO. *Some who are worthy of admiration are not philosophers.*
 FE- *No wise man pursues that, in the attainment of which, he thinks he will be unsuccessful.*
 RI- *Some wise men pursue fame ;*
 SON. Some who pursue fame think they will not be unsuccessful in gaining it.

FIGURE IV.

- BRA- *All the wonderful operations of Nature are continually in action.*
 MAN- *All things that are continually in action do not surprise us ;*
 TIP. *Some things that do not surprise are the wonderful operations of Nature.*

- CA- All miracles are *things of rare occurrence*.
 ME- *No things of rare occurrence* make a slight impression on the mind;
 NES. None of the things which make a slight impression on the mind are miracles.
 DI- Some taxes on the necessities of life are *oppressive*.
 MA- *All that is oppressive* ought to be repealed;
 RIS. Some taxes on the necessities of life ought to be repealed.
 FE- No immoral acts are *permitted as amusements*.
 SA- *All that is permitted as amusements* is calculated to inspire joy;
 PO. Some things calculated to inspire joy are not immoral acts.
 FRE- No acts of injustice are *legitimate means of enrichment*.
 SI- *Some legitimate means of enrichment* fail;
 SON. Some things fail that are not acts of injustice.

It cannot have escaped the notice of any one who has attentively studied the examples of syllogisms which we have given, that those of the first figure are most natural in their form, possess the power of placing the truth most obviously before the mind, and that they yield conclusions of all the four sorts, namely, affirmative, negative, universal, and particular. The syllogisms of the first figure gain this completeness of comparison, this clearness, immediacy, and directness, from their strict accordancy with the Aristotelic *dictum*. It is, on this account, looked upon as the perfect mood, while all others are esteemed imperfect ones. The principles on which the other figures depend, however, are quite conformable to the dictum, as well as to the principles, of *common sense*. They are these:—Fig. 2nd. If any quality, property, or attribute, is universally predicable of any certain class of objects, any object which does not, or class of objects which do not, possess that quality, &c., cannot possibly belong to that class; or, if a quality, etc., is universally predicable, as not existing in any member of any class, any object which does, or class of objects which do, possess that quality, &c., is manifestly predicable as not belonging to that class; hence, all the conclusions of the second figure are negative. Fig. 3. If two qualities, properties, or attributes, belong to the same class, or the same part of a class, they *may coexist* in the same class, or part of a class; but, if one of the two qualities, etc., belongs to the same class, or the same part of a class, and the other be excluded from that class, or part of a class, they do not invariably coexist in the same class, and hence, the conclusion of the third figure must be particular. Fig. 4. If a whole class, or any part of it, be contained in another, and that other in a third, the first class must contain some members of that third; again, if a whole class, or any part of it, is excluded from another which is wholly or partly contained in a third, the first is in part excluded from that third; but, on the contrary, if one class is universally contained in another from which a third is completely excluded, that third is wholly excluded from the first; hence, in the fourth figure, we cannot have a universal affirmative conclusion. To obviate these imperfections, a method has been contrived by which the imperfect moods of these three figures may be changed into the perfect moods of the first, by certain alterations in the terms or propositions of which the syllogisms consist; this is designated REDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. The imperfect mood to be reduced is the *Reducend*; that to which it is reducible, the *Reduct*; and the object of the operation is so to alter the forms of the syllogisms, declared to be legitimate in the several moods of

the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th figures, as to produce equally valid ones in the first, either preserving the same conclusion, or producing one which, by conversion, will become its equivalent, or contradictory. Reduction is of two kinds, Direct and Indirect.

DIRECT OR OSTENSIBLE REDUCTION is employed, when, from the transposition or conversion of the premises contained in a syllogism of the imperfect mood, we gain one which yields the same conclusion in a perfect mood, or else one from which the same conclusion is immediately inferable by conversion.

INDIRECT REDUCTION, or, *Reductio ad impossibile vel ad absurdum*, is used when, by taking the contradictory of the conclusion, and one of the premises, we deduce a conclusion which contradicts the other premises—when we do not prove that the conclusion of the Reducend is true, but that it cannot be false, or that an absurdity would be the result of supposing it untrue. In a prior page, we gave a few doggerel verses, some portion of the mysteries of which we then explained, and promised to elucidate the others at another time. That period has come; and we now remark, that these lines are so constructed as to indicate the method of procedure which each mood requires for its *reduction*. The initial letters—B, C, D, F—point out to which mood of the first figure—Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio, respectively—the given moods may be altered; *M* signifies *mutandis præmissis*, i.e., the premises being transposed; *S*, indicates that the proposition symbolized by the vowel preceding it should be converted simply; *P*, that the conversion should be *per accidens*, or, by limitation; *K*, intimates that indirect reduction is to be employed: the use of contra-positional conversion, however, will render indirect reduction unnecessary. The following mnemonic lines are the key to the former quintet.

Barbara, demonstrat B; Celarent, C, reducit;
D, redit ad Darii; F, redit ad Ferio;
S, vult simpliciter verti; P, vero per accid;
M, vult transponi; K, per impossibile duci.*

The following Table will show at a glance the various kinds of reduction in each mood, and the method of its accomplishment:—

	<i>Reducends.</i>	<i>Reducts.</i>	<i>Method of Accomplishment.</i>
Fig. II.	Cesare	Celarent	Convert major premise simply.
	Camestres	Celarent	Transpose the premises; convert the minor and conclusion simply.
	Festino	Ferio	Convert the major premise simply.
	Baroko	Barbara	Reduce indirectly, or convert by contraposition.
Fig. III.	Darapti	Darii	Convert minor premise <i>per accidens</i> .
	Disamis	Darii	Transpose the premises; convert the major and conclusion simply.
	Datisi	Darii	Convert the minor premise simply.

* B, points out Barbara; Celarent reduces C;
D, yields to Darii; F, to Ferio;
S, wishes simple, but P, accidental conversion;
M, desires transposition; K, indirect reduction.

Fig. IV.	{	Felapton	Ferio	Convert the minor premise <i>per accidens</i> .
		Ferison	Ferio	Convert the minor premise simply.
		Bokardo	Barbara	Reduce indirectly, or by contraposition.
	{	Bramantip	Barbara	Transpose premises; convert conclusion <i>per accidens</i> .
		Camenes	Celarent	Transpose premises; convert conclusion simply.
		Dimaris	Darii	Transpose premises; convert conclusion simply.
		Fesapo	Ferio	Convert the major premise simply, the minor <i>per accidens</i> .
		Fresison	Ferio	Convert the major and minor premises simply.

EXAMPLES OF REDUCTION.

Cesare.

No sensualist is *truly happy*.
 All really wise men are *truly happy*;
 Therefore, no sensualist is a really wise man.

Darapti.

All good men are happy.
All good men resist their evil desires;
 Some who resist evil desires are happy.

Celarent.

No *truly happy man* is a sensualist.
 All really wise men are *truly happy*;
 Therefore, no sensualist is a really wise man.

Darii.

All good men are happy.
 Some who resist their evil desires are *good men*;
 Some who resist their evil desires are happy.

We have dwelt at so great a length on the *formal* part of the Prior Analytics, that we have left ourselves little room to point out the many wise, ingenious, and forethoughtful sayings, the acute distinctions and philosophical remarks with which they abound. A hasty and imperfect sketch is all that we can now present to our readers. The remainder of this treatise, contains instructions for the discovery of middle terms; the general principle laid down is, to examine the question so as to ascertain what is the point to be proven; then, to seek out such a term as shall bear the relation required in the mood or figure to be employed, as the rules of syllogism demand: after this, he occupies some chapters in showing the method of resolving propositions into their several parts, so that the truth of each individual part may be tested with care and caution, and concludes with a general description of the powers of syllogisms, their uses, and the most effective means of employing them in disputation.

Posterior Analytics. This book is a most important one, and we are sorry that our limits will not permit us to give more than what may be termed an *Index* of its contents. It commences with a dissertation on the distinction between the *form* and *matter* of a proposition; with this, however, we may presume that our readers are already fully acquainted. He then divides syllogisms into three sorts:—1st. Apodictical, or possessed of true premises, and duly *formal* in construction; 2nd. Dialectical, or possessed of only probable premises, and accurate as to the *form* in which it is cast; 3rd. Sophistical, or those which, while apparently true and formal, are really neither of the two. The principles of evidence afterwards engage his attention, but on this we have already enlarged,*

and therefore need not trouble our readers with further remarks on them. Causes he divides into—efficient, material, formal, and final; and then proceeds to treat in a most lucid and acute manner on Demonstration,—the general principle is, that there must be truths necessary, and eternal, which, either as the result of mere thought, evolution, or the influence of experience, naturally germinate in the mind, and are the seeds of all our future thought-blossomry,—that from these truths we derive others, but that each derivative truth is less surely evident than those from which they are derived,—that Experience, in its widest sense, Analogy, and Testimony, are the three “sources of evidence,”—and that all human thought is included in the threefold classification of Truth, Opinion, and Faith.

The second book contains the *Topica*, or a treatise on the Art and Method of Conducting Discourse; but, as this department is now usually consigned to the other branch of the *Trivium* Rhetoric, and, as it will be slightly noticed in the division, *Method*, we will not seek to synopsise it here.

The third book, *De Sophismatibus*, or an essay on the Causes of Error, and the nature of Fallacy, we purposely omit noticing, as it will occupy a whole article on a future occasion.

Here, now, our analysis must terminate. No one can be more sensible of its imperfections than we are ourselves. A few words upon the principle which has guided us in our labours, may not be amiss, to prevent a misunderstanding of the scope of our undertaking. In the first place, we desired to give a brief, yet comprehensive, view of “Formal Logic.” For this purpose, upon whose works could we fix more appropriate to our end than those of the great father of the science; but then, these writings did not contain a full exposition of the subject as at present understood, a few deficiencies of detail having been supplied by his followers in the course of the centuries that have rolled along since he had mingled with the dust. In this dilemma, two ways seemed to offer themselves fitted to our purpose; 1st. To give a complete *vidimus* of the whole spirit of the Aristotelic Logic, in our own words, and after our own manner, incorporating, at the same time, the trifling, yet necessary additions, of his followers, and then to signalize the chief of these in a remark in closing: or, 2nd. To abridge the *Organon* of Aristotle, as briefly as possible; then, to follow out the plan by specifying each itemal improvement, and its author. The former we adopted, because it was most likely to effect our object—was quite sufficient for the purpose at which we aimed; because it enabled us to be more brief, more systematic and intelligible, and gave greater coherency and methodicality to our outline than the other seemed capable of doing. In the second place, we wished to rescue the name of a philosopher whom we thought justly entitled to admiration and reverence from the traditionary and fashionable contempt with which the mention of it was treated. We have no reverence for falsehood, of however ancient lineage it may be, or however highly born; and, though we have no hope that our feeble pen will turn back the tide of obloquy which has been flowing for centuries, or that our weak words will weigh against the potent syllables breathed forth from the learned and eloquent lips of the occupants of professorial chairs, yet we have cast what we consider the seed of truth upon the mental soil,—it cannot be our fault if it produce not fruit.

These explanations are necessary, in order to prevent the captiousness of ungenerous criticism, or else they would have found no place here; nor would we have troubled our readers with the interruption, but that we consider it necessary that a full understanding should subsist in their minds of the presiding purpose under which a paper is written, in order that a proper estimate of its execution may be formed. To return, however, from digression, we must recall attention to the object which Aristotle, in the writings which have passed under our review, kept steadily before him—the discovery of “the precise process in which the mind invariably performs the operations of thinking.” He was ambitious of introducing, as far as possible, the same clearness, certainty, and methodicality into moral, social, and political truth-investigation, as previously existed in mathematical speculations. For this purpose, he carefully and acutely analyzed the reasoning process, in order to attain a knowledge of all the positions and combinations in which the act of comparison could be most distinctly and accurately made. Engaged in these inquiries, he discovered the *form* in which all reasoning proceeded in the mind; he elaborated this discovery in the manner we have seen, and gave this as his contribution to the science of mind. But this is only one phase of his answer to the oft-repeated and important query, What is truth? how and where is it to be found? Did it immediately concern our subject, we might point to his *Politics*, *Rhetoric*, *Ethics*, *Metaphysics*, and *Poetics*,—his essays “On Sensation, and the Objects of Sense,” “On Remembrance and Recollection,” “On Colours,” “On Sounds,” “On Meteorology,” &c., and his great work, the “History of Animals,” as triumphant refutations of the charge brought against him, of neglecting, if not actually opposing, experimental philosophy. Indeed, in the very books which we have been analyzing, he remarks, that “Experience furnishes the principles of every science. * * * If we were to omit nothing with which observation can supply us, regarding phenomena, we could easily acquire the demonstration of all that is demonstrable, and explain what is really incapable of being experimentally proved.”* We are far from defending his doctrines as perfect—how far we differ from him in our estimate of a true and valid Syllogistic Theory, will appear in future papers; but we think we have said enough to explain his doctrine,—to place the object for which he wrote in a clear light, and to enable our readers to judge for themselves of the position among the thoughtsmen of the world, which Aristotle, the Stagyræite, should occupy. If keen, acute, and searching analytical skill—cool, discriminating, investigative powers—patient, persevering, practical, and sensible “inquisition of nature,” and especially that most difficult department of nature—the human mind—be worthy of admiration, he displayed them all. If clear, concise, orderly, and concatenated exposition—elaborate, industrious, and difficulty-defying research—careful, complete, and thorough-going, critical, sagacity, be praiseworthy and honourable, his works exhibit all these qualities. Let us then yield him the “gratitude” he asks, and let us “not follow a multitude to do evil,” by heaping opprobrium, and antiquated and unmerited abuse upon the name of one who earnestly desired to be a benefactor of his race. Well may we use of him—despite of all his imperfections—the words of R. H. Horne, in “Orion,” and say that Wisdom

* *Αναλ υτικά Προτερα*, 1. 30.

“ Taught his mind

To reason on itself, far as the bounds
Of sense external, furnished images
And types in attestation of each phase
Of man's internal sphere—large orbit space
For varied lights—and also shewed the way
Rightly his complex knowledge to employ,
And from their shadows trace substantial things,
Things back again to shadows—thus evolving
The principle of thought from root to air.”

Philosophy.

IS MESMERISM TRUE ?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

OPPOSITION, in the present state of sub-lunary affairs, is an unfailing attendant upon Truth. Develop any higher ideas than those of which the world is already possessed, —discover to the gaze of mankind, in the boundless ocean of Truth, some little island hitherto unexplored, and by certain individuals you will be branded as an impostor, while the new territory, by whose discovery you fondly imagined you were meriting the applause of your fellow-mortals, is denounced as a *terra in nubibus*—a cloud which you, like some sea-worn voyager, have mistaken for solid earth. Strongly entrenched within the fortress of their own ignorance and self-sufficiency, and proud to enrol themselves among the self-styled enlightened public,—these persons think themselves in duty bound to keep due watch over the belief of this fashionable monster—the “public”—in order that he may not go beyond the *juste milieu*—the proper bounds, in putting credence in those often wonderful narratives which are brought to his ears. This class of individuals, finding themselves possessed of by no means a large endowment of the believing faculty, are apt to revenge themselves upon those of opposite tendencies, and to

their judgments, are no better than a set of credulous fools.

The mesmeric doctrines are no exception to this rule. They have been assailed by sneers and obloquy, while their believers have been held up to public reprobation as crazy enthusiasts. Now, however, the tide is turning, and the respectful manner in which the opponents of the science have conducted themselves towards it in the pages of the “British Controversialist” is a hopeful omen of its future success.

In the No. for March, we find that two letters of the alphabet—viz., C. A., have set themselves in array against the truths of Mesmerism. The mode of attack pursued by the said C. A. is a close approximation to the manner of skirmishing denominated by military men, *sharpshooting*. Some advocates of Mesmerism having taken a nap, and innocently dreamed therein of people going to the moon by means of Mesmerism—like the fast young lady, who had formed the intention of going to town by the electric telegraph ; C. A. reading these conjectural vagaries, straightway sets them down as axioms of the science, and proceeds in proper form to attack them as such. Now this appears to us very like a denunciation of railways, because some crazy engineer had proposed to carry a line to the Dog-star !

But let us come to the gist of the question. C. A. tells us that he disallows the claims of the mesmerists to credence on the following grounds :—

“Compound for sins they are inclined to,
By damning those they have no mind to.”

In other words, they devoutly believe that those persons who are willing candidly to examine and test the doctrine submitted to

1st. Because they are contrary to all experience, and our knowledge of the nature of things. They go not merely beyond our present knowledge, but they are opposed to it.

2nd. What the mesmeric advocates declare to be possible, they have not demonstrated by making actual.

Reason the first, might have been included under the single affirmation, that the mesmeric claims are contrary to experience. But *what* claims of Mesmerism are contrary to experience? C. A. has not thought proper to enlighten us on this point; we shall, therefore, take it for granted that Clairvoyance is one of them; the more so, that it seems, in an especial manner, to excite his hostility. Now, what facts of experience does Clairvoyance contradict? C. A. will doubtless answer, that people seeing at preternatural distance, and through opaque bodies, contradicts all our knowledge of optics, and of the eye as an optical instrument. Very good. But who informed you, C. A., that in such cases the subjects of the second vision see with their eyes? Did they, indeed, do so, then your argument would have held good; but as they do not, the question resolves itself into another, —What is the extent of your experience as to psychological existences? We shrewdly suspect the answer will be equal to *nil*. Having, then, no experience of spiritual being, how can you affirm that Clairvoyance is contrary to our knowledge of the nature of things? Moreover, regarding the alleged failures, it is, we think, by no means fair to disbelieve a science, merely because some of its experiments have failed.

On glancing over the paper of "Vinclum" we find nothing but a chain of assertions, which the writer appears to think are sufficiently based upon such phrases as "There cannot be the slightest doubt," "We have indubitable evidence," &c. And even supposing that his arguments had been stronger than they actually are, they could not have been said to militate much against the science; for his paper might, for anything we can see to the contrary, have been placed as readily on the affirmative as on the negative side of the question.

Lastly, we come to W. M., who has scarcely exercised his reasoning faculties in

the construction of his article, any more than "Vinclum." He commences with a dissertation on the antiquity of Mesmerism, which, we are informed, had its origin in Egypt—"that land of sorcery and dark deeds." W. M. would also do well to remember, that Egypt was the nursery of the arts and civilization. In paragraph the fourth, he admits the reality of mesmeric sleep, but seems dissatisfied with its effects, such as its exposing individuals suddenly aroused from its influence to the danger of insanity. What has this to do with the truth of Mesmerism? W. M. says, that "since an individual in the mesmeric trance can give information respecting events of which he had no previous knowledge, read books through a board or wall, &c., the said individual should also be able to tell us through what agency he has acquired those extraordinary powers." On the same ground, we might call on W. M., who has doubtless often witnessed heavy bodies fall to the ground, to explain by the operation of what causes their descent was produced. In the middle of the sixth paragraph, we meet a question in italics, which we shall simply controvert by saying, that persons in the mesmeric trance are not unconscious; but, on the contrary, their faculties, more especially in the sleep-waking state, are excited to a preternatural degree of exaltation. As to W. M.'s pet theory, guarded as it is by a "sand-bank," upon which, unluckily, it is also founded, we beg simply to state, that Mesmerism has already produced important effects as a curative agent.* Hence we refer W. M. to the reply of our Lord, when accused by the Pharisees of curing diseases through diabolical agency.

In conclusion, we entreat our readers candidly to inquire and judge for themselves, remembering, above all, that Mesmerism is still in its infancy, not having arrived at that maturity which would warrant the philosophical observer to construct a theory capable of comprehending all the various, and apparently contradictory experiences, which have been revealed of the science. When that auspicious moment shall have arrived, although we may not be able to

* See "Braid on Neuro-Hypnotism," and "Gregory's Letters," lately published.

remove the veil which clouds distant worlds from our gaze, yet we shall doubtless be able to comprehend a little more of that

infinitude which is no less interesting, and far more important—our own existence.

HAROLD.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

If unanimity in the pleading of advocates might be taken, as in the testimony of witnesses, as a proof of truth, our opponents in the present debate would certainly occupy a more favourable position than ourselves. But this is not the case; for the harmony of their arguments arises from the fact, that they have a given theory to establish, and our apparent diversity of opinion is accounted for by the different quarters from which we have assailed that theory. Despite of first appearances, we deemed this very diversity as something in our favour, showing, as it does, that Mesmerism possesses not merely one weak point, but that we believe it to be built upon the sands of conjecture, and that pressure upon any side will endanger the safety of the whole edifice.

In referring to the papers of those who have supported us in our negative position, we observe that we all agree, that there is *some* truth in Mesmerism, though not sufficient to make it true as a science. But let not its defenders think that the first admission is worth much to their cause; for we believe with Bossuet, that "every error is a truth abused." The fact that rigidity of the limbs may be produced in many persons by various processes, (and amongst others, by mesmeric passes,) no one presumes to deny; but that Magnetism, much less *Animal* Magnetism, has anything to do with it, remains to be proved. Indeed, the recent experiments of mesmerists go directly to substantiate the contrary; for it has been lately asserted by a Dr Darling, now lecturing in London, that a person may mesmerise himself, by holding a common shilling in his hand, gazing continually upon it, and abandoning himself to whatever sensations may come over him. But a shilling is not necessary: "the dervishes of the east gaze into their own navels," and then fall into a trance! Mr Braid, of Manchester, to prove that Animal Magnetism has nothing to do with the rigidity of the limbs, in the way of direct causation, asserts that he can produce

"precisely similar sensations in *certain sorts of people, without an instrument.*" He has only, by word or sign, to excite the expectation of the occurrence of certain sensations in the patient's mind, and they are experienced. If these things are so, where is that principle of Animal Magnetism of which mesmerists have made so much?

Taking the ascending scale, we come to Clairvoyance, of which A. W. thinks we made too much in our former paper. He asserts that this is not the subject of discussion, although he admits that it is a part of it. Surely our friend has not forgotten that "the greater includes the less." It is patent to all the world, that Clairvoyance occupies no mean space in the so-called science of Mesmerism; and, therefore, its discussion "is necessary to the settlement of the question." With respect to A. W.'s remarks about professing to write a treatise on the Solar System, and then confining attention to the planet Neptune, we have only to request him to put the case fairly, and he will then see its true bearing, and see, too, that it would be quite proper in treating for instance, upon the theories formed respecting the motion of the heavenly bodies, to refer to the motion of the planet Neptune, or any other planet, as bearing upon these theories. Let A. W. remember that truth is always consistent with itself; and if he finds contradictions and absurdities in new-fangled systems of science, he may be sure that there is something rotten at their heart's core.

Neither A. W., nor the redoubtable "Harold" appear very anxious to say much upon this said subject of Clairvoyance; and we can understand "the why and the wherefore," when we refer to the marvellous discoveries which it has made, the following instance of which is now going the round of the newspapers, on the authority of the *Melbourne Argus*:—"A Melbourne lady, in a clairvoyant state, declares that Sir John Franklin has reached England in safety, and

that there were great rejoicings in consequence !” Alas, that such beautiful ideas as our mesmeric friend possesses should ever be brought to the rough test of actual life, and we feel inclined in pity to address to them the words of Byron—

“ Ill-starred, though brave, did no visions foreboding,
Tell you that fate had forsaken your cause ? ”

Since writing our opening paper, we have met with an article on the “ Magician’s Clairvoyance Explained,” an extract from which we subjoin for the edification of our readers :—

“ The whole system of presumed ‘ double-sight ’ rests with two persons—one who advances to the audience to receive the article desired to be experimented upon, and who asks a question of the other ; and the blind-folded person, who replies. The effect of these questions and answers being arranged into a system and order, constitutes the whole art of Clairvoyance.

“ Every question has a corresponding answer ; and to be perfect, requires a good memory. The simplicity of the questions principally misleads the audience, being no other than an ordinary interrogation which any one would make, modified only by an understanding between the confederate parties, that the same sentence, differently arranged or put, calls forth a different reply, thus ;—

‘ Q.—Is it plain or ornamented ? A.—Ornamented.

Q.—Is it ornamented or plain ? A.—Plain.’

“ We will now give a few illustrations of the system of questions and answers, premising that the same order can be, and is frequently, carried out to a very elaborate extent.

‘ FOR COLOURS.

‘ Q.—What colour is it ? A.—Black.

What is the colour ? Blue.

Tell me the colour. Green.

Has it a colour ? White.

Any colour ? Orange or Yellow.

Name the colour. Brown.

‘ FOR METALS.

What metal ? Gold.

What is the metal ? Silver.

Tell me the metal. Copper.

Name the metal. Iron or steel.

What metal is it ? Brass.

‘ FOR MONEY.

What have I now ? Money.

Now what have I got ? A sovereign.

Can you tell again ? Half-crown.

Is this the same ? A shilling.

You say I have money, but don’t tell me the coin ? A florin.

You say I have money ; why not tell me the value, if you can see it ? Half-a-sovereign.

I cannot hear you. A bank-note.

What is its value ? Five pounds.

Of what value is it ? Ten pounds.

Can you tell its value ? Twenty pounds.

How much is it worth ? Fifty pounds.’

“ The above illustrations are sufficient to show the plan of simple questions ; but as it frequently happens that *particulars* of the article are required, they then become complex, but are no less easily understood than the simple questions, because the latter are only combinations of the former.

“ It should be understood that the questioner, during the process of eliciting the answers, uses such actions as are necessary to call forth the replies.”

We have given sufficient explanation to show the basis of the system and illustrate the principle on which many wandering mesmeric lecturers have astonished the “ natives ” of our country towns.

There is another class of mesmeric phenomena which we must notice, as C. W., jun., has said so much upon it ;—its curative effects. The truth of our friend’s preliminary remarks respecting the power of individual influence, and the contagious nature of some diseases, will be admitted by all ; but it does not follow from this that health is contagious, or that that may be transmitted. Indeed, C. W. appears to have formed an erroneous notion of the nature of health. He speaks of it as a “ principle,” instead of regarding it as nothing more than the absence of bodily pain, sickness, or disease. When he speaks of the creative power which every individual possesses, so that by “ concentrating his energies to one focus, he is enabled to originate a supply ” of this health-principle, “ either to support him through his own requirements, or to transmit to others for their benefit,” we are filled with wonder that he and his friends do not commence business on a large scale, and remedy “ the ills which flesh is heir to ! ” We are also somewhat surprised that when C. W. felt

his subject to be dry and uninteresting, he did not seek to enliven it by recording some of the "wonderful cures" resulting therefrom. They would have served a second purpose, in affording us the opportunity of comparing them with the miracles of Mormonism, and the still more wonderful miracles of the priests of the middle, *alias* the dark ages. We need not pursue the subject

any further than to observe, that when the mists of credulity envelop the mind, and *expectation* takes the watch-tower, we ought not to be astonished if imagination makes things that are, appear as though they were not; and things that are not, appear as though they were.

A. C.

History.

WAS OLIVER CROMWELL A FIRST-RATE GENERAL, A GREAT STATESMAN, AND A SINCERE MAN?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE—III.

AMONG the reminiscences of our first acquaintance with the historic page, are those of a line which, perhaps, oftener caught our eye than secured our consideration,—

"Though cunning, bold; and though intrepid, brave."

We could not have thought it other than a correct description of the individual whose history it preceded, though, had the character of Oliver Cromwell been summed up in a less favourable epitome, it would have been equally acceptable to our youthful loyalty, which had no conception of regal dignity but in connection with royal blood.

We are free to confess—and what school-boy of the last generation would hesitate to make a similar confession?—that with some admiration of Cromwell there was combined more of disgust. How could it be otherwise? As readily should we have questioned the veracity of the historian in any other point received with universal credence, as in this; as likely should we have suspected the patriotism that distinguished Cromwell's cousin, as the hateful qualities which, upon the same testimony, predominated in Cromwell's character. Thanks, however, to honest men than many of his biographers appear to have been, Oliver Cromwell now stands before us in a different light. In this light we shall consider him, yet adopting no new theory merely because it is *new*.

Novelties, as such, must here have no charms for us. To over-rate Cromwell's excellencies—to magnify them into the superhuman—to represent him other than *what he was*, would not only be an offence to truth, but would also be an act of indiscretion on the part of his friends, serving to perpetuate and strengthen the injustice which malevolence and prejudice have, and still would have, done to his memory.

Our vindictory remarks will naturally resolve themselves into the triple division which the question in discussion assumes,—Cromwell's GENERALSHIP, his STATESMANSHIP, and that abused element of his character which has been registered under the name of HYPOCRISY, but which we, with no mean precedents and pretensions, would prefer to denominate SINCERITY.

Was Cromwell a first-rate General? Assuredly he was. To adduce the evidence seems to us almost superfluous. It is too voluminous for enlarged recapitulation; it is, besides, acknowledged, though contemptibly vilified, by his enemies; and is what every person holding an opinion of Cromwell is supposed to know. It begins in the earliest struggles of an oppressed people, and ends only in that glorious victory with which successive struggles were crowned. It is manifest from the time that the farm was forsaken for the battle-field, till the victorious sword rested in its sheath. We might point the detractors of Cromwell's military

fame to the conquests of Grantham, Gainsborough, and Waisbyfield; to the memorable triumphs of Marston Moor and Naseby; and to the crowning overthrow of the adversary at Worcester, and ask if these do not show, beyond a doubt, the presence of a great Commander. If the conclusion be denied, we strip Cromwell of the facts, and invest them with the more relishable name of a Marlborough or a Wellington; we then ask if, associated with these names, they do not become credentials of distinguished military talent. And if admitted, ought they to suffer depreciation because they are not deeds of Waterloo or of Blenheim? At the least, Cromwell's title is equal to that of many who would pass, without dispute, as first-rate Commanders. In short, if there are qualifications which, combined, constitute a first-rate General: if these qualifications consist in ability to command; in high personal courage; in skill which is as sure to win a battle as to plan it; in sagacity to discover an enemy's weak points, and the means of compassing the stronger; in heroism not daunted by difficulties, and in purpose which at all hazards accomplishes its end; if any criterion be a wisely-chosen, well-disciplined soldiery, faithful alike to chief and country; and if any proof be uniform success, the causes of war removed, and its end triumphantly attained; and if a nation's thanks by means of its Parliament; of exaltation, honors, and titles awarded to the warrior be additional proof of first-rate generalship, then, undoubtedly, was Oliver Cromwell, whether fanatic, enthusiast, or madman, a first-rate General.

Was he also a great Statesman? We hesitate not to answer this question, too, in the affirmative. It will doubtless be conceded that a statesman who, by a certain set of wisely-adapted measures, wins for himself the appellation of a great Statesman, would not by the exercise of the same set of measures have gained the same repute in any age other than his own. For example:—Imagine Sir Robert Peel, with his schemes, transferred to the times of Wat Tyler, and where is his greatness? He may become a great man, but he must first re-frame and adapt his measures to the wants of his day. It will further be grant-

ed, as in the case of every statesman, that minor defections do not invalidate the claim to greatness which major excellencies bestow, inasmuch as human perfection being exceedingly uncommon, every man who does not possess it is willing to make allowance for his neighbour. Apply these remarks to the case before us. No sooner has Cromwell's day past, than (in addition to the scurrilous abuse which has always been showered upon his administration) his public acts for the rule of the Commonwealth are dragged forth, and from age to age, meted by the changing spirit of the times, are exposed successively to the censure of historian and divine, infidel and Christian, Parliament and people; and condemned as unstatesmanlike, vulgar, tyrannic and despotic. What can be more unfair? To remove Cromwell to other than his legitimate sphere, is, without a doubt, to extinguish his greatness. Viewing him as legislating for a later period than his own, his policy may be all that has been described, or even worse; but leaving him where we find him,—an occupant of the seventeenth century—his country the victim of deceit, and the scene of distraction; with a kingdom misgoverned and discontented, without a king, disagreeing about government; some clamouring for a creed, some for a crown, some for everything with religion, and others for everything without religion; a state of things made up of extremes, old untrue notions, and new false notions—the truth lying between; tyranny, and something more than liberty; absurdities, and something beyond reasonableness, as if (speaking reverently) old father Time, discovering a flaw in his work, had obtained a fresh importation of unripened material wherewith to improve it; physical force better understood than moral; a sword the best argument, for so said all good men, and so interpreted they the Bible;—viewing Cromwell as surrounded by, and battling with these, some of the bewildering mistakes and troublous elements of his time; and making for him that allowance which is due to human imperfection, and which the comparative rudeness of that age especially demands of us, and we arrive at a right comprehension of the policy of Cromwell. His levying war against the king; signing

the fatal warrant; his summoning and scattering parliaments by the breath of his mouth; substituting for constitutional government absolute and arbitrary rule;—his daring remedies for the evils of the body politic become understandable, reasonable acts,—the most of them justifiable, the worst excusable, and the whole a masterly display of superlative statesmanship. Unswervingly loyal,—nay, start not, reader, at the word! for he whom you have heard of as a regicide, *was* loyal to the sovereign power, though he felt, and rightly, that when that power had been forfeited by a king, his allegiance was no longer due to him, but to the people into whose hands the sovereignty had fallen;—of large sympathies with popular wants, animated with an ardent love of liberty, and possessing in an extraordinary degree the capacity to govern, and the determination, at all costs, to give embodiment to his convictions, and wanting none of the essentials of true greatness,—Oliver Cromwell stands out upon the records of statesmanship as mighty men do from meaner, meriting the testimony which has been borne by competent authority, that “Cromwell was the greatest prince that ever ruled England.” The results of his administration are advantages which cannot be questioned.

“Ah,” say some, “the arch-hypocrite: we might have little hesitation in acknowledging the warrior and statesman, but the sincere man is beyond discovery. Cromwell was not only a dissembler, but his dissimulation was of the most detestable kind—that which disguises itself in the garb of sanctimoniousness, and the show of doing for God what is alone done for self.” Well, history says so, and so does that influential authority, hearsay; but both have often been caught tripping, and perhaps it will be found in the present instance that if their province lie beyond facts, another construction would be more creditable. It is a little in our favour, that they are not quite unanimous in this particular. But leaving them to their agreements or disagreements, let us just glance at, in its foundations, this serious charge of hypocrisy. It rests on a concurrence of circumstances—on coincidences. Cromwell professed to be a religious man, and to have in view in all his under-

takings the glory of God; at the same time his measures are found to contribute to his own temporal advancement, and eventually to place him within the reach of that which has been represented as the summit of his ambition; *therefore* he was a hypocrite. Now, with respect to those who view all religion as hypocrisy,—the greater the godliness, the more complete the cheat,—we have no hope of their granting to Cromwell what they deny to those the most pure in heart. We disclaim all sympathy with them, and expect none in return. But to Christians professedly do we appeal, and ask them, Is it an uncommon thing to find a religious profession allied with those energies and capabilities which command success in life? Do you attribute improper motives in such cases of accidental coalition? And if you do not, will you refuse to Cromwell that which you grant to the Christian merchant? An under current of policy there doubtless was; but you allow this to the merchant, you allow it to the statesman, you allow it to yourself; you neither expect the one to show you his ledgers, nor the other to reveal the secrets of his cabinet, nor are you yourself so veridically ingenuous as to confess to every meddler you meet with, the why and wherefore of your prosperous doings, even though he should dare to nickname your prudence, and give to your religion the alias of hypocrisy. Sincerity!—if we may be allowed it in pleading for Cromwell’s—its denial to him would be perfectly incomprehensible to us, did we not know that religion has ever been branded by irreligion as hypocrisy and deceit. It was so before the days of the Puritans; was especially so in the generations that immediately followed them; and the name of Nazarene is still a reproached thing. Herein lies the secret. The scoffer labelled Cromwell “hypocrite,” and soon, other than the scoffer endorsed the lie. Honesty believed it, and may still suspect his sincerity; but if it will continue to doubt, we feel bound to ask for the evidence. Where is it to be found? In the worshipping hearth of St Ives—is insincerity there? In a frequented closet—is the Judas there, as false to his Master as to his fellow-man? In spoken words and written documents, warm with the heart’s freest and most fervent feelings;

in profession honoured by consistency ; in the *Christian* buffeting the rough storms of life, and triumphing in death over its ebbing billows—in these is the “leaven of the Pharisees” the operating and sustaining principle ? If it be, by what test detect you the presence of the base alloy ? Till you have fully satisfied us on these points, we must believe that Cromwell was a man of sincerity. We must believe that a spirit-impelling sincerity alone could have supported so magnanimous a career as his ; that it was because he *really meant*, that his life surpassed the common realities of being. We are pleased to observe that the religious consistency of Cromwell has not yet been assailed by our opponents in the present debate ; neither W. T. nor T. H. have defended the old prejudices, or brought forward the old charges against him. It is political hypocrisy that they affirm concerning him, and thus venture to attack his character as a Christian. This charge, and, indeed, all

others, we may leave to other hands ; fervently hoping that they may be investigated in a manner every way worthy of ENGLAND’S GREAT PROTECTOR. We would, however, make one observation in closing :—there may be those whose hatred of war will lead them to object that Cromwell’s military fame adds no lustre to his character. To them we reply,—This is a matter beyond our province : we have only to decide upon the merits of his claims to be called a first-rate Commander, without expressing approbation or disapprobation of war itself. We have our own opinion upon the latter ; but we cannot but remember that the sentiments which now obtain among the people of England upon this subject are far different from those of their forefathers some hundred years ago, when none but a Quaker would have dissented from the maxim—That it is lawful for Christian men to take up arms.

B. W. P.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

“Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest,
Some Cromwell guiltless of his country’s blood.”
—Gray.

“And Cromwell, he of iron frame,
And tongue of ready guide,
Gave but one glance, he dare not look,
On that sad martyr’s smile.
No, dared not ! for he felt and knew
He shared a murderer’s fame ;
He knew that thousands then unborn
Would curse his guilty name.”
—Cromwell and King Charles’s picture.

THE present question involves a triple consideration—foremost, whether Cromwell was a first-rate General?—next, was he a great Statesman?—and thirdly, was he a sincere man ? To us, the latter seems by far the more important point, for, in the absence of sincerity, the highest endowments, the most noble attainments, may be made subservient to the accomplishment of purposes the most vile, and ends the most debasing.

We shall, no doubt, lay ourselves open to the charge of ignorance, when we say that we know so little of the essential qualities of a great General, that we scarcely feel competent to venture an opinion on this point. We do indeed retain upon our

memory sufficient of our historic readings to remind us that Cæsar, Hannibal, William the Conqueror, and Bouaparte, are ranked among the greatest Generals the world has ever seen. But how shall this serve our present purpose ? If lapse of memory cause us not to err, the characteristic excellencies of these illustrious personages (!) consisted in their ability to destroy, in the *smallest* possible space of time, the greatest possible number of their fellow creatures—to besiege and pillage cities, towns, and villages—to desolate countries, and to spread war, misery, and famine, where peace, happiness, and plenty formerly prevailed. These were avocations in which they delighted, and in which they obtained world-wide notoriety ! If then, we ask, the qualifications of a great General are to be estimated by their total disregard of the sanctity of human life—turning a deaf ear to the cry of the orphan, and the prayer of the widow—ravishing the virtuous, and slaying the innocent—spreading terror and desolation in every direction—and, in a word, exchanging, as far as in them lie, the qualities of virtuous and intelligent beings, for those of *fiends incarnate*,

shall we not be rather honouring the hero of the "bare-bones parliament," and "puritanic pretensions," in the omission of his name from the foregoing "illustrious band?" But sooner than prolong this part of the enquiry, we will consent to give the point up to our opponents, merely reiterating our belief that the "greater the General the worse the man!" and the more accomplished his arts of war, the further removed is he from those precepts and practices which form the very "light and life" of civilized and refined society.

On the question of Cromwell's Statesmanship, we shall probably join in severer issue. We at once state that we have grave doubts upon the correctness of the claim set up for him in this respect. That he held the reins of power for a time—that he exercised an extensive influence over the British empire—and that he quelled, also, for a time, *outward* manifestations of discontent, we are not going to deny. Power of this description may be rather that of the tyrant or the despot, than that of the wise and enlightened ruler. We deem some further test necessary. We have endeavoured to discover in Cromwell that majestic nobleness of thought, that true serenity of action, which enables the really great Statesman

"Th' applause of list'ning senates to command"—

we have sought to trace in his character and in his actions that far-sightedness, and deep reflection, which enable their possessor to sway the destinies of the people,

"And read their hist'ry in a nation's eyes ;"

but we have failed in so doing. Cromwell's power was that of the sword, not of intellectual greatness; and this on the page of history, has been recorded under the significant designation of the "iron rule." He did not exhibit that towering grandeur of thought, and independence of action, which is the certain characteristic of true genius. No! his policy was suited to the then *present*—without regard to the *future*;—measures which tended to increase his popularity for the moment, or to increase his power, met with his ready support. He was lavish in his pretensions regarding the liberties of the people; yet no ruler

ever retained power more exclusively in his own grasp! The boast of even-handed justice was ever on his lips, yet how many of his public and private actions were in this found wanting? But we will not proceed with mere assertions, which, without some support, would be of little weight. We will at once adduce the authorities from which we have drawn our conclusions. Hallam, in his Constitutional History, tells us that Cromwell "never showed any signs of a legislative mind, or any desire to place his renown on that noblest basis—the amelioration of our social institutions." Macaulay (the eloquent defender of Cromwell) admits "that the death of Charles, *and the strong measures which led to it*, raised Cromwell to a height of power fatal to the infant Commonwealth."* And again, "in no long time it became manifest that those political and religious zealots to whom this deed (the murder of the King) is to be ascribed, (and of whom Cromwell was the chief,) had committed *not only a crime, but an error*."† Thus fully admitting the *impolicy* of Cromwell in this particular. Lord Jeffrey says, "there can be no question that the severities of Cromwell, and the extravagancies of the sectaries, had made republican professions hateful, and religious ardour ridiculous, in the eyes of a great portion of the people."‡ And this, indeed, could be the only possible effect of *promises* of liberty never fulfilled, and *professions* of religion never acted up to! As a proof of his cruelty and vindictiveness, Sir James Mackintosh tells us that, "urged by a general antipathy against the Irish," he "exercised, *more than once*, in his Irish campaigns, *the most odious rights or practices of war*!"§ While as specimens of his love of justice, history elsewhere informs us that "he degraded three judges without just cause, and intimidated the barristers; while equally shameless were the means which he used for the erection of the courts by which, in 1654, Gerard and Vowel, and in 1658, Slingsby and Hewitt were brought

* Critical and Historical Essays.

† History of England, vol. I.

‡ Jeffrey's Essays, vol I., p. 182.

§ Sir James Mackintosh's Collected Works, vol II., p. 127.

to the scaffold!"* Do not these authorities support the inference we have drawn? And they are authorities which neither a D'Aubigné nor a Carlyle (with all their adoration of their hero) can cast into the shade. But we hear a whisper. A modest Cromwellian asks us to "consider the times in which he lived," and "not to bring the rudeness of the manners of a former age into unfair contrast with the refined taste of the present." We are not unmindful of these injunctions; we should be sorry that our zeal should outrun our discretion: as a general rule our maxim would be, *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*.† But when we see a man—of whose character even history speaks in terms so unvarying, and in whose public acts the deep crimes of usurpation and murder stand prominently forward—held up before succeeding generations as the very apostle of liberty, justice, and virtue, we pass by all minor considerations, and our feelings become akin to those of the truth-loving Goldsmith, who, while no doubt contemplating the same, or a similar picture to that before us, penned those lines in which we now find "ready utterance"—

"O then how blind to all that truth requires,
Who think it freedom when a part aspires!
Calm is my soul, nor apt to raise in arms;
Except when fast-approaching danger warns:
But when contending chiefs blockade the throne,
Contracting regal power to stretch their own—
When I behold the factious band agree
To call it freedom if themselves are free—
Fear, pity, justice, indignation start,
Far off reserve, and bare my swelling heart:
Till half a patriot, half a coward grown,
I fly from petty tyrants to the throne!"

We are by no means desirous of estimating the qualities of Cromwell by an unfair standard—we are ready to judge him by the standard of his own times. From the many names which shed a lustre over the historic records of the seventeenth century, let us select a few. Look to that glorious band of contemporaries and compatriots of Cromwell,—Pym, Hampden, and John Milton. Do we find that their lives, their characters, or their actions became contaminated by the rudeness of that age? Do they not stand forth as "bright and shining lights"—the darkness by which they were

surrounded making their brilliancy more apparent? Their virtues were above all the influences of evil. Their ambition caused them not to forfeit the "fair renown" of an upright and consistent life. True, they neither sought nor obtained such "worldly greatness," such pomp and power as the hero of the Commonwealth; yet their memories will survive, and their virtues will be honoured, when the records of the injustice of tyrants, and the tyranny of usurpers, shall be forgotten, or, at most, shall exist only to be pointed at by the blighting finger of scorn! Need we say more of Cromwell as a Statesman?

We now come to the question—was Cromwell a sincere man? This part of the inquiry differs from the preceding ones, inasmuch as we have now rather to do with *motives* than with *actions*. Yet the former can only be correctly judged of by the latter, actions being the *outward* manifestations of *inward* designs. We have already referred to many of the chief incidents under Cromwell's rule, but we must revert to them again, for history, rather than ourselves, to bear testimony to the extent of his sincerity. We have heard much of the boasted "liberty of the subject," and the "purification of the Houses of Parliament." The King being murdered, "England was declared a Commonwealth. The House of Commons, reduced to a small number of members, was nominally the supreme power of the state, but, in fact, the army, and its great chief, governed everything. Oliver had made his choice. He had kept the heart of his soldiers, and had broken with almost every other class of his fellow citizens."* While ever seeking his own advancement to power, he was always careful to avoid any manifestation of this desire—he wished all honours to appear as rather forced upon him than sought after! Thus—again using the words of Macaulay—"that his elevation to power (after the King's death) might not seem to be his own act, he convoked a council, composed partly of persons on whose support he could depend, and partly of persons whose opposition he might safely defy!" In some respects his actions and habits were, in an eminent degree, incon-

* National Cyclopædia, art., "Cromwell."

† Let nothing be said of the dead but what is good.

* Macaulay.

sistent with themselves. Macaulay tells us, "he lived without parade or ostentation; he was temperate, and indefatigably industrious and exact in his official duties; yet under the guise of piety and virtue, he practiced the most subtle machiavelism, using mankind as the tools of his ambition, and maintaining his power, as he had acquired it, by boldness, cunning, and tyranny." Hume, although generally averse to Cromwell, has given the following summary of his character, which seems fully borne out by other authorities:—"His extensive capacities enabled him to form the most enlarged projects: his enterprising genius was not dismayed with the boldest and most dangerous. Carried by his natural temper to magnanimity, to grandeur, and to an imperious and domineering policy, he yet knew when necessary to give the most profound dissimulation, and most oblique and refined artifice, the semblance of the greatest moderation and simplicity; a friend to justice, *though his public conduct was one continued violation of it*; devoted to religion, *though he perpetually employed it as the instrument of his ambition*!" Where, then, the sincerity of such a man? possessed of good natural abilities, yet constantly prostituting them to the accomplishment of the worst designs. Rowton, in his "Debater," (a book which every student reader of this Magazine should possess,) has caused one of his speakers to utter the following eloquent disquisition regarding Cromwell:—"As to his religion, I believe him to have been A HYPOCRITE. When in conjunction with his most awful slaughters I find him speaking the name, and quoting the words of the Most High—bringing the Gospel of peace to justify the horrors of war—I can come to no other conclusion than that his religion was one of word and not of deed. Whatever he did, he had a text of Scripture to justify it by.

His whole life seems to me a life of pretence and cant. Had his religion been purer, he would have been more peaceable; but his violent contentions and self-willed career seem sufficient to prove that, although he *had the name of religion ever on his tongue, he never had the spirit of it in his heart.*" Again; how can we reconcile his participation in the death of Charles with this profession of sincerity? Having usurped his power, why did he seek to destroy his life? For a time he did withhold his concurrence—why did he afterwards consent? He could not have been sincere on both sides! Some of his defenders have indeed tried to screen him from any part in this transaction, but his own conscience, as manifested in the restlessness and terror he exhibited in his last days, was his most powerful accuser.

"He longed, yet did not dare to die,
He trod life's path alone;
The dark curse hung around him still,
And every hope was gone.
He swayed the truncheon, bore the rule,
The land and bright sea o'er;
But the bright peace of earlier days
Came to his heart no more!"

We now have done. We have fearlessly, but conscientiously, exposed the "evil of his ways." It is for our opponents to point out his virtues, for we would not say of him, *monstrum nullâ virtute redemptum a vitiis*.^{*} We would rather remember, *nemo mortatum omnibus horis sapit*,[†] and admit that at least some of his failings were more "his misfortune than his fault." Yet we shrink not from the position we have assumed, and finally assert our belief that, giving him such credit as he may deserve as a General, he was neither a *great Statesman* nor a *sincere man*.

C. W., jun.

* A monster whose vices are not counterbalanced by a single virtue.

† No man is wise at all times.

He that goes to church to get reputation, goes to worship the idol-goddess, Fame; he that goes to get custom, goes to worship the idol-god, Plutus or Mammon; he that goes to please some individual, goes to worship that individual; and he that goes merely to please himself, goes to worship himself. In a state of order, the worship of God consists in his being regarded as man's chief end; and therefore, in every state, a man's chief end, and his Object of worship, is one and the same.

Politics.

OUGHT GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE A SECULAR EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

MR EDITOR,—In taking up my pen on the negative side of this discussion, it may not be amiss if I make a few remarks principally by way of reply to your able correspondent "Philomathos." The course of reasoning which he pursues is so common to men of his class, that we might regard his paper not merely as a manifesto of his individual opinions, but of those of a great party. It may be well to observe at the onset, that the friends of voluntary education hold many opinions in common with their opponents. They mourn the evils of ignorance, and sincerely desire the education of the people, believing that for "the soul to be without knowledge it is not good." To them these views have nought of novelty, for they are their old and cherished ones, and such as they have not been slow practically to carry out. When the theme of popular education was treated with contempt, they were the first to lift up their voices in its favour, and to the present hour they have not ceased to develop and promote it. Nay, further: it is to them that we owe the existence of most of the educational institutions which adorn our land; and it is from them that these institutions have received their best and constant support. If such be the case, where is the propriety of the appeal of "Philomathos" to such? and why does he, by implication, charge "criminality" upon them—insinuating that they are guilty "of their brother's sins?" If they cannot conscientiously join in a scheme of national education, and pursue what they deem "a more excellent way," it is most unjust to denounce them as bigots and fanatics, or represent them as laying stumbling-blocks in the way of the onward march of society. Rather, we think, they should be honoured for what they have done, and what they are willing still to do, unaided by the State, and even unblest by the populace.

The first position that our opponent takes

—that education is necessary for the well-being of an individual and a community,—no one, we presume, will be prepared to dispute; but we are bold to deny the validity of the inference which he draws—that ignorance is the main, much less the only source of crime. Have we no gentlemen ruffians—no intelligent criminals—and no Mannings, Rushes, and Sloanes? True, the majority of those who fill our jails are from the uneducated classes, because those classes, unfortunately, at present constitute the majority of our people,—because, also, their poverty exposes them to greater temptations, and affords them fewer facilities for escaping the eye of the law, than have other classes. If the only reason why our opponents conclude that ignorance is the source of crime, is the fact that most of our criminals are ignorant, it will be perceived how they might, on the same grounds, conclude that filth and rags are a source of crime, because most of our criminals are filthy and ragged!

The next proposition of "Philomathos,"—that education ought to be provided by the Government—is supported by a line of argument which might be employed with as much force to show that food ought to be provided by the Government. Food is necessary, and Government ought to provide it—1st, It would tend to the diminution of crime, seeing that many are driven to acts of theft and violence from sheer hunger;—2nd, Because Government alone can give that "permanency and stability" to individual support that is essential for the removal of "the cares of life" and "the uncertainties of subsistence;"—3rd, It would be a just method of supplying the wants of the people, because all would feed alike;—4th, "In the end, it would be a decided monetary saving," because it would be cheaper to feed all the people frugally than allow some to riot in luxury, and others to die of starvation. These arguments are similar to those which

the advocate of Governmental education has brought forward to make good his position, if he does admit their force when applied to food for the body, neither can we when applied to food for the mind. We hold that Government ought not to attempt to educate the people, because the work is proceeding so rapidly and satisfactorily by voluntary agency, and because it is beyond the province of the Government of a free people. If these objections could be removed, our past and present experience would forbid us enjoying any strong faith in legislative enactments for moral and social elevation.

With respect to the character of the education to be provided, "Philomathos" maintains, as his third proposition, that it should be *secular*, by which we presume he means that it should be made up, for the most part, of the arts of reading, writing, and the elements of general knowledge. We cannot but here record it as our conviction, that the best kind of education consists not merely in storing the mind, but in training the *feelings*, and in disciplining the *heart*. We are old-fashioned enough to believe that the heart—that fountain of evil—must be purified, and its bitter waters sweetened by some heaven-prescribed remedy, before the "issues of life," can become wholesome to man and honourable to God. If education is to be the great preventive of crime, why forbid it bringing religion and religious motives to bear upon those under its influence? In the words of the late Dr Hamilton—"Man is something more than matter—he is a spiritual being: he is accountable for the exercise of his liberty, possessing the choice of conduct. He lives for ever. These are the views which make him great and dreaded. To draw out such a being for his duties, and his beliefs, and his perceptions, must be a religious task. Any attempt to educate him, saving religiously, is a mockery and an insult. We cannot, indeed, conceive of an education of man's nature, without a constant appeal to his relations towards the Deity, and to the influence of rewards and punishments over him. What is defuded as Secular Education is most superficial, considering the depths of his soul; most incidental, considering the laws of his being; and most temporary, considering the revolutions of

his duration. Such a secular education need not say, There is no God; but it must not say, there is one. Such a secular education need not say that Christianity is a lie; but it must not say that it is the truth, and no lie! Such a secular education need not denounce the faith of a hereafter; but as a thing of an earthly *seculum*, must never point to *secula seculorum*.

But many of our opponents admit that children ought to be taught religion, and say that they would leave that to their parents, strangely forgetting, that the majority of parents either have not time or ability, or inclination for the work.

It is worthy of note what effects this system of secular education would have upon our existing schools; for the question is not merely whether the ignorant shall be brought under secular education, but whether all our education shall become secular,—whether institutions which have long been established and have effected much good, shall be broken up by unnatural competition and legal influence.

We cannot close without one word to the working men who may peruse this paper. We would have them weigh well the coercive measures which it is designed should be brought to bear upon them. It is proposed that "*no child be permitted to enter any employment whatever*" until it has received an educational certificate. Friend "Philomathos," in speaking of the education which should be "provided" by the Government, very carelessly substitutes, on page 187, the word "enforced," as a synonyme! In the report of the meeting of the Public School Association, recently held in the metropolis, we noticed that a gentleman inquired if it was the object of the Association to ask Government to enforce education; and the reply of the chairman was, "not at present," giving at the same time the intimation that that might be an ulterior object. Working men, ponder this admission and declaration, and say whether you are willing, first for Government so to load you with taxes as to make you in a measure dependent for the support of your families upon their own labours, and then by an arbitrary law to take that support from you by taking charge of your children themselves and making you help to pay them for their

"parental care!" We have confidence in the answer which they will give to this liberty-loving Englishmen, and dare predict question. J. M. S.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE subject of Secular Education is now one of the great questions of the day, and involves the highest interests of man. Attention was called to this subject, during the animated and protracted discussion by Dr. Vaughan and Mr. Edward Baines, four or five years ago. Without giving an opinion of the relative merits of these combatants, it must be admitted that they roused public attention, and brought into the field of discussion, abilities of the highest order, sifting and testing the plans propounded on both sides; ultra-voluntarism on the one hand, and state interference on the other. Soon after this, a scheme was originated in Manchester, bearing the name of the "Lancashire Public School Association," whose fundamental principles are, "Unsectarian education, supported by local rates, and governed by local control;" thereby securing the support of the indifferent and selfish in the cause of social progress, and preventing the frequent mismanagement of common endowed schools, and the invariable mismanagement of centralization.

Whatever differences may be found to exist among the friends of popular education, as to the best means of promoting it,—on the subject of wide-spread ignorance, and its baneful influence, there is perfect unanimity. Marriage certificates, gaol and pauper statistics, police reports, and our daily social intercourse—all these are appealed to in proof of various grades of ignorance, and its withering effects upon those who ought to be the strength and safeguard of a nation. The axiom that "knowledge is power," is admitted in theory by all, but practically denied by many, who, in the blindness and bitterness of sectarian and party zeal, close the fountain of *all* knowledge unless supplied from the too frequently stagnant and muddy waters found within denominational enclosures. Thus we find one party (and it is neither small in numbers nor unimportant in character) asserting that the established Church is, and should con-

tinue to be, the sole instructress of the people; and any other agency employed in the course of instruction is denounced as latitudinarian and infidel. Another class, admitting in common with the former, the fact of demoralizing ignorance, contend that unaided voluntarism is sufficient for *all* the moral wants of the people. This, and more than this, is fearlessly, and sometimes boastingly, asserted on both sides, in opposition to fact, observation, and experience. May it not be pertinently asked, if the ultras on both sides utter the sober truth, how is it their work is so badly and inadequately done? Both having admitted the existence of ignorance, in spite of all the means used for its suppression, furnish a conclusive answer against themselves.

In the midst of all the moral darkness that surrounds us, it must be allowed that the instrumentalities used for its removal are benevolent and wise, lessening, to an incalculable amount, the evils that would otherwise befall us. The munificence of private individuals, and of different religious denominations, has done much for the elevation of the country, more particularly in a denominational or congregational capacity. Monuments of their bounty and untiring zeal are seen on every hand. Witness their infant, adult, and ragged schools, town missions, &c. These are only a few of the many agencies employed in the laudable work of social progress—agencies which add a lustre to the names of all engaged in such noble employment, and confer a lasting benefit on the population. But these agencies, good and wise as they are in many respects, fall very far short of the moral wants of the age. Read the appeal made to England by Dr. Bacon, of Newhaven, United States:—"The churches and denominations here (England) might attempt to educate those of their own denominations; but who was to educate the children of Roman Catholics, and those of chartists and socialists? What did educators propose to do in the name of religion and the world's

Redeemer, with these children, whom neither the Church nor Dissenter could reach with religious education?" Who does not feel the truthfulness and force of this appeal? It is a mistake to suppose that those who advocate the right of the state to give to its people the means of a good "Secular Education," are unconscious of, or ungrateful for, the personal and pecuniary support voluntarily given for educational purposes.

A minute examination of the machinery employed by pure voluntarism for educational purposes, will show that it is regulated by impulsive action, and not by well-regulated organization; hence it is fitful and not uniform; moving quickly when exciting causes exist, and tardily and irregularly when those causes cease. The school is constructed and regulated as a recruiting place for the church or chapel whence it has emanated, and not designed and adapted for the wants of the district. Besides, circumstances of various sorts, such as reverses of fortune, changes of opinion, or death,—these suddenly and unexpectedly cut off the supplies of the school, and it becomes neglected by the schoolmaster, and deserted by the scholars. Or where schools do not lack funds, they are frequently shunned, or nearly so, because they are planted where least needed, or conducted on sectarian principles, which make them repulsive, and consequently inoperative. Church schools, Independent and Wesleyan schools, are seen in groups, or in the midst of a Roman Catholic population, where a great display of party zeal is shown, but little of the meekness of the Christian, or the wisdom of the clear-headed man of business. To this list of untoward circumstances, may be added the inefficiency of schoolmasters who are chosen for their official connection with the church or chapel, and not for their literary and general qualifications. For these, and many other reasons that might be assigned, if our limits did not impose brevity, it might be shown that a good Secular Education is unattainable when dependent on an impulsive charity.

On politico economical grounds it might be safely affirmed, that a national system of Secular Education is desirable. It is true that knowledge would not be an infallible remedy for pauperism and crime, with the

many evils flowing therefrom; but while this is granted, it must be maintained that it is not putting the case fairly. The simple question is—Is knowledge better than ignorance? To which the universal consent of the civilized world says, yes. The leader of ultra-voluntarism makes out a long list of expenses attending a national system of education, and puts it as a pocket question, and asks, "Will the people willingly submit to such an impost?" With regard to the expense, Mr. Baines has not stated the whole truth, inasmuch as he has omitted to take into account those considerable items in the punishment of crime, and the maintenance of pauperism, which in all cases would be much lessened by a well-organized system of education. Do our gaols, work-houses, penitentiaries, penal settlements, cost nothing? Do our policemen, gaol chaplains, and judges, form no items in our national expenditure? A wholesome criminal code will always be required; for it is too much to expect for humanity that the time will ever come when crimes will not be committed, or that pauperism will not exist. Let us try to understand the philosophy, that "prevention is better than cure," by being more eager to build school-houses than gaols. But there are other and higher grounds than those of political economy on which a nation's duty to educate the people rests. A nation, like the father of a family, cannot tear itself away from its moral duties. If those duties are not self-imposed and efficiently discharged, society must bear the disastrous consequences.

Primarily, all fostering care and educational appliances belong to the parents of the young; but as they too often fail to discharge their duties, either through indifference or inability, or partly both, benevolence steps in, and does the work of the parent to some extent. Now comes the searching question,—Shall the thousands who are neglected by their parents, and not overtaken by the hand of benevolence, be uncared for by the State? Shall they be allowed to grow up like weeds in the garden of God's creation, and then cut down because they are useless and noxious? Shall the minds of our rising race have no direction given to them; and shall we then punish

them for not having chosen the right path? These questions should have their due weight with our legislators, patriots, and philanthropists. There is a class more influential than sagacious, that denies the right of the State to meddle with mind, affirming that, "the duty of the Government is to punish bad people, and to hang the incurably bad!" This sentiment has been uttered in the nineteenth century by a Christian minister, who maintains the sophism that education, like commerce, should depend exclusively on competition. Competition in matters of education is only *voluntaryism in action*, and of its shortcomings enough has already been said. As knowledge is a means of conserving society, wise legislators would be anxious for its diffusion, believing that the elevation and happiness of the masses, and the true greatness of a nation are promoted thereby, and additional security given to the British constitution. It may be said, that while the foregoing facts are admitted, the problem must still be solved,—Can any system of Secular Education ever work harmoniously and efficiently in this country, divided, as it is, into so many parties and sects. Listen to Mr. Cobden by way of reply:—"What we wanted for Old England, had been for centuries applied to New England; and if people were afraid of the consequences, let them look at the consequences in New England States. The schools there had given the people an education, compared with which, ours might well make us blush. But our opponents said, this system would produce infidelity and irreligion. Well; where could we find in the world a country comparable with New England States for religious zeal, and the general reverence in which religion was held? What was their test? The number of places of worship? There were far more

places of worship in New England, in proportion, than in this country. Was it in the observance of the Sabbath? He had been there, and had seen a chain drawn across the street to prevent traffic interfering with public worship. Was it the respect paid to ministers of religion? He could vouch, from experience, that there was no country in Europe where ministers were treated with such solid deference. Was it that the forms of religion were empty? If that meeting had been in New England, the proceedings would have been begun with prayer. Their courts of law were never opened without prayer; in fact, everything betokened the highest regard for religion. On every ground we ought to cultivate the minds and principles of our people to the same extent as was done in the United States, for public opinion rules this country as much as it did in the pure democracy across the Atlantic." It may still be urged, that the success of a system of "Unsectarian Education" in New England, is no guarantee of success for a similar system in (Old) England. If Catholics and Dissenters of various grades send their children to one common school in New England, and where the system works so well there, that "it is as unusual to find a person that cannot read and write, as it is to find a person without an eye, or blind, or deaf and dumb," why should it not work well here? Let us pause for an answer. Fortified by such facts as have been cited, let us invite the co-operation of all that are friendly to truth, liberty, and happiness, in the furtherance of a system of National Education.

Discussion on the subject will give information, and information will bring conviction; and conviction will produce co-operation, and co-operation success.

FIDES.

Social Economy, etc.

IS IT MORE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL TO SUBSIST ON A PURELY VEGETARIAN DIET, THAN ON ONE OF FLESH AND VEGETABLES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

REASON is possessed by different persons, in different quantities or degrees, and it is very much affected as to its quality by the mental and physical condition of its

possessor; hence what is reasonable to man in one condition of life, becomes very unreasonable in another condition; and this is well known to be the experience of the same individual at different periods of his history. What thinking man is there who can look back upon his past history without perceiving that his ideas respecting what is reasonable on important subjects, have become not only changed, but completely turned from one side to its opposite? The only way to account for this difference seems to be, to acknowledge the progressive character of man, and, as a necessary result, the progressive character of his perceptions, thoughts, and conduct, and consequent position in relation to what is true.

Since, then, our ideas of what is reasonable, are just according to the position in which we stand in relation to what is true, it is always well for a man, previous to entering upon the examination of a philosophical subject, to ask himself, What is my position in relation to what I already believe to be true?—Have I, as far as I am able, put into practice the truth I have acquired? Because, as this affects the position of the individual in relation to truth, it must also affect his perception of it, just as the position of an artist affects the view of the landscape. This accounts for the varieties of opinion which exist on the same subject. If a dozen artists were to sketch the same landscape, each occupying a different point of view, it is plain their productions would differ, although each one might be perfectly correct in itself.

In expressing ideas on the subject of human food, therefore, let us understand clearly the point of view from which the present sketch is taken, and then its being different from the views taken by others will be accounted for; and in order to judge of its accuracy, this point of view must be attained, so as to compare the sketch with the facts or truths of which it is the professed delineation. The point, therefore, from which we view the present subject is the conviction, already described, as the “progressive character of man.”

Just as man's ideas of what is reasonable or true,—or his mental food,—alter with his state and condition, so do his ideas of what is adapted for his physical sustenance

—his bodily food; and the necessary means of providing this food, will harmonize with the state and condition of the man who partakes of it. The various conditions of humanity in relation to food, may be described as follows:—I., Cannibalism; II., Animalism; III., Vegetarianism. Each of these lines are adhered to likewise, more or less strictly, according to the state of man.

I.—CANNIBALISM.

The lowest condition of barbarism presents the human being as the consumer of the flesh and blood of his fellow-man; cannibalism is to him the most “reasonable and beneficial,” and the food he thus secures is best adapted to promote that fiendish ferocity which is essential to procure it, whilst the murderous outrages he commits, and the diabolical rejoicings over his victims, are regarded as sources of enjoyment which would require considerable self-denial to forego. It would be difficult to convince man in this condition that human flesh was not designed for human food; and his habits, so long as they were maintained, would strengthen this idea by the great benefit which he feels to be derived from the food. Happily, this condition of man does not exist in what is called civilized society; and in the barbarous nations it exists in a greater or less degree, according to the natural and cultivated dispositions of the tribes. All we have to do with it is to bear in mind that by it, and in connection with it, human reason is so far degraded as to consider it as right and justifiable.

II.—ANIMALISM.

The most complete instances of Animalism are the Esquimaux, as these people live almost entirely on animal substances. Their moral and intellectual sensibilities offer no obstruction to the destruction of animal life, and their ingenuity and enterprise are not sufficient to supply any other means of subsistence. To these people, living upon the flesh and blubber of animal bodies is “reasonable and beneficial.” It would be difficult to convince them that blubber and tallow are not superior to wheaten bread. Their experience confirms their opinion as to the benefits they enjoy from this practice; and although the philosopher

can easily perceive that by it their mental powers are checked in their growth, and made almost obsolete,—still, to them, no such effects are visible, and they continue to enjoy what appears to them to be “the best food of man.” There are other people and nations that enjoy more temperate climates, who subsist on a mixture of vegetable and animal food, and being considerably more intelligent than those who live entirely on the flesh of animals, they not only stoutly declare that this diet is reasonable and beneficial, but some profess to deduce from scientific reasoning that man “was designed to subsist upon a mixed diet”—that the formation of his teeth and other organs prove by comparative anatomy that such is the case, and this is supposed to be confirmed by their own experience, knowing the benefits they obtain from their favourite dishes, though obtained at the expense of other creatures’ lives. But no one can deny the fact, that in society where these notions practically prevail, Animalism in various other forms does its work of moral degradation;—that men fall victims to depraved appetites and passions; consequently, this is not the highest and happiest condition of humanity. Disputes, quarrels, and human bloodshed, individually and nationally, prevail to a frightful extent; therefore the law of progress in this phase of existence still points forward to the more complete development of humanity, when “they shall neither hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain.” To men, however, in the condition in which Animalism is the order adopted, although it may not be professed, to subsist on a mixture of flesh and vegetables is somewhat consistent, to them it is “reasonable and beneficial,” and will be thought to be so until further knowledge has been brought to bear upon the subject. This conviction we believe to be sincerely held by many intelligent men, and so long as the practice of living thus is continued, it is probable such conviction will, in some degree, exist; because, whatever food man takes, when once the organs of digestion have become accustomed to it, the animal economy derives benefit from it; and so long as that economy is inexperienced in relation to a better diet, it is very apt to affect the reason, and thus to convince the practitioner of the superla-

tive character of the course adopted. To a man, therefore, who simply wishes to enjoy in some degree this Animalism, as it regards food, and thinks no higher condition desirable for himself or for mankind, and who thinks that it is right for appetite to govern reason, and to keep principle in subjection, and who desires to be more or less in bondage to the flesh, we dare say the mixed diet is more reasonable than that which we believe belongs to, and is promotive of, a more advanced condition of the human race.

III.—VEGETARIANISM.

It is therefore the purpose we have in view, and regard as the grand design of existence, which will regulate our conclusions as to the food adapted for sustaining that existence. The flesh of murdered human beings is best adapted for sustaining Cannibalism in all its horrid forms; and to the man who sees this state as the design of his creation—the purpose of his life,—it is quite consistent for him thus to support his physical frame; and so long as man regards *in feeling*, if not in verbal acknowledgment, the gratification in a certain degree of a gross appetite the principal end of existence, so long the flesh of animals will be regarded by him as conducive to this end, and, consequently, as affording the most excellent food; but to the man of higher aims and nobler purposes, who sees in the continual progress of the human mind towards greater moral perfection, a purpose worthy of the most strenuous efforts of discipline,—who regards the victory over his own passions and appetites as of greater consequence than all other achievements,—who considers that intellectual vigour, moral energy, and spiritual freedom, are conditions all fraught with the highest and most lasting satisfaction, and are, indeed, the only states worthy of attainment;—the man who thus views the purposes of his creation, and whose heart is set upon their accomplishment, will think it no privation to deny the appetite for flesh, which he may hitherto have indulged, to test the efficacy of vegetable food; and a *complete trial*, made with this end in view, soon convinces him that to subsist in this way is not only more reasonable and beneficial than subsisting on a mixed diet, as it regards the attainment of his

moral and spiritual purposes, but the physical man becoming more healthful and vigorous; and even the external enjoyment of the senses, being relieved of previous grossness, becoming far more acute and complete, this superior condition of the physical man will act upon the spiritual, with which it is in close reciprocity, and a new life of vigour will thus be induced; which will again act powerfully upon the convictions, and exalt into a principle what was undertaken as an experiment. In this way, thinking men have been led to the adoption of what is called "Vegetarianism."

The history of mankind is full of instances manifesting the condition in which Vegetarianism, in some form, has been acknowledged. The poets and historians, both sacred and profane, unite in declaring that the primitive state of man, before corruption was known upon the earth—when the world was in its happy childhood—fruit and other vegetable productions were the adopted, as well as the appointed food. Here is to be recognised the principle already explained,—the harmony of the food selected with the end or purpose desired to be effected. In the "golden age" of the poets, the purpose of life was spiritual, and natural, but delightful, obedience to the law of God, as described by Thomson—

"Dance and sport,
Wisdom, and friendly talk, successive, stole
Their hours away. While in the rosy vale
Love breathed his infant sighs, from anguish free,
And full, replete with bliss; save the sweet pain,
That only thrilling, but exalts it more.
Nor yet injurious act, nor surly deed,
Was known among these happy sons of heaven;
For Reason and Benevolence were law.
Harmonious Nature, too, looked smiling on:
Clear shone the skies, cooled with eternal gales,
And balmy spirit all. The youthful sun
Shot his best rays, and still the gracious clouds
Dropt fatness down; as o'er the smiling mead,
The herds and flocks commixing played secure.
Such were those prime of days;"

and the food that was then consumed, described by the same poet as—

"The living herbs profusely wild,"

afforded the most appropriate element for securing this happy state of existence—this wise purpose of life. But although these delicacies of vegetable nature served as

"The food of man
While yet he lived in innocence, and told
A length of golden years; unfleshed in blood,
A stranger to the savage arts of life,
Death, rapine, carnage, surfeit and disease;
The lord and not the tyrant of the world,"

yet when the bliss of Eden was lost, all the corruptions of a fallen condition followed, and among the rest, a resort to food which can only be obtained by means of deeds at which all the finer feelings of our nature revolt. Thus what was orderly in Eden would have been considered too good for a less orderly condition; and it was perfectly consistent with the character of *fallen* man to partake of food which was less pure and wholesome; and being contrary to his original nature, was more consistent with a state of disobedience.

Orpheus, one of the earliest poets on record, understood the value of a diet discipline; for he not only abstained from flesh, but from all kinds of animal substances. Numa subdued the warlike spirit of the Romans by the exercise of the principles he learnt from Orpheus and other ancient poets, first, in his own case, and then by a clever contrivance he induced the citizen to cultivate the land around their city, and to subsist upon the vegetable food it produced: he thus secured Rome from war during the forty years of his reign. Pythagoras made this an important part of his discipline and doctrine; and we believe there is no human instance on record of greater mental prowess than this philosopher possessed, and the stability of a great part of his philosophy remains not only unshaken, but confirmed by the Christian dispensation. The good prophet Daniel with his companions in captivity, who were not only better and fairer, but "more skilled in all the learning of the Chaldeans," afford us good examples. Socrates, Plato, Menedemus, Zeno, Epicurus, Epictetus, and, in fact, many of the favourite names of ancient history might be added to the instances in which mental superiority has been attained in conjunction with subsistence upon vegetable food. Plutarch, who wrote the biographies of these men, soon became enamoured with their practice, and delighted to imitate their example.

We will now refer to instances in modern history. Thomas Tryon was a philosopher of the seventeenth century, and wrote "The

Way to Health, Long Life, and Happiness," and many other valuable works: his acuteness of perception entitles him to a conspicuous place among the worthies of England, and he was a most vigorous advocate of vegetable diet. Franklin could not understand arithmetic until his intellect was made clear by adopting this diet, which he was induced to do by the perusal of Tryon's work. Swedenborg attained a degree of scientific and theological acuteness, and, as many believe, of spiritual illumination, and he subsisted on vegetable food for the last forty years of his life. Newton accomplished his greatest achievements when adhering to the simplest diet—vegetable food. Milton and Shakespeare have both recognised the value of the practice. Our own philanthropist, Howard, was an excellent instance of mental and physical endurance, and of preservation under dangerous circumstances of pestilence and plague, whilst partaking solely of vegetable diet. Lamartine affords a living testimony, as do a large number of persons who have formed the Vegetarian Society, which extends to all parts of Great Britain, Ireland, the Continent, America, and some of the English colonies. Amongst

the members could be mentioned many who have already rendered essential service to their country and to the world, and whose memories will be revered by posterity. We could add to these instances, whole communities, such as the early Christians, the Pythagoreans, the Burmese, the Hindoos, the Japanese, the Chinese, and other peaceful people, who have, in some degree, at least, practically acknowledged the value of subsisting on vegetable food; but we think what has already been adduced will be received as sufficient historical evidence to show the validity of the conclusion at which we have arrived;—that whenever mental superiority is desired, the discipline afforded by subsisting on vegetable diet is well calculated to secure this great end. And believing, as we do, that this mental and spiritual excellence is the *design of our creation*, as it is conducive to the greatest satisfaction and happiness, we cannot arrive at any other conclusion, than that subsisting on a purely vegetable diet is more reasonable and beneficial than on a mixed diet of flesh and vegetables.

H. S. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

SELF-DENIAL is the greatest of virtues. Under its exercise the man rises from sense to sentiment, from perception to reflection, and from matter to spirit. Humanity is born subject to the "desires of the flesh," to appetites and propensities, necessary, it is true, for the purpose of linking him with the earth upon which he depends for the support of his physical existence; but yet necessary only so far as they obey the dictates of those higher faculties which connect him with justice, mercy, and truth. Hence all movements which tend to check this inordinate sensualism to which man is prone, and divert the energies of his mind upward to those purer and higher activities, which tend to wean him from the animal to the moral, such movements cannot but be beneficial to mankind. Hence, also, the importance of fasts, temperance movements, and Vegetarianisms; which so far as they operate in curbing that animal grossness to

which man is addicted, even from the very circumstances of his situation, in so far as their exercise and extension beneficial in the amelioration of mankind. Yet notwithstanding the benefits thus accruing from such movements, as developing and symbolizing that self-denial which is the concomitant of man's advances in his upward path to the spiritual, they are frequently, in the hands of their too warm admirers, made to assume a repulsive aspect, being exalted from their true character as special remedies, into cures for all

"The thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to."

Blind to the vastness of movement in the circling of that machine which regulates, under Providence, the universe; which leads in its train a thousand diverse influences, a thousand scattered and paradoxical truths, each of which is destined to effect its own

particular share in the grand result, they can perceive only the little wheel set in motion by their scanty, water-power, and thenceforth imagine this to be the great universe machine, but newly invented, eventually to revolutionize society, and bring about the Millenium.

Let us, however, come to Vegetarianism, and those who command us to abstain from "all appearance of evil," whether in the shape of a beefsteak, a joint of veal, or a leg of mutton.

In the first place, man cannot always live upon vegetables, and that from a reason which cannot but be appreciated—viz., that not everywhere are vegetables to be found. We do indeed grant that John Bull is, upon the whole, remarkable for his carnivorous propensities; and that the number of Irish bulls (of which many are Irish oxen and calves) which he devours is truly enormous. We also admit that, without detriment to our glorious constitution, he might dispense with a class of officials whose existence and title must be a permanent insult to our Vegetarian brethren—viz., the Beefeaters. And while we allow that an end ought to be put to the abominations of Smithfield market, yet it must not be forgotten that the British lion is a carnivorous animal, and will therefore never be brought to feed solely on cabbages. Seriously, however, we think that flesh is a most reasonable article of diet, although its beneficial effects depend more or less upon the country or clime. At the Equator, for example,

Vegetarianism might be practised with great propriety—nay, we doubt not that man, without inconvenience, might confine himself to the productions of the earth even in the temperate zones. A word, however, in thy ear, *ω ἀπότε ἀνδρῶν*, wisest of Vegetarians—do not, as thou lovest the principle, carry it to the Poles. Thou wouldst not have even the ghost of a chance to proselytize an Esquimaux. And then how painful to contemplate thee, day after day, engaged in the pastoral operation of planting Scotch kail, cauliflower, or Swedish turnips among the icebergs, only to find, when thy stock of vegetables is waxing "low exceedingly," and thy nasal organ approximating, in the sharpness of its conformation, to its prototype in the genus *avis*, that the soil is by no means remarkable for its fertility. Then at length rendered ravenous by hunger, we see thee rushing upon some orphan seal, or juvenile white bear. Heaven preserve thee from Ursa Major! that happens to present his unlucky self before thy famishing eye, and perchance to divert the pangs of thy too tender conscience; adopting the plan pursued by the fox when commanded by his ghostly father confessor, the wolf, to abstain from flesh during Lent, when he plunged the poor murdered kid into the river, exclaiming, "Gang doun Sir Kidde, and come up Sir Sawmoun."

So fare thee well, friend Vegetarian, and we trust that thou wilt take this for what it is meant to be—a harmless *jeu d'esprit*.

HAROLD.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. XI.

57. *Affectation* is the attempted assumption of what is not natural to us—the imitation of some quality, property, &c., which does not really inhere in, or belong to, ourselves. It displays itself in many different forms, and in each receives a distinct name. The affectation of learning is pedantry; of virtue—prudery; of honesty—hypocrisy; of piety—canting, &c. In each of these cases the external expression of the passion differs, although the thing remains the same; indeed, the best general direction which could be given for the accurate delineation of Affectation, would be to gently over-

do and caricature the real feeling. The pedant has a general air of stiff and unwieldy pomposity which seems to say,

"I am Sir Oracle,
Let no dog bark when I do ope my mouth."

The words are delivered with a superabundance of emphasis, a stateliness, formality, and dogmatism which are perfectly ridiculous, when the manner and the matter are contrasted. The prude has a thousand airs, grimaces, would-be winning glances, and attractive gestures; she attitudinizes, peers, pouts, weeps hysterically, and sometimes faints; is pettish, languid, sentimental, nervous, vapourish, &c.

"A would-be lady of ten thousand graces,
Who monkeyfies herself by her grimaces."

The religious hypocrite—the Simon Stylites—has a countenance as morose and melancholy as if the heavens were clad in sackcloth, and the earth were covered with a funeral pall. The hands are clasped as if in silent prayer, the sad, sin-sorrowed eyes glance fearfully upwards, the head is shaken ruefully, the deep, rumbling groans come slowly and labouredly from the afflicted heart, and sighs are usually mingled with Gospel-interlarded speech. He appears to be at infinite pains to make his dull eyes gleam with fervent-seeming fire, and terribly grieved by the doings of every one less outwardly and pharisaically holy than himself. It is impossible, by extract, to convey any accurate idea of Affectation; we may mention, however, as familiar instances, John, in the "City Madam," and Mrs. Millemant, in the "Way of the World." The reader's memory will easily supply other examples, either from the rich fields of our literature, or from the actual personages which are to be met with, too frequently, in the walks of common life.

58. *Sloth* manifests itself by stretching out the arms, gaping the mouth, twitching the upper lip, heavy eyes, listless attitudes, the hanging of the head, yawning, nodding, stupidity of stare, general inertitude of manner, and inclination to sleep.

59. *Intoxication* is so frequently seen as to require little description; as the nature of the party differs, so do its manifestations. In almost all cases, however, the eye is dull, sunken, and watery; the face idiotic, sleepy-like, and unnerved; the manner is either sheepish and lumpish, or full of braggadocio and maudlin heroism; the under-jaw is unhinged; pronunciation huddled and indistinct; the gabble nonsensical and disjointed; egotism is in the ascendant, even when the discomfited *self* rolls in the mud or reels along his undirected course, with a mind helmless and ungovernable, and a body loutish, tottering, and incapable of supporting its own weight.

60. *Anger* is a passion usually excited by injury, real or imaginary, committed either on ourselves or others, and commonly accompanied with a desire to inflict an injury in return. It differs in the degrees of its intensity and violence, from simple displeasure to rage and delirium. The eyebrows are knit, the forehead wrinkled and cloudy, the eye fierce, staring, and inflamed, the nostrils wide-stretched, the breathing laboured, the breast heaving, the face red and bloated, the temple-veins swelled like cordage, the mouth open, with the lips drawn up so as to show the teeth; the hand is outstretched, the foot violently stamped, the head is strained, and nods menacingly, and violent excitement is visible in the whole demeanour.

The following extract, from the master-spirit of English poetry, will finely illustrate that hot and craving thirst for recompensing "evil for evil," which this passion excites:—

"Disturb his hours of rest with restless trances!
Afflict him in his bed with bed-rid groans!
Let there bechance him pitiful mischances
To make him moan, but pity not his moans!
Stone him with hardened hearts, harder than stones!
And let mild women lose to him their mildness,
Wildier to him than tigers in their wildness!

"Let him have time to tear his curled hair!
Let him have time against himself to rave!
Let him have time, of time's help to despair!
Let him have time, a beggar's orts to crave;
And time to see one that by alms doth live,
Disdain to him disdained scraps to give!

"Let him have time to see his friends, his foes,
And merry fools to mock at him resort!
Let him have time to mark how slow time goes
In time of sorrow; and how swift and short
His time of folly and his time of sport!
And ever let his unrecalling crime
Have time to wail the abusing of his time!"

—Shakspear's *Rape of Lucrece*.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Stratford St Mary, Suffolk.—*Lecture on Pythagoras.*—On the evening of Monday, Feb. 3rd, Mr. H. S. Clubb, delivered the first of a course of lectures on Pythagoras the Philosopher, to the members of the Stratford Mutual Improvement Society; Mr W. Clark presided. The lecturer commenced by showing what constituted philosophy, according to the idea propounded by its eminent founder. Wise men had existed previous to Pythagoras, and they were called Sophists; but Pythagoras, with his characteristic humility, took the title of Philosopher, because it expressed the idea of a *lover of*, or a *seeker after* truth, rather than that of a *wise man*. In that sense all men are philosophers in some degree. The carpenter at his bench, seeking to join two boards together by making them "true," is, in his way, a truth-seeker. A picture too, exhibiting the human features, commanded our admiration; but if instead of a correct delineation, the head was made too big for the shoulders, it would excite disgust. The reason was, the picture was not "true." Nothing was more evident therefore than the universality of the love of truth. Pythagoras, at an early age, discovered this inherent principle of the human mind; and what constituted the chief element of his success, was his practical adoption of whatever he discovered to be true in relation to the management of his own body and mind. As soon as he discovered in the writings of Orpheus, and other poets, that by subsisting upon the simple elements of the vegetable kingdom, and abstaining from every kind of animal produc-

tions, he should be rendering his body more healthful, his passions more controllable, and his mind more expansive,—he at once adopted this degree of truth; and in its practice he discovered its importance, and the vast influence it enabled him to acquire for the promotion of philosophy, or the love of truth, in the world. The Lecturer then proceeded to show how Pythagoras progressed from one degree of intellectual and moral achievement to another, and how, in his steadfast determination to acquire wisdom by a practical obedience to its first dictates, he was enabled to subdue the passions and prejudices of a corrupt and heathenish people, and gradually to develop in them high and ennobling principles.

The second lecture of the course, was delivered the succeeding Monday evening. The lecturer detailed more particularly the events of the philosopher's life, and drew therefrom many lessons respecting moral culture. Magna Grecia, the city and community founded by Pythagoras, was described, wherein the inner and inmost circle of students were trained so as to abstain from carnivorous and other sensual indulgences, and were thus enabled to arrive at that high degree of moral existence for which Pythagoras and his disciples have been so justly celebrated. The lecturer concluded by an earnest appeal to all young men to follow the example of the philosopher, if they wished to secure those blessings which virtue and manly courage to conquer difficulties could alone realize.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

53. What is the best course to adopt in order to obtain a fixedness of purpose in literary and other pursuits?—T. W.

54. How can I so improve the art of conversation as to be enabled to deal with unexpected topics in a rational, agreeable, and entertaining manner?—INCIGNITO.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

35. *The Study of the French Language.*—If "Incognito" is well acquainted with grammar, he will find *Ollendorf's Method*, or *De Lille's Grammar*, admirably adapted to his purpose in obtaining a knowledge of the French language. But we must remind him that without a master he must be content with learning French, minus the pronunciation. No French or English book can give him *that*, and he will do well not to waste his time and money in studying one which pretends to do so. The course of study is so clearly defined in both these works, that any remarks of our own would be superfluous. The first mentioned is the least expensive.—S. M. F.

36. *The Improvement of the Memory.*—As J. M. C. has directed an inquiry to me with regard to the best means of improving a bad memory, I will state briefly my ideas on the subject. I have little faith in what is termed the science of Mnemonics, or artificial memory, but believe that by adopting its basis, that is, by following out the principle of association of ideas, much good might be effected. I have experienced the advantage of the plan myself. When you read, hear, or see anything which you wish to remember, endeavour to establish a link of association or connection between it and something else,—no matter what,—with which you are more immediately familiar. Then, when you wish to recall the former subject to your recollection, fix your attention to that with which it was connected. The association you formerly established will immediately suggest itself, and the desired object will be attained. Thus much regarding memory in general. With respect to the facility of acquiring and repeating lengthy passages or extracts either in prose or verse, what I would most strongly recommend is extensive and careful reading. Cultivation here is everything, and any actor or public speaker can inform you that however difficult it may be at first, the task of learning by rote becomes in time one of the easiest imaginable. Nor does this storing of the memory confuse or distract it, on the contrary it becomes in every way improved. Touch the *key note*, as it were, of any passage, and the rest flows forth with correctness and fluency.

Perhaps I have not laid down any rule sufficiently definite for the guidance of J. M. C. and others, but I hope that the hints given may be so far satisfactory.—C. C. M.

37. *Phrenotypics.*—This science is based upon what mental philosophers call the *association of ideas*, and aims at connecting with familiar objects and ideas, others which are unfamiliar. In order to accomplish this, an imaginary connection must be formed between them of sufficient strength to endure the lapse of time, and of sufficient power that when one is mentioned the other shall be brought to mind. Perhaps the earliest work in the English language upon this subject is Dr Grey's *Memoria Technica*, but his system has been improved and extended by Dr Crook, and many others. Numerous works of no great pretensions have been published upon the subject, and among the best we may mention Laws's *Manual of Phrenotypics* price 1s. 6d. or 2s. It may not be unacceptable to our readers if we furnish a specimen of the phrenotypical *modus operandi*:—the "problem" is to connect two notions, one of which is familiar and the other not, and the way to work it, is to draw a familiar notion out of the unfamiliar one, and then to connect the two familiar ones. For instance the French word *Dieu* is unfamiliar to us, but its meaning—God—is not; now if we ask ourselves the question what English word does *Dieu* suggest to our mind, it will no doubt be *dew*, and then we have to connect *Dieu* with *dew*, and *dew* with *God*. Again the French word *ciel*, meaning *heaven*, may suggest the English word *seal*, and you have then to connect in your minds *ciel* with *seal*, and *seal* with *heaven*, and this may be done by remembering that in the Apocalyptic visions *sealed books are represented as kept in heaven*. We confess that we do not attach much importance to this branch of phrenotypics, for it often requires greater labour to form the machinery than to accomplish the task without it.

A more important principle has been brought into connexion with this system, which is the localizing of events, and this we have tested in the instruction of the young with considerable success. We propose in a future No. of the *Controversialist* to give a sufficiently full outline of the methods we have used for any of our readers to try them themselves.—A. C.

40. *Imperfect Vision.*—Imperfect vision is a serious obstacle to the acquisition of knowledge, and no practice should be pursued that has a tendency to increase it. Reading at night should be avoided, for the best light to read by is that of the sun. To secure time for doing this, the habit of early rising should be resolutely formed. The present is a very favourable season of the year for its commencement; and I would express a hope that H. W. N. will not be the only one of your readers who, in this way, will test it. It would be a profitable occupation to devote a portion of the time thus rescued from sleep, to the perusal of our standard authors of greatest excellence; and then to give an hour in the evening for writing what can be remembered, or for repeating it to a friend, where one can be found who will listen with interest. We heard a young man once say, that he made it his custom to tell to another all that he learnt himself, and that he found it very beneficial to

his own mind, as well as instructive to his friend. I should recommend H. W. N. to devote some of his evening hours to intelligent company, either in the social circle, or in connection with some literary society.—A. C.

43. *English Orthography*.—This is so inconsistent, and all its rules have so many exceptions, that to become proficient in it is no easy task. We remember, with anything but pleasure, the many hours we spent at school in "learning to spell," and how we were once horrified with the thought that we should have to "learn by heart" the contents of Johnson's Dictionary before we became "good scholars!" We need not say that we never performed this more than Herculean feat! We must, however, confess, that we left school without a very intimate acquaintance with English Orthography; and it was not until we had acquired a taste for reading that we became sure of the mis-called "just method of spelling words." We recommend J. W. to be a "reader," and he will soon become a "speller." There is a little work, that may be had for a few pence, from Simpkin, Marshall, and Co., entitled, "Help to Orthography," which he might find of some assistance.—L. S.

44. *Navigation*.—F. H. F. would do well to study those sciences which are intimately connected with the art of Navigation, such as Decimal Arithmetic, Logarithms, Theoretic and Practical Geometry, Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, Geography, and Astronomy. Some knowledge of Mechanics would also be found useful. We believe the best work on Navigation is Norie's, published at about 18s. It is so generally known that there will be no difficulty in obtaining it.—G. N.

Allow me to recommend to F. H. F. some handbooks published by Weale, High Holborn, especially the following:—"Theory and Practice of Nautical Astronomy and Navigation," "The Art of Ship-building," "Sailors' Sea-books." Hamilton Moore's "New Practical Navigation" is a standard work.—J. M. S.

45. *Behaviour under Insult and Persecution*.—The case put by A. B. is not novel, and we shall therefore be pardoned if we recommend an "old fashioned" remedy. A. B. is subject to insult and contempt from an equal, with whom he is compelled to hold daily intercourse, and he wishes to know how to cure the evil, and yet spare the feelings of his persecutor. Surely A. B. has not forgotten the injunction, "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established." Has A. B. pursued this course? Has he, *without bitterness*, pointed out to C. D. the impropriety of his conduct; and this failing, has he called in friends to arbitrate between them? If he has done all this in a proper manner, and all has failed, we know of but one other step, and that is, to refer the matter to the *superiors* of both parties. We admire the desire of A. B. to spare the feelings of his persecutor, but this must not prevent him seeking redress for his grievances.—E. F.

47. *Algebra and Geometry*.—If I understand the question of G. R., it is to the following effect:—How can I so study the subjects of Algebra and Geometry, as to make the one subservient to the study of the other?

That the one may be rendered subservient to the study of the other is certain, and we think may be made apparent by one or two observations. Algebra may be rendered subservient to the study of Geometry, as it provides condensed formula for the expression of geometric truths

—e.g., in the formula, $a^2 - x^2 = a+x-a-x$, we have an algebraic expression of a truth in Geometry, but is a condensed expression of the truth that the difference of the squares of two lines is equal to the rectangle under their sum and difference. Another illustration of the same truth may be found in the common, but, in quadratic equations, useful formula, $a+x^2 = a^2 + 2ax + x^2$. Again: Geometry may be rendered very useful in the study of Algebra, for in Geometry we have the same truths demonstrated at full length and plain terms, which are proved by signs in Algebra. To the learner the former is the easier to understand—e.g., $a+x$.

$a-x$ may be demonstrated by Algebra to be equal to a^2-x^2 yet it is not so fully comprehended, as the truth which the formula represents when that truth is demonstrated by Geometry. The same remark will apply to the formula, $a+x^2 = a^2 + 2ax + x^2$. If $a+x$ be multiplied by itself, it can be shewn to produce $a^2 + 2ax + x^2$; yet $a+x$ is too abstract a notion to be readily laid hold of by the uninitiated. Attach $a+x$ to something, a line for instance, as is the case in Geometry, and say with Euclid, if a right line be divided into any two parts, the square of the whole line is equal to the sum of the squares of the parts together with twice the rectangle under the parts, and then demonstrate this by actually constructing the squares, &c., and you have the truth presented in such a form as the mind can grasp—and why? Though the truth is still, in some sense, an abstract truth, it is presented in a concrete form. Having said thus much on the fact that each of the subjects under consideration may be rendered subservient to the study of the other, we will attempt to give a little advice deduced from our own experience. We believe that if we had never studied the Second Book of Euclid, we could not have worked, with anything like comfort, quadratic equations. On this account, we should advise our friend not only to work through that book before he enters upon them, but also to make himself familiar with every part of it. The labour spent in accomplishing this will be more than compensated in the pleasure which he will derive from being able to comprehend with ease the processes connected with the solution of quadratics. The reason of this is obvious. He will already have become familiar, in a concrete form, with the truths upon which the solution of quadratics depends; but which truths, in Algebra, are presented in an abstract form, and consequently a form which renders them more difficult to grasp. On this account, we should advise G. R. to make himself acquainted with the first two books of Euclid at the same time

as he passes through the earlier parts of his Algebra. The order of studying that subject has already been adverted to under the heading "Mathematics" in the January number of the *Controversialist*.

Our friend is doubtless aware that the science of Algebra may be turned to good account in working many questions in practical mathematics. In mensuration and mechanics we have found it of service repeatedly.—G. N.

49. *The Study of the Law*.—We believe that the *Law Times* is the best, if not the only periodical, required to aid the young law student during the period of his clerkship. Such, however, is not its professed, or even primary object; but like the excellent *British Controversialist*, it is one of that class of works, whose accomplishments outweigh its pretensions. It is a most valuable work to all concerned in the study, and practice, of the law. Its worth is attested by the fact, that it finds its way into almost every office of respectability, throughout the kingdom. But the youth, who would attain proficiency in his profession, must master thoroughly first principles; must dissect, masticate, and digest, so to speak, his Blackstone; or, perhaps, what is now better, *Stephens's Commentaries*, founded partly upon Blackstone. This is essential to his success as a sound, and safe practitioner. It is, in fact, the foundation upon which the superstructure of a good legal character is built. There is, with emphasis, no "royal road" to the knowledge of the law. The path is rough and difficult, but with courage and perseverance, it may be travelled with satisfaction, and success. The best guide, companion, and assistant that we know, is the *Law Times*; and it is equally adapted to the student, and practitioner. The former, especially, should make it his constant friend, and counsellor, and have it continually by his side.—T. C.

50. *The Study necessary for Reporting*.—An essential requisite for a reporter is, of course, a thorough, practical acquaintance with some system of shorthand. A few years ago, rapid longhand writing would generally pass muster, but some amount of stenographic ability is every day becoming more necessary. Of the many systems of shorthand in common use, Pitman's Phonography is by far the best, and is now in high esteem among reporters generally. Mr Pitman's works will furnish all the requisite information in this particular. We use this system ourselves, both for ordinary writing and professional reporting, and therefore speak from experience. A knowledge of shorthand, however, is far from being the only necessary qualification for a reporter. A good general education is quite indispensable, and not less so a tolerably intimate acquaintance with the topics of the day. To "chalk out a particular course of study," as our correspondent requests, would be a difficult task, as very much must necessarily depend on the capacity and attainments of the individual. But we may state generally that a reporter, or one who contemplates becoming such, should possess some amount of information on as many subjects as possible—science, literature, art, politics, etc.;—and, unless he has a gigantic intellect, he must content himself with a somewhat superficial acquaintance with them all, rather

than bestow too much time on a few subjects, as to master them thoroughly, which is by no means necessary for the mere purpose of reporting. Such works as *Chambers's Information for the People*, and other popular treatises of a like nature, will be found to contain sufficient matter for reading, on the subjects of which they treat, as far, at least, as scientific knowledge is concerned. History, ancient and modern, and especially the latter, should be the subjects of careful study, or, at any rate, of much reading. A knowledge of foreign languages can scarcely be said to be essential to a reporter, but it is unquestionably at all times a great acquisition; French and Latin especially, will be found most useful in his profession. There is no mode of becoming familiar with the events of the day, which, as we have said, is indispensable, but by reading the newspapers; and to understand the details of parliamentary business, the debates should be frequently perused. A facility in general composition is highly requisite, and will very often be called into exercise. Of course, if a reporter is in any way confined to particular subjects, such as medicine, chemistry etc., he should be well acquainted with them, and generally he will find no difficulty in becoming so. For the rest, we may say briefly, *learn whatever you can*; for it cannot fail to prove useful at some period of your professional career.—T. A. R.

50. *Reporting*.—I would strongly advise H. B. to study Pitman's System of Phonography. It is extremely simple; and the expense is trifling. The following are the several books required:—"Exercise Book," 6d.; "Copy Book," 3d.; "Phonographic Manual," 1s. 6d.; "Reporter," 3s. In addition to these, H. B. should have a case for holding his reporting paper, which is 1s. To arrive at a quick method of writing, he should practise one hour daily; and never allow a lecture, sermon, &c., to pass, without endeavouring to take as much as possible.—J. G. R.

51. *Committing Propositions in Geometry to Memory*.—The best plan that we know of committing Euclid's propositions to memory is, to omit the letters altogether, and then, in demonstrating, to introduce either letters or figures, at random. If the propositions are thoroughly understood, it will be of little consequence whether figures or letters are introduced, or how they are arranged. The demonstrations should not be committed to memory at all, only studied thoroughly.—G. N.

52. *St. Cecilia*.—St. Cecilia, whose legend is one of the most beautiful on record, was a noble Roman lady, who lived in the reign of the Emperor Alexander Severus. Her parents, who secretly professed the Christian faith, brought her up in that belief, for which she afterwards suffered martyrdom at Rome. She was enthusiastically fond of music, and played on all instruments, but none enabled her to breathe forth that flood of harmony with which she was filled; she therefore invented the organ, consecrating it to the service of God. When she was about sixteen, she was married to a young Roman—virtuous, rich, and noble by birth—named Valerian, who afterwards became a Christian. For further particulars, see Mrs Jameson's "Poetry of Sacred Legendary Art," vol. 2.—K. W.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

BEFORE proceeding to lay before our readers the award which we think due to the various students who have this month entered our Logic Class, we would direct attention to the following remarks, which we hope may be useful both as an excitement to our present students to persevere in their labours after improvement, and to others to begin a course so beneficial and so honourable; and as advice and direction in the best method of proceeding while engaged in preparing papers for this department. "The habit of committing our thoughts to writing is a powerful means of expanding the mind, and producing a logical and systematic arrangement of our views and opinions. It is this which gives the writer so vast a superiority, as to accuracy and extent of conception, over the mere talker. No one can ever hope to know the principles of any art or science thoroughly, who does not write as well as read upon the subject. One of the greatest and most prevalent stumbling blocks to new beginners in composition, is the almost universal desire they show to write something *very fine*. They take up their pens, and expect that thoughts of singular sublimity will be showered down upon their minds for their own exclusive honour and distinction. They look upon their pen as a magician's wand, with which they can conjure up at will truths the most interesting and vitally important. These extravagant and mistaken notions lead timid minds to despair, and those of a firmer and more resolute character to midnight obscurity. In writing, therefore, the general rule we should always keep before the mind's eye is, that our written words be a simple transcript of our thoughts. The language ought to be as plain as possible; and, in most cases, simply that in which our ideas were first suggested to our minds. This rule will be found of infinite value on those subjects of inquiry where intricate processes of reasoning are required. For want of observing it, many minds of great original strength and acuteness, have run a most unprofitable course, and been constantly over-shooting the mark by an anxious desire to clothe their ideas in what they imagine to be sublime and elevated language."

We had prepared, according to promise, a detailed criticism upon each of the essays, but this we are sorry we are prevented, by "a press of matter," from inserting; we will, however, make a few extracts from these as they turn up to our hand at random. The following sentence is exceedingly confused and ill-arranged:—"What is more distressing than to see a lecturer or speaker at a loss to find words to express his thoughts as he would like to do, which is sometimes the case, who although he may have fine thoughts, and had he but the right words, would deliver some of the best of lectures." It would be much improved thus—What is more distressing than to see, as is sometimes the case,

a lecturer or speaker at a loss to find words to express his ideas, although if he had these as a dress for his fine thoughts he could deliver some of the best of lectures. "Man is possessed of the capacity of imbibing copious draughts of information from the vast multitude of surrounding objects," contains an ill-sustained figure; it is better thus—Man is possessed of the capacity of imbibing copious draughts from the well-springs of knowledge which surround him. *Its* ought, in no circumstance, to be used for it is; and *'tis* never in prose. This sentence is *radically* bad, because it contains a mixed metaphor. "Language is used by the senator to *express* the grand and majestic *torrent* of feelings which swell his breast, and *which*, like *imprisoned spirits*, burst their bonds asunder, and with the rapidity of the lightning's flash convey their *electric influence* to every heart, *clothed* in all the *prismatic colours* of language's ever-changing dress." Such sentences as these are incorrect—"Could, and have been, performed;" it ought to be—could be, and have been, performed. The following violate a rule of grammar:—"The valuable stores of literature he is possessed of."—"Destitute of every blessing he is now possessed of."—"The immense superiority man is endowed with." Of which he is possessed—with which man is endowed, is the correct method of expression. "For the making them susceptible to the cheering beams of intellectual light," should be—for making them susceptible of enjoying the cheering beams of intellectual light.

86, F. A. Y., (chaste, clear, and argumentative); 84, E. S. I., (clear, intelligent articles, evincing that the writer is at once a reader and thinker); 83, W. T. H., (concise and plain); 80, L. M., (a very neatly argued paper); 78, I. P., (a well-arranged paper); 75, C. I. D., (argumentative and perspicuous); H. L., (a judiciously ornate essay); Juvenis, (written in an easy, natural style, though wanting in variety and force of expression); 74, T. W., (a very creditable production); 73, J. M. K., (chaste and pretty well sustained); Philologus, (brief, but logical); J. N., (rather disconnected and discursive); 72, H. C. N., R. K., and J. H., (pretty fair essays); 70, S. H. A., I. E., H. S., H. H. H., E. L. B., (these papers display thought and care; the last mentioned understands his subject well, and with persevering practice will acquire a style adequate to his wants); 69, T. T., J. W. H., J. T. B.; 60, J. N. K. We are much pleased at the enrolment of so many students, though we are sorry at the same time to observe some absentees. Young men ought to remember that real and permanent improvement is only attainable by diligence, regularity, industry, and lofty aspirations, which spurn "inglorious ease." This hint we are sure will be taken in good part. We have only space for the insertion of the following specimen of the essays:—

Query 1st—What is Perceptivity?—Name its

* Blakey's Logic, p. 164 et seq.

two sources, and describe the general mode of their operations.

Perceptivity is that capacity of the human race by which they acquire the *elements* of knowledge. It includes two processes—Sensation and Reflection. Through the medium of the nerves of Sensation, the mind is informed concerning objects external to itself; by the power of Reflection, it takes cognizance of its own operations.

* * * * * The mind receives impressions from two species of sensation—1st, that species which in common language is called *feeling*, and gives the ideas of cold, heat, pain, &c.; and 2nd, that species which affects the mind through special organs, called senses. * * * * * The former gives information of *effects* only, the latter directs the mind to a cause. * * * * * The former is beyond mental control; the latter is, on the contrary, greatly under mental direction.

* * * * * Seated in the brain, impervious to the sight and to the touch, shut in from the observation of the senses, silently and almost unnoticed, the mind operates, and mind alone can discern the faculties of mind. Within the narrow limits of its abode, however, more important knowledge is acquired than in the whole range of the external world. Reflection observes by inexplicable means the faculties of Discerning, Retaining, Comparing, Combining, Abstracting, &c., the cool operations of the instruments of Touch, as well as the method of action pursued by the throng of Passions—serviceable as they are dangerous. * * * * * Such are the channels of knowledge—the avenues only, which lead to the portals of the mind, and debark the materials which Reason is to employ. Along these channels what traffic! Objects crowding to the sensorium without jostling in the way—hurrying to the presence-chamber, some to be received with aversion, others to be the excitements of delight—some summoned to the council—others the mere messengers of idle pleasure. How strange a court! no pomp, no ornament, no ensigns of power; but in truth, what real grandeur, majesty, and strength!—H. T.

The mind, until Perceptivity has introduced to it the glorious world without, may be compared to a magnificent, capacious, newly-built palace, whose niches have yet to be filled with forms of beauty, whose walls and ceilings are yet to be clothed with all the hues of the rainbow, laid on by the delicate fingers of the children of fancy, whose corridors are yet to resound with the peal of the harmonious organ, or the still more pleasant sounds of the silvery-toned harp, while the merry laugh of its inmates, and the gentle aspirations of lovers are still unheard in its bowers. But anon the five magnificent portals of the senses are flung aside, every chamber and hall is filled to overflowing, and everything becomes instinct with life and motion. In other and plainer words, sensation makes the mind acquainted with the outward material world, carefully notes the peculiarities of the objects which come under its ken, and fills the memory with images of these objects, that the mind may use them in the building up of the future fabric of thought. * * * * * Reflection is the power which the mind possesses of observing the different processes which the ideas undergo in the act of being worked and incorporated into

thoughts, and forms another great source of nourishment and *thought-material* for the soul.—F. J. D.

Query 2nd—What is Sensation? Mention the different senses, and describe their objects and manner of action.

Sensation is the power of perceiving external objects by the aid of the senses. Whatever comes within the range of the action of the senses, acts upon them in a manner peculiar to their structure or object, and sensation is the result. The senses are seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, smelling; each of which is formed for a particular purpose, and is intended to convey to the mind impressions of the nature, qualities, or action of the bodies which surround us. The eye, the organ of seeing, conveys a knowledge of the light, shade, colour, aspect, form, position, &c., of outward objects to the mind. The ear, the organ of hearing, has for its object the giving to the mind the impression of differences and modifications in sound, and thus to give pleasure or pain, according as the tones are agreeable or disagreeable. The sense of feeling is distributed over the whole body, although it resides more powerfully in the tips of the fingers. Its object is to give information regarding the impressions which outward things make on the body, and by this means to tell us what they are made of. The taste is to inform us of the quality or nature of our food, and to tell whether it is relished or not. The sense of smelling informs us of the odour or effluvia of bodies. Each sense has its own manner of acting; and what affects one sense has not the slightest effect (in the same sense) upon another. The loudest report of a cannon will not produce sight in the eye; neither will the most brilliant light cause the ear to hear.—J. C.

Query 3rd—What is Perception, its *differentia* from sensation and the objects of its notice?

Perception is the excitation of the intellect by the agency of sensation. Sensation is the corporeal impression; perception the consequent mental notion. The objects of its notice are the sensational impressions.—R. G.

Query 4th—What are Ideas, their varieties and their characteristics?

Ideas are the result of external and internal impressions operating upon the mind, and made known to us through the medium of consciousness; and an idea may be defined as "*that apprehension of an object or mental state, which is raised in the mind either by perception, memory, or imagination, by, and upon which, the operation of thought is performed.*" Ideas are of two kinds, sensible or mental. Sensible ideas are originated by outward objects; mental ones are obtained through reflection. * * * * * Ideas may be classed and defined in the manner which follows, viz.,—Simple ideas, those which are indivisible by the mind, and which cannot be communicated by definition to others.—Complex ideas, as is implied in the name, are such as are made up of two or more simple ideas, thought of *unically*, i. e., as one.—Distinct ideas are those in which we have a clear, accurate, and perfect comprehension of the originating object or mental state.—Indistinct ideas are the opposite, such as we are unable to define or

conceive of in a clear and accurate manner.—Adequate ideas are such as give us a full knowledge of *all* the parts and properties of the originating object or state.—Inadequate ideas, on the contrary, are those which do not give us a perfect knowledge of *all* the parts and properties. The difference between a distinct and an adequate idea is, that the former informs the mind of the boundaries and dissimilitudes of objects; the latter imparts a knowledge of those properties which cause these dissimilitudes.—Abstract ideas are formed by comparison thus, the mind, on a number of ideas being put before it, observes in what they all agree, and *abstracting* that notion, bestows on it a name, as height, roundness, &c.—Concrete ideas express an abstract quality as inherent in an object.—Particular ideas are originated by individual objects, “as they are seen in nature, unclassified and individuated,” and are denoted by particular, *i. e.*, proper names, as Athens, &c.—General ideas comprehend whole classes of persons or things, and are symbolized by common names, as clergy, trees, &c.—J. H., Manchester.

When men are ushered into the world, their minds are complete blanks, devoid of all ideas, thoughts, or impressions; but the complicated machinery—if we may so speak—is speedily set in motion, and the process of mental “daguerreotypy” readily commences. From the relations which we sustain to the outward world, and the natural workings of our sensational powers when they come into contact with external things, ideas are originated in the mind, and that activity of soul, called *thinking*, is begun. In infancy, our ideas—more especially those regarding science, philosophy, morals, and religion—are vague and imperfect. This is not, of course, blameworthy in us, then, for our faculties have not reached maturity; but how many are there whose mind-powers have attained this point—whose notions of these great and important matters are confused and inaccurate? These we consider blameworthy, and hence the necessity of urging them to adopt the following rules, *viz.* :—

1st—“Endeavour to gain accurate ideas.” Ideas constitute knowledge, and our usefulness and influence in society depend upon the amount and quality of that knowledge; and hence the importance of this rule is readily apparent. * * * * To all such subjects as demand our attention, and which have interblended with their propagation the vital interests of humanity, we should give a solemn, impartial, rigid, and scrutinizing investigation; * * * * we must take nothing for granted, but demand proof for everything; we must not think by proxy, but realize our own responsibility, and think, feel, and act for ourselves.

2nd—“Gain as many ideas on every important subject as possible.” “That the soul be without knowledge it is not good,” is an inspired declaration, and every day’s experience fully corroborates its truthfulness. * * * * Our Creator has designed us for other and nobler purposes than merely to toil, eat, and sleep. * * * * He has not been unmindful of our higher nature, but has abundantly provided intellectual food to nourish, invigorate, and expand our immortality-aspiring souls. Yet in the midst of all these

bounties, how many are there who are content to live in profound ignorance of all that is noble, holy, sublime, and mind-inspiring in nature, and in effect say, “thy gifts be to thyself, and thy rewards unto another,” we will have none of them! We have the fields, the flowers, the rocks, and streams; the hills, the valleys, and the roaring floods; the insects dancing in the sun’s bright beams, and all the songsters of the fragrant woods; the loud-voiced thunder, the lightning-flash, the wild music of the sea-billows dashing, the heaving earthquake, and the volcano crater charged with flame and sulphury smoke, to teach us lessons we were wise to learn. Let us embrace the opportunity, and improve it well, and we shall reap a great and enduring reward. * * * * Let us be studiously careful to adorn the inward man with the beauteous garments of truth and righteousness—to amass rich stores of golden ideas “on every important subject,” so shall we become more useful in our various spheres of duty, and be better prepared for a far more glorious life “beyond the narrow verge of the cold sepulchre.”—B. K., Kilmarnock.

Query 1st—What is Language, and what are its uses and advantages?

Speech is one of the noblest of the faculties with which man is endowed, inasmuch as by the magic facility it furnishes for the transmission and interchange of thought, his superiority over the brute creation is unmistakably established.

The proper signification of the term Language, is the enunciation of the thoughts by articulate sounds. In its more extended sense, however, it comprises *every* medium by which we can produce in another’s mind, ideas, the counterpart of those existing in our own. In its more general signification, it may be considered as of two kinds, natural and artificial: the former including all those tones and gestures by which man, in common with the lower animals, *instinctively* manifests his wants, feelings, and emotions; the latter comprising those vocal sounds and written characters to which, by prior compact, certain ideas have been affixed. The power of communication by natural language is possessed by many animals; but the wondrous faculty by which every thought may be embodied in appropriate and intelligible articulations, is bestowed on man alone. And had the human race been without this important means of social intercourse, how helpless and wretched would have been their condition; they would have felt themselves imprisoned even whilst at liberty—isolated beings, though dwelling amidst multitudes; they would have been stationary and unprogressing, though possessed of every *other* element of civilization and improvement. But having speech as the channel for the diffusion of intelligence, how vastly changed their circumstances; thought, before stagnant with unhealthful inactivity, now circulates through the social system, diffusing vitality and vigour—mind is enabled to commune with mind; and as it is by excitement and *contact* in the natural world that the electric spark is elicited, so is it by mental excitation and contiguity that truths, before hidden, are revealed, and art, science, and invention receive their most power-

ful impulses to progression. In reference to this subject, one of our poets beautifully says—

“Thoughts shut up want air,
And spoil, like bales unopened to the sun;
Had thought been all, sweet speech had been denied;
Speech ventilates our intellectual fire,—
Speech burnishes our mental magazine,
Brightens for ornament, and whets for use.”

Language also reveals to us the acquired knowledge of the past, and thus the mental wealth of poets, historians, and philosophers, and all the varied discoveries of mechanicians and men of science become our common inheritance. In whatever aspect man is considered, the inestimable importance of this faculty is apparent. Viewing him as a social being, we have already seen that Language is the basis of society, for only by the powers it affords can a man perform the duties, and participate in the advantages incident to a social state. As an intellectual being, destitute of this faculty, it may be questioned whether he could employ his powers, seeing that it is in *mental language* that the process of reasoning is carried on; certain it is, however, that their exercise would be greatly retarded, inasmuch as man would be unable either to acquire or communicate information, and thus would lack the great, if not the greatest, stimulus to intellectual exertion. Its influ-

ence on man, as a moral being, too, is unquestionably beneficial, for whilst it tends to refine and elevate his character, it at the same time enables him to inculcate and commend the social, moral, and religious virtues. And when this faculty becomes invested with new powers, and acquires a more extended influence by means of those modern wonders, the printing press and the telegraph, may we not justly anticipate that its beneficial effects will be felt more and more in all these relations, while the universal spread of education would make these great blessings even more apparent than they now are, and extend the sphere of their action beyond all that we can at present conceive?—F. A. G.

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. V.

- 1st—Ought “Definition” to be considered an act of “Judgment” rather than of Perceptivity—and Why?
- 2nd—What is a Proposition? Distinguish between the use of a Definition and a Proposition.
- 3rd—What are the parts of a Proposition?
- 4th—What are the chief relations which objects bear to each other?
- 5th—How may Propositions be divided?

Notices of Books, etc.

The Young Man Perplexed by Religious Controversy. By J. A. James. London: Hamilton. Birmingham: Mathison.

This is the fifth of a series of practical sermons to young men, by one whose name is well known in the religious world. We presume that we were favoured with a copy on account of the subject treated upon—controversy; and we must confess that we have perused it with considerable interest. Taking the question of Pilate—What is truth?—as his motto, Mr James refers to the various opinions held by religious sects, points out the abuses of controversy, and concludes with practical directions and fatherly counsels. We consider the last to be the most valuable part of the sermon. We are glad to find the preacher setting forth the importance of a young man looking at both sides of a question, and then making an intelligent choice; for “Every man should know what he believes, and why he believes it: he should take his side, and valiantly keep it.”

The spirit in which controversy should be carried on, is very forcibly set forth, as well as the manner in which arguments should be weighed, and a conclusion arrived at. Take the following extract as an illustration:—

“Young men, be ardent lovers of the truth—diligent seekers after it—constant associates with it—and impassioned admirers, valiant defenders of it; but at the same time, not pugnacious, restless, bitter, and bigoted disputants for it.” * * * *

“To adopt, in conclusion, the directions and words of Saurin—‘Buy the truth, which requires the sacrifice of dissipation—of indolence—of precipitancy—of prejudice—of obstinacy—of curiosity—of the passions. We comprise the matter in seven precepts:

- Be attentive.
- Do not be discouraged by labour.
- Suspend your judgment.
- Let prejudice yield to reason.
- Be teachable.
- Restrain your avidity of knowing.
- In order to edify your mind, subdue your heart.”

History of Greece. By Miss Corner. London Dean and Son.

Miss Corner’s name in connection with Histories for Schools and Families, is widely and favourably known. In this, the last product of her pen, she treats of Greece, that land “of battle and of song.” In tracing its history from the earliest period to the Roman conquest, while she rejects all that is fabulous, or points out its unhistoric character, we never find her omitting

“The scenes our earliest dreams have dwelt upon.”

The questions on each chapter have been evidently composed with much care, and they greatly add to the value of the work for educational purposes. We can recommend it with confidence.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XV.

RATIOCINATION.

THE USES OF THE SYLLOGISM.

"Those in whom the faculty of Reason is predominant, and who most skilfully dispose their thoughts with a view to render them clear and intelligible, are always the best able to persuade others of the truth of what they lay down."—*Descartes*.

WHEN we perform the act of self-introspection with diligence and carefulness, and endeavour through the intimations of Consciousness, to ascertain the precise nature of the mode in which the thought-powers operate during the period in which the Ratiocinative faculty is active, we shall perceive—despite of the amazing swiftness and subtlety of the electricity of thought—if we dare use that expression to shadow forth and typify the mysterious nature of the mentality—that our Reason is capable of exerting itself in two diverse manners, and may almost be said to be possessed of two distinct powers; the one, that by which new truths are primarily apprehended—by which the *suggestions* of experience are soonest appreciated—by which the revealments of sensation and consciousness are generalized into hypotheses—and the first faint dawnings of new and hitherto unthought-of ideas are earliest comprehended;—the other, that by which those truths which experience has suggested, are eliminated, developed and verified—by which the whole series of consequences involved in the adoption of any opinion, are fully and adequately presented to the mind, and by which the accuracy or erroneousness of our mental generalizations and hypothetical conceptions is brought before the intellect in such a manner as shall lead to their being accepted or rejected. This two-fold capacity of the mentality is recognized by the philosophers of many different schools;—the former is the Intellect—*Noûs*—of Plato; the pure Reason—*Reine Vernunft*—of Kant; and the Spontaneity—*Spontanéité*—of Cousin;—while the latter is the Logical power—*Διανοία*; the Understanding—*Verstand*; and the Reflectivity—*Réflexion*—of the same parties respectively. The one, Kant, defines as the faculty of forming primary notions—*Vermögen der Urtheile*; the other, as the faculty of drawing conclusions—i.e., syllogizing, *Vermögen der Schlüsse*. Coleridge, too, if our memory serves us correctly, somewhere distinguishes these two powers by the names, *vis rationalis* and *vis regulatrix*;—the Reason, or that which comprehends, generalizes, co-ordinates, and hypothesizes; and the Understanding, or that which regulates, unfolds, and subordinates all the impressions

which the mind receives, according to the necessary laws under which it acts. The former is that faculty which first, dimly and obscurely it may be, gains a glimpse of those laws "in which endless discoveries are contained implicitly, and to which, as they afterwards arise, they may be referred in endless succession;" the latter is that power by which these primary ideas are brought forth into definitude, by which the dim-seen notions of the spontaneous Intellection are made distinct and clear, and by which all the remote consequences of any law are progressively and gradually eliminated. Nor is it by philosophers alone that these powers are recognized as distinct. Universal experience has herein confirmed the teachings of philosophy; for it has led men in every age to look upon those who were endowed with the power of throwing the light of Reason upon the secrets of Nature, as possessed of a superior capacity to that which appertains to common mortals. It carefully distinguishes between "the far-darting glance" of Genius, whose eye is illuminated by "the light which never was on land and shore," and the mere acuteness and versatility of Talent. We all know that the primal desiderata in discovery is the attainment of accurate guiding conceptions, and that it is much easier to understand and even expound the *rationale* of any new discovery or invention, than to work out in our own minds the elementary conceptions from which discoveries result. Have we not all often wondered at the simplicity and commonness of the circumstances which constituted to the minds of scientific men the points of origination for some of their most renowned Genius-achievements? These ideas seem to arise in the mind by a special activity resulting from its peculiar constitution and previous habits, and by a certain capacity of looking at the objects of experience in new points of view; and thus it is that we are continually called upon to see "obscurities in science, which appeared impenetrable, suddenly dispelled, and the most barren and unpromising fields of inquiry converted, as if by inspiration, into rich and inexhaustible mines of knowledge and power, by a simple change in the point of vision, or by merely bringing to bear on them some principle which it never occurred before to try." These considerations are sufficient, we conceive, to warrant us in arriving at the conclusion, that the Ratiocinative faculty is duplex in its mode of acting. But in order that our meaning may be rendered more intelligible, and that we may reduce our observations from the abstract to the concrete, it may be advisable to present our readers with an illustration. This we will do by a slight reference to the grand discovery of the immortal Newton. The fall of bodies to the earth, which experience continually revealed to him, or if you will have the old traditionary story,—the fall of an apple from a tree in his garden at Woolthorpe—suggested to his mind the law of Gravitation. Thus far, the act was one of mental spontaneity,—an exercise of the pure Reason; but no sooner had this suggestion been given to the mind,—no sooner had this thought-germ been planted in the Intellect, than with the characteristic ardour of an original mind, he called into action the faculty of Reflectivity,—the Logical power, in order to try the truth or falsehood of the hypothesis. The truth of the law then became, in logical phrase, the question, to prove which a middle term required to be sought. Confining our attention merely to the astronomical relation, we may state that *a priori* calculations were made upon each of the then known planets in succession, for the purpose of ascertaining the

amount of their several deflections, on the assumption that the law was true; that the results of these calculations were then compared with the amount of deflection which actual experiment made known, and that a perfect coincidence between them was immediately observed. There was then no longer any room for doubt. The law was true.

To state the matter syllogistically and in the most general terms, the undershown may, perhaps, suffice:—

If it be true that “the gravitating forces of bodies are to each other, *directly as their masses*, and *inversely as the squares of their distances*,” then the sun, and all the bodies which revolve round him, should act and react on each other, in accordance with this rule.

But the planets—*i.e.*, all the bodies (comets excepted) which revolve round the sun, act and react upon him and upon each other, in accordance with this rule (as per the coincidence of the *a priori* calculations which I made, and the inductive observations which I carefully executed);

Therefore, it is true, that “the gravitating forces of bodies are to each other, *directly as their masses*, and *inversely as the squares of their distances*.”*

Accepting, then, as true, this analysis of the Reason, which establishes a two-fold capacity in the thought-powers, we shall find that there is also a corresponding duplex distinction in the operations which it performs;—I., The mind is possessed of the power of discovering new truths; II., The intellectual faculties are capable of developing the truths which we have discovered, or which we imagine we have discovered, by analyzing what is necessarily included in them, but which we have failed to recognize as involved in their adoption, either through incapacity all at once to discover the latent qualities and relations which appertain to the objects with which the mind becomes conversant, and to perceive the whole series of consequences which result from any opinion which we accept, or through the assumption of opinions as true, by education, reading, conversation, &c., before they have been legitimately wrought out by our own intellectual powers.

Having, then, arrived at this point, we will now proceed to investigate “the Uses of the Syllogism” in their relation to the two peculiar capacities which we believe belong to the Ratiocinative power; and for this purpose we shall inquire—

I.—What is the “Use of the Syllogism” in the discovery of new truths?

* While remarking on this subject in the text, it occurred to us that it would be useful for our young readers were we to subjoin the following sentence or two from an Oration on the Life and Genius of Sir Isaac Newton, by Thomas Cooper. Speaking of the discovery of the law of Gravitation, he says, “None of you, I trust, will join in the foolish attempt to depreciate the mind of this illustrious discoverer, by that senseless remark, ‘It was all accident.’ Accident! why, had not hundreds of men seen apples fall, and eaten them, too, and yet had never thought of this doctrine of Gravitation? Be assured that no grand truth has ever fallen ‘by accident’ into a man’s mouth when he happened to yawn. No! no! It is not to the listless and indolent that Nature’s revelations are made. The mind must be prepared to perceive it; it must yearn after a discovery of Nature’s secrets; it must be girt up and grappling with the difficulty. I tell you, young men, again, it is the Searcher—and the Searcher alone—who finds the gold of Truth; it is the Worker—and the Worker alone—who discovers that “Open sesame” which is to unlock the opulent secrets of the universe.”

We have had occasion to mention, in a former paper, and, if we mistake not, to prove, that all our knowledge is Experience-originated, and that however much we may exert our imagination and intellect combined, we are quite incapable of transcending that Experience. It is true that we can, by the aid of Reason, arrive at a knowledge of the necessary and inevitable occurrence of many things before they actually do occur, and that by the wondrous powers of Imagination we may picture forth scenes of far more than earthly beauty, and a succession of events of bliss and joy greater far than mortal ever experienced; but still the *data* upon which Reason acts, and from which Imagination culls, are given in Experience, and we only employ the known, as in Algebraic Equations, for an index and exponent by which we may discover the unknown. This idea has been most accurately expressed by an eminent writer thus;—"Philosophy being strictly confined to experience, often embraces in its definitions only what lies within that sphere; and when it refers to anything beyond, it still connects what is *beyond* with what is *within*. Nay, in tracing out existences, it often comes to one which is the last of those experienced, but which indicates another set not directly experienced, lying, as it were, on the boundary line between them. In such a case, what thus lies upon the line is taken as an indication or exponent of what is not experienced. When a definition is given of the latter, accordingly, it is either confined to the former, or derives from that its principal materials; that is, the exponent is either substituted for what it indicates, or is employed as the best means of characterizing it. In short, what is only indicated, is best known by its relations to what is experienced, as being most closely connected with it."*

It will follow from the above statement, that every absolutely new truth must be furnished to the mind by experience, and that by no possible exercise of our mentality can we attain to any such truth if it be not suggested by, and implicitly contained in, our experience. Such an assertion, some of our readers will be ready to exclaim, is tantamount to a complete surrender of the opinion that the Syllogism is of any use in the discovery of new truths. But a little reflection is all that is necessary to rectify this rash conclusion. It must be borne in mind, that we cannot know objects *per se*—i.e., as they are *in themselves*; that *noumena* are beyond our perceptive-ken; and that phenomena alone are capable of impressing our minds. It is somewhat difficult for us to believe this, because we feel that we can produce no change unless through some instrumentality, and then assume that no change can be produced on ourselves unless through some instrumentality likewise, and thence infer that we are affected by noumena or objectivities, when in reality the phenomena or qualities of objects are all that can ever impress us. Seeing, then, that we can only know the properties of objects, and that the mind names its *ideas*, and not the *objects* which originate these ideas, it will immediately appear that it is an inevitable necessity of the intellect to generalize its experience; for if we can know objects only through their properties, our only idea of these objects must be that of particular and special collections of properties. Now we must, perforce, think of objects as we have experienced them. If, then, every absolutely new truth can only

* Cairns on Moral Freedom, p. 231.

enter the mind through experience, it must be evident that the proposition in which it is contained can only be *experience-expressed*. But we are liable to collect erroneous experience, as well as to apply an idea too hastily to the explanation of our new experiences; as in the case of the North American Indians, who having obtained a quantity of gunpowder, rashly concluded that its grains were the seeds of a plant, and sowed it upon one of their extensive prairies, in the hope of reaping a rich harvest of the "thunder" of the pale faces. We have not space to particularize regarding the possibility of erroneous conceptions; however, we may be allowed to submit the following observations, which may somewhat assist our readers in elaborating the point for themselves:—1st, All new truths of experience may be expressed in, or contained under, one or other of the propositions of relation—viz., Existence, Coequality, Succession, Causation, Similarity, Diversity, Quantity, Quality, &c.; 2nd, That we can only know the properties and relations of objects, the changes they undergo, and the effects which they are able to produce; 3rd, That we know all the causes concurring to the production of an effect, if all of them appear to our experience; some, if only some affect us; none, if we have not observed any; and *vice versa*, we know all the effects capable of resulting from a cause if, the cause being known, we have perceived them all, and some and none upon the conditions before stated; 4th, That all propositions of Causation relate to—1st, Single causes capable of producing specific single effects, and *vice versa*, certain single specific effects producible by certain single causes; 2nd, Certain several causes combined, or capable of being combined, in order to the production of one species of effect, and *vice versa*, one species of effect produced or producible by the combined agency of several causes; 3rd, One definite cause capable of producing several different effects, and *vice versa*, several different effects produced or producible by one definite cause. It will be seen from the above remarks that there are many possibilities of error arising from the too hasty acceptance and generalization of the suggestions of Experience. We may instance the supposing of an accidental property, quality, relation, &c., to be an essential one; the mistaking of the number of causes concurring to the production of an effect, &c. How then are the erroneous conceptions, the rash generalizations, and the immature hypotheses resulting from the suggestions of experience operating upon the mental Spontaneity to be corrected? How are we to rectify the *ideas* of the Reason? What "compensating balance" can we employ to bring the Intellect and the realities of things into correspondence and coincidence? Plainly, as we imagine, thus:—by stating the Reason-educed idea, law, or discovery, to the mentality as a question, to which the mind by its own natural laws will impart its formal character; announce the middle term, which will be sufficient to prove the point; this middle term must then be referred to Experience, to be proven,—in other words, Induction must be employed to ascertain whether the actual facts of the case will bear out and substantiate that which the mind, by its own formal processes, demands as the condition of verification. If the Induction be rigidly performed, and the requirements of the Reflectivity or logical process be accurately fulfilled, the mind can no longer hesitate in accepting the product of the Intellect as true and real. Such, we consider, is an approximation to the accurate analysis of the process of the Ratiocinative faculty in Truth-discovery. We do not say that this is always

explicitly *et totidem verbis* stated in the mind; it is sufficient for our purpose that it is an implicit condition to the adoption by the mentality of any generalization, hypothesis, or theory whatever, as the expression of one of those truths of science on which it can repose as a guiding principle in all its future dealings with the objectivities with which it is concerned. If this be not an expression of the general fact of Consciousness, how do we account for the rejection by the mind of those numerous fanciful yet baseless theories which flash as frequently and as transiently as summer lightning through the avenues of thought? How comes it that we find that all the great discoveries for which our era is conspicuous, have flitted like fairy visions before the wide-open eyes of the geniuses of other times, and that yet the day of their realization was so long delayed? Does it not seem that the mind, although capable of catching up the shadowy suggestions of experience, and "nourishing a youth sublime with the fairy tales of science," yet feels that a process of verification is necessary previous to their being rendered worthy of belief? Were some such intellectual act not performed, we should be believing in truths without any processes which lead to them, and acting on principles destitute of known basis or foundation; and if such a process be performed, in what other manner can it be than in that which we have stated? We know of no other. To the question proposed, we answer, that "the use of the Syllogism in the discovery of new truths" is to verify and certeriorate them to the mentality, by indicating the amount of inductive evidence which by the forms of the thought-powers are necessary to the complete demonstration of the point or points at issue.

II.—What are "the Uses of the Syllogism" in the development of those truths which we have discovered, or which we have had suggested by Experience to the Intellect?

"There is as great a difference between the seeds of thought and their perfect development as between the oak and the acorn. The mind is ever thinking; and new thoughts not only add to our stock of knowledge, but in some measure alter its appearance."* Although the Reason possesses, as we have seen, the power of having suggested to it, and thus implanted in it, the seminal reasons of things—*λογoi στερματικοι*, yet the young seedling must be nourished into growth, and trained into shape, by the aid of experience:—the vital and vivifying power, indeed, resides in the mind, but experience is the condition and means of its development. From this consideration it would seem that it is not enough that the germs of thought should have been excited to active and living manifestation, but that a farther process is necessary—namely, evolution. It is concerning the share which the syllogism exerts in this process that our present inquiries are begun. In order to set this in a clear light, we may again refer to the aforementioned fact, that all our knowledge consists in an acquaintance with the properties, qualities, relations, &c., of bodies, and may farther mention, that of these there are, as it appears to us, two great classes, which may be characterized respectively as *manifest* and *latent*;—under the former are to be ranked those properties, qualities, relations, &c., which present themselves most obviously, conspicuously, and ordinarily to the survey of the mind; and under the latter, those which require a keener insight, and a more close and scrutinizing

* Douglas's "Philosophy of Mind," p. 173.

inspection. It must be evident to every one that the mechanical philosopher, and the chemist, look upon matter with a far different purpose from that of ordinary observers; that the physician and the anatomist gaze and experiment upon the human frame in a manner obviously distinct from that of unprofessional persons; that the astronomer views the heavenly bodies with an eye far more acute and a mind differently biassed from that of those unlearned in the science; and that the psychologist fixes his mind with a greater degree of analytic skill and with a nicer discrimination, as well as more defined presiding intention than that employed by men unmindful of such pursuits. In each and all of these cases, as well as in many others, the main difference consists in the fact, that the one party engages his mind only with the manifest, the other with the latent properties, &c., of the several objects of investigation. Manifest properties are, generally speaking, those which differentiate bodies, while latent qualities are those which lead to their identification and colligation; the latter constitute the generic and specific properties, &c., of objects, while the former consist of the differential and the accidental. Although a knowledge of the manifest relations of bodies is more easily attained, that of their latent qualities is of greater importance; for, on account of the vast multiplicity of objects with which we are surrounded, unless we were endowed with a capacity of discovering these similarities in things, we could never apply our knowledge—even supposing we could obtain it—to any useful purpose, or put it to any advantageous use.

The mental operations by which latent qualities, relations, &c., are discovered, are these:—1st, It observes the similar qualities which exist in different objects, and then sets them down as common attributes; 2nd, It examines these common qualities, in order that it may discover their peculiar properties, or those which are necessarily and invariably found to accompany them; 3rd, It institutes comparisons between several common attributes, that it may discover their resemblance to each other, and it then considers these as more general common qualities; 4th, It classifies and colligates together those objects which possess these common properties. It is by such exercises that the latent qualities of bodies are rendered cognoscible by the Intellect. Ideas of one species of property, when compared, suggest ideas of other relations, and these again of others still farther removed from common observation; and thus by the placing of objects before the mind in a variety of positions, throwing upon them a great number of different lights, and employing new and enlarged modes of analysis and comparison, most interesting discoveries are frequently made, most unexpected relations are often revealed, and new truths are frequently presented to the mentality. It is by more extensive analysis, more accurate comparison, and stricter attention to the requirements of experimental evidence, that Chemistry has elicited such a useful as well as curious store of knowledge from objects which have been obtruding themselves on the notice of man from the earliest periods of time. It is by the same means that Astronomy is now capable of looking upon the star-studded scroll which gentle evening unrolls to his gaze, and reading therefrom so many lessons of Wisdom. We might proceed thus through the whole circle of the sciences, showing that inquiries regarding the latent properties of objects have constantly been found to produce beneficial results, and to enlarge the sphere of human knowledge. But our rapidly filling pages warn us to desist, and to be more brief in noticing the

query contained at the head of these observations. This our readers will not be slow to perceive we have been answering, when they consider that the Manifest relations of objectivities imply and suggest their latent properties and relations, and that we are irresistibly led to attribute the same properties to those bodies which impress their similarity most strongly on the mind. Hence our confidence in reasoning from analogy! Hence the appropriateness of similes, metaphors, and allegories! Now, whenever experience has suggested a new truth, or what we imagine to be a new truth, to the mind, by conjoining with the idea of a Manifest relation the invariable possession of a latent quality, the mind strives to develop this thought, to compare it with experience, and to *induce* under it the greatest possible number of objects or classes of objects. In the development of thought, therefore, syllogism directs us what is the proper form the evidence should take to prove the premises; and the premises being once proven, it is evident we may infer from these premises many other truths implicitly contained, though not formally enunciated, in them, and in this light at least the doctrine of J. S. Mill is correct, "that the force of the syllogism consists in *an inductive assertion with an interpretation added to it.*" But there is obviously another important use of the syllogism—namely, unfolding to the mind the consequences of those general truths which have been received by men as the general laws of science, and teaching their peculiar applications, either singly or in combination. Such are the laws of Gravitation, Motion, and of the six simple Mechanical Powers, of Multiple Proportions, the rules of Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric, Criticism, &c. Indeed, it may be said that as all complex machines, however, intricate and involved may be their structure, consist but of combinations of the six simple mechanical powers; so does all reasoning, however complex, resolve itself into terms, propositions, and syllogisms. We could have wished to follow this subject into more explicit detail, but we have perhaps said enough to set the mind of the reader in the way of elaborating the topic farther for himself. In our next we will treat of the Informal Syllogisms, which will lead to some further illustration and exemplification of "the Uses of the Syllogistic Logic." Meanwhile, our readers will permit us to exhort them to follow out in their own minds the ideas presented to them; this they will doubtless find advantageous to their general mental culture; for there is no saying more correct than that

"Truth springeth out of Truth."

RELIGION and Morality are universally coupled together by writers as distinct things, but their mutual relation is both vaguely and variously appreciated. Some who deem themselves philosophers, by religion, mean a kind of theism, and by morality, the conduct deemed respectable. Some Christians include in religion the morality required by the Bible, others make religion to embrace only the duties of worship; the former, by morality, as separately mentioned, mean Christian conduct as estimated by a worldly standard; and the latter by morality, mean faith showing itself in works. Viewing man comprehensively as a Christian and a citizen, "religion" *should* mean all that the Word of God requires as due to God from his faithful servants; and "morality," all that is due to his countrymen (or those with whom he has to do) from a good citizen, whether defined by the Word or by subordinate authorities consistent with it.

Philosophy.

IS LANGUAGE OF HUMAN OR DIVINE ORIGIN?

DIVINE—I.

LANGUAGE, forming, as it does, the medium through which our ideas are communicated to others, and the conceptions of our minds are made known, is one of the leading characteristics that distinguish man from the brutes, and it must rank among the most important attributes. The consideration, therefore, of its origin cannot but prove a most interesting and profitable occupation.

We hope at the outset to make it plain that Language, in its extended sense—*i.e.*, as the expression of ideas by arbitrary sounds, has existed from the earliest times; upsetting thereby the theory of a noble author,* who, on the ground of certain fanciful descriptions by the ancient poets, contends that man's original condition was that of a wild animal, without language or arts of any kind, and that the advancement of mankind out of this state alone lead to the invention of speech.

It is impossible to imagine any plan by which, in primeval times, intercourse between man and man, and between tribe and tribe, could have been effected without the aid of some kind of language. Though at such a period man's means might have been many, and his wants few, still we hold that in the necessary relations of life, the use of some form of language must have been indispensable when the first societies of men were formed; and how could such societies be formed without the aid of Language. Language, if an invention, must be regarded as the noblest ever made by man,—one, therefore, that we should have expected as the last in the order of time; but it is evident that it must have preceded all the other arts and sciences, as a knowledge of it is essential to a knowledge of them.

If we are permitted to assist the solution

of this question by a reference to the Sacred Writings, they will afford confirmation of our views on this head:—"Adam gave *names* to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field."—Gen. ii. 20. Now without articulate sounds, Adam could not have done this; for, of course, the inexpressive, unmeaning jargon thus left him, would have totally failed to furnish the number of definite terms requisite for giving names to all cattle, and the varied tribes of birds and beasts. It therefore becomes manifest, in our opinion, that articulate sounds were employed, and equally clear does it seem, that sensations of wonder, curiosity, and awe, and the eager investigation of himself and the works around him, which must have characterized the *first man* in his isolated condition, must have precluded the possibility of efforts being made on his part to seek out any of the "many inventions" with which our race has become familiar. Hence, speech being used by him, he must have been endowed with it; and this opinion is confirmed by the beautiful adaptation of the larynx, glottis, &c., for the emission of vowels and assisting in the formation of articulate sounds.

Whoever, therefore, admits the early use we claim for Language, can hardly fail to refer it to a Divine source. The Creator must have endowed our first parents with the power of forming articulate sounds, made them fully sensible of the power they possessed, and given them an impulse to exert it. How much more probable is this, than that "the Father of Mercies" having made man in his own image, should leave him in the condition of a dumb beast to wander in the world! Reader! is it not more consonant with your conceptions of the benevolence of God to suppose that He who made our mundane father a social being, and endowed him with faculties suited to

* Lord Monboddo.

that character, would instruct him how to use them, rather than allow him to live for ages in silence horrible?

The great lexicographer, Dr Johnson, speaking of the origin of language, said—"It must have come by inspiration: a thousand, nay, a million of children could not invent a language. While the organs are pliable, there is not understanding enough to form a language; by the time that there is understanding enough, the organs are become stiff. * * * When I maintain that Language must have come by inspiration, I do not mean that inspiration is required for Rhetoric and all the beauties of Language; for when once man has Language, we can conceive that he may gradually form modifications of it."*

That all languages are derived from one primitive universal one is now generally admitted; that such a one existed nearly two thousand years after the creation of man is testified by Genesis xi. 1.—"the whole earth was of one language and of one speech;"—and if we examine and compare

the languages in present use, we shall find ample reason for believing that all form modifications—extensive, no doubt—of one mother tongue. A striking similarity between many of the sounds in use in different countries will be discovered, such similar sounds, too, having the same signification in both cases. The limited nature of this article precludes our furnishing numerous instances which could be given in support of this assertion. We will, however, give one to illustrate our meaning: it shall be the word *mother*, which is about the first the infant attempts to lisp. *Mother* is in Latin, *mater*; in Saxon, *mother*, *medder*, *meder*; in German, *mutter*, *muoter*, *muder*; in Spanish and Italian, *madre*; in Danish, *moder*; Dutch, *moeder*; Persian, *mader*; and in Sanscrit, *matree*.

Taking, then, these things into consideration, and the strong improbabilities attaching to all opposite theories yet advanced, we can see no reason for arriving at any other conclusion than that Language ranks, among the many other gifts bestowed upon man by his beneficent Creator.

Dartford Institute.

E. Y.

* See Boswell's "Life of Johnson."

HUMAN—I.

THIS is a question on which there has long been a diversity of opinion among philosophers, and one to the discussion of which great acumen and mental ability have been brought. If we should not succeed in throwing any new light upon the subject, we hope to gain the attention of the readers of this magazine, and to place such reasons before them as shall enable them to come to an intelligent conclusion for themselves.

It may be well to premise that the evidences to be brought forward in this debate cannot be of the mathematical or demonstrative kind, but rather inductive and analogical. The former are necessarily excluded, from the nature of the case.

In attempting then to solve the problem of the origin of language, let us notice the nature of those things which are indisputably the works of the Divine Being, and we may mark well not merely the beauty by which they are characterized, but the absolute perfection impressed upon the whole, which thus excludes anything approaching to pro-

gress or improvement. To whatever part of the creation we direct our gaze, this fact strikes our attention; and whether we contemplate the planetary orbs, or take a microscopic view of an insect or a plant, we are compelled, in admiration, to confess that they are "minutely perfect all." But it is not only so with the material world, but also with the habits and instincts of all living things. How admirable the mechanical skill of the beaver and the mathematical powers of the bee! Who expects to discover improvement in the construction of the hut of the one, or in the cell of the other? Another characteristic of the works of God is universality and invariableness, which may be seen illustrated in the instincts of the animal and insect to which we have referred. It is far different with language; for it is at best an imperfect medium for the expression of thought and feeling. Those who have had the greatest powers of speech have felt most how poorly the "words that breathe" can give utterance to the "thoughts

that burn." Hence poets and orators in their highest flights have never been able fully to express the noblest thoughts of their minds or the purest aspirations of their hearts. If this is the case at the present time, what must have been the inconvenience felt in bygone days, when many of our words were so poor, and our whole stock so small. The progress made in perfecting our language during the interval between Chaucer and Wordsworth has been immense, and this change for the better is not confined to it, but may be traced in every other language used by civilized men. Thus language does not possess the first sign of a Divine thing—perfection and unprogressiveness. That it is not invariable or universal in its character who will doubt that has spent a few hours in that Industrial Exhibition to which all nations are sending some representatives? Further, we may observe that if language were inspired or instinctive all would speak the same tongue, and the young would understand its meaning, and the method of using it as easily as birds do the musical inflections and scale.

Again: There is an important philosophical law which we should not now lose sight of—viz., never to assume a new cause when natural ones can explain the fact. Now natural causes will explain the origin of language. From what has already been advanced it will be seen that the progress of language is from the simple to the complex, and as an additional proof of this we may refer to the language of the Chinese, which is of the most primitive order, and consists entirely of monosyllables. The simplest words were doubtless at first educts of instinctive utterances, and would be expressive of such mental emotions as wonder, awe, and fear. This class of words we still retain under the designation of interjections. The next step we apprehend would be the designation of objects from sounds connected with them "as the wind from its whistling noise, the cow from its lowing, and so on. In our own language we still speak of the mewing of the cat, and the cawing of the rooks. The word *cuckoo* so exactly descriptive of the note of the bird thus called, ramifies through several languages. It is spelt *coucou* in French, and *cucula* in Italian." The first reference in

Scripture to the employment of human speech is in Genesis ii. 19, where we have the record of the fact of Adam giving names to the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air. There is something very suggestive in the phraseology there employed. The Almighty is not represented as telling Adam how to designate his creatures, but rather, as bringing them to him, "to see what he would call them." Having endowed man with the power of speech, he encourages him to use it for himself; and thus, doubtless, man was left to invent language himself; for God never does more for him than his necessities require. Adam having affixed a definite term to each object, that word would continue to be the sign of the object referred to, and each called the other up to recollection whenever presented to the mind. In communicating with each other, our first parents would soon find that the names of things were not sufficient to express all they wished, and attributes and actions would be referred to. For these, new words would have to be coined, or through the faculty of association, old words would have to be applied to new ideas. Words which were originally employed to denote sensible objects were afterwards applied to intellectual ideas. The etymology of the Hebrew language, as spoken by the Israelites, furnishes an illustration of the origin of abstract terms with which they were familiar; and the abstract ideas of the Hebrew tongue may in many instances, be traced to the object or circumstance whence they originated. Thus:—the idea of power was derived from the *horn* of an animal, because the animal when enraged was observed to exert its power through its horn; and the same word in the Hebrew which signifies horn, also signifies power. An idea of power also originated from the human *hand*, because through it man exerts his strength. Hence the same word in Hebrew still expresses both the object and the idea derived from it:—"Life and death are in the power of the tongue," reads literally, "Life and death are in the *hand* of the tongue."

"The last object to which man directs his attention, and that which he finds most difficult to comprehend, are the powers of his own mind. The operations of the mind can scarcely be understood but by compar-

son with external objects. In all languages, we therefore find that words denoting intellectual ideas, when traced to their origin, are taken from sensible objects, and were at first metaphors. The words *understanding*, *evidence*, *reflection*, &c., are all taken from the objects of sense."* If, then, it is possible, for language thus to be formed, we have another powerful reason for referring its origin to a natural and not to a miraculous cause.

Such, then, are a few of the considerations which have led us to entertain the opinion

* Lecture on the Philosophy of Language.

which we have indicated by the heading of this article. We are aware that much discredit and disrepute have been thrown upon that opinion through the absurd theories respecting the origin of the human race which have been associated with it. We need scarcely say, that for these theories we have no respect, but rather, we seek to separate the wheat from the chaff—the truth from error. We pause now to listen to the arguments of our opponents, to acknowledge their force, or show their weakness.

A. C.

History.

WAS OLIVER CROMWELL A FIRST-RATE GENERAL, A GREAT STATESMAN, AND A SINCERE MAN?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"Say, why was man so eminently raised
Amid the vast creation; why ordain'd
Through life and death to dart his piercing eye,
With thoughts beyond the limit of his frame!
But that the Omnipotent might send him forth,
In sight of mortal and immortal powers—
As on a boundless theatre—to run
The great career of justice; to exalt
His generous aim to all diviner deeds:
To chase each partial purpose from his breast,
And through the mists of passion and of sense,
And through the tossing tide of chance and pain,
To hold his course unfaltering; while the voice
Of Truth and Virtue up the steep ascent
Of nature calls him to his high reward,
The applauding smiles of heaven."

Akenside's "Ode to Cromwell."

MR. EDITOR,—In replying to the articles of W. H., and W. T., I feel some little difficulty, not on account of the truth or force of their arguments, but because they have not advanced any facts in support of their opinions. I must confess that I am surprised to find that not *one* of the numerous extracts which I have given has been disputed, nor its author's reputation impugned. I frankly avow, that W. H., and W. T., in forming their judgments, have adopted a somewhat singular course. For instance, W. H. has gone so far as to show the contrast between Cromwell and Washington,—

the former finishing his career in the second half of the seventeenth century, in barbarous, uncivilized times; the latter, in all respects, possessed of far greater advantages, and living three quarters of a century after the death of our hero. If such be the standard by which my negative friends estimate the character of any individual, their qualifications, or their work, must, in this respect, be lamentably deficient. W. T. has also ventured to contrast the military capabilities of Cromwell with those of Napoleon, Marlborough, and Wellington. To illustrate to what extent W. T.'s knowledge goes on this head, I may state, that it is well known to all acquainted with the accounts of the actions in which Napoleon and Cromwell figured, that the former, in several instances, adopted precisely the same course in military tactics which the latter so successfully pursued in the battles of Marston Moor, Worcester, &c. Had my opponents followed the hint given at the conclusion of my article on page 179,—viz. "to transport themselves into the times they were describing," they would probably have given a fair and impartial decision.

GENERALSHIP.—After the illustrations

already given, I should have thought it unnecessary to have produced further proof ; but, with my opponents it appears otherwise. When Cromwell's claim to generalship is backed by the testimonies of Generals Fairfax, Essex, Colonel Hutchinson, and last, though not least, king Charles himself, I should have supposed that it would never be disputed that his claim as a commander had good grounds to rest upon. Lord Clarendon admits that "Cromwell's army was one of order and discipline, that its sobriety, prudence, courage, and firmness, made it famous and terrible all over the world." If, then, Cromwell knew how to tutor and train an army for war, to withstand the best soldiers of the day, it would not be too much to give him credit for good generalship, seeing that his services were highly appreciated by the greatest men of the day, and by others at the present time. Guizot, in the "History of the English Revolution," informs us that "Fairfax, on receiving orders to leave the siege of Oxford, and to pursue the king, wrote to the House of Commons, requesting that Cromwell should return to join him, as his presence and services were *indispensable* in the command of the cavalry. The letter was countersigned by *sixteen colonels*. The House, on reading the letter, immediately acceded to the request." Further proof on this head is unnecessary. In concluding, I cannot but admire the candour of C. W., jun., in relinquishing this point to his opponents. My opponents have made reference to what *they* designate "Cromwell's butcheries in Ireland."* I will answer the objection in the same words used by Mr Roebuck, M.P., in the House of Commons, May 27, 1851, on the Torrington Policy in Ceylon. "He contended that Ceylon was not a colony, but a conquered country, and should be governed in a rigorous, if not a despotic manner. *Because the insurrection had been resolutely put down*, it had been represented of little importance, and the measures taken for its suppression had been *condemned as cruel* ; but he believed that

under such circumstances, judicial severity was here mercy, and that a mild and timorous policy would have led to the most disastrous results."

STATESMANSHIP.—Before proceeding to adduce further proofs of this, I will notice a few objections that have been made. In the quotations which I shall bring forward, it will be seen that several of these objections are at once silenced ; and that, too, by the authorities on which C. W. has placed reliance. The assertion of W. T., that "Cromwell's foreign policy was anything but wise, &c.," is disproved by the fact that Cromwell never made war in order to obtain conquest or military glory, but to seek redress either for his own country, or for some other which had not the power to enforce reparation. Had the United Provinces done nothing which called for the interference of the Protector ? Had not the Dutch, the Bey of Tunis, given provocation sufficient to justify the recovery of immediate satisfaction ? And, why did he cripple the power of one kingdom (Spain) for the benefit of another (France) ? First, because Spain had been the dread of all Europe for ages ; obtaining conquest by the sword. But the defence of France by the Protector excites our admiration for him the more, when we reflect that Cromwell was not on friendly terms with France ; but he did not regard that ; he saw evidently that she had been grossly insulted, and accordingly espoused her cause. But surely it was not bad policy so to do. Lord Palmerston has done so in several instances,* and received commendation, not rebuke and calumny. W. T. also informs his readers that Cromwell's home policy was worse than his foreign. Two examples to the contrary will suffice to prove that this charge is false. Dr. Lingard says, that "he (Cromwell) reformed the Chancery, that he laboured to abolish the abuses of the law, he had placed learned and upright judges on the bench, and he had been careful in all ordinary cases that impartial justice should be administered."† He gave us a far better representation (considering the interval elapsed, and the character of the times,)

* At the time to which the "butchery" in Ireland has been referred, 150,000 protestants had been massacred. The brutality and ferocity of such conduct is unexampled, and defies explanation.

* Witness his espousal of the cause of Hungary.

† Vol. 2, page 130.

than we have at the present day. The instrument of Government provided that there should be 430 members in the House of Commons. After a lapse of 200 years, we have just got an additional—100. Southey says, also, “the judges discharged their functions with equity, the laws had, their course, nothing being allowed to prevent their execution, the finances were administered with economy, the army and navy were paid regularly, and the arts of peace flourished throughout the length and breadth of the kingdom.” W. T. has asserted that “the laws which Cromwell passed were only to perpetuate his own power.” I quote Cromwell’s own words in parliament to disprove this:—“The Instrument of Government doth declare that *you have a legislative power without a negative from me*. You may *make laws*, and if I give not my consent within twenty days to the passing of your laws, they are *lego facto, laws whether I consent or not*.” In the nineteenth century, in this realm, no law can be in force without the royal consent. What a contrast! And Cromwell only interfered with the laws when the Instrument of Government was infringed, or the rights of conscience invaded; which I might prove did space admit.

SINCERITY.—In writing upon this question, I regret that my opponents have associated (as also on the other heads,) subjects which do not come under the text of sincerity, and which I could refute did space admit. For my part, I cannot conceive that any person having carefully read Cromwell’s letters and speeches, and also remarked the consistency with them with which he acted, can arrive at the conclusions made by C. W., W. H., and W. T. That he was addicted to double-dealing, or “dissimulation,” or “consummate hypocrisy,” I deny. One of his most striking characteristics was, frankness in enunciating his convictions as they spontaneously flowed from his heart, without attempting to mystify or convey a meaning contrary to that expressed. I have looked through his letters and speeches to see if I could discover any dissimulation, and I have looked in vain. On the contrary, his sentiments on religious and other topics, appear to be in perfect harmony, clothed with the heart’s

warmest and most fervent feeling, and calculated to impress the truth of the sentiment on the reader’s mind. I was somewhat surprised, on reading C. W.’s article, to find a corollary which is more in favour of his opponents than of himself. He says, “The former (motives) can only be correctly judged of by the latter (actions), actions being the outward manifestation of inward designs.” He admits (from the extracts which follow,) that Cromwell wore the cloak of religion, or that his *actions* were *religious*; this, then, is *outward manifestation*: following out his theory, therefore, Cromwell was *religious inwardly*. I am glad that C. W. has made such an important concession. I quite agree with the remark of B. W. P., “that the charge of hypocrisy rests on a concurrence of circumstances, or coincidences.” To my mind, it appears (I say it respectfully,) that historians have been the more zealous to stigmatize Cromwell as a hypocrite, because he was a really religious man, eager to promote piety and virtue. Reader, if you would understand him, study Cromwell’s correspondence with his own family, and with his most intimate friends; with his fellow soldiers, his ambassadors, official agents, ministers, and the representatives and heads of foreign courts; his addresses to his Ironsides on the eve of battle; his speeches to his parliaments in anticipation of their friendly co-operation, or in censure and defiance of their faithless opposition, and obstinate perversity; and, last of all, read those “passages concerning His Highness in the time of his sickness,” and the solemn death-bed prayer of the great general and statesman, the words in which he addressed himself to God, (commending his people to His protection,) when the things of time were passing away as a vain shadow, and the realities of eternity were awfully present before him,—read all these, and say if the theory of Cromwell’s hypocrisy has the appearance of truth, or even probability. Whatever opinion I may form of Cromwell’s policy, I find that from the period of his unheeded labours as the farmer of Huntingdon, to his last hours, amid all the magnificence of Whitehall, a perfect consistency and uniformity is apparent, through his written and spoken language, including

those passing effusions of friendship and parental affection which were destined for none but partial eyes. Cromwell may have been an enthusiast, even a fanatic; but, while there remains such voluminous evidence of his faith in his own policy, and his firm and unflinching reliance on the religion he had professed through life, I must dismiss the charge of hypocrisy as one of the most cowardly and malicious that history ever adopted. I may be allowed to remark here, that had Cromwell been the wicked, ambitious, intolerant, and hypocritical man that his enemies would have us believe, it is singular that on his death-bed he never betrayed any anxiety of mind, or remorse of conscience. On the contrary, a distinguished person present at his death, assures us that he "died with great serenity and tranquillity of mind, assured that a better heritage awaited him hereafter." On the receipt of the sad tidings of the death of the Protector, most of the sovereigns of Europe (including Louis XVI.) went into mourning, testifying their respect for a statesman whose policy had won their admiration.

I cannot conceive why my opponents attack Cromwell as insincere, because he quoted texts of scripture on the battle field, and elsewhere. Was this a new thing? Did this constitute hypocrisy? or, is it a profanation of scripture, as my opponents say? Is it by this test that they discern hypocrisy? I have yet to learn that Cromwell ever spoke irreverently of the scriptures, and I question whether my opponents will not discover that their assertion was easier made than proved. C. W. asks how his opponents can reconcile Cromwell's participation in the death of Charles I. with his professions of sincerity? Every studious reader of the History of England is aware that Cromwell made the most strenuous efforts to save Charles, but the letter sent by that unfortunate monarch to the Queen, (and which was intercepted by Cromwell and Ireton,) sealed his fate. In this letter, Charles assures the Queen, that instead of Cromwell having a silken garter, (or, more properly, the Order of the Bath,) the Lord-Lieutenancy of Ireland, and other honours (which Charles had promised him), he should be treated with a *hempen cord*,

when he fell into Charles's power. After such an example of infidelity on the part of Charles, I put it to C. W. which he would have done, had he been situated as Cromwell was? Should he decide against Cromwell, his decision will inevitably betoken imbecility. The assertion of C. W., that Cromwell was continually annoyed by terror in his last days, cannot be reconciled with the testimonies of Milton, Whitelock, Burnet, &c., who ascribe any restlessness of mind that he might have suffered, to the apathy with which his parliaments prosecuted their Reform, and also to the delay which occurred on the most trifling of subjects. On this point, any further proof would be superfluous; I will only request a candid consideration of my former article. Before closing, I cannot refrain from expressing my astonishment that C. W. should speak in such laudatory terms of Milton, and refuse to accept his testimony to Cromwell as a First-rate General, a Great Statesman, and a Sincere Man.

One or two testimonies to the Protector's character in the triple aspect, and I have finished. The following is from Macaulay's Essays, vol. 2, page 479:—"On the other hand, the *fanaticism* of Cromwell never urged him to impracticable undertakings, or confused his perception of the public good. Inferior to Bonaparte in invention, he was far *superior* to him in *wisdom*. Cromwell was emphatically a man. He possessed, in an eminent degree, that masculine and full grown robustness of mind, that equally diffused intellectual health, which, if our national partiality does not mislead us, has peculiarly characterized the great men of England. Never was any ruler so *conspicuously born for sovereignty*. The cup which has *intoxicated* all others, *sobered* him. His *spirit*, restless from its own buoyancy in a *lower* sphere, reposed in *majestic placidity* as soon as it had reached the level congenial to it. *Rapidly* as his *fortunes* grew, his *mind* expanded *more rapidly still*. *Insignificant as a private citizen, he was a great general, he was a still greater prince.*

"The ambition of Oliver was of no vulgar kind. He never seems to have coveted despotic power. He at first fought sincerely and manfully for the Parliament, and

never deserted it until it had deserted its duty. But even when thus placed by violence at the head of affairs, he did not assume unlimited power. He gave the country a constitution far more perfect than any which at that time had been known in the world. For himself, he demanded, indeed, the first place in the Commonwealth, but with powers scarcely so great as those of a Dutch stadtholder, or an American president. He gave the Parliament a voice in the appointment of ministers, and left to it the whole legislative authority, not even reserving to himself a veto on its enactments, (is this perpetuating his own power?) and he did not require that the Chief Magistracy should be hereditary in his own family. Thus far, we think, if the circumstances of the times, and the opportunities which he had of aggrandizing himself be fairly considered, he will not lose by comparison with Washington or Bolivar."—Page 45, 46.

Finally, Mr Mayor, (a member of the Parliaments under Cromwell,) says, "We

regard, not without some veneration, the man who, amidst all the disadvantages of personal insecurity, administered with so much wisdom and vigour, the Government he had usurped, as for six years to avert from his country the deep disgrace to our national history, the Restoration of the Stuarts.

"But, whatever the artist or the herald has contributed to the Protector's renown, immediately on the restoration of royalty, and the mouldering tabernacle of his mighty mind was forbidden to contaminate the sepulchre of kings * * * yet there remains for Oliver Cromwell, among the proudest memorials of his country's fame, a monument such as few kings have had the fortune to erect; and, which, guarded by the pen and the press, the artillery of ethereal power, not the most potent prince, even another Omar, shall be able to destroy."

Gentlemen of the Jury,—What is your verdict?

J. G. R.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

In availing myself of the privilege of a reply in this discussion, I will just premise, that I am not arguing as a partizan, neither do I wish to obtain a triumph over those who have arrayed themselves against me in this friendly tourney. My aim is truth; this invited me to venture upon this stormy voyage; and it has been the beacon that I have kept steadily before my eye: but if the medium through which its glorious light has reached my vision be a distorted one, happy will he be who shall dispel the delusion.

I have tried to behold Cromwell in his own proper person. I have desired to read his inmost soul only by that light which his own words and actions have emitted. I repeat, I am no partizan;—I do not belong to that class who think it their duty to heap every slander, and throw every obloquy upon Cromwell's devoted name. Neither do I profess to have any sympathy with those who read Cromwell's history with the intention of setting him up as a model man. Each of these classes are alike in the wrong. It is mere sophistry to take the actions and

words of Cromwell, and then explain them away by saying, though he did this and that, and said the other, yet still his heart glowed with fervent emotions of patriotism, and was enlarged with every free and liberal opinion. Such reasoning, when actions and words speak plainly, is worth nothing. The worst of men can be made models of every perfection, and the possessors of every virtue, if we are to judge of their actions in this sophistical manner. What it concerns us to know is, did Cromwell do those things which history says he did? If he did, then away with the plea about his "motives." We have nothing to do with men's motives: their actions and their words are the only criteria by which we can know them. I doubt not but that Pontius Pilate, when he consented to the crucifixion of our Lord, appealed to his motives in proof of his honesty; but though he wished to save Jesus, he had not the honesty to interpose his power, and do the Innocent One justice. We must never bring forward the plea of honesty of purpose, or purity of motive, when history records evil deeds concerning

its heroes. The man who attempts to palliate his misdeeds, by saying that he wished to do good, either proves that he did a wilful wrong, or else that he had not the courage to take the right steps to gain what he professed to be his end.

Our judgment of Cromwell is, then, founded upon what we read, consequently we can have no sympathy with those who would prevent us seeing his misdeeds by attempting to blind us with the assumed purity of his motives.

But much as we find fault with those of whom we have just spoken, much less do we agree with those who would heap nothing but scorn and shame upon his head. The name of Cromwell will ever pale the cheek of the despotic crew. It well suits the views and principles of those who trample upon humanity's rights, to attempt to make the name of Cromwell hateful in the eyes of man. That name is a scarecrow to despotic kings. Cromwell is the finger-post, which with silent, yet powerful meaning, tells every despot to beware, lest by trampling upon his people's rights, he raise around him the surges of a rebellious storm, which storm may throw up some imitator of Cromwell to hurl the despot from his hated throne.

Despots, and the admirers of despotic power, hate Cromwell, not because he, like them, acted with despotic power,—not because he trampled too often upon a people's rights—not because of his lack of virtues; but they hate him, because in him they read what an infuriate and down-trodden people can ever do when they are aroused and determined for their rights.

Cromwell, tyrant though he was, rose, as all the world knows, upon the will of a great and once despot-ridden people. He was the exponent of a people's wish; but he too fondly abused the awful trust committed to his care; for which he merits our indignant reprobation.

Cromwell's name is hated and maligned by the despotic, because in early life it was associated with all that was liberal and free. Had the man at first been what he became when he arrived at the summit of his ambition, we should not hear the enemies of freedom speak ill of his name. Had Cromwell been born heir of a despotic throne,

much of the obloquy which is now heaped upon him would have been unknown. He is hateful in the eyes of many only because he reached to despotism by mounting the ladder of popular freedom.

We have, then, no sympathies in common with those who think that kings rule by a right divine. We respect those who sit in high places, but our respect is commensurate with their qualification for the high duties which belong to their station, and the justice with which they fulfil them. Our love of manly freedom forbids us to look upon the masses as so many machines, to be employed for the sport and pleasure of those who are called kings. Hence it is, that from the testimony of history, we find so many things in the life of Cromwell which prevent us from consenting to call him an honest man. We repeat, we have formed our opinion of Cromwell as history has proved him. We can have no other test by which to know the man. If history has taught us false things, honoured shall be that name which divests tradition of its false colouring and presents us with the naked facts, without artificial adorning.

We had hoped that this discussion would have induced the friends of Cromwell to bring forward such proofs as would have removed from his name those blots which lead us to view him as anything but one of the greatest and best of men. We are sorry to be compelled to believe that his admirers have nothing new to bring forward; and that they are convinced that what has so long been recorded of him is true. We are free to confess that Cromwell's character is not properly understood. He is undeserving of much of the blame that is cast upon him, and he is utterly unworthy of much of the praise which has recently been given him.

J. G. R. has manfully laboured to make the character of Cromwell assume a more lovely aspect; but, unfortunately, he has chosen his proofs from a very suspicious source. It is never wise to seek to establish the proof of a man's virtues from the testimony of those who have been partakers in his deeds. Much as we respect the writings and the character of Milton, he is the last man whose testimony we should receive when the sincerity of Cromwell is called in ques-

tion. Milton beheld in his patron, Cromwell, the very opposite of that which his own soul abhorred—viz., kingly power. And while Cromwell only professed to hate regality, and to uphold a republic, Milton saw in him the man after his own heart; but Milton has shown by his writings that he could tolerate in his favourite, Cromwell, what he thought merited his utmost indignation when evinced by a king.

Again: how differently are the actions of a man interpreted when seen by a bosom friend, than when inspected by an uninterested party. Every man has had his bosom friends, and they have ever found much to admire, or their friendship would not have existed; but the great actions, which the world alone can read, these are the criteria by which a public man's character must be known. We cannot, therefore, consent to have Cromwell's sincerity founded upon the testimony of his partial friends;—his actions, and his actions alone, must be taken as the index of his mind. When it can be shown that Cromwell did not act with duplicity,—that he did not reach despotic power upon the surges of political freedom,—that he did not in his declining years belie the professions of his earlier days,—then, and not till then, can we consent to call Cromwell an honest man.

J. G. R. takes it for granted that Cromwell was a religious man. This point he attempts to prove from certain facts recorded of him. Now, we are not presuming to sit in the place of Deity;—to us the secrets of men's hearts are unknown; but this much we must affirm, that outward signs of religion are no sure proof that grace reigns in the heart. Cromwell might have had the fear of God before his eyes; but it is certain that he too often acted as though his own aggrandizement and his own honour were the only gods he had any wish to serve. It seems mere sophistry to endeavour to argue in his favour by saying that we cannot read his inward thoughts. A man is not to judge of his fellow man by his thoughts;—"by their fruits ye shall know them." Cromwell laboured for kingly power, while professing not to desire it. Where, then, was his sincerity?

It is one thing to prove that England was benefitted by Cromwell's reign, and quite

another to show that he was an honest ruler. We should be very unwise to deny that Cromwell made a brilliant display of despotic power; we know that his energy caused the name of England to be feared; but his foreign success is no proof of his ruling his people by just and honest means. Neither has it been shown in this discussion that Cromwell is entitled to the character of a great Statesman. We have been reminded of his great victories over foreign foes as a proof of his profound statesmanship; but we do not see in them any evidence of a master mind. We rather behold in Cromwell's wars the desire to draw from himself, and to fix upon conquest, the gaze of a jealous and discontented people. A great Statesman, we conceive to be, a man who frames and enforces those laws which shall conduce to the peace, happiness, and contentment of the people for whom he legislates. Where are these proofs of Cromwell's great Statesmanship? Did he conciliate the English people? Did he found such a system as the English people have loved to honour? Did he not leave the country in danger of a terrible anarchy, to escape from which it threw itself abjectly at the feet of a worthless king? Would it have been thus if Cromwell had been a great Statesman? We think not.

B. W. P. wishes to show that Cromwell was just the Statesman for his age; but, unfortunately for his argument, his friends differ from him. Many tell us that Cromwell was born before his time. It is passing strange that Cromwell should have hurried the country from a republic into the iron grasp of military rule, and at his death have left it a prey to the progeny of a despotic king, if he were just the Statesman suited for his day.

We do not question Cromwell's ability: he knew how to perform great acts: he was fitted for and he accomplished great things; but, alas! for his country and his own fame, he allowed an insatiable ambition to warp his better judgment, and so he stopped upon the very threshold of greatness, when he might, by a proper use of his unbounded talents, have placed himself upon the highest pinnacle of fame, by proving himself one of the best and wisest of men. We sincerely wish that it were our pleasant task thus to

view him ; but " facts are stubborn things," and facts lead us to conclude that Cromwell stopped far short of true greatness. It is charitable to the individual to throw a veil over his worst deeds ; but when we are in search of Truth, we must rob partizanship of its sophistry, and, as far as in us lies, present facts as we find them.

In this discussion we have refrained from adducing any arguments drawn from other men : we think it best in such inquiries not to be led by the opinions of others, but to seek to form our own upon that evidence which is laid before us. C. W., jun., has shown by his well-selected and judiciously used quotations, how easy it would be for us to fortify our own positions, by extracts drawn from the writings of others. But wishing rather to be guided by facts than by opinions already formed, we have come to the conclusion that Cromwell was not, in the true sense of the word, a great Statesman. We leave it to the candid student of English history to judge if our opinion be wrong.

We feel that we are transgressing our limits in this reply, but we cannot conclude without remarking, that we think J. G. R. and B. W. P. have failed to show that Cromwell was a first-rate General. We have conceded that he had in an eminent degree the qualities to fit him for the heading of a troop, or to lead in a wild and sudden attack ; but we have yet to learn why he should be called a first-rate General. A first-rate general has an eye to a defeat and a retreat, as well as to a victory. We have not yet seen where Cromwell demonstrated his perfect knowledge of the baneful art of war. J. G. R. made an unfortunate mistake in quoting the expression of Mr Vincent's friend, the Polish officer, as a proof that

Cromwell was a first-rate General. It is true that Cromwell proved that he had ability in the battle of Dunbar. But ought a first-rate general to lead his army into such positions, that something *very near to a miracle is needed to deliver them from destruction* ? First-rate generals depend not upon mere stratagem in the hour of fight, or the bull-dog courage of their troops, to keep them from defeat. No : they show their generalship by throwing away as much as possible, all dependence upon chance ; but trusting to their knowledge of their profession, they endeavour ever to meet their foe at a disadvantage. But, it is urged, that Cromwell gained many battles. So he did ; but we must not be hasty in drawing conclusions therefrom. Undoubtedly he was a successful General. But, we ask, is success always a proof of ability ? Sir J. Moore met with little else than disasters during his campaign, but withal, he stands forth on the page of history as one of the most accomplished generals this country ever possessed.

Cromwell had to thank a wild fanaticism, rather than his military skill, for those decisive victories which helped to place him on the pinnacle of power. Much, very much, might be adduced to show that Cromwell was deficient in many qualities which have characterized those who rightly deserve the title of first-rate generals. But forgetting that which Cromwell had not, and that which he had that he would have been better without, we conclude by repeating, that he was not the monster that some have painted him, neither possessed the graces with which some fondly seek to endow him.

Thornclyff.

W. T.

Politics.

OUGHT GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE A SECULAR EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

It is hardly possible for us to overrate the importance of education. Whether considered in relation to the individual, or

to the state,—as the process by which man is converted from a mere brute into an intelligent moral agent,—or as affording the most

secure basis and guarantee for an enlightened system of government,—its promotion amongst a people is equally worthy of the efforts of the philanthropist, and of the enlightened lover of his country.

But, to be of any essential service to either the individual, or to the state, it is necessary, that the education given, should be adapted to the constitution of the human mind. The human mind, not being all intellect; nor composed entirely of affections, nor of sentiments, nor of propensities; but of these combined;—each acting, and being acted upon by the others;—it is evident, that any system of education, to ensure beneficial results, must take all these elements into account; and so act upon each with reference to the others, as to ensure a healthy and well balanced action amongst the whole.

Education, is, therefore, the unfolding and training of these various powers of the mind. *Secular* education, as I understand it, consists in an exclusive education of the intellect, to the neglect of the feelings. *Religious* education has reference to the moral feelings. Its object is to give due supremacy to conscience, and thereby to keep in check, and to regulate the passions and the other elements of our moral nature.

Now I cannot see in what respect any other distinction can be drawn between secular and religious education. *Religious* education has fully as much reference to *this world*, as secular has. I must therefore contend, that the proper distinction, is, not that the one prepares us for this world, and the other for the world which is to come; but, that the one addresses itself exclusively to the intellect of man, while the other addresses itself, *as exclusively*, to his moral nature. In one word, the one communicates to him the knowledge which is *power*,—the other supplies him with the knowledge which is *life*.

I have already said, that man requires all the help he can obtain from each of these systems. Secular education, however, supplies him with only a partial, and not the most important aid; and I say, that a system which thus *ignores* the moral nature of man, must be fatally defective; and merits the severest condemnation that can be passed upon it. These considerations then, satisfy me, that if it be right for the government to interfere *at all* in the education of

the people, that it ought not to provide an education so vicious in its principles and unsatisfactory in its results as this. But it is my conviction, that it is no part of the essential duty of government to provide any system whatever for the education of the people. The chief duty of government, briefly stated, is the preservation of the state. Internally, it protects society from the lawlessness of its vicious members; externally, it protects the nation from the unfriendly designs of its neighbours. To secure these ends it is armed with certain powers, and becomes the “organized physical force of the country.”

I do not say, that legislation never goes beyond these limits; or that occasion may not sometimes justify it in so doing. The faults of governments always have been in the direction of over-legislation. But I do say, that it is *essential* to the best interests of a people that this tendency should be jealously watched, and in general resisted, as tending to the undue increase of patronage and power by the government; and as calculated in the same degree, to jeopardize the liberties of the people.

On the other hand, the duty of education rests primarily with the parent. This is now admitted by all parties. Education therefore cannot be said to belong to government by natural right, and the assumption of it, is, consequently, sought to be justified on the score of expediency.

The main ground, upon which nearly all state-educationists rest their case, is this;—that ignorance is the parent of vice and crime; that it is better to prevent than to punish crime; and that, *therefore as it is* the duty of government to punish crime, it is its duty to educate, in order to avoid the necessity of having subsequently to punish.

This I believe to be a fair statement of their case. We meet with it sometimes in nearly this same form; and continually meet with phrases embodying more or less distantly, the same idea. As a case in point, I may mention the article of “Philomathos.” In what he pleasantly calls his “exordium” this idea stares at us from every other sentence. It also forms both weft and woof of the first division of his subject; and it bristles up again in almost every line of his second.

I think then, I represent the state-educationists fairly, by saying, they believe ignorance to be the cause of vice and crime; knowledge to be the parent of virtue; and the duty of government to be, to provide the one as the most effective antidote to the other. Now, the estimated expense of *applying* this antidote is more than £10,000,000 sterling; and we are therefore fully justified in examining its claims to being considered an effective one.

I object then, earnestly and decidedly, to the grounds assumed by the state-educationists, being accepted as a justification of state-interference in the people's education. I believe it is *not true* that ignorance is the cause of vice and crime; and that knowledge is the parent of virtue; and if these be not true, then it cannot be true either, that the application of a system of secular education as a means of lessening crime, will effect the object for which it is designed.

Vice and crime are intimately connected. They do not indeed stand related as cause and effect, but rather, both are results springing from the same cause; and they differ not so much in quality as in degree; not in character so much as in results. They are two branches of one stream; or perhaps more correctly, two streams flowing from the same source.

They, of course, both originate in the human mind. Our immediate object now, is to determine the precise place of their birth. Because, if they originate *in the intellect*, then it would be proper to apply the remedy *to the intellect*; if otherwise, its application will be inoperative for their removal.

Now, it occurs to me very forcibly, that I never heard of *intellectual* depravity; nor of *mental* turpitude; nor of any such like phrases. It is, therefore, quite possible that *intellect* has nothing to do in the origination of vice. But if indeed, vice *does* originate in the intellect, it can easily be traced home to it. In what corner of the intellect, for instance, does *lust* find its source? In what congenial spot in the brain does that openness which ramifies through the innumerable channels represented by petty larceny, shop-lifting, highway-robbery, fornication, etc., find its appropriate source, and centre of action? *Not in the intellect.*

Or whence comes virtue, with its train of happy and congenial influences? Whence flows that large-hearted benevolence, which would encircle and bless the whole human race? Not from the *intellect*. And whence does the eye derive its sparkling light, when the hand is again pressed by that of a long absent friend? Not from mere *intellect*.

No, the fact is, virtue and vice owe their origin to the *moral nature* of man, and when that happens to be radically depraved, no amount of mere learning will suffice to quench its evil influence, or to arrest its evil course. The connection between ignorance and vice is *not* direct and immediate, but relative and accidental. In other words, ignorance is connected with vice, only through the accident of its previous connection with depraved moral feelings. If a man is found utterly ignorant, the fair presumption is, that he will be found utterly depraved too; but the *reverse* will not by any means hold good, and we are not therefore to conclude, that to make that man virtuous, we have only to pour plenty of *knowledge* into his mind. You may as well attempt to make a man *wise* by merely training and cultivating his *feelings*, as hope to make him *virtuous* by merely cultivating his *intellect*.

Let the student of history recall to his mind the lives of some of the illustrious intellects of this and other nations, and decide to what extent learning is akin to godliness. To take an example in passing, Bacon was what the Germans would call a *full* man. He had no lack of learning certainly, and he could even discourse eloquently on moral subjects, yet *moral turpitude* was his ruin, for he lost his chancellorship for speculation and notorious mal-administration of justice. "Philomathos" may explain that as he best can. At all events it goes far to prove that great learning may co-exist with great depravity, and consequently, that it alone is inoperative for the suppression of vice.

Secular education, however, is the only practicable one as far as the state is concerned, and we may therefore easily judge of the success likely to attend the efforts which may be made to suppress vice by means of such an instrument as this.

My case then is this:—I have attempted to show in the first instance, that a sys-

tem of secular education is not suited to the condition and wants of the human mind;—that it is false in its principles, and pernicious in its results, and that therefore the government, if it has the right to educate *at all*, ought not to provide such an education as this. In the next place I have endeavoured to show, that the duty of educa-

tion rests primarily with the *parent*, not with government; and lastly, that the plea generally used in justification of government interference is unsound and false, and that consequently, the case of the state-educationalists *as far as it rests upon it*, must fall to the ground.

Gateshead.

A. W.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

“In whatever light we view education, it cannot fail to appear the most important subject that can engage the attention of mankind. When we contrast the ignorance, the rudeness, and the helplessness of the savage, with the knowledge, the refinement, and the resources of civilized man, the difference between them appears so wide, that they can hardly be regarded as of the same species. Yet, compare the infant of the savage with that of the most enlightened philosopher, and you will find them in all respects the same. The same high, capacious powers of mind lie folded up in both, and in both the organs of sensation adapted to those mental powers, are exactly similar. All the difference which is afterwards to distinguish them, depends on their education.”—*Stewart*.

“Man is an animal formidable both from his passions and his reason; his passions often urging him to great evils, and his reason furnishing means to achieve them. To train this animal, and make him amenable to order, to inure him to a sense of justice and virtue, to withhold him from ill courses by fear, and encourage him in his duty by hopes; in short, to fashion and model him for society hath been the aim of civil and religious institutions, and in all times, the endeavour of good and wise men. The aptest method for obtaining this end hath been always judged a proper education.”—*Bishop Berkeley*.

THE day in which we live is characterized by inquiry, investigation, and a thirsting desire for improvement in literature, science, and art. Every discovery clearly indicates that human Wisdom is endeavouring to penetrate the unknown. She appears convinced that there is something more to be discovered, and unfolded, calculated to raise man in the social state, and to make him wiser and better. Hence, the value set upon education, and the interest which attaches to the discussion of the present question,—which discussion I will at once enter upon, without any further introduction, and inquire,—

First, Is it the duty of Government to educate the people? and,

Secondly, Should the education be secular?

No person, I take it for granted, will dispute that ignorance is, in a great measure, the cause of crime. Statistics in abundance attest the fact. I find, from a report for Manchester for 1848, that of those persons who were convicted, or held to bail, 1 in 15 could neither read nor write, 1 in 17½ read and write well, and 1 in 496¼ have learned something more than reading and writing. In the report by Mr. S. Neal, chief constable for Salford, for April, 1851, he informs us that of 1,111 children, from two to fourteen years of age, 338 read imperfectly, 778 cannot read at all. This is, indeed, a specimen of the deficiency of education in Manchester and Salford alone. The question naturally arises—“With so large an amount of crime, and its accompaniment, ignorance, whose duty is it to educate the people?” I will proceed to show that Government should do it, or at least pass an act for such purpose, leaving the rest to be carried out by the people. By so doing, state interference would be altogether avoided.

The relation of education to persons better instructed, is as follows:—“Of 22 returned as superiorly instructed, 16 were discharged, and 6 summarily convicted, not one committed for trial. Of 342 who read and write well, 79 were discharged, 172 summarily convicted or held to bail, while only 49 (1-6122¼ of the population) were committed for trial. Of 72 transported, 2 read and write well.” Thus, it is seen that convictions in the better educated class, are far fewer than those of the ignorant.

As a question of financial economy, education would result in a vast diminution of money annually expended for criminals, paupers, charities, &c. It will be admitted that paupers are (on the whole,) ignorant. A Guardian of the Manchester Union

serts "that out of 13,000 paupers dependent on the Union, *six* well instructed could *not* be found."

The following table will give an idea of the sum annually disbursed in Manchester, in 1847-8, on criminals, police, expenses of prosecutions, charities, &c.

	£	s.	d.
Expenses of prosecutions at Sessions and Assizes.....	2981	3	7
Expenses of conveyance of convicts and prisoners to the depots and gaols.....	202	11	8
Expenses of maintenance at New Bailey, Lancaster Castle, and Kirkdale.....	7681	12	7
Cost of 469 police officers and men.....	24969	6	3
Prosecution and maintenance and conveyance of prisoners, (omitting maintenance, and depots, and transportation expenses) ...	10885	7	10
Amount of property necessary to make stealing a payable trade for 458 thieves, at 40s. per week.....	57632	0	0
Food supplied to lockups.....	55	9	4
Summonses, warrants, &c., (lowest possible estimate).....	600	0	0
Interest, four per cent on cost of Borough Gaol, £120,000.....	4800	0	0
Expenses of pauperism for Manchester, Hulme, Ardwick, Cheetham, Chorlton.....	222550	8	0
Borough-Reeve, Infirmary, Night Asylum, School of Refuge, Lying-in Hospital, Eye Hospital, Blind Asylum, Deaf and Dumb School, Female Penitentiary, Fever Hospital, Chorlton Dispensary, Ancoats Dispensary, Lock Hospital, Homeopathic Dispensary, Children's Dispensary, (Charities).....	36630	11	11
* Total	369968	11	2

From the preceding statistics, &c., the following conclusions may safely be drawn :

1st, That ignorance is the cause of crime ;
2nd, That paupers, on the whole, are ignorant ;
3rd, That the recipients of charities, and inmates of workhouses, are ignorant ;
4th, That convictions among the better educated class are comparatively few ;
5th, That a vast sum of money is annually expended for the support of criminals, gaolers, and magistrates, which might be considerably reduced were a national system of education adopted.

* In this List, the salaries of the Recorder and Stipendiary Magistrate are omitted, besides many other incidental expenses, including charities given away at churches, chapels, etc. The probable amount would reach about £4,000 or £5,000 more.

It would be well to consider the state of education in some of the states of America : in several of them, one child out of three has, or is receiving, a good education. In Prussia, parents are compelled to send their children to school ; and, although I am no advocate of compulsion, I cannot but admire the object. From this, let our rulers take a lesson, or ere long, Great Britain will be put to shame by some of her neighbours.

Is it the duty of the Government to educate the people ? I reply, It is. If it be the duty of Government to provide suitable officers for the administration of the laws, and the punishment of offenders against the laws, I contend that the Government is in duty bound to give a sound education to every person within the realm, so that he may be able to read the law, to see how it applies to himself, and what he will suffer, should he violate it. For a Government to have a large staff of magistrates, &c., and an uneducated people, who can neither read nor yet understand, is absurd, in my opinion ; quite as ridiculous as it would be to place a china plate in the hands of a child, and then to punish him for breaking it. In the first place, a utensil is given to the child, the use of which he knows nothing about ; and secondly, for breaking it, the child is chastised. The same remark applies to a Government and an ignorant people. There is much truth, particularly in the last clause, of the following quotation :—" Laws are generally not understood by three sorts of persons—viz., by those who make them, by those who execute them, and by those who will suffer if they break them."—*Halifax*. In support of my opinion on this subject, I will present an extract :—" A method of communicating instruction to every member of society, is not difficult to discover, and would not be expensive in practice. The Government generally establishes ministers of justice in every part of the dominion. The first object of the ministers ought to be—to see that every person is well instructed in his duty and his rights ; that he is rendered perfectly acquainted with every law, in its true spirit and tendency, in order that he may know the reason of his obedience, and the manner of obtaining redress in case he should need it ; that he is taught to feel the cares and interests of an active citizen,

to consider himself a real member of the State, knows that the Government is his own, that society is his friend, and that the officers of the State are the servants of the people. A people possessing these ideas will never violate the law, unless it be from necessity, and such necessity is to be prevented by means equally obvious."

2nd.—Ought the Education to be *secular* only? The true definition of the term Secular is not generally admitted by all parties, but that given by "Philomathos" is correct.

I contend, for various reason, that the Education should be secular.

First, The Government has, or ought to have, nothing to do with spiritual things, —nothing beyond the sphere of this life lies within its province. For this reason the Church ought not to be united with the State. Government has quite sufficient business on its hands in temporal things, and, I may add, that this alone is not discharged so as to give satisfaction to the people.

Second, The instruction should be secular because all sects and denominations being taxed for the support of the schools, &c., no theological doctrine could be inculcated without doing violence to the consciences of some (most of) the sects or parties. Were the principles of Protestantism taught, the Roman Catholics (who, I regret to say, are kept in a state of extreme ignorance by their priests) would object unanimously—and here be it remarked, that they constitute a great proportion of our population: the Unitarian, on the other hand, would not accept the doctrine of the divinity of our Saviour; the Baptist, Independent, and Wesleyan, would each have his petty difference to urge against the introduction of the Church of England belief. With such impediments as these, the question is no more than this:—Seeing that the greater proportion of our population is uneducated, owing to the deficiency of education and lack of effective machinery; that crime and its accompaniments are increasing rapidly; and that poor rates still continue to be saddled upon us, is it of more importance to allow education and crime to take their own course, —the former utterly incapable to meet the demands of the times, and the latter in-

creasing, as a necessary consequence; or to establish a national system of Secular Education, by which *all* persons shall be *educated* not only in the common rudiments of instruction, but also in those beautiful traits of Christianity—viz., love, gentleness, honesty, soberness, temperance, chastity, frugality, industry, perseverance, good-will, and cordial feeling towards all men; in short, all the branches of science, art, and literature—doctrinal teaching excepted. To answer the question in the negative would be to deny what experience has proved to be true,—that crime is on the increase, and that so long as there is no national system of education, so long will a large portion of the people remain in ignorance, degradation, and disgrace; while to add to our misery and shame, gaols, workhouses, &c., will multiply rapidly amongst us, requiring additional servants, and entailing enormous expense on the people. A realization of this description I can scarcely fear. Intelligence and refinement are going forth with too great rapidity to admit of this. The question, therefore, remains with the people; and I doubt not that as Government has manifested no desire for any further general system of instruction, that the people—the only legitimate source of power—will convince their rulers that if they are averse to reforming mankind, they (the people) are determined to obtain that object, not by the sword, but by the aid of that powerful auxiliary—moral force.

Again: viewed as a matter of social and financial economy, a national system of education (similar to that propounded by the National Public School Association,) would be of infinite value. From the statistics quoted in the preceding pages, I have shown that in the year 1848, £368,968 were expended in criminal prosecutions, &c. Did space permit, I could further show that schools, masters, &c., might be furnished for Manchester at a cost of £56,550 10s.,* which would be defrayed by a 1s. rate on the borough assessment. Suppose fifty per cent. diminution of crime occur for the first year after the opening of these schools, there

* This includes books, apparatus, and other requisites; about £11,000 would be left for minor expenses.

would be a saving of £7,379 for that year, and the sum would increase rapidly each succeeding year. But if we deduct fifty per cent. less of the thieving, drunkenness, pauperism, beggars, charities, &c., (or, in other words, fifty per cent. on each of the amounts thus disbursed) the saving will be enormous. In the instance I have given, I have only deducted fifty per cent. of the *whole* amount. £7,379 is, however, worth saving, even apart from every higher and better motive.

Having such an object in view—viz., the regeneration of criminals and the education of the people, I would call on the philanthropist to aid us in obtaining so desirable an object, and thus add further lustre to En-

gland's glory, by expelling crime and ignorance from our land, and by promoting the welfare of the people, socially, morally, and intellectually. An educated people will thus be qualified to protect its liberties, to guard its rights, to elect representatives for the senate house eligible for that important post, to withstand enemies at home and abroad; in a word, Education will be the best and most effectual barrier against our people degenerating into the commission of crime, and it will enable them to preserve, inviolate, Civil and Religious Liberty.

"The fate of empires depend on the Education of Youth." —*Aristotle.*

Manchester.

J. G. R.

Social Economy, &c.

IS IT MORE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL TO SUBSIST ON A PURELY VEGETARIAN DIET, THAN ON ONE OF FLESH AND VEGETABLES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE subject of diet is scientific and practical, as well as moral and theoretical. Physiologically, flesh, in any degree, stimulates the nervous system more than vegetable food, and a mixture of flesh and vegetables is opposed to the healthy activity of the digestive organs, being of an opposite character, and the two kinds of food forming rather an "incongruous mixture" than a healthy meal. The real pure flavour, the easy digestion, and the agreeable effects of vegetable food, are scarcely known to the consumer of a "mixed diet." The *taste* is so improved, however, by *adhering to a purely vegetable diet*, that a simple crust of wheaten bread affords a degree of even gustatory enjoyment, which must be experienced to be known; whilst to the person accustomed to animal substances, the pleasures of the appetite can seldom be secured without the usual "steak" or "chop." The true Epicurean science taught this, for the founder of this philosophy lived entirely upon the fruits and vegetables of

the garden, never polluting them with animal substances. Enjoyment of food is secured, not by the flavour of the food, but by the healthy condition of the appetite, and this is always best attained by healthy digestion, which is almost sure to follow proper exercise, and regular resort to a diet consisting of fruit, farinaceous, and vegetable substances; while to take these with animal food, renders them far less digestible; and the idea is commonly arrived at, that vegetables and fruits are difficult substances for the gastric juice to act upon. These two kinds of food, like good and bad qualities of the mind, are not adapted for each other; they will not assimilate properly together. The fat of flesh particularly, when mixed with vegetables, renders them less penetrable by the gastric juice, hence the mistake as to their adaptability for digestion; whilst taken free from such mixture, they are admirably adapted for the purposes of the assimilative process.

It is because vegetable food is less oppre

sive to the system,—less absorbing of the vital energies of the man—that it has a calming influence on the nervous system, and thus becomes effective for moral purposes; because the nerves being closely connected with the mind, and the irritating and heating tendency of a flesh diet causing an inflammatory action, instead of a healthy one, the propensities become excited and less controllable when flesh diet is used in any of its forms. Hence we find the harmony of physical science with the moral discipline of the poets, philosophers, and prophets.

It must be particularly understood, that in advocating a purely vegetable diet, as better adapted for the practical philosopher—the worker in either material or mental things—we do not imply simply vegetables, but the productions of the vegetable kingdom; and these comprise—

1st—Fruits of every description which are considered adapted for human food.

2nd—Farinaceous substances, either obtained from the cereal seeds, as wheat, oats, barley, maize, or in the form of extracts from vegetables, such as arrow-root, sago, tapioca, potato flour, *tous les mois*, as well as the saccharine secretions, sugar, molasses, honey, &c.

3rd—Vegetables, in their abundant variety.

It will be seen from this “bill of fare,” that the choice of food, to the Vegetarian, is of a very extensive character; and as all these substances are in agreement with each other, there is no inconvenience occasioned by partaking of vegetables, farinaceous articles, and fruit, at the same meal.

Although these three descriptions of food comprise all that are required for the enjoyment of life, and are capable, other things being equal, of ensuring the “true luxury of existence”—health—there are many Vegetarians who partake of some kind of animal substances, as milk, cream, butter, cheese, and even eggs, and in these cases, *abstinence from flesh* is regarded as the rule, while with those who live entirely on purely vegetable food, the doing so is regarded as a principle of life. But between these two practices there are mediums or degrees, in which men may suit their own states and conditions of moral progress, courage, and conviction:—some take vegetable food,

and generally milk; others add cream and milk to this diet; some generally partake of cheese, and others of eggs; so that even in what is called Vegetarian diet, there is a wide range, and a man may either adopt the simple form at once, or go through these various degrees of Vegetarian practice. Dr Franklin, after saying that he lived on 1s. 6d. per week, by means of vegetable diet, says, “I have since kept several lents, most strictly, leaving the common diet for that, and that for the common, abruptly, without the least inconvenience, so that I think there is little in the advice of making those changes by easy gradations.”

We are fully of the same opinion as it regards the ability of the physical frame to endure these changes; but it is well to understand that *faith* has a great deal to do in these matters, and Franklin, having *strong faith in the efficacy of vegetable food*, would be able to make the change without the least danger. But we know there are other men whose faith is weak to begin with, and in such cases it is well not to go *too far* beyond their present convictions, as in doing so they may become subject to a relapse; and to use these gradations, which the animal substances obtainable *without slaughter*, seem well adapted to supply, will be, perhaps, in such cases most advisable.—Having strayed from the simple course of Nature in various directions, each man must return by the most direct path *from the position which he now occupies*, and it happens that a variety of ways are provided, which may all lead to the same happy result, especially if the same end be kept constantly in view.

As we have purposely taken up the subject in the present paper on somewhat different grounds to those on which vegetable diet has been ordinarily advocated in the Vegetarian publications, we will present in a concise form from a small tract recently published, the principal grounds on which this question may be discussed, and on which we are willing to defend it.

“*The Principle*.—That Man, as a physical, intellectual, and moral being, can become most completely developed in all his faculties by subsisting upon the direct productions of the vegetable kingdom.

“*The Reasons* for entertaining this princi-

ple are various, with different persons, but they are principally based,

"1st—On the Anatomical Structure of Man, as described by Linnæus, Cuvier, and other eminent naturalists, who express their conviction that man was designed to live on the fruits of the earth.

"2nd—On History, which shows that this principle was the rule of life at the happiest—the primeval—period of human existence; and that wherever it has been adopted, it has proved itself to be beneficial to the human race.

"3rd—On Physiology, which shows that the purest blood, and the most substantial muscle, sinew, and bone, are produced by Vegetarian diet.

"4th—On Chemistry, as promulgated by Liebig, and other eminent chemists, showing that all nutriment whatever is derived from the vegetable kingdom, where it is found in the most suitable proportions.

"5th—On Domestic Economy, which proves, by chemical deduction, that more nutriment can be obtained for 1*d.* from farinaceous food, than for 1*s.* from the flesh of animals.

"6th—On Agriculture, which shows the vast amount of food obtainable in vegetable produce, compared with that of animal produce, on the same extent of land.

"7th—On Psychology, proving to every practical investigator, that in proportion as this principle is adhered to for this end, the passions can be kept in subjection to the moral principles of the mind.

"8th—On the Practical Testimony of many great and good men, in ancient, modern, and present times.

"9th—On the Appointment of Man's Food at the Creation.—Genesis i. 29.

"10th—On the Individual Consciousness of the truth of the principle, which becomes more and more powerful in proportion as the principle is adhered to in practice.

"*The Practice.*—This is described in the 'Vegetarian Messenger,' vol. i., p. 3."

For the facts and arguments in confirmation of these reasons, we would refer to the publications already alluded to;* considering it unnecessary to take up the pages of "The British Controversialist" with the mere repetition of what may be so readily obtained.

We have endeavoured to blend reason with experience, as we believe these ever should be united, whilst the benefits derived are always regarded in the light of that reason and truth which we are thus practically capacitated to enjoy. In this view, charity has full scope for doing its "perfect work," because it regards all men as right *in their degree*, whilst it points ardently forward to a more exalted right—a condition of intellectual, moral, and spiritual perfection, in which all that is just, merciful, and true, shall be actively realized and enjoyed as the greatest blessings of the human race; and vegetable diet being, as we believe, more conducive to this end than a mixed diet, we arrive again at the conclusion, that "it is more reasonable and beneficial to subsist upon a purely vegetable diet, than on one composed of flesh and vegetables."

H. S. C.

* The "Vegetarian Messenger," No. 15, contains an article entitled, "The Vegetarian Movement: its claims upon public attention," in which the leading features of the system are described.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

MR EDITOR,—In the present day there appears to be a spontaneous desire among all classes of society, aided by our philosophers, poets, divines, literary and scientific writers, &c., to elevate the Social, Moral, Intellectual, and Political condition of the people; to render them better acquainted with those duties which devolve upon them; to employ their mental faculties in the

study of literature, sciences, and the arts; to direct their attention to the works of Nature, and Nature's God, to the laws which regulate the motion of the earth and seas,—the succession of the seasons, and the change of day and night; to the marvellous contents of the canopy above us, with its innumerable suns, moons, stars, and satellites; and last, though not least,

to the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms, for the purpose of ministering to the wants, or arresting the progress of the frailties, of man. A poet whose strains have often charmed us, truly says,

“Not a tree,
A leaf, a bud, a blossom, but contains
A folio volume, we may read, and read,
And read again, and still find something new—
Something to instruct, and something to amuse
E'en in the humblest weed.”

Such, then, is the aim of those who seek to raise the people out of ignorance, and to familiarize them with those objects which are “around us and about us.” Among the associations of individuals which have the amelioration of mankind at heart, is one called the “Vegetarian Society.” This society is endeavouring, by a wide dissemination of their principles, to reform the habits of the human family, or, in other words, by moral force to persuade them to abandon the use of fish, flesh, and fowl, and to substitute a regimen consisting entirely of vegetables. The principles upon which their argument in favour of Vegetarianism is based, I hesitate not to pronounce as false,—as being neither in accordance with Holy Writ, the rules and requirements of Nature, or the highest medical science. I shall attempt to prove that Vegetarianism (if carried out indiscriminately) is at variance with the preceding tests. At the same time, I cannot but highly appreciate the motives which influence its advocates. It is with reluctance that I take up my pen to censure or condemn the system; for, to a certain extent it may be productive of good. Its adoption is beneficial to some persons whose constitution, temperament, and occupations are such, that a greater amount of health and comfort will accrue to them from a vegetable diet, than one of flesh and vegetables. This is the only merit which I can attach to Vegetarianism, nor can I discern on what facts their system is based, the proofs they adduce (though in a few instances confirmed by medical authority) are nothing more than misrepresentations and distortions of evidence which cannot be controverted, if tested impartially. The following proofs will bear me out in this assertion:—

First—Flesh eating is sanctioned by

Scripture. I shall content myself by selecting a few of the numerous examples which the Bible contains. The first reference is to Acts xii. 11—15, where Peter is commanded to “kill and eat.” In John vi. 11, it is said, “And Jesus took the loaves, and when he had given thanks, he distributed to his disciples; and likewise of the fishes, as much as they would.” In 1 Kings xvii. 4—6, we read, “And it shall be that thou shalt drink of the brook, and I have commanded the ravens to feed thee there. And the ravens brought him bread and *flesh* in the morning, and bread and *flesh* in the evening; and he drank of the brook.” In Luke xxiv. 41, it is recorded, “And while they yet believed not for joy, and wondered, He (Christ) said unto them, Have ye here any meat? And they gave him a piece of a broiled *fish*, and a honeycomb. And *he* took it, and *did eat* before them.” Again: in 1 Timothy iv. 1—5, the inspired apostle writes, “Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter days some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils. Speaking lies in hypocrisy, having their conscience seared with a hot iron. Forbidding to marry, and *commanding to abstain from meats* which God has *created* to be received with thanksgiving of them which believe and know the truth. For every creature of God is *good*, and not to be refused, if it be received with thanksgiving. For it is sanctified by the Word of God and prayer.” The following is a comment of the Rev. John Brown on the last passage:—“For every thing, as God made it, is answerable to the purposes for which he created it, and *nothing* which is *proper* for *food* ought to be forbidden or scrupled,” &c. Then, surely, there is sufficient in these quotations alone to justify flesh eating. We see our Divine Saviour, together with some of the greatest of the apostles and prophets, has set a precedent which fully sanctions the use of flesh as an article of diet.

Second—Flesh eating is justified by Nature, (1st) because there is a similarity between the teeth of man, and those of herbivorous and carnivorous animals; and, further, that his digestive apparatus, as in that of all carnivorous animals, is not of so complicated a character as that of herb-

aceous animals. On this head, I may take an extract from the Physiological department of the "Family Tutor," and I believe, from the pen of a member of the Royal College of Surgeons. In No. III., p. 68, he says, "This may be regarded as a fortunate incident for Geology; as, of all parts of the body, the *teeth* are most decidedly distinctive of the character of the animal. The reason for this arises from the adaptation of the teeth to the peculiar food on which an animal lives." After commenting on the teeth of man, he says, p. 69, "Now these three sets of teeth, which we may call grinders, tearers, and cutters, represent *three* classes of teeth among the lower animals. The grinders, which are evidently adapted to perform the operation which gives them their name, are found developed to the fullest extent in animals that live wholly upon an herbaceous diet." * * * "The pointed teeth, or tearers, are found most perfect in those families of animals which prey on other animals, and live on flesh." * * *

"The front teeth, the incisors, are adapted for gnawing and cutting, and we find these teeth especially prominent in the family of Rodents, or Rodealia." P. 71—"In the course of our remarks, we shall have to speak more particularly of the nature of the food of man; but we would here point out that in the structure of the jaws and teeth, we find a clear indication that he is adapted for taking food both from the animal and the vegetable kingdoms, seeing that in the organs which prepare the food for digestion, we find instruments adapted for the preparation of both forms of diet. This is but one of many arguments that may be brought against the advocates of an entire animal or vegetable diet; and had we not such abundant proof in the structure of man, we might appeal to his instincts, which, under all natural circumstances, have dictated to him a mixed diet as that which is most desirable for his sustenance." I have more evidence on this point, but this may suffice.

(2nd.) "To determine what kind of food is best adapted for the full development and support of man has long been a controverted question. It is contended by some that a vegetable diet is the most simple and natural, and therefore the most proper. The

reply to this argument is founded in nature. Essential distinctions exist in the construction of the masticating and digestive apparatus of animals, and unerring instinct accordingly prompts them to select that kind of food which is adapted to their particular organization;—the natural food of some animals being entirely of flesh, that of others strictly of a vegetable kind, while man, from his organization, requires a mixture of animal and vegetable food."* "As a rule, it is found that vegetable food is more difficult to digest than animal food, and throughout the whole animal kingdom, the size of the stomach, and the length of the intestinal tube are greater in herb-eating than in flesh-eating animals." "In these creatures (carnivorous animals), as the lion, tiger, &c., it assumes the simplest form, the flesh they eat requiring little preparation for digestion. The stomach of man stands truly between these two classes—herbivorous animals on the one hand, and carnivorous on the other; thus indicating that he is intended for a mixed diet. We shall find, as we proceed further, in considering the subject of the structure of the digestive organs in man, that *there is nothing to encourage the notion, that man lives best on vegetable food alone.*" Dr J. S. Wilkinson, M.R.C.S.L. and E., F.R.S.E. &c., says, "The length of the alimentary canal bears a great reference to the kind of food consumed by the animal. In some of the ruminant animals, cows, sheep, &c., it varies from *eleven* to *twenty-eight* times the length of the whole body. Those animals which live wholly upon flesh, have an intestinal canal much shorter. In the lion and tiger, the length is from *three* to *five* times." And Dr Barnes, M.D., F.R.S.E., says, "There are some animals that live on vegetable, and some that subsist on animal food. Man is capable of subsisting on either sort of food, and hence is termed an omnivorous animal. There is a remarkable difference in the construction or organization of animals that feed upon different kinds of aliment, and there is an evident relation between the conformation of the digestive apparatus, and the food upon which the animals are nourished. Grani-

vorous animals have broad, flat, grinding teeth, a very long *alimentary canal*, and a very large stomach, or *several* stomachs. Carnivorous animals have sharp, conical, teeth, that cut like scissors, for dividing their prey." * * * "Man holds a place between granivorous and carnivorous animals, and unites, in some measure, the character of both. The structure of his teeth, the movement of his jaw, and the organization of his alimentary canal, all clearly prove that he was intended to live both on *animal and vegetable* substances." * * * "Animal food, it appears, is *easier of digestion* than vegetable food."

The following table, prepared by a celebrated London chemist, confirms the preceding assertions:—

Quantity of food necessary to obtain 1 lb. of Nutritive Matter, and its cost at average retail prices.

lbs.	Nutritive Matter.	£	s.	d.
25	Milk contains 1 lb. cost	0	2	1
100	Turnips	0	12	6
50	Potatoes	0	2	11
50	Carrots	0	8	4
4	Flesh	0	2	4
9	Oatmeal	0	1	0½
7½	Barley Meal	0	0	11
7½	Bread	0	0	11½
7½	Flour	0	0	11½
3½	Peas	0	0	6
3½	Beans	0	0	7

Note.—It must be remembered that the prices given above are not standard prices, as the prices of vegetables fluctuate considerably. Flour, potatoes, carrots, turnips, milk, &c., advance considerably in winter.

Table of the equivalent value of several kinds of food with reference to the formation of muscle and fat.

lbs.	Albumen.	Unazotized Matter.
100	Flesh contains 25 lbs.	... None.
..	Peas..... 29	... 51½
..	Beans	... 52
..	Lentils	... 48
..	Potatoes	... 24½
..	Oats	... 68
..	Barley Meal.. 14	... 68
..	Hay	... 68½
..	Turnips	... 9
..	Carrots..... 2	... 10
..	Red Beet..... 1½	... 8½

From the foregoing table it will be seen that there are only three vegetables which exceed the amount of nutriment contained in flesh, but 100 lbs. of potatoes only contain 2 lbs. of albumen. This article, too, constitutes an *every-day* diet of the *Vegetarian*. To say anything more on this head would be superfluous, as the preceding testimonies of medical men are sufficient.

I would now briefly comment on an opinion expressed by H. S. C., and held by all vegetarians,—viz., that Vegetarianism contributes to control the passions and subdue the feelings. Now, I do not doubt for a moment that depression of spirit or loss of strength and sprightliness would result from the adoption of the Vegetarian system; but that it controls or subdues the passions or vices to which man is subject, I dispute. It is to education alone that recourse must be had, to prevent, as well as cure these evils;—*not* merely the education suited for the counting-house or the study; *not* the mere knowledge of history, geography, astronomy, chemistry, &c., but a higher and better education, which far outstrips in purity the mere acquisition of the rudiments of knowledge. The object which Vegetarians seek to obtain by the adoption of their system—the control of the passions—is a noble one; but nought save an influence from above will ever effect this. I trust therefore that Vegetarians will not hereafter arrogate to their system that which the *true* education of the head and heart, the feelings and passions, will alone bestow.

In conclusion, I have conscientiously given free utterance to my opinions on this important question, adducing in their support authorities whose veracity can well be relied upon. I have neither been actuated by malice nor ill-will towards my Vegetarian brethren, but rather by a determined zeal to expose the fallacies of their system, and the deceptive nature of the ground on which it is based; and, lastly, I have laboured to show that a judicious quantity of animal food is not only good for man, but was designed for his use by that Great Being who made him

"to have rule
Over the fish and fowl of sea and air,
Beast of the field, and over all the earth."

Manchester. ANTI-VEGETARIAN.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. XII.

61. *Peevishness* is a modification of Anger: it is impatient, nervous, petulant, and splenetic; venting its fretfulness upon any object which may lie in its way; it is full of agitation, and the mind is like a wind-tossed sea—"to one thing constant never;" it is fidgetty and gloomy, full of disdainful glances, scornful language, and pettish indignation. The eyes dart from one object to another, unsettledly—looking at nothing with a broad, distinct gaze, but with eyes aslant and gloomy brow; the hands are twitched, and the feet are occasionally, though suddenly, shifted from their position.

62. *Malice* differs from Anger in being settled, deliberate, and determined. It is no sudden outburst of passion; but a cool, cautious adaptation of means to the attainment of an end—the infliction of pain, whether deserved or not: it is a wanton and gloating delight felt at beholding others miserable. Hence it is that Beatrice, in the "Cenci," says,

"I fear that wicked laughter round his eye,
Which wrinkles up the skin, even to the hair."

Cenci himself most accurately describes the feelings which riot in the bosoms of the malicious, when he says,

"I love
The sight of agony, and the sense of joy,
When *that* shall be another's and this mine;
And I have no remorse, and little fear,
Which are, I think, the checks of other men.
This mood has grown upon me, until now
Any design my captious fancy makes
The picture of its wish (and it forms none
But such as other men would start to know,)
Is as my natural food and rest debarred
Until it be accomplished."

It causes the eyes to flash fitfully, stretches and strains the muscles of the face, sets the lips firmly round the teeth, with the mouth open; the hand is firmly and fiercely clenched; the whole frame is stiffened into distortion, and the voice is low, harsh, grating, rushing in fierce torrents of vocables from the heaving breast; and the whole demeanour is flushed with insatiable, though forcibly subdued, fury.

63. *Envy* is a feeling of repining and regret at the superiority of another, or of discontent at his success, prosperity, or elevation, commonly accompanied with an itching desire to place some obstacle in his way, to depreciate his excellencies, or otherwise to counterbalance his supposed greater advantages by some injury or act of malice. It is disappointed emulation, soured and turned to bitterness. Shakespeare, with that masterful touch for which he is so justly famous, has painted to the life a full-length portrait of an envious man, in the following extract:—

Cæsar.—"Let me have men about me that are fat,
Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep o' nights :
Yon Cassius has a lean and hungry look ;
He thinks too much ; such men are dangerous.

Antony.—Fear him not, Cæsar ; he's not dangerous :
He is a noble Roman, and well given.

Cæsar.—Would he were fatter !—But I fear him not :
Yet if my soul were liable to fear,
I do not know the man I should avoid
So soon as that spare Cassius. He reads much :
He is a great observer ; and he looks
Quite through the deeds of men : he loves no plays,
As thou dost, Antony : he hears no music :
Seldom he smiles, and smiles in such a sort,
As if he mocked himself and scorned his spirit,
That could be moved to smile at anything.
Such men as these be never at their heart's ease
Whiles they behold a greater than themselves ;
And therefore are they dangerous."

—"Julius Cæsar."

We refer to the play itself for other instances, especially to the speech in which Cassius instigates Brutus to join in the conspiracy against Cæsar.

64. *Cruelty* is a compound of Anger, Envy, and Malice—which see.

THE NATURE AND USES OF POETRY.

THE end and aim of Poetry has commonly been said to be, the "giving of pleasure." Hence from a mistaken apprehension of what is really meant by this term, many have looked, and do look upon even the greatest works of the poets, as something designed more for ornament than use ; something, which, like the tracery upon a service of plate, may be dispensed with, without much detriment to the articles themselves ; something in short, that forms a toy for the amusement of elderly blue-stockings, and those "fine feeling" people that pique themselves upon an acquaintance with literature. We indeed confess that Poetry gives pleasure, but we deny that it does so in the common meaning of the word, viz., sensual enjoyment. We claim for the gratification derived from the study of Poetry, whether in its material or formal state—i. e., whether as it is seen in the radiance of the solar orb, in the changing hues of the clouds, and in the wavings of the breeze-agitated forest ; or as it is con-

templated in the *Iliad*, the *Paradise Lost*, or the *Ancient Mariner* ;—a higher name than that given to the momentary enjoyments of sense. We claim for it a function inferior only to that of Religion, which is also a "giver of pleasure," in that it gratifies and exalts the higher nature of man.

For the framework of the following investigations we are indebted to that admirable work, "*Morell's Philosophy of Religion*," by which they were suggested, but its particular application to POETRY is wholly our own.

In considering the subject, it is necessary, first, to give a short synopsis of the faculties of the human mind in order to form a basis for our theory,—second, to consider what is the peculiar essence of Poetry,—and third, to describe the functions exercised by it, in the elevation and development of the human faculties.

§ 1st. In enquiring into and observing the operations of the mind, we are conscious of the existence within it of different feel-

ings, emotions, and ideas. We are conscious of being placed in immediate communication with the phenomena of nature around us; we perceive the grassy carpet underneath our feet, the majestic hills rising in the distance, and the profound concave over our heads, either studded with stars, or filled with the pure light emanating from the great centre of our material world. From all the varied and innumerable objects which surround us, impressions are carried through the media of our senses to the mind, and this we call perception.

Again, we are conscious of certain desires, arising we know not how within our minds; we feel a craving for food, for property, &c., and these are denominated propensities,—or, because they originate through our corporeal nature, and are enjoyed in common with the inferior animals,—animal feelings.

But further;—on the intellectual side of our nature; we observe in ourselves the capacity of forming and retaining in our memories, certain notions representative of objects perceived, which notions we also find ourselves more or less capable of classifying, arranging, comparing; and, when one part of an arrangement is presented to us, of inferring the remainder; and this is commonly designated reflection; or as it is sometimes styled,—the logical consciousness. Moreover, we are conscious of desiring the love and approbation of others, and of a feeling of self-satisfaction towards ourselves, which may be designated the social feelings. But there still remains a numerous class of emotions to be accounted for,—a still higher and nobler part of our nature,—the *moral sentiments*. These, with force proportioned to their development in the individual man, for ever point upwards to that heaven, where dwell the Good, the Beautiful, and the True. In their nature and mode of action, they partake chiefly of the character of feelings. Who that possesses a rightly constituted mind, has not felt the sweet emotion of pity and universal benevolence, the glowing images of the beautiful, the satisfaction of having fulfilled the dictates of duty, and the awe-inspiring sense of a Supreme Being, upon whom we are absolutely dependent?

We have said that the moral sentiments in the mode of their operation, resemble

the *feelings*; we have now to add, that in contemplating the objects to which they are directed, they assimilate to the perceptive faculties. The percepts reveal to us, *directly and presentatively*, the material existences, forms, and qualities, which are external to our minds, and these the reflections render into *abstract* forms, or *representative* notions, capable of being contemplated in logical sequence.

The moral sentiments stand in a similar relation to the reflective powers of the mind. They, in like manner, bring us into the immediate and *concrete* presence of those higher elements of Beauty,* Truth, and Goodness, which exist in the visible universe, and which, by a sublime synthesis, lead us at last to contemplate, in their loftiest impersonation,—the Deity.

It has been already said, that the moral sentiments stand in a similar position with regard to the reflective faculties, as the percepts. It now remains to illustrate this relation. It has been observed, that while the percepts reveal to us those intuitions of individuality, size, colour, &c., which go to make up the sum-total of our impressions of external objects; still, before we act from definite notions, or ideas *representative* of those impressions, it is necessary that they undergo the process of reflective realization—that they become wrought up by the logical consciousness into distinct ideas, capable of being linked together in harmony with the laws of thought, and coupled with their appropriate symbols.

* In the theories of Beauty we have hitherto seen, we think sufficient attention has not been paid to the examination of the question in a *subjective* form. For, if we regard the sense of beauty as a faculty, (which to us appears the only feasible view), and if from the investigation of the faculties of the human mind, we discover that each faculty is placed in immediate relation to a certain object, then it follows, that this particular faculty must also have its object. It is perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the existence of a God, that there exists universally in the human mind, a disposition to worship and fear a Supreme Being. If then, the one sentiment affords a powerful proof of the actual existence of an objective reality, with which it stands related; why may we not then infer the existence likewise of an objective beauty from the other? If we acquire our ideas of beauty through association why may we not derive from the same source our ideas of God and morality? Thus the association theory tends to a shallow Atheism.

In like manner, while the moral sentiments, or, as they are styled by Morell, the intuitional consciousness,—present us with the concrete impressions or intuitions of beauty, goodness, and truth; these must be realized reflectively, before we can form them into abstract and intellectual ideas. Let us endeavour to exemplify this. We have heard children before they were capable of distinguishing a single note, as written in the music-book;—nay, even before they could speak distinctly;—sing simple musical airs with correctness. Now, to what was this to be attributed? Evidently, we think, to the strength and early internal activity of the musical faculty or organ, which thus prompted and facilitated its exercise.

But before these children could have understood the music-book, it would have been necessary that they should have realiz-

ed reflectively, or by the aid of the logical consciousness, the laws and principles of harmony, and the arbitrary signs, with which they are connected.*

In the same manner it follows, that however gifted an individual may be with regard to his capability of perceiving the *concrete* existence of beauty, goodness, and truth; it will be necessary for him to realize these into formal notions or intellectual ideas, before he can produce a speculative system of theology or ethics, or a poem like the *Excursion*, or the *Paradise Lost*.

HAROLD.

* For a more detailed account of the distinction between the moral sentiments, or intuitional consciousness; and the reflective faculties, or logical consciousness, see *Morell's Philosophy of Religion*, chap. II.

(To be continued).

A POETICAL CRITIQUE.

We have received several pieces of what we suppose the writers would call poetry; but, try what we will, we cannot even make some of them into *verse*;—this distinction, of course, will be readily understood by all. The most illiterate can distinguish the difference between that which simply charms the ear, and that which touches the heart. Verse, after all, is but a sorry mechanism, which tickles the ear by its jingling. Nay, it has hardly merit enough to be called the echo of poetry. It is as a parrot repeating the words of sages, without the merest knowledge of the value of what it utters.

Verse is but the faintest shadow of a reality. It is a lying self-assertion, professing what it is not. It depends upon exterior forms, and not on the ever-living, inspired soul within. Poetry is a striving after the true Ideal, and is produced by an inward perception of the Beautiful. The true poet must be at one with Nature, and in harmony with all times.

There are now so many verse makers, that it would be a blessing to get rid of them in the shortest way possible. Whipping, we fear, would not do the work, inasmuch as they would esteem themselves "martyrs in the cause." A legal friend of ours proposes to try them for misdemeanour, thus:—Good, or passable verse makers, for taking silly people by the ear, thus deforming the said organ, by increasing its length disproportionately for the *human* species;—indifferent, or bad verse makers, for a palpable conspiracy against the *tympani* of society, by drumming their harsh, croaking notes into its ears, thereby injuring the delicacy of the said organs. Whether this would succeed, or not, we cannot pretend to say, but assuredly "something must be done!" Question, yet, whether the

whipping-post would not do the deed. Cole ridge got whipped at college for being a doubter, and he never doubted after. Might not a whipping cure a verse-maker? We should think there could be no harm in trying; and, if not, then something else. "But," says some easy soul, "why not let him sigh out his tale 'in the ear of evening?'" With all our hearts, say we, spoil evening's ear if you will, if she has no objection, but we have. Sing to the listening moon if she will patronize, but do not challenge us; we have other work to do than to be listening to the woes of every rhymester that chooses to scribble. The winds may waft their sighs to other shores, and them too. To such we bid God speed—cry Get you gone,—

"I'd rather be a kitten and cry mew,
Than out of these same metre ballad mongers."

All this we do not say to our correspondents whose verses have called forth these remarks, but to the generality of would-be poets, boys who turn down their collars à la *Byron*, write a few verses, then—but we all know what then. From our souls we love *poetry*; but mere mechanical numbers, about west winds sighing, sweet-scented groves, dew drops, and hyacinthine bowers, we do thoroughly despise. Then, again, the greatest piece of cant, perhaps, that has been "canted in this canting world" of late, is the one about the progress of society, the march of intellect, social and moral elevation of the people, etc. We hear it doled out so often and so wearily, by parties who are the last to make any solid advancement, either for themselves or others, that the very sound becomes wearisome and sickening in the extreme. Few, now, can float quietly and earnestly in the deep,

silent, flowing stream, unnoticed and unknown to fame, but must turn to the shallows to terrify the minnows and trout that inhabit the little brooks. Besides, it is only *there* they can see their own little forms reflected; only *there* they can feel the waters ruffle with the commotion they have caused, and that is oftentimes but the effects of a heated imagination.

Above all, the class of poetizers seems to increase prodigiously. Some may see in it an increased love of the Beautiful, an earnest of better times,—we can only see in it a disposition to babble. If their love of the Beautiful be so great, let them study the productions of Shakespeare, Shelley, Milton, Keats, and of Goethe, and learn to wait till the poetic fire compel them to write,—till the spirit *will* find utterance. How many weary disappointments should we unfortunate souls be spared! How many impatient murmurings at having been tricked out of so much valuable time! and, what a nausea we should now and then get rid of! But such a state of bliss is not to be expected. Every juvenile now thinks he has a perfect right to challenge the public attention to hear him squeak out his penny trumpet, declaring it to be the last and sweetest strain. Ah! "That strain again—(oh! would) it had a *dying* fall!" But such is not the case; listen, we must, whether we applaud or condemn.

But now to the practical part of our critique. We have received "Lines to my Vest," "On Passion," "Stray Thoughts on a Flower," also "Lines on Demosthenes." With regard to the merits of these compositions, we must say they have not very high claims, for many reasons. The last—Demosthenes—has not even the merit of *verse*. We cannot, for the life of us, *screw* it into metre; all that we can make of it is, that it is long measure, but short weight.

Webster says, "accent alone regulates English verse." Try this by that rule.

Becalm'd | his tróu | bled spir | it gáve | impulse | to |
progress
'Twas well | appl'd | he pér | sever'd | ye shall hear |
with what | succées

It is just dimly visible that this is an attempt at the Iambic measure; that is, two syllables to the foot, the second being the accented one, as *retire*. But it will also be seen, that in each of the foregoing lines this rule is broken. The same fault runs throughout the whole of the composition. There is not a poetical thought in the whole twenty verses.

One good rule for beginners in verse-making we heard from the lips of George Dawson, Esq.; in his lecture on the "Mythology of Nations." It was to the effect, that persons intending to write poetry should make this resolution, to *use no mythological names*. This struck us as being an original idea, worthy of consideration; and we beg to offer it to the notice of W. T., for we began to doubt, in reading "Demosthenes," whether we were in the company of historic characters, or about to make our obeisance to Old Mythicus.

One word of advice to W. T., and then we pass to the consideration of the other pieces. It is this, Do not attempt to turn the natural bent of your mind into channels for which it is unsuited; the writing of poetry is no easy mat-

ter,—only to be acquired by hard labour, and persevering thought—and then even not without some latent talent. For we are weak enough to believe in Genius or Inspiration, call it what you will,—that poets are "poets born," not made.

Mechanics is a useful science, *in its place*; but most certainly that is not in the world of song.

We would advise you to try prose *first*. Get over that well, and then you may again try poetry. We will forward your verses as you desired, if you still wish it; but our advice is, that you do not attempt to "go into print" yet. Send us a prose article, and we will notice it, either in the magazine, or privately, if you prefer. Or, indeed, if you still determine to follow the muse, we will do the same for a copy of verses. But try your next upon some simpler subject; the one you chose, though appearing to possess charms, is really unfitted for rhyming. There are hundreds of subjects to which you might give more life and spirit. The thought that any one else has written upon the same subject need not trouble you; only keep from copying their thoughts. Write that which comes spontaneously. Be sure that you understand yourself, what you wish should be understood by others. If you have a vague, shadowy, meaning, in your mind, do not rest with a half-expression, give the whole thought "full form and bulk." Let it really have an existence to yourself, and you may then succeed in making it known to others. An old Spanish proverb says, "By perseverance the mulberry becomes satin."

And now for the other "lines." First of all; W. C. seems not to understand grammar nor punctuation, both necessary to be provided with even on a *prose* journey, but on a *poetical* tour still more so, we think, notwithstanding the fact that our greatest poets have broken the rules, and put at defiance Lindley Murray, etc, to the no small alarm of professors and small men of every kind. They broke the rules, because they wrote for higher purposes than grammar; language was their servant, not their master. But this is not so with beginners; they should serve till they can command. Besides, these "blots," as they are called, were not palpable blunders in every instance, but were demanded by the peculiar nature of the composition.

Take the second verse of lines "On Passion," and see the mistakes that occur in it. We will supply the corrections in parallel verses.

"What anguish wrings the aching heart
When tempers' vicious *sting*
Compel us from our friends to part
What sorrow does it bring
When trifles scarcely worth a thought
Unlink the chain of love
And sever hearts that first were taught
That *feeling* from above."

What anguish wrings his aching heart,
When temper's vicious *sting* aching
Compels us from our friends to part—
What sorrow does it bring!
When trifles, scarcely worth a thought,
Unlink the chain of love,
And sever hearts that first were taught,
That *feeling* from above.

It will be seen that "sting" is the nominative to "compels." The third verse, we have read

over six or seven times, but all to no purpose; we cannot make out its meaning.

"What doubts and fears distress the mind,
What keen sensations feel (?)
What that should ever prove unkind
And cancel RIGHTS appeal." (?)

We cannot make out the connection of the second line with any of the others, nor even what it means. Does it mean that the *mind* feels keen sensations? Even taking this to be the case, it is of very awkward construction, for "*mind*" is in the objective case, governed by the verb "*distress*;" consequently, "*feel*" is without a nominative. "That we should ever prove unkind." Is this to be taken as a simple exclamation of sorrow? thus: Oh! "that we should ever prove unkind!" that is, "what a sad reflection it is to think that we are guilty of doing so." "And cancel rights appeal." In the first place, we should presume that "*rights*" should be in the possessive case, thus: "*rights*." This we conclude from the fact that W. C. has quite omitted to notice *this trifle* all the way through, with perhaps one or two exceptions, and they are quite misapplied, inasmuch as he has written the *possessive case singular* for the *objective plural*, thus: "What fiery passions in our bosom's glow!" Again; "For if mankind would lesson's take." Another fault is in the mode of *elision*; thus, "throb'd," instead of "throbb'd," and "revell'd," for "revell'd;"

besides, he has it correct in one instance, "swell'd." Another, in not putting the sign of elision, thus; "theres," for "there's," (there is.) But the line we were examining: "and cancel right's appeal." What this means, we are equally at a loss to know. What *right* is it that has made the appeal? and what "*appeal*?" One other grumble, and then we have a pleasanter task. In the seventh verse of "Stray Thoughts," the accent is made to fall on the third syllables of "*eloquence*" and "*recompense*," thus:—

"For if mankind would lesson's take,
From thy pure eloquence
They would the ills of life forsake
To gain such recompense."

This, spite of good reading, will give a sing-song to the words that is tedious.

As we have now given the faults, let us be just, and give a passage that has some merit in it. It is the piece of which we have just been speaking, namely:—"Stray Thoughts on a Flower." We shall take the liberty of punctuating it ourselves, and of making a slight alteration in the last line.

"The patient, on the bed of death,
Thy odour faintly breathes;
And welcomes, with his latest breath,
Thy green and budding leaves.
And, when o'er him the earth is laid,
There still ye gently wave!
The sweetest tribute love e'er paid,
Is planted on his grave."

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Demerara, West Indies.—At a meeting of the Smith Church Mutual Improvement Association, held on Thursday, May 1, it was resolved:—"That the honorary secretary do place himself in communication with the editor of 'The British Controversialist,' and inform him of the operations of the Association." It gives me pleasure to act in compliance with the foregoing.

The Association has been formed about twenty months for the benefit of the young men of Guiana, upon whom freedom has shone with her resplendent rays, and it aims to excite in them a laudable desire for literature. Its operations are conducted by a Patron, Vice-Patron, President, Vice-President, Treasurer, Honorary Secretary, Assistant Secretary, Librarian, and two Officers of Committee. The Association meets for the despatch of business on the first and third Thursdays in each month, when essays are read by members, as well as subjects given for discussion. It has gradually increased since its commencement; and it is a pleasing fact that though it was denounced as a nine days' wonder, it has lived so long. We take "The British Controversialist," and possess a library of four hundred volumes, principally standard works. Should you think us worthy of your notice, in this far-removed corner of the West Indies, we shall at all times readily receive any advice and counsel you may think we require.—John Cook, Honorary Secretary, Demerara.

Milngavie Mutual Improvement Society.—At the suggestion of a few friends, I recently

summoned a meeting of about a dozen of my acquaintance. All invited, attended; and after a brief conversation, it was unanimously agreed to form a Mutual Improvement Society. A code of laws was submitted by one of the members, which, with a few alterations and additions, was adopted for our guidance. We meet fortnightly, and the discussions have been very animated, and generally highly interesting. The most keenly contested subjects have been, "Ought the Government to provide a secular education for the people?" and "Ought the Bible to be used as a class book in schools?" The latter occupied two nights.

Finsbury Mechanics' Institution.—The sixth quarterly meeting of this flourishing Institution was held in the commodious hall, Commercial place, City Road, on Monday, May 5th. The chair was taken by the respected Treasurer, J. Taylor, Esq., who in a brief speech opened the business. Mr C. R. Carter, the Secretary, then read the report of the Committee, which was a lengthy document: it stated that there were 264 members, being an increase of 70 over last quarter; that the classes had been well and regularly attended; that the library consisted of 350 volumes, of which 114 members had availed themselves; that the deliveries had been 540 during the quarter, showing an increase of 46 members who had availed themselves of the library, and 262 deliveries; that the reading-room had been well attended, and had been supplied with about 36 daily, weekly, and monthly

newspapers and periodicals. The committee had great pleasure in informing the members, that in consequence of a suggestion made by a number of members, they had formed a debating class, which would meet on Tuesday evening, in addition to the discussion class which meets on Saturday, and is free to the public. The report concluded by calling on the members to exert themselves, and endeavour to induce their friends to join, as it was impossible for an institution to exist long at their low subscription, unless the working men of the neighbourhood support it. After some discussion among the members present, the report, on the motion of Mr Davie, seconded by Mr P. Nunney, was unanimously adopted. The following gentlemen were then elected as committee-men for the ensuing half-year:—Messrs D. Tullerman, Watson, Nolan, Lawrence, and W. O. Cameron. Mr J. Taylor was re-elected Treasurer; Mr G. Dolman, Librarian; Mr Tunstall, Sub-librarian; Mr C. R. Carter, Secretary; and Messrs Davis, Dent, and Grahame, Auditors. A vote of thanks was then given to the Committee, Officers, and Chairman, and the meeting dissolved, all appearing pleased at the good humoured and quiet manner in which the business was conducted.

Colchester Mechanics' Institution.—The Mutual Improvement Class held their Annual Meeting on Friday Evening, 2nd May. Mr J. Bridge occupied the chair. The Secretary read the Report, which gave great satisfaction. During the last eight months, the class has kept in active operation; twenty-one lectures have been delivered, and several animated discussions held. Previous to the present year, the class has ad-

joined during the summer months, but it was determined that this summer it meet once a month. The "British Controversialist" is taken in by several of the members, and, finding that it is likely to prove of much valuable assistance to them, we would particularly recommend it to those who are connected with other debating societies.—F. W. B.

Hackney Literary and Scientific Institution.

—The subject of the falsification of human food was lately brought before the members of the Discussion Class at the Hackney Literary and Scientific Institution, when Mr. Henry Althans, jun., introduced the following proposition:—"That the adulteration of food, as practised by fraudulent tradesmen, ought to be entirely repressed by law." An animated debate was kept up for nearly three hours, in which Messrs. Eldon, Grounds, Stevens, Pizzey, B. Robinson, and T. Price took part; when, the question being submitted to a show of hands, it was declared to be carried by a very large majority. In the course of the debate, frequent reference was made to the fearless and startling revelations of the *Lancet*, and a warm meed of praise accorded to its able conductors. Might not this example of submitting this all-important question to the test of public discussion be usefully imitated by every scientific institution in the metropolis?

Harborough, Leicestershire.—A Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society has been established in this town. It numbers already 26 members, and meets weekly in the Free School-room, when lectures are delivered, essays read, and questions for discussion brought forward.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

55. A young man desirous of becoming acquainted with Mechanics, will feel grateful to any of your correspondents who can give him any information on the subject.—X. L.

56. Did Cyrus spend the early part of his life in secrecy, having been preserved from death, and brought up by a shepherd's wife?—and did he, after filling the world with the fame of his conquests, fall in battle by the stratagem of a hostile queen? Dr Wright, in his "Universal Dictionary," gives the affirmative on the authority of Herodotus; but Rollin, in his "Ancient History," book 4, art. 1, sec. 1, and art. 3, sec. 4, gives the negative from Xenophon;—which is to be relied on?—H. A.

57. 1—What books should be read for preparation before matriculation in Trinity College, Dublin? 2—What will be the amount of fees, including everything? 3—Can B.A. be obtained in three years, and M.A. in two years after? and are any extra fees to be paid at these times? 4—Is it possible that a young man, self-educated, spending six hours a day in study, can, without

a tutor, pass creditably the necessary examinations? Answers to these queries, and any additional information will greatly oblige.—M.P.

58. When reading, my mind often wanders to other subjects, thus causing me to forget what I am perusing. Can any of your readers inform me how to remedy this defect?—J. B.

59. What were the doctrines of Hutchinson? and in what did he and Sir Isaac Newton differ?

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

36. *The Cultivation of the Memory.*—Memory, like every other faculty of the mind, requires a vigorous condition of both physical and intellectual constitution; and to maintain health and vigour, it is necessary that the laws of life and health should be obeyed. Students are apt, in their eager and zealous pursuit of intellectual acquisitions, it may be in the cultivation of memory itself, to forget that they have bodies as well as minds; that the nervous system, especially, exercises an amazing influence on the perceptive and retentive powers: hence, we see many

instances of those who, by immense labour, may have acquired a considerable amount of knowledge, but, because they have neglected the discipline of the physical powers, their nervous system is shattered, memory and all their other faculties are weakened in their operation, and if the student manages to live on, it is frequently under severe depression and suffering, whilst all the learning that he may have gone through, or rather which may have passed through his mind, can seldom be brought into effective service. It frequently happens that ministers of religion, especially, commit this sad error in their discipline, and the result is, that although they may have studied all the dead languages, have gone to the root of every word used in the Scriptures, and although they may have studied profoundly the old "fathers," and every book which seemed calculated to fit them for their important calling; yet, with all this, when they ascend the pulpit, instead of being able to stand up and deliver themselves with ease, power, and authority, they are obliged to trust very much, if not altogether, to *written* discourses. These they can deliver, but in a very feeble manner; and, if they secure a congregation, it seldom increases, either in numbers or devotion, because the feeble utterances of mere words, without the vigorous application of these to individual life, by an influx of spiritual power, (for "the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life,") there is little or no effect produced: the hearers are commonly made very drowsy by the monotonous tone and the inanimate discourse, or receive with disrelish and discomfort the misanthropic expressions of their hypochondriacal minister.

I think I cannot better illustrate these views than by giving the result of my own experience and observation. My occupation being literary, and seeking, as many others have sought, to acquire proficiency in my occupation, I applied myself vigorously to work. Having originally a good constitution, and previously accustomed to considerable exercise in the open air, for the first few months of studious application I succeeded very well; but, as I went on, I gradually lost that vigorous healthy stamina which I had before enjoyed, and by the time I ought to have been ready to apply the result of my study to public service, I could not trust to my memory; my nervous system was so far weakened as to render public speaking, which had previously been, on other subjects at least, comparatively easy, an almost insurmountable task; and where it was accomplished, its effect was, to me at least, of a very unsatisfactory character. I had always been accustomed to look *within* rather than *without*, for strength to overcome difficulties; I seriously considered what had been the cause of this failure in my endeavours. I felt sure that my want of success was not owing to either apathy or indifference, but a sheer loss of physical and mental power! I determined, therefore, to adopt a new course of discipline. I had studied the philosophy of Pythagoras, and others of this school, and I discovered that the success of these men had been attributable, first, to their simplicity of diet, entirely abjuring *all animal substances*, and living upon fruits, vegetables, and farinacea; secondly, early rising; and thirdly, vigorous *physical* as well as mental

exercise. I had previously adopted, to some extent, the first of these, and to this I mainly attributed the healthy and vigorous condition which I enjoyed previously to sedentary occupation; but I now came to a determination that, (notwithstanding the influence of friends whose judgment I had every reason to highly esteem; who considered that a partial use of animal substances, such as eggs, butter, cheese, cream, and milk, was necessary, or at least desirable,) I would give the Pythagorean system a complete trial. Accordingly, I adopted a simple diet consisting of a few plain but wholesome farinaceous preparations; good wheat-meal unfermented bread, with vegetables and fruit; my only drink being "the crystal beverage." So important did I conceive this course to be, that, in order that I might avoid *every* temptation to a different mode of life, I retired to a small country town, beautifully situated on a rock of stone, where, although still continuing my literary labours, to a considerable extent, I gradually acquired strength, by taking daily, an amount of physical exercise, for which the beautiful hills and wooded groves of the neighbourhood were delightfully adapted. Although at first my ability to walk extended only to two or three miles at a time, I gradually acquired strength so as to walk eight or ten miles a day. In the course of five weeks, I had made so much progress as to feel able to take a pedestrian tour; and being then in the West of England, I joined a party of three gentlemen, and we took several routes over the beautiful counties of Hereford, Gloucester, and Monmouth. I now found that I could accomplish twenty-five or thirty miles a day, without experiencing much inconvenience. I then took a route by myself, from Ross in Herefordshire to Tintern Abbey, along that most beautiful of English rivers, the Wye. It was a warm autumnal day; the trees were just changing the colour of their foliage; the birds sang delightfully amidst their branches; and the interest which I felt in the slightly winding river and the course of the wood-covered hills, was such as I had seldom or never before experienced; and although carrying a considerable load in my knapsack, I reached those beautiful old ruins, after walking upwards of twenty miles without stopping, with but little more than ordinary fatigue. After examining these celebrated remains with intense interest, I took my course to Chepstow, through that most magnificent portion of the valley where the hills assume rather the form of cliffs of the most imposing, yet beautiful character, clothed as they were with foliage of every shade, from the tint of the faded oak, to that of the dark green holly tree. In scenes like these, the memory could but be deeply impressed, and the mind become reanimated and fitted for exertion. After a few weeks' pleasant rambling, but still attending to my avocation, I retired to my home, vastly improved in health and spirits, and more than ever determined to persist in the discipline of the Pythagorean school: retiring to rest between the hours of nine and ten, and rising at from four to five o'clock in the morning,—bathing the whole body with cold water, and applying friction to the skin,—both mind and body became capable of intellectual and physical labour. I adopted the

following as my daily course:—Being winter time, the first two or three hours were devoted to literature. At this early period of the day, the mind seems freer and less liable to distraction, and my work went on more satisfactorily than ever it had done before. My breakfast consisted of a preparation of rice, or some other light farinaceous substance, with brown bread, and a little fruit. I then took two or three hours' exercise in my garden. My dinner consisted of two or three kinds of simply cooked vegetables, a farinaceous preparation, and sometimes fruit, always with the unfermented wheat-meal bread. I found that after such meals as these, if I did not exceed in quantity, (and it is easy not to do this with unstimulating food,) I could apply myself with the greatest ease, and considerable vigour, to my literary labours, which I usually did for three or four hours. My evening meal, at six o'clock, was similar to that of the morning, only somewhat less in quantity. Evening was spent in either reading, conducting classes, or lecturing, as the case might be; and although, at the commencement of this course of discipline, I invariably used notes for my lectures, and seldom spoke with much effect, I found now that my *memory was greatly improved*. I altogether abandoned reading lectures, or referring to notes, and I found that I could go through a lecture on an historical subject, after once or twice reading the history, with ease and pleasure to myself and audience, without reference to any notes whatever. My avocations, once burdensome and wearying to both mind and body, were now sources of the highest enjoyment.

I continue the course above described, with a little variation as the seasons advance; finding it better to take my exercise at three different periods of the day, about an hour before each meal, than to take it, as before, in three successive hours.

Thus, my own experience completely confirms my belief, that the best method of cultivating the memory, is to promote, by abstemious habits, early rising, and daily physical exercise, that healthy condition of both body and mind which renders *all* the functions of life active, and at the command of their possessor. The real enjoyment with which such a life is replete, should be made known to *all literary men*, and especially to those whose high office it is to minister to the spiritual necessities of the human race!—A DISCIPLINARIAN.

(To be continued.)

39. *Self-Knowledge*.—Under this head, I observed in a recent No. of your Magazine several large works recommended; I would take the liberty of mentioning two small ones, which I have found satisfactory. They are "The principles which truly constitute a man," price 3d., published by Newbery, King Street, Holborn; and "Bush's Life in its Origin," &c., price 3d., Hodson, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn.—E. W. H.

45. *Behaviour under Insult*.—"Desirous of showing courtesy to C. D.! No. If a man insulted me, I would challenge him, and blow his

brains out. Submission to insult is the mark of a craven soul!" Such would, doubtless, be the exclamation of some; but it has not our approval. Our motto is, "Render to no man evil for evil; but overcome evil with good." We recommend A. B., so long as the disposition referred to is evinced, not to cherish more intimate familiarity with C. D. than is unavoidable. Of course, he cannot be indifferent to the conduct of which he complains; but it is better, we think, to treat it as unworthy of serious regard. Let him show C. D. every courtesy, and never allow himself to encourage, or exhibit symptoms of, vexation under C. D.'s provocations. Let him render C. D. every kind office in his power, consistently with the self-respect he owes to himself; overlooking all proffered indignity on the part of C. D., without volunteering, but always abstaining from, every avoidable familiarity;—and C. D.'s superciliousness must be of an extravagantly large gauge, indeed, if such treatment do not abate, at least, if it should not quite cure, his overweening conceit and offensiveness.—T. C.

46. *Works on the French, German, Italian, and Spanish Languages*.—Grammars: Delille's, French; Ollendorf's, German; Veneroni's, Italian; Del Mar's, Spanish. Dictionaries: Spiers's, or James and Mole's, French; Flugel's, German; Barretti's, or Graglia's, Italian; Neuman and Barretti's, Spanish. Class Books: De Porquet's Trésor, Le Page's Echo, French; De Porquet's Trésor Italien, Italian; Del Mar's Dialogues, Spanish.

49. *Law Periodicals*.—One of the most suitable periodicals for a person just entering upon the study of the law is the "Law Student's Magazine," published by Robt. Hastings, Carey Street, Chancery Lane, price, unstamped, 1s. 7d., stamped, 1s. 9d. The leading features are, notices of recent enactments; notices of cases decided in the different courts; reviews of new books; and notes arising out of "actual practice" in the various branches of the law, tending materially to assist the student in the right understanding of the theory of those branches; while last, but not least, there is a department where students may start inquiries into "moot points," and receive the opinion of their fellow-students thereon, much after the plan we are here pursuing. We would recommend the student in commencing with this periodical, also to obtain the "Law Student's First Book," by the same publisher, price 15s., as this will assist greatly in unravelling the mysteries which at the onset everywhere meet the student of the Law; and moreover, it afterwards forms a convenient text-book.—C. W., jun.

Having been an articulated clerk to a solicitor for some years, I would observe, in reply to W. L.'s query, that, in my opinion, it is better for a beginner not to take in any periodical at first. Blackstone should be well read, and a slip of paper kept at hand for noting down points for inquiry as they present themselves in reading. "Smith's Elementary View of an Action at Law," price 7s. 6d., is a useful little work.—W. E. H.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

We are happy to observe the rapid improvement which our students are making. We admire the industry, carefulness, and clearness of thought, which the greater proportion of the papers submitted to our inspection evince. The conviction grows upon us as we proceed, that a vast field of usefulness lies before us in this department of our labours. The amount of youthful talent which is being aroused to exertion—the timid young men who are being emboldened—the eagerness to improve expressed in the many communications that we receive for this section,—are cheering evidences, to us, of the beneficial influences which we are enabled to exert. In the view of this widely diffused agency of mental culture which we have been privileged to set in operation, we are naturally filled with anxious solicitude to fulfil, to the best of our ability, the pleasing duty which has devolved upon us, by endeavouring to guide this mental activity to a beneficial end. We need not say that it occupies much of our time and thought, and that the extension of the facilities for improvement which this section offers is engaging our attention. We heartily wish, however, that those who feel the benefits of the exertions they are called upon to make, would use their endeavours to diffuse a knowledge of these benefits, and employ their efforts to induce others to enter into competition with them. We are sure that no ungenerous wish to limit the rivalry can exist in the minds of those whom we address, and that they are willing to engage with gladness in the emulative contest which will so materially tend to discipline the intellect, and cultivate the aspirative feelings of the youth of our country.

There are a few parties who have sent in papers, of whom we will say nothing more offensive than that they seem to have forgotten that there are a few common rules of Grammar, to which even the most ignorant are expected to conform; and that it is necessary, in preparing a paper or papers for minute and critical inspection, that thoughtfulness and judicious reading should furnish the groundwork of an essay—that care and attention should be employed in its construction, and that a keen-sighted revisal should always be bestowed upon the work before it be transmitted to the view of any party who is expected to give a candid, impartial, and trustworthy opinion on its merits. Of course we do not publish the initials of the parties to whom we refer, as we are fully persuaded that tenderness to their feelings demands this at our hands. We have no wish to discourage them, but would rather commend to their notice the words of Virgil, "*labor omnia vincit.*"

We recommend the following extract to the attention of our readers. "The education which is conducted through the medium of books, makes a young person familiar with words, far more rapidly than he can become acquainted with things; nor would there be mischief in this,

if he were aware of his real ignorance—if he regarded the words which he hears or reads or repeats by rote, as signs, to a very great extent, not of what he yet knows, but of what he has yet to learn. The danger is, that he will deceive himself and others, by mistaking his familiarity with the signs of knowledge for the knowledge itself. Nor can anything be said to warn him against this error, which has not been said before,—the common-sense of mankind, independently of theory, having prescribed to the young student, from time immemorial, the duty of asking himself what meaning he has with every word he uses, or professes to understand; and the necessity of betaking himself to the ordinary ways of learning, when his knowledge falls short of his language. One powerful method of bringing him to a consciousness of his deficiencies in the inductive process of logic, will be, to require from him proofs of his knowledge in deductive essays or themes. These essays, it is expected, will be an occasion of frequently sending him back to the inductive process, to supply what has been unconsciously omitted." (Smart's *Manual of Logic*, page 113, sec. 11.)

The following is the Register of this month, viz.: 88, B. G. D., H. T., and E. G., (the communications are highly satisfactory); 86, Johannes, (elegant and forcible); Achates, (accurate and philosophical); W. N. (displays great taste and care); E. S. I., (neat in execution, and accurate in thought); 84, Effort, (carefully composed, and logically argued); 78, T. W., (a neat and grammatical performance); R. K. (is improving rapidly, this paper is much more consecutively reasoned than former ones); 75, J. H., (we are exceedingly well pleased with this essay, the illustrations are well chosen); 74, H. H. H., (finely thought, but hastily composed); J. N., (improving remarkably well,—greater care, and thorough revisal of his papers, would greatly increase their value); Philologus (is very industrious and deserving of praise for his care in composition); 73, I. W. H., (rather brief); T. T., (well argued, though rather overstrained in expression); I. E., (very well written); 70, E. L. B., (more carelessly written than the last paper, though well thought); H. D., S. H. A., (very creditable essays).

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. VI.

1. Mention and explain the great distinction between Physics and Metaphysics.
2. What is Evidence?
3. How do the Ideative faculties acquire their knowledge—is it innate, or experience-educated?
4. What is Consciousness? and, what part does it bear in truth-acquisition?
5. What are the two sources from which Consciousness gains its knowledge?

PHONOGRAPHY;

OR,

PHONETIC SHORTHAND.

Speech and Writing are the grand mediums for the interchange of thought and affection, and thus for carrying on the necessary intercourse of life. Between these two methods of communication, there has always existed great disparity in point of facility and dispatch. To *speaking*, is an exercise comparatively rapid, easy, and delightful; to *writing*, is felt by all to be tedious, cumbrous, and wearisome, in an extreme degree. Is this disparity necessary? or, does it result from the imperfection of our system of writing? The hand is as skilfully organized for the rapid execution of written characters, as are the lungs, larynx, mouth, tongue, and lips, for the ready articulation of spoken sounds. It is an interesting and important inquiry, —Why are not the *signs* employed in writing, as simple as the *sounds* they represent?

Within the last hundred years, travelling has been expedited to seven times the former rate of speed; within the last ten years, the epistolary correspondence of this country has increased four-fold, by the introduction of cheap, but remunerative, postal communication; and, by means of the electric telegraph, intelligence can now be conveyed to any distance in a few seconds. Similar improvements and facilities distinguish the present from all former times, in almost every department of social and commercial life; and yet we continue to use the mode of **WRITING** which has been handed down to us from the remotest antiquity, (with but

very slight changes in the forms of the letters,) and which, by its complexity, obliges the readiest hand to spend at least six hours in writing what can be spoken in one! Is this right, fit, or necessary? The genius of the age answers, "No."

It is, however, in accordance with the law of human life and progress, that Alphabetic Writing, one of the earliest developments of human intelligence, and hence co-extensive with civilization, should be slow in receiving improvement. The inventions of modern times can be brought to maturity before they are very widely disseminated; but it is not so with one whose age cannot be counted, not even by centuries; which is known and practised throughout the world, and which, in all its minutest particulars, seems to be inwoven with the very fibres of our mental constitution.

But it is also in accordance with the law of human life and progress, that that which is defective and erroneous, should be remodelled, and rendered conformable to reason and truth; and that that which is difficult should be made easy. In this age of intellectual and business activity, the want of an expeditious method of writing is universally felt.—"Who that is much in the habit of writing," asks the *English Review*, "has not often wished for some means of expressing by two or three dashes of the pen, that which, as things are, it requires such an expenditure of time and labour to commit

to paper? Our present mode of communication must be felt to be cumbersome in the last degree; unworthy of these days of invention: we require some means of bringing the operations of the mind, and of the hand, into closer correspondence."

Shorthand.—Systems of Shorthand based upon the common alphabet, though considerably briefer than ordinary writing, are altogether incapable of supplying its place in the common business of life. On this point, no more conclusive evidence can be necessary than is afforded by the fact that, notwithstanding the art of Stenography has been employed in this country for nearly three centuries, few, except professional reporters, make a practical use of it. The illegibility of Shorthand is proverbial, and the public have wisely refused to trust the record of their thoughts and deeds to its faithless keeping.

Phonography.—The desideratum of a *brief method of writing, briefer than the briefest Shorthand, and yet as legible as Longhand*, is supplied in Phonography, the invention of Mr Isaac Pitman, of Bath. It is already used by many thousand persons in this country and in America, with perfect fearlessness, for all the common purposes of writing,—for correspondence, in book keeping, for writing sermons, essays, etc., that are to be read in public, and for reporting the proceedings of law courts, and legislative assemblies. It is a system of *Phonetic Shorthand*, as rapid, and as intelligible as speech itself; of which it is, as used in correspondence, an exact picture; and as used in verbatim reporting, a perfect and intelligible outline. Phonography is based upon a correct and practical analysis of spoken language, and represents words as they are really pronounced. There is every reason to believe, that, in the course of time, it will entirely supersede Longhand, except in legal documents, titles of manuscript books, headings of chapters and pages, leading words in written indexes, addresses of letters and parcels, etc.; where the bold appearance of Longhand, in comparison with Shorthand, affords greater facilities for reference. The following facts may be taken as indications of the future general adoption of Phonography:—No one who is practically acquainted with the system, ever thinks of employing Longhand when writing to a person who has a knowledge of the Phonetic Shorthand alphabet. The alphabet of the system, and the ability to read it, may be acquired in three or four hours' study. The

ability to write Phonography at the rate of twenty words per minute,—the average rate at which Longhand is written,—may be acquired by any one who can already write Longhand, in one month, by practising from half an hour to an hour per day. By continued practice, increased facility is attained, and in six months the student of the art is able to report a slow speaker verbatim, at the rate of a hundred words per minute. One or two months' additional practice will enable him to write at the average rate of public speaking, which is one hundred and twenty words per minute.

Phonography has received extensive and hearty approval from the press, and other competent authorities. A few of the numerous commendations bestowed upon the system, are here submitted for the reader's consideration.

"It appears that the system, wherever it is explained, meets a warm reception from many persons. It impresses all with an admiration of its simplicity and truthfulness, the result of the relation which it bears to natural principles; and hundreds and thousands have studied it so far as to be able to correspond in it. We find that four lessons have enabled us to convey the system into our mind, and that only practice could be further necessary to enable us to write it with ease and speed."—*Chambers' Edinburgh Journal*, 5th Oct., 1844.

"Phonography, the invention of Mr Isaac Pitman, is by far the most philosophical, and, in many respects, the most useful system of Shorthand ever devised."—*Atlas*.

To Clergymen, Ministers, Authors, etc., Phonography will be found an invaluable aid in facilitating the expression of thought in composition, in economising their time, and in relieving them from the drudgery at present inseparable from the use of Longhand writing.

"The manuscript of these pages was entirely composed in Phonetic Shorthand, and set up by the compositors from this shorthand copy."—*A Plea for Phonetic Spelling; or, the Necessity of Orthographic Reform*. By Alexander John Ellis, Esq., B.A. Demy 8vo., pp. 180.

"I have been writing for Professor Agassiz during the last year, and within the last nine months have written from his dictation, and have copied out for the press, more than 1,000 octavo pages of 400 words each. He told me yesterday, that Phonography had enabled him to do more in one year, than he could have done in three years without it; and that he finds the facilities which it affords to him, to exceed very much the power of the human mind for work—for intellectual effort."—*Mr Edwin Leigh*, Boston, United States, in the *Precursor* (a Phonetic Shorthand periodical) for September, 1850.

To Business, Literary, and Professional Gentlemen, etc., Phonography offers great advantages in making memoranda, and in expediting their business in drafting or dictating important correspondence, official documents, reports, articles for the press, book-keeping, etc., and, as far as their correspondents are acquainted with the system, in using it in ordinary business letters.

"Dr Campbell, in the *Christian Witness* for September, 1849, writes:—'Had we done nothing besides our correspondence, our function would have been no sinecure; it constitutes, although unseen, a heavy addition to our visible periodical labours; and, but for the constant aid of a body of Shorthand writers, for this and our general labours, it were utterly impossible for us to get on. Job Orton, of honoured memory, in his celebrated *Letters*, often thanks God for the discovery of Shorthand, and we not seldom echo the grateful aspiration.' Phonography is the system chiefly, if not wholly, in requisition, in connexion with Dr Campbell's editorial labours."—*Phonotypic Journal*, November, 1849.

To Professional Reporters, and others, Phonography offers advantages, as a system for reporting, both in point of brevity and legibility, which are not to be found in any of the Stenographic systems.

"Mr Pitman's Phonography is the briefest and best system of Shorthand, in every respect, that has ever been invented."—*Liverpool Chronicle*, 18th May, 1850.

"Having written Phonography nearly ten years, and, during that time, having had frequent opportunities of comparing it with various systems of the Stenographic school, we have no hesitation in declaring the superiority of Phonography, both in point of brevity and perspicuity."—*Preston Guardian*, 15th June, 1850.

To Medical and Legal Students, and others, Phonography will be found most serviceable in taking notes of the addresses of professional lecturers and teachers, for making extracts from books, and for many other important purposes.

"For nearly thirty years I have been using a system of Shorthand, but have given it up for Phonography, which is so complete, that I do not think it possible to invent a better system. I would strongly recommend Phonography to medical students, as it will be of the greatest service to them in their future life."—*Dr Birt Davies*, Coroner for Birmingham.

To Young Men, Phonography especially recommends itself as a valuable auxiliary in the work of self-improvement. For making extracts from choice and instructive works, for keeping a diary or common-place book, for correspondence and literary composition, etc., Phonography is pre-eminently valuable. It will also be found useful in taking notes of sermons, speeches, discus-

sions, lectures, etc.—thus collecting material for future thought and reflection.

"There is no man in England unacquainted with Phonography, to whom a knowledge of it would not be a boon, deserving vastly more application than its attainment really requires. At the same time, there are classes of persons to whom it specially commends itself: the first class to which it appeals for reception, and the class to whom it will be of the greatest service, is the *educated young men* of this country. There are few young men who do not wish for a speedier method of committing their thoughts to paper, than the ordinary writing now in use. Phonography appropriately steps in to meet this requirement. * * * * We may be thought extravagant, but we are conscious of speaking the truth when we say that we would not give up the use of Phonography for the addition of £100 per annum to our income."—*Christian Philanthropist*, May, 1850.

To Ladies, Phonography is recommended as a pleasing, useful, and improving accomplishment. The facility with which it may be written, renders it a most delightful medium for correspondence; while, for noting down the numerous ideas which daily present themselves to the mind, or for transcribing the thoughts of others, when reading, it is truly invaluable.

"The large number of persons who have long practised Phonography, will all, with enthusiasm, proclaim its admirable adaptation to express thought as it arises. How full and expressive are phonographic letters! None but those who have received them can form any idea of the power which they have to call forth the kindly feelings of human nature, and the spirit of universal brotherhood. I have a letter now before me, from my brother, which contains thirteen pages, with about 200 words in each, making in all 2,600 words, written in about the same time that it would take to speak them."—*Miss S. A. C.*, in the *Phonetic Journal*, April 1, 1850.

To the Young in Schools and Seminaries, Phonography should be universally taught, as conducing to the attainment of a just pronunciation. Its use also helps to ripen the buds of thought with which the young mind teems, and gives ease and grace in the art of composition.

"We should be glad to see a system of *writing sounds* popularly studied, and brought into general use, were it only for the benefit that must result to popular articulation. We look upon Phonography as a most valuable auxiliary in teaching the Art of Speech: and our object in treating of it in this work is that we may by its aid, advance popular knowledge on the subject of speech. We should anticipate great good,—not to articulation alone, but to the general interests of language and education—if every boy in our schools were a phonographer."—*Principles of Speech and Elocution*, by Mr Alexander Melville Bell.

Prior to the invention of Phonography, Shorthand was regarded as an art useful mainly to reporters, in noting down the words of rapid discourses. It is no longer to be thus restricted in its application. It is an accomplishment useful to all classes alike, in the common pursuits of study and business. It is already used by many writers for the press, and by business men in keeping accounts, conducting correspondence, etc., and will doubtless be more and more applied for these and other purposes as the merits and uses of the art become known. Three hundred thousand copies

of the Phonographic System have been demanded since the invention of the art, in 1837, without any effort at gratuitous distribution; several thousand letters, written in Phonography, pass through the post weekly; and five periodicals are published in England in this Shorthand character, and enjoy a circulation of about seven thousand copies per month. These facts are so many proofs of the intrinsic value of the system.

Phonographic Institution, Bath.
May, 1851.

PHONETIC PUBLICATIONS.

Shorthand Instruction Books.

Exercises in Phonography, or First Book of Instruction in Phonetic Shorthand, 6d.
Phonographic Copy Book, 3d.
Manual of Phonography, 1s. 6d.; Roan, 2s. 6d.
Reporter's Companion, 2s. 6d.; cloth, 3s.
Phonetic Shorthand Alphabet, per packet of 100, 6d.
List of the Phonetic Society for 1851, 2d.

The Members of this Society correct the Exercises of phonographic students through the post gratuitously.

In Phonetic Shorthand.

Phonographic Star, for learners, (illustrated).
— Correspondent, for letter writing, (illustrated).
— Magazine, in an easy reporting style.
— Reporter, in the style of verbatim reporting. All monthly, 2d. each; Annual Vols. 2s. 6d.
Precursor, devoted to Phonetic Spelling, fortnightly, 2d.
Book of Psalms, 1s.; bound, 2s.
The New Testament, bound, 6s.; morocco, 7s. 6d.
Phonographic Teacher, 1s.
Flowers of Poetry, gilt edges, 6d.
Laura; or, "The only way to be happy is to be useful." By Miss A. A. Gray. 9d.
Hart's Orthography, 1869; or "An Orthographic contending the due order and reason, how to write or paint thimage of manne's voice, most like to the life or nature. Composed by J. H. [John Hart], Chester Heraft;" reprinted from a copy in the British Museum. Cloth, 2s.
Extension of Phonography to Foreign Languages. By A. J. Ellis, B.A. 8d.

Phonetic Longhand.

View of the Phonetic Alphabet in Ten Styles of Writing and Printing, 3d.
Phonetic Writer, (a series of copies,) 4d.
Phonetic Longhand and Phonotypic Alphabets, per packet (100), 8d.

Phonetic Penman, (in and ornamental) 6d.
Slips, containing the New Letters, 1d. per dozen; 6d. per hundred.

In Phonetic Printing.

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The Art of Reasoning.

No. XVI.

RATIOCINATION.

INFORMAL SYLLOGISMS.

“To understand the theory of that which is the appropriate occupation of men in general, and to learn to do that *well* which every one *will* and *must* do, well or ill, may surely be considered as an essential part of a liberal education.”—*Whateley*.

HITHERTO our attention has been chiefly confined to the consideration of pure categorical syllogisms, or such as in all points fulfil the laws of the thought-process, in its rigid adherence to the formalisms of the mentality. But as the mind, in its present condition cannot always acquire knowledge of a kind so definite and certain as such reasoning demands, and is not at all times capable of attaining so accurate an acquaintance with surrounding objectivities and their relations as is requisite in processes of such a precise and strictly formal character as those which we have previously described, it would seem necessary that it should possess the power of adapting the method of its intelligential acts to the circumstances which call forth its powers, and thus be rendered capable of reasoning with ease, accuracy, and dispatch, upon the almost innumerable probabilities which are daily and hourly exciting the thought-agencies of men. It will be seen as we proceed that this is really the case, and that while the same code of general laws still hold their undivided jurisdiction over the operations of the ratiocinative faculty, some slight practical variations are permitted to suit the various purposes of the Intellect when engaged in its investigations. These we purpose in our present paper to explain under the general designation of “Informal Syllogisms.”

I.—A Hypothetical Syllogism is, as its name imports, one whose conclusion rests upon the truth or falsehood of some fact—the accuracy or inaccuracy of some prior inference, or the occurrence or non-occurrence of some event;—one whose conclusion does not flow from absolute and positive premises, but is limited in its validity by the contingency or conditionality of some other fact, occurrence, or opinion, which is expressed in the hypothetical proposition which forms its major premise. It is, however, to be remarked that the mere fact of the major premise of a syllogism being a hypothetical proposition does not necessarily and *per se* entitle that syllogism to be considered hypothetical. A proposition may be, and indeed often is, strictly categorical, even although both premises be hypothetical. If the contingency be carried forward into

the conclusion, and reappear there, the hypothesis is considered as a part of one of the terms, and is thus rendered strictly categorical in form; but when the reasoning *rests* upon the hypothesis, when that is the pivot upon which the question turns, and when the conditional premise bears in itself an illative force, and the inference arising from the conjunction of the premises yields a categorical—*i.e.*, a positively, and directly assertive conclusion, the syllogism is correctly denominated hypothetical. The following examples will illustrate the distinction between categorical and hypothetical syllogisms, while the latter will exemplify what is meant in the afore-given definition.

Example I.—CATEGORICAL.

BAR- If men are not holy they cannot be happy.

BA- If men are hypocrites they are not holy.

RA. If men are hypocrites, they cannot be happy.

Example II.—HYPOTHETICAL.

If all men do not admire the same objects, Taste cannot be uniform.

But "one mind perceives deformity, where another is sensible of Beauty"*—*i.e.*, all men do not admire the same objects;

Therefore, Taste cannot be uniform.

Of Hypothetical Syllogisms there are obviously four moods—1st, That in which the antecedent is affirmed, and the consequent is accepted in the conclusion; 2nd, That in which the antecedent is denied, and the consequent is rejected; 3rd, That in which the consequent is denied, and the rejection of the antecedent follows; 4th, That in which the consequent is established, and the antecedent is held as proved. Of these, however, the 1st and 3rd alone are admissible; for in mood 2nd, the denial of the antecedent will not disprove the truth of the consequent, because that may follow from other antecedents; nor in mood 4th will the proof of the consequent establish the accuracy of the antecedent, as other antecedents may produce the same consequents. There are then only two admissible moods—Direct and Indirect; these are scholastically denominated *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*.

1st.—Direct hypothetical syllogisms proceed on the principle that if the antecedent be granted or proved, the consequent results from it by illation. It consists of a hypothetical major premise, which affirms the conjunction of two things conditionally—a categorical minor, which affirms the hypothetical antecedent—and a conclusion in which the consequent is considered established—*e.g.*,

If it be true that the eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter occur sixteen minutes later when the earth is in that part of her orbit which is at the greatest distance from that planet, than they do when it is in the nearest position with regard to it, it will follow that light must travel at the rate of ninety-five millions of miles in eight minutes.

But it is true that these eclipses do occur so much later in the given position; Therefore light travels at the rate of ninety-five millions of miles in eight minutes—*i.e.*, about two hundred thousand miles in a second.

* Hume's Essays, vol. i., essay 22.

2nd.—Indirect hypothetical syllogisms proceed on the principle, that if the consequent can be denied, the antecedent, in so far as the implied condition is concerned, is false. It consists of a hypothetical major premise, which contains a conjunctive affirmation, a categorical negative minor, and a conclusion in which the hypothesis is positively rejected—*e.g.*,

If the mind be possessed of no moral perceptivity, the slave who quietly weeps over his bondage, and the hero who boldly gives his blood for his country, will produce the same impression on it.

But they do not produce the same impression on the mind;

Therefore, the mind is possessed of moral perceptivity.

II.—A Disjunctive Syllogism is one whose major premise is a disjunctive proposition. The principle upon which such syllogisms are considered valid is, that *only some* of the asserted things can be true, and that if these be affirmed, the rest may be denied; or if the rest be denied, these may be affirmed. The accuracy of such reasoning, however, will depend upon the completeness of the enumeration made in the major premise, and the distinctness of the parts asserted as disjunct; for if one of the disjunct parts can be affirmed of any of those from which it is asserted to be disjoined, the argumentation is invalid. Such syllogisms admit of great variety, according as the members of the major premise are more or less numerous. When the major premise consists of two members only, the minor asserts the one and the conclusion denies the other; or the minor denies the one and the conclusion affirms the other—*e.g.*,

It is either true that ignorance is useful, or that knowledge is so.

But it is not true that ignorance is useful;

Therefore, knowledge is so.

When the major premise consists of more than two members, the minor affirms one or more to be true, and the conclusion negatives the remaining terms; or the minor denies one or more of the terms, and the conclusion affirms the truth or predicability of the other—*e.g.*,

The angle B A C must either be equal to, or greater or less than, the angle E D F.

But it is neither equal to, nor less than, it;

Therefore, the angle B A C is greater than the angle E D F.*

III.—Dilemma is a species of argument which is in some sort a compound of the two kinds of reasoning just described. It might therefore be defined as a hypothetical, disjunctive syllogism. The Dilemma is so framed that the denial of the consequent or consequents, negatives the antecedent; and the admission of the consequent or consequents, renders the antecedent predicable. In arguments of this kind, two or more suppositions are placed before the mind in such a manner that whichever term be accepted, a conclusion favourable to the reasoner's point may be inferred. In the major premise, it is asserted that some one or more of the antecedents must be true, and that some one or more of the consequents is false; the minor affirms or denies, as the case may demand; and the conclusion states the inference affirmatively or negatively, according to the *quality*

* Euclid, book i., prop. 25.

of the minor. Of this kind of argumentation there are two species, Direct and Indirect.

A Direct Dilemma may either be simple or complex.

1st.—A Direct simple dilemma is one whose major premise contains several antecedents, any one of which may be considered capable of producing the single consequent which is attributed to their agency, whose minor affirms the antecedents in a disjunctive proposition, and whose conclusion affirms the consequent categorically. "This kind of argument was urged by the opponents of Don Carlos, the pretender to the Spanish throne, which he claimed as heir-male, against his niece the queen, by virtue of the Salic law excluding females, which was established (contrary to the ancient Spanish usage) by a former king of Spain, and was repealed by king Ferdinand. They say,

If a king of Spain has a right to alter the law of succession, Carlos has no claim,
and if no king of Spain has that right, Carlos has no claim.

But a king of Spain has, or has not, that right;

Therefore, (on either supposition) Carlos has no claim."*

"Three courses are before us—to go backward, to stand still, or to go forward.

We cannot go backward—we cannot stand still;

We must, therefore, go forward."

A Direct Complex dilemma is one in which the major premise affirms that several distinct antecedents have each different and determinate consequents; the minor asserts these antecedents in a disjunctive proposition; and the conclusion determines that some one of these several consequents must be true—*e.g.*,

"We must either gratify our vicious propensities, or resist them.

To gratify them will involve us in sin and misery; to resist them requires the exercise of self-denial;

Therefore, we must either be subject to misery, if we gratify our passions; or submit to self-denial if we restrain them."

2nd.—An Indirect dilemma is one which has a major premise which contains an affirmation regarding one antecedent and several consequents, or several antecedents and one or more consequents; a minor which denies the consequent or consequents; and a conclusion which denies the antecedent or antecedents—*e.g.*,

If men were prudent, they would act morally for their own good; if benevolent, for the good of others.

Many men will not act morally, either for their own good, or that of others;

Such men are, therefore, neither prudent, nor benevolent.

In all accurately constructed dilemma-arguments, the *one* part of the minor premise may be capable of being denied, but both or all should never be capable of being negated; on this account it is that we speak of offering anyone either horn of the dilemma. It is when we have thus shut up an opponent, that he can neither accept nor reject all the parts, but is left to choose either one he pleases, and is, despite of that, unable to escape, he is said in common phrase to be "caught." Although the word dilemma is now used as a synonym for what Sam Slick denominates "bein' in a fix," yet we think

* Whateley's "Easy Lessons on Reasoning," p. 104.

that the names of trilemma, quartilemma, &c., ought to be adopted, according to the number of antecedents and consequents which the major premise contains.

IV.—Enthymeme is a syllogism in which one of the premises is, for the sake of brevity, suppressed. It appears at first sight to consist of two propositions only; but upon a closer inspection we may easily perceive that the reasoning is imperfect—*e.g.*, the sentence, "*possunt quia posse videntur*"—they are able because they think they are able—seems as it were, of itself, quite complete; but it will not appear so if anyone denies that every one is able to do what he thinks he is capable of doing. The full reasoning comprehended in the sentence of Virgil, may be thus syllogized:—

Every one is able to do whatever he thinks himself capable of doing.

They think that they are able;

Therefore, they are capable of doing it.

An enthymeme, it will now be seen, consists of a premise and a conclusion, the former of which receives the name of antecedent, the latter being denominated the consequent; while there is, besides, contained in it a reference to another premise, which, from the certainty that it will be supplied by the hearer, is retained *ἐν θυμῳ*—in the mind. Such syllogisms as these may be rendered formal by the insertion of the omitted premise. To determine which is omitted, however, is sometimes difficult, and may be effected in a different manner, according as the omitted member be one of a categorical or hypothetical syllogism. If the syllogism be categorical, the enthymeme will contain *three* terms, one of which will occur twice; by doing which it is known to be an extreme, the term found in conjunction with it in the consequent will be the other extreme, and the remaining one the middle term; hence results the following rules:—1st, If the *subject* of the *consequent* appear in the *antecedent*, it is the major premise that is omitted, if in the *predicate*, it is the minor. 2nd, If neither *subject* nor *predicate* of the *consequent* be found in the *antecedent*, it is the major premise that is omitted, and the syllogism is either hypothetical or disjunctive—*e.g.*, the enthymeme, "Sensualists cannot realize their wishes; for it is impossible to enjoy perpetual gratification without satiety," is thus rendered formal and categorical:—

CA- Sensualists wish to enjoy perpetual gratification without satiety.

MES- It is impossible to enjoy perpetual gratification without satiety;

TRES. Therefore, it is impossible for sensualists to realize their wishes.

Again: the enthymeme, "In the infancy of society, penal laws must have been extremely severe; as the more barbarous the people, the stronger must be the bonds to restrain them,"* may thus be restored to its categorical form:—

BAR- The more barbarous the people, the stronger must be the bonds to restrain them—*i.e.*, penal laws.

BA- In the infancy of society, men were more barbarous than now;

RA. Therefore, in the infancy of society, penal laws must have been extremely severe.

* Tytler's "Elements of History," p. 14.

Again: "Man is accountable; therefore he is possessed of power to do good or ill,"* may thus be syllogized:—

If Man is accountable, he must be possessed of power to do good or ill.

But he is accountable:

Therefore, he must be possessed of power to do good or ill.

V.—Epichirēma is a syllogism to one or both of the premises of which the proof is annexed. Taking the last example, it will become an epichirēma by proving the major term thus:—

If man is accountable, he must be possessed of power to do good or ill; for to call a person to account, to approve or disapprove of his conduct who had no power to do good or evil, is absurd.

Man is accountable;

Therefore, he is possessed of the power of doing good or ill.

This is a very common method of argumentation in public addresses; each premise is separately and lengthily proved: the multiplicity of things brought forward often confuses the mind of the listener, and he is frequently led to yield the assent of his reason to a conclusion of much wider and more extensive application than the given premises really justify. Cicero's *pro Milone* is an elaborate epichirema. The major premise is, "Self-defence is lawful." This he proves from a consideration of the general principles of justice, from the usages of many nations, the natural instinct of man, and by the examples of illustrious men. The minor premise is, "Milo acted in self-defence:" this is proved by the fact, that Clodius lay in wait to slay him, and that he had arms and guards with him, while Milo was almost unprovided with any; and he then concludes that "What he did in self-defence was lawful"—viz., his killing of Clodius.

VI.—Sorites. This species of argument is only an abbreviated series of syllogisms arranged in such a manner that the predicate of each prior one becomes the subject of its successor, and so on in regular progression, until in the conclusion the subject of the first premise is affirmed or denied of the predicate of the last. In such a series as this the strength of the conclusion is only equivalent to that of the weakest link in the chain of reasoning. It is obvious that such a series of concatenated syllogisms may be carried on to any extent, so long as the purpose of the speaker requires it, and the chain is preserved unbroken. In the listener, however, it requires diligent attention, as the introduction of one premise of a doubtful nature will vitiate the whole process of argumentation in which it is employed. The following is a specimen of a sorites:—

Happiness is the result of obedience to the Divine laws.

Obedience to the Divine laws constitutes virtuous conduct.

Virtuous conduct is the subordination of the inferior to the superior portions of our nature.

This cannot be done without the practice of self-control;

Happiness, therefore, is the result of the practice of self-control.

* Reid's "Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind," essay i., chap. 7.

The following are the rules which govern Sorites:—viz., 1st, The last premise alone can be negative; 2nd, The first premise alone can be particular; 3rd, If the first premise be particular, and the last negative, the conclusion must be particular or negative.

If we are desirous of ascertaining the validity of a chain of reasoning such as this, it can easily be done by decomposing the series into the several syllogisms of which it consists. In doing this, we must consider the *second proposition* of the Sorites the *major premise*, and the *first proposition* the *minor*—e.g.,

BAR- Obedience to the Divine laws constitutes virtuous conduct.

BA- Happiness is the result of obedience to the Divine laws;

RA. Therefore, happiness is the result of virtuous conduct.

The conclusion of the first syllogism is then to be considered as the *minor premise* of the second syllogism, and the next proposition the *major*—e.g.,

BAR- Virtuous conduct is the subordination of the inferior to the superior portions of our nature.

BA- Happiness is the result of virtuous conduct;

RA. Therefore, happiness is the result of the subordination of the inferior to the superior portions of our nature.

The same rule now holds good through the whole series, and must be carefully followed—e.g.,

BAR- The inferior portions of our nature cannot be subordinated to the superior without the practice of self-control.

BA- Happiness is the result of the subordination of the inferior to the superior portions of our nature;

RA. Therefore happiness is the result of the practice of self-control.

VII.—A Prosylogism consists of two syllogisms so joined together, that the conclusion of the prior forms one of the premises to the posterior, and is thus nearly related to the Sorites. The Soliloquy of Juno—

“Pallas ne exurere classem

Argivum atque ipses, potuit submergere ponti; &c.

* * *

Ast ego, quæ Divum incedo regina, Jovisque

Et soror et conjux, una cum gente tot annos

Bella gero; et quisquam numen Junonis adoret:

Præteræ, aut supplex aris imponat honorem!”*

may be exhibited, so far as the reasoning process is concerned, in a prosylogism, thus:—

Whoever is greater than Minerva ought to be able to do more.

I, the sister and wife of Jupiter, am greater than she;

Therefore I ought to be able to do more.

* “Was not Pallas able to burn the fleet of the Greeks, and to overwhelm them in the sea? But I, who am the queen of the gods—both the wife and the sister of Jupiter—carry on war with one nation so many years, and shall anyone yet worship the divinity of Juno, or suppliantly place an oblation on my altar.”—“Æneid,” book i.

But Minerva was able to avenge her wrongs ;
Therefore, I ought to be more capable of avenging mine.

VIII.—Analogy, or Parity of Reasoning, is a species of argumentation of which there are a considerable number of varieties. It consists in tracing those general, although, it may be, imperfect resemblances which exist among differing and distinct existences, and from the similitudes observable in them, inferring the proportional similarity of their causes, or the comparative sameness of their effects. As the coincidences and similarity of properties perceptible in the objectivities which impress the mind differ materially in their degrees, it will be obvious that there is in the common affairs of life a very wide range for the practical exercise of this description of reasoning. It will therefore be of great service if we can find some general expression of the laws which hold good in Analogical arguments to which we can refer as settled points in the employment of any such methods of ratiocination. As an attempt to supply this want, we may be allowed to observe—1st, The lowest degree of belief ought in general to be attached to those arguments from Analogy, in which *one* circumstance alone is similar, and *all others* are dissimilar. 2nd, The highest degree of belief, short of absolute conviction, ought to be conceded to those arguments in which *all* the circumstances, except *one*, resemble each other. 3rd, The lowest degree of similarity may shew that a thing is *possible*. 4th, The highest degree of resemblance demonstrates the extreme probability of the accuracy of the reasoning. 5th, The degree of belief ought to be strictly proportioned to the ratio between the agreeing and the disagreeing elements contained in the objects brought forward as analogous. The chief precautions to be observed in reasoning from Analogy are these—1st, Never reason from suppositious resemblances. 2nd, See that the similarity is real, not nominal. 3rd, Never demand or yield assent to any conclusion which is not warranted in the degree of resemblance which the objects bear to each other. 4th, When actual, and well-ascertained facts are opposed to our Analogy, so far as to involve the point at issue in our reasoning, we may generally consider our Analogy as incompetent.

Analogical reasoning seems to depend for its validity upon the natural and inherent tendency which operates in the minds of men to rely upon Experience. This may be couched in many varied phrases, and these phrases may be accounted “fundamental truths,” “primary verities,” &c., as is the fashion in some metaphysical schools : but whether we say “the future will resemble the past ;” “approximate causes will produce proportional effects ;” “similars produce similars ;” or, “our past experience is the guide of our future actions,” &c., we conceive the meaning is equally the same, and is equally convincing regarding the imperative necessity of watchfulness as to the teachings of that world-renowned taskmaster, Experience. The supposition or postulation of the truth of Experience may be considered as the major premise, and the other terms may be thus formally reduced to syllogisms—viz.,

Wherever similar general causes operate, similar general effects will most probably result.

Similar general causes operate in the earth and the planets ;

Therefore similar general effects will most probably result in both.

But Life, Vegetation, &c., are the results of these laws on earth ;

Therefore, Life, Vegetation, &c., may most probably be found in the planets.*

Nearly allied to this kind of argument is that which Aristotle denominated Oratorical Induction, but which is now more generally designated Reasoning by Example. The general principle on which this species of ratiocination proceeds is, that any two causes or effects which are in each point precisely similar, must produce, or have been produced by, precisely similar causes or effects—*e.g.*, The loss of its colonies ruined Holland ; therefore, a similar loss will ruin England. Such arguments as these are, of course, invalidated by proving that there is a disparity or dissimilarity in the cases.

IX.—Induction is another species of reasoning depending upon the principle of resemblance for its validity. Of the processes by which such ratiocination is conducted we have treated so fully in a previous article,† that our remarks at present must be brief. Induction consists in attributing the properties which are to be found in each part of a whole to that whole. It maintains that what is true of each one of the parts is also true of the whole. It collects, classifies, and groups together families, as it were, of particular facts ; observes with care and precision the particular attributes which they all, in common, possess ; and from these eliminate a greater fact or law. In this method of argument, we reason from specials to generals—from individuals to a generic whole. It will be seen from this, that it is of the highest importance that we should use the utmost caution and vigilance in discriminating between the accidental and essential qualities of objects.

Induction is either Perfect or Imperfect : Perfect when all the parts of a whole are enumerated ; Imperfect when all the parts of the whole either are not, or cannot be so. It is seldom, however, that man can attain to a knowledge of the whole of the individuals contained in any class of objectivities, and hence we are generally constrained to rest satisfied with a limited enumeration, depending upon analogy for the accuracy of the reasoning founded upon the observed particulars. Induction seems to be the appropriate method of leading the several facts of which we become cognizant into the judgment-hall of the mentality, therein to have their relation to human concerns decided upon ; and that general propositions and axioms may be evolved from them, in order, that they may supply to the mind “the forth-flowing founts of future experiments.” “This is the *principle* of an indefinite, not to say infinite, *progression* ; but this progression, which is truly Method, requires not only the proper choice of an initiative, but also the following it out through all its ramifications. It requires, in short, a constant wakefulness of mind, so that if we wander but in a single instance from our path, we cannot reach the goal, but by retracing our steps to the point of divergency, and thence beginning our progress anew. Thus a ship beating off and on an unknown coast, often takes, in nautical phrase, “a new departure ;” and thus it is necessary often to recur to that regulating process which the French language so happily expresses by the word *s’orienter*—*i.e.*, to find out the east for ourselves, and so put to rights our faulty reckoning.”‡

* For other remarks on this topic, see article No. VII., vol. i., p. 214.

† Article No. VIII., vol. i., p. 245.

‡ Coleridge on Method, p. 18.

Religion.

DOES THE DIVINE TRINITY OF FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT, EXIST IN THE PERSON OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

I am not the proposer of the above question, but have had my attention called to the subject, and been requested, by a well-wisher of your publication, to enter upon the discussion. I understand that the point intended to be inquired into, is the idea which the Scriptures set forth for man's belief concerning the personality of God. The subject is one of importance, and a clear and Scriptural view respecting it is what every one should endeavour to obtain. A right idea of God is the only sound foundation for genuine religion and a true church.

The question before us supposes the existence of other ideas concerning God. The most generally received opinion is, that the Divine Being exists in three persons, each of whom singly, and "by himself," is God and Lord, "and yet they are not three Gods, but one God." Another doctrine on the subject, held by Unitarians, is, that there is but one God in one person, and that Jesus Christ is not that personal God, in any correct sense of such a term. The writer of this paper undertakes to show that the Tripersonalists are wrong in what they affirm respecting God; and, also, that Unitarians are in error when they deny that Jesus Christ is God. If it can be shown that Jesus Christ is God, and that there is but one God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God, and both the Trinitarian and Unitarian view of Him will be refuted by the same arguments.

The first of "the thirty-nine articles of religion," inserted in the "Book of Common Prayer," sets forth what is acknowledged by "the Established Church" upon this subject. It also expresses what is believed concerning God, by Catholics, and the generality of dissenting Christians. It is true that some of them might not have chosen

the language for stating their belief which has been ecclesiastically adopted by "the Established Church;" still the idea of all will be found to be similar, howsoever they may differ in their methods of describing it. I, therefore, take that article as a fair representation of the popular idea respecting a tripersonal God.

Now, in the first place, the doctrine asserted in that article was not known to the primitive Christian church. It cannot be traced farther back than the Council of Nice, held A.D. 324. It was at that assembly first ecclesiastically expressed, and finally determined by a majority of votes, the numbers being, according to Philostorgius, 296 for it, and 22 against it. That Council was convened by Constantine, in consequence of the fierce ecclesiastical excitement which had for some time prevailed and disturbed the religious peace of Christian professors; and the object of it was to put down the opinions of Arius. The discussion was marked by great bitterness of sentiment and turbulence of spirit, so that, in the language of Jortin, "If such councils made righteous decrees, it was by strange good luck." The "Athanasian creed," in which the same idea of a tripersonal God is propounded, does not appear to have been known in the church until about the middle of the fifth century; and there is no evidence to show that Athanasius was the writer of it, or that it was ever established by the authority of any general council.

It is not necessary now to say more of the history of this tripersonal idea; let us look at the doctrine itself. It is thus expressed:—"There is one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions; of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness; the Maker and Preserver of all things, both visible and invisible. And in

unity of this Godhead there be three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity;—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” The statement that “there is one living and true God,” expresses an idea in which I most fully concur; but this idea is but little more than what results from what is called “natural religion.” So much is confessed by Pagan philosophers, Mahometans, and Deists in general. But the God of the Scriptures has revealed himself more in *detail*. It is the information thence resulting which imparts to the Christian religion its superior knowledge of God, and enables its rational recipients to have some intellectual conception respecting him; but, certainly, a God without “body, parts, or passions,” does not present such a conception. Who does not see that a God without a “body” is necessarily deprived of that which is requisite to constitute his entity? but the “three persons” in which the “unity” is said to exist, are declared to be “*of one substance*,” and what does the existence of a *substance* imply but the being of a “body:” wherefore the article, in the first place, asserts God to be *without a body*, but that, nevertheless, he is distinguished by a *substance which is a body*; and, therefore, it declares him to be and *not to be* at the same time! which is an evident absurdity.

Again; he is said to be without “parts,” though it is afterwards declared that his “unity” consists of “*three persons*,” but surely every one who thinks upon this statement must see that *each* of the *three persons* who, it is asserted, constitute this one God, must, necessarily, form one *part* of his *unity*, and that, therefore, while in one sentence it is proclaimed that God has *no parts*, in the other which immediately follows, it is said that he has three parts!

It is not easy to ascertain what is meant by its being said that He is destitute of “passions;” because the obvious sense of the expression puts both the Deity and his creation out of existence. Surely “God is love;” and doubtless it was from this that creation originated. This love in God is infinite, and what is infinite love but the perfection of passion? If he were destitute of this he would be without creative energy, and creation could not be, but creation *is*, and, therefore, he cannot be without it.

An examination of the second and fifth “articles of religion” will show, still further, that the doctrine respecting a tripersonal God cannot be true. The second article treats of the “Son of God, which was made very man,” and it is thus stated:—“The Son, which is the word of the Father, begotten from everlasting of the Father, the very and eternal God, and of one substance with the Father, took man’s nature in the womb of the blessed Virgin, of her substance: so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say the Godhead and manhood, were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God, and very man; who truly suffered, was crucified, dead, and buried.” Here it is said that *one person* in the Godhead was “*begotten from everlasting*,” that he, and he only, took man’s nature, and “joined” that nature to himself “*never to be divided*,” so that *one person*, and *only this one person* of the Godhead is at the same time true and very man! Now is it true that anything can be “begotten from everlasting?” That which is *begotten* necessarily implies the prior existence of a *begetter*, and a *time* when it was *not begotten*; and this most indisputably deprives the subject of which it is predicated, of the attribute of eternity. The Son begotten cannot be coeval with the Father by whom he was begot! Besides, this eternal Son (these terms are a decided contradiction) is said to be “*of one substance with the Father*.” This, then, gives a body to the Father which the preceding article asserts he does not possess! Again. He is said to have “*two whole and perfect natures*.” Now how can his person be *one* with the Father and Holy Spirit, when he has *two whole and perfect natures*, one of which is declared to be “very man?” Can He, who is described to have taken upon himself man’s nature, be “*of one substance with the Father*,” who, it is believed, did *not take it*? He who is said to have been “crucified, dead, and buried,” cannot be the same with him who suffered neither one nor the other. Is the person of the Son, who is said to have “joined” to his Godhead the manhood, one with the person of the Father, who is supposed not to have taken upon himself such a nature?

Surely there must be a dissimilarity in the persons of the Godhead, when one of the *three* has "joined" to him a manhood which the other *two* have not! Certainly a careful reflection on this matter must satisfy rational persons that some great mistake has been perpetrated upon this important subject.

But I pass on from the Trinitarian statements concerning the personality of the Father and the Son, to what is stated respecting the Holy Ghost. This is set forth in the fifth article thus:—"The Holy Ghost, proceeding from the Father and the Son, is of one substance, majesty, and glory, with the Father and the Son, very and eternal God." To talk of the Holy Ghost as very and eternal God, *proceeding* from the Father and the Son, as two other very and eternal persons in the Godhead, is to forget what has been previously said respecting their unity. The proceeding Personality of the Holy Ghost from the Personalities of the Father and the Son, seems to indicate that He is altogether of a different nature from them. It is a manifest contradiction to say that the Holy Ghost is of "one substance, majesty, and glory, with the Father and the Son," when, at the same time, he is said to be a *proceeding* from that Father and Son. He who proceeds cannot be one with those from whom he proceeds. He who receives a commission cannot be one with those who confer it! Now all these are confessed to be great difficulties; but they arise entirely from the division of the Godhead into a triumvirate personality, and the assigning to each a particular office in the work of man's redemption. This separation of God into three Persons, ascribes to God the Father an authority like that of a sovereign consul,—to God the Son an office resembling that of a senator,—and to God the Holy Ghost a power similar to that of a tribune of the people. And who does not see the irrationality, not to say the impiety, of carrying such a notion as this to the Godhead. Think of a minister of the church teaching from the pulpit what ought to be believed and practised, and that a prelate was standing near him, whispering into his ears the truths of virtue that were to consecrate his discourse, and then both commissioning a third person to descend

into the temple for the purpose of opening the ears, and enforcing into the hearts of the people, the good advice which is delivered. I say, think of this procedure, and you will think of that which is precisely similar to the sanctification which Tripersonalists assert to come from the third Person of the Godhead: and is not this eminently irrational? Where is it to be found in the Scriptures?

Such, then, are some of the objections which I urge against the idea of the "Divine Being existing in three Persons," as that idea is authoritatively expressed and usually conceived. But I hold that the notion is nowhere taught in the Word of God. I am aware of the evidences on which the doctrine is professed to be founded; and am acquainted with the principal glosses and defences which have been offered respecting it; still it is a doctrine which rests on inferences, and not upon Scriptural expressions. I am aware that Tripersonalists do not like to have this doctrine *rationally* investigated; they regard it to be a holy mystery, not to be comprehended—to be believed, not to be explained. But if it is a mystery not to be comprehended, how do they know that it is true? The very circumstance that it is not to be understood, is a strong presumption against its truth, and a certain evidence that it is received in blindness.

I cannot, in the space to which this paper is limited, say much respecting the Scripture passages on which Tripersonalists rely for their doctrine, but an instance or two may be referred to. The pronouns "us" and "our" are, in a few instances, applied to the Supreme Being; and these are considered to indicate his tripersonal existence; but, surely, this is very unsafe ground for the support of such a doctrine. If the common idea of Persons is retained, then the notion of three Gods is established. This conclusion cannot be evaded. But perhaps the ordinary notion may not be insisted on; if it is not, I can only deal with any other after it is defined. I admit that those pronouns do indicate a plurality of something pertaining to the Divine Being, but I see no necessity for concluding that something to be *persons*, and certainly the terms do not confine the plurality

to *three*. They must be interpreted in consistency with the oneness of God; and, therefore, they must be understood of the plurality of the Divine attributes. Let us take the earliest example which the Scriptures afford, as an illustration. It is written, "Let us make man in our image after our likeness," (Gen. i. 26). Man being made, is found to be but one person. But if God existed in three persons, and the pronouns "us" and "our" were intended to express this doctrine, then man, in order to be an image and likeness of God, should have been three persons, but as he is not so, the notion that these pronouns indicate the existence of a tripersonal God must be abandoned. But supposing the subject treated of in those words to be the creation of the first man, then the plural terms may be consistently interpreted to have reference to the plurality of Divine attributes which were unitedly engaged in that great work, and man may be satisfactorily regarded as an image and likeness of them. These attributes in God are love, wisdom, and power; and that which answers to them in man, are will, understanding, and operative energy.

The terms "Father," "Son," and "Holy Spirit," are, in the New Testament, frequently employed to indicate something pertaining to the Supreme Being; but there is no instance in which personality is ascribed to any of them but the Lord Jesus Christ, and he said, "the Father is in me," (John x. 38). "I and my Father are one," (John x. 30.) He also showed that the Holy Spirit was a Divine influence proceeding from the union of what are called the Father and the Son, when "he breathed upon his disciples and said, Receive ye the

Holy Spirit," (John xx, 22). Hence it was that the apostles declared that "In Jesus Christ dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily," (Col. ii. 9); and that "he is the true God and eternal life," (1 John v. 20). "The only wise God our Saviour," (Jude 25). The "Trinity," therefore, is centred in his glorious *person*—a Trinity not of *persons*, but of essential principles. "The Father," constituting his inmost Divinity, "the Son," being his manifested humanity, and "the Holy Spirit," those holy influences which emanate from their union to effect the regeneration of men; and this rational view of the Divine trinity in God, has an illustrative counterpart in the human trinity in man, which consists in his soul and body, and the operations which proceed from their union. And here I put this question to Tripersonalists in general:—You profess to believe that there is but one God—you profess to acknowledge that Jesus Christ is God; how, then, can you escape the conclusion that Jesus Christ must be the only God? I wait for a reply. I have shown a few reasons why I reject the "orthodox" opinion respecting a tripersonal God, and briefly indicated my own belief concerning him. This, perhaps, is enough for a beginning. I shall be happy to give a candid attention to any reasoning and Scriptural defence of Tripersonalism which may be offered; and, also, to carefully consider any Scriptural objections which may be urged against the doctrine of the exclusive Deity of the Lord Jesus Christ, which I verily believe to be the sum and substance of the revealed teachings respecting God.

Preston; May 20, 1851. E. D. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

THE affirmative of this question is but one of the many objections which have been urged against the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, and therefore it must be exposed and refuted by those who are anxious "earnestly to contend for the faith once delivered to the saints."

Before we enter upon an examination of the question itself, it may be well to refer

to the doctrine of the Trinity as held by intelligent and orthodox christians. In reading the Scriptures, we find mention made of three distinct persons, called the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; each of these persons has all the qualities of personality ascribed to him, as in the use of pronouns, I, he, thou, &c. Each person also has divine attributes ascribed to him,

and divine worship claimed for him. Now these propositions are capable of the most unanswerable proof drawn from the word of God; and, taken by themselves, they might lead us to suppose that these three persons must be three distinct Gods. But at this stage of the argument we are met by the solemn and reiterated assurance, that "the Lord our God is *one Lord*," and that "there is none other God but *one*." How then shall we receive these declarations? We must either set up our reason against them, and thus reject the testimony of God, even when delivered concerning himself; or we must allow our faith to embrace them as truths revealed to us in the word of God; as truths which the mind or reason of man never could have discovered. Now, how has this doctrine been received by men who make a boast of their reason? They have seized upon the word person, and assuming that it must mean a *human* person, they have amused themselves by displaying the folly and absurdity of saying, that *three* persons can be *one* person, or that *one* person can be *three* persons. And having thus misrepresented the doctrine, they have been eminently successful in making it appear ridiculous and contemptible. Others, again, have rejected the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as impossible and unreasonable. Now if you argue with a man of this class, it is astonishing to find how, in the name of *reason*, so many unreasonable things are held and maintained. You will find that man invulnerable to any argument. You may press him with scriptural proofs, with the most direct statements, with a reference to the imperfection of his own mental powers,—but in vain. You may enumerate the fearful consequences of his denying this great truth of the Trinity, and such as the Deity and atonement of Christ, the depravity of the human heart, the necessity of Divine grace;—all this is in vain. What to him are revealed truths as compared with the free exercise of his reason?

But it is with the members of another sect that we have now to deal—men who feel that they cannot deny the Trinity absolutely, yet fear that it "is so repugnant to reason, that numbers have been so shocked by the idea of a trinity of Gods, that they have taken refuge in the no less awful errors

of Arius and Socinus." Having thus disposed of the trinity of persons, they suppose a trinity of principles to exist in the Lord Jesus, "consisting of the Divinity itself, which is called the Father; the Divine Humanity, which is called the Son; and the Divine Proceeding, which is called the Holy Spirit." What, then, is the advantage of this scheme? Is it more agreeable to reason? Is it more free from difficulty? Does it remove all mystery? or is it based upon clear passages of Holy Scripture? Now, to my own mind, nothing has been said or written on this subject so capable of refutation, and so replete with absurdity, as this notion of the Swedenborgians; for, according to this view, we have the Father, the Son, and a third being, termed the Holy Spirit; and yet, by some strange and undefinable process, they are reduced to *one* person, as though a man should assert that a father, the son, and their individual or collective actions yet make one person. Can anything be more incongruous or absurd than this? And yet this is the reasonable method which they adopt to avoid an unreasonable doctrine!

But let us take this theory, and apply it to explain some of the facts recorded in the New Testament. Take, for instance, the subject of prayer. Our blessed Lord has left us an example in the earnest, persevering prayers which he offered to his Father. In John xii. 27, Christ exclaims, "Father, save me from this hour; but for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again." Now, according to this *new* doctrine, the Son is praying to himself—is seeking deliverance from himself—is answering himself—is glorifying himself; and yet at the same time leading the people to believe that his Father was still in heaven while He was upon earth. I am content to rest the case on this single passage of Scripture; for if Swedenborg be right, the whole account seems characterized by absurdity and gross deception. But we may select another case, and that in connection with our Lord's baptism, as found in Matthew iii. 16, 17, "And Jesus, when he was baptized, went up straightway out of the water; and, lo, the heavens were

opened unto him; and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and lighting upon him. And, lo, a voice from heaven, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." This is an important passage, as bearing on the doctrine of the Holy Triunity. According to the orthodox view, all is clear; these are the three persons in the Godhead manifesting themselves in different forms; or, as Bishop Beveridge has beautifully expressed it, "Had we, who know nothing but by our senses, been present at this time with Jesus at Jordan, our very senses would have conveyed this truth to our understandings. Here we should have heard a voice from heaven. Whose was it but God the Father's? Here we should have seen Jesus coming out of Jordan. Who was that but God the Son? Here we should have seen something else, too, in the form of a dove;—and who was that but God the Spirit? Thus was God the Father heard speaking, God the Son seen ascending, and God the Holy Ghost seen descending upon him. The first was heard in the sound of a voice, the second was seen in the form of a man, and the third was beheld in the shape of a dove." But now take for a moment the theory of Swedenborg, and then you have the voice representing the Divinity, the Son representing Christ's Humanity, and the dove representing his Proceeding! You have the Divinity well pleased with the Humanity, and the Proceeding of Christ descending upon and sanctifying both! And the advocates of this theory rejoice in the fact that *they* at least are made free from the mysteries and errors of the old world! The only possible way of establishing this *new* doctrine, is to follow the example of the Mormonites, and discover a new Bible; for all the terms used in our present version are against it. Before we can receive it, we must blot out of the Bible the expressions, Father, Son, Servant, Messiah, as they indicate relations totally incompatible with a mere Trinity of principles, and at the same

time we must ignore the nature, the offices, and the work of the Holy Spirit.

It will not be necessary to examine the passages of Holy Scripture which are generally adduced to prove this scheme of a Trinity of principles, as they will be found to refer to two very important doctrines which are, of course, held by the advocates of the orthodox views—viz., the Deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the unity of nature and purpose existing between the Father and the Son. The sum of what we have said is this:—that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as held by the vast majority of those professing and calling themselves Christians, may be clearly stated and abundantly proved by the authority of Holy Scripture; that men are to look at its practical importance rather than to its mysterious aspects; that where reason cannot judge, there faith must adore; that if we cannot understand *how* these things can be, yet that is no proof that they do not exist; but it should lead us to place implicit trust in the word of the living God, and at the same time to be satisfied with the assurance that, "what we know not now, we shall know hereafter." Nor must we lose sight of the second fact on which we have insisted, that when men reject the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as impossible or unreasonable, they either adopt a new rule of faith, and reject other fundamental truths of the Bible, and so, like the Socinians, rob the Christian religion of its very life and soul; or they set up some other theory which, like that of the Swedenborgians, is destitute of Scriptural authority, is utterly opposed to the facts as recorded in the Word of God, and is, withal, so absurd in itself, and so full of mere fancies and contradictions, that it is difficult to affirm which challenges most of our surprise, these crude notions themselves, or the conceit in which their advocates indulge,—that they, of all men, are the most reasonable and profound.

B. W.

As joys are increased by participation, so griefs are lightened when they derive not their source from the severe stings of self-reproach.

Philosophy.

IS LANGUAGE OF HUMAN OR DIVINE ORIGIN?

DIVINE—II.

WHAT is Language? Whence its origin? Does it arise out of the spontaneous activity of the human faculties? or are its rudiments communicated by the Creator of these faculties—by the Supreme Being himself? Such is the subject of our present paper.

What, then, is Language? The husk of ideas—the *body* that renders the invisible and incommunicable perceptions* and conceptions of the mind visible and communicable. This husk or body consists of two distinct series of symbols or representations,—the one phonic, and the other written. Are these, moreover, separable from the ideas which they are constructed to represent? I answer, To a certain extent, they are, I think, separable from most, if not all, of our concrete impressions of objects; inseparable from most, if not all, of our abstract notions or ideas.

In the first place, it is obvious that in our contemplations of material and *individual* objects, that the perceptive faculties are capable of retaining a reminiscence or faint representation of any one long after its contact with the apparatus of the senses—that the mind is also capable of recalling from its passive existence in the storehouse of the memory, this reminiscence into active being, as the object of reflection; and that it can do so altogether independent of the word or term by which the said impression is denoted. When I say this is obvious, I call upon all who may feel inclined to dispute its validity, to prove it themselves, by endeavouring to recall to their memories the image of some sensible object, without the term used to render it nameable.

But when we leave the concrete, and arrive at the abstract—when we find it

necessary to contemplate those types which the mind forms, according to the law of generalization, as the representatives of a class of objects,—then we find the term as inseparable from the idea, as the algebraic symbols $x y z$, from the unknown quantities which they denote. Thus we find it impossible to call into perceptual existence the general ideas of *horse*, *bird*, apart from their respective terms; and when the intellect is forced to recall some sensible perception, it merely descends to the contemplation of some fragment of the individual or concrete. All logical, or reflective notions are therefore, mostly, if not wholly, inseparable from their terms. There are ideas, however, apparently abstract in their nature, which may appear to some, upon reflection, to militate against the truth of this,—such are those of beauty, spiritual beings. But upon due reflection, these will be found not to be abstract ideas at all, but a kind of emotive consciousness, which through the operation of the moral sentiments, enables us to conceive of their presence and existence.

Language may, then, be divided into two great departments—that representing concrete impressions, and that denoting abstract ideas.

Here I have occasion to make an assertion that will seem startling to those who affirm that the verb is the *word*, or principal part of speech. On the contrary, I affirm that the *noun* is not only the principal, but that it is the only part of speech. Let us see. Is Language the representation of things or ideas? The grammarian will, doubtless, answer—of things. What! have you, the grammarian, solved the question that has occupied, and continues to occupy, the attention of thinkers since they began to think? Have you been able to penetrate the hitherto impenetrable veil of *phenomena*, and arrive

* By perception I mean the passive impressions made upon the mind by external or objective existences; by conception those, so to speak, positive ideas formed by its active working.

at the hitherto unknowable *noumena*? But if you have not been able to solve this hitherto insoluble problem, how can you assert that Language is the symbol of things?—you who are conscious alone of impressions or ideas. If Language, then, be the representative of ideas only, are not the symbols of these ideas necessarily *names*, or nouns? Our impressions of movement, of quality, of place, are in themselves as much ideas as those of substances; and hence the symbols by which we denote them have an equal right to the designation of Noun.

Language being thus the names of ideas, it follows that it will increase in significations, or vary according to the increase or variation of ideas. Of what, however, consists the rudiments of Language? This leads to another question, What is the lowest phase of sentient existence? Sensation. The rudiments of speech then will be the expression of sensations, and these form that part of speech called Interjections. Interjections, then, or the voices of sensation, I conceive to be the rudiments of Language.

Let us suppose that two individuals destitute as yet of the power of expressing their thoughts in language, are thrown into companionship, then the first step towards the establishment of a community of ideas would be the mutual understanding of those natural expressions of pain, surprise, &c., with which the Creator has gifted the human being.

This spontaneous language being formed, and man having acquired the capacity of communicating his sensations, the next higher faculty of the mind is perception, and accordingly man would, in the second place, form sounds representative of his impressions of external objects. These in the case of animals, would probably be formed from the particular sounds which they utter, illustrations of which may be

found in the names of several birds in our own language. Here, however, the faculty of comparison or analogy would come into operation, and modify to a considerable extent the names thus formed. A process of the mind requiring also to be taken into consideration, is that of generalization—a process which begins in a greater or less degree, soon after the first awakenings of thought. Analogy, or the faculty which describes resemblances, naturally leads to the classification of the objects in which resemblances are to be traced. And this classification of like objects, though at the beginning of its attempts, it would be necessarily vague and confused; yet ultimately, as man began to move with greater freedom in the region of reflective thought, it would acquire precision and clearness; for every part of a language reacts upon the whole. When man begins to philosophize, his first step is to define terms, and fix their meaning.

But here want of space obliges me to pause. In the foregoing remarks I have endeavoured to trace the progress of Language from its rudimentary forms to those higher modes by which we express the ideas of science and philosophy. The reader, however, may ask, How does all this show Language to be of Divine origin? To this I answer, That the Divine Being always employs means commensurate to the end in view; and if we admit that He is the Creator of man, and hence of the human faculties—if we admit that we possess rudimentary expressions, or what might be called spontaneous language,—if we also admit that man, thus constituted, possesses a capacity and tendency to go forward and upward—then we must also admit that while Language progresses in the progression of man; it must also, like him, be traced to a Divine origin.

HAROLD.

HUMAN.—II.

THE amount of discussion which this question has, at all times, elicited among those who reflect on how they “live, move, and have their being,” proves that it is one of profound interest.

Language, or the communication of thought by articulate sounds, is a means so admirably adapted to its end, that the majority of men have espoused the opinion that it is the gift of a beneficent Creator.

This opinion is, however, opposed to the usual workings of Providence, and should not, therefore, be entertained.

The Divine Being has, in no instance, done more for man than the occasion absolutely demanded, but as a countervailing gift, man has been equipped with an intellect, far transcending that of any other created being—an intellect capable of devising means, by which to subdue stubborn nature to his purpose, and capable also of contriving a system of vocal representatives for the expressing of his conceptions, corresponding with his superior organism. The vocal organs in man are so formed as to admit, readily, of sound being articulated, and divided. Possessing an intelligence eager to out-pour itself, and possessing also facility of utterance, he would, while aiming to communicate his conceptions, naturally endeavour to explain them by a species of language, though it might be to us unintelligible babbling. This it would do, independently of any inspiration announcing the adaptation of the organs of speech to the purpose for which he employed them. These organs would act as readily at the suggestions of the intellect, as does the hand at the dictates of the will. So constituted, man could not resist his desire to utter some sort of sound. His intellect must have impelled him to it. The sounds uttered, being altogether novel, would, of course want that intelligibility which words now possess, but their import would be rendered sufficiently apparent by gesticulation. Through frequency of repetition, these sounds would be allied to certain ideas and emotions, and usage would ratify what necessity had by chance adopted.

The supposition that language originated in this manner, does not cast a slur upon the character of the Creator. To fashion the faculties by which man may invent idea-symbols, is, in our opinion, as godlike an act of creative skill, as would be the creation of these symbols themselves. This latter supposition implies either the unprogressiveness of the God-given tongue, or the continual intervention of miraculous aid; that is to say, it implies that a language complete, and fully developed, must have been framed—a language which anticipated the whole of the world's arrangements, the appliances

of civilized life, indeed, everything which language is, or will be, capable of expressing; or it implies that any individual who chooses to coin a word, is an instrument in the hand of God, developing the language originally framed.

Language in its primitive state is wholly monosyllabic, every utterance has its very simplest form; this, however, generally continues only till a certain point in civilization has been reached, after which, when the extension of knowledge renders additions to the vocabulary necessary, a change occurs in the manner of forming words. Instead of devising on every occasion, as might easily be done, arbitrary sounds, to suit the significations required, it is more common, for the sake of perspicuity, to group two or more words together, to combine into one word parts of other words, or to alter, by prefixes, and affixes, (themselves originally words,) an already known and approved word, and so render the language more copious, at the same time preserving its simplicity and expressiveness. Language, it is plain, is of natural growth. We link words together for the purpose of expressing compound ideas, and we vary the meaning of words by uniting to them prefixes and affixes. Were it not for the adoption of these, and many other devices, the number of words would far outgrow the power of man to master them, and would ultimately become an insuperable barrier to his progress. But in consequence of derivation being so largely practised in cultivated languages, a sort of family relationship subsists among the words, which greatly lessens the labour of acquiring and of employing them. According to the learned Adam Smith, the very copious language of the Greeks, that polished and literary people, numbered, only, somewhere about three hundred primitives. It cannot reasonably be maintained, that the ingenuity of man is inadequate to the formation of that very limited number of thought-signs. Let any one of our opponents take a copy of the Imperial Dictionary, and write out from it, the genuine English primitives: he will have a tolerably long array, but we think he will be satisfied of the truthfulness of our position.

Certain affinities exist in nature which

man can discover; the discovered affinities constitute science; the application of science constitutes art; yet no one asserts that science and art are of divine origin. Necessity drives man to discover and invent. Why should he not discover a thought-communicator, as well as a labour-abridger? It is but a different application of the same faculties.

Our opponents may still insist that the elements of the originally given language are merely modified by man. To which we reply, that a language spoken by people enjoying continual intercourse, becomes well defined, and maintains a uniformity, scarcely pervious to alteration, unless arising from the growing refinement of those who employ it; whereas, a language spoken by uncivil-

ized wandering tribes is soon broken up into numerous petty dialects.

Seeing that the supposition that language is of human origin, harmonizes with the usual providence of God, while the contrary one implies numerous improbabilities; seeing that from his organization it is natural man should employ language, and that language is solely up-built by human means; seeing too that the progress of civilization is that of language, that it shares in the fortunes of those who employ it; and further, seeing that every other science and art has been left for man to discover, or to invent—I cannot believe that language would be made an exception, and must conclude that its origin is human.

PHILOLOGUS.

Politics.

OUGHT GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE A SECULAR EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

GOVERNMENT ought *not*, in my opinion, “to provide a secular education for the people.” I have not arrived at this conclusion without much consideration. I frankly confess, that if I had followed my *inclinations* I should have adopted the affirmative side on this question. I do not recollect any debatable subject on which I have been compelled to come to an opinion so strongly adverse to my wishes. If, therefore, sincerity in the advocacy of a cause be commendable, I may, without any egotism, lay claim to it in this matter of education. Let it not be inferred, however, that because I object to the Government providing *secular* education for the people, I am favourable to its doing so if the *religious* element be introduced into any provision it may make. Far from it. My objection extends to that as well. I hold that education is a matter in which Government has no right to interfere; and thus openly proclaim my opinion, although the avowal may cause your correspondent

“Fides” to class me amongst those “who, in the blindness and bitterness of sectarian and party zeal, close the fountains of *all* knowledge, unless supplied from the too-frequently stagnant and muddy waters found within denominational inclosures.” “Hard words break no bones!” and “Fides” may be surprised to learn that, although an “ultra-voluntary” on this question, I am as little of a sectary as he may be. Indeed, I have a very strong opinion that the division of the Christian church into so many sects, has been one main cause of the comparatively slow progress it has made. But what could “Fides” have been about to write thus, in his very next paragraph, of these obstructive sectaries?—“The munificence of * * * different religious denominations has done very much for the elevation of the country, more particularly in a denominational or congregational capacity. Monuments of their bounty and untiring zeal are seen on every hand, * * * which add a lustre to the names of

all engaged in such noble employment, and confer a lasting benefit on the population." "Is Saul also among the prophets?" Why, oh, why, dear "Fides," if this opinion be true—and I believe it to be so—did you pen the first sentence I have quoted? Surely, *these* are not the persons who would "close the fountain of *all* knowledge, unless," &c. But a truce to personal criticism. As none of the articles on the affirmative side have in the least altered my opinion, it will be as well at once to give my reasons for differing from them.

I fully agree with my opponents, that education is a very desirable matter. On that point there is no difference of opinion. The *casus belli* between us is, how that education should be imparted. But, while making this admission, I am far from being convinced that the means of education are not fully equal to the requirements of the times. I think, indeed, that were we, under a national system of education, to erect school-houses, and provide tutors for every child in existence capable of receiving instruction, that the most sanguine advocate of Government interference would be miserably disappointed with the result—that it would be shown, indisputably, that until the social condition of the masses be improved, very few, if any, more children would be sent to school.

One of the chief arguments urged by the Governmentists—if I may be pardoned for coining a word to express myself briefly—is, the deplorable amount of ignorance prevailing, especially among the lower classes of society, which ignorance, voluntary efforts cannot be expected to remove; and they urge, therefore, that Government ought to take the education of the people into its own hands. Now admitting, for the sake of argument, this to be a correct statement of the case, does the deduction they draw from it necessarily follow? I think not. Why is it there is so much ignorance? Because of the want of school accommodation? If so, how is it that so many of the schools already in existence, and where a good and cheap education may be obtained—such as British schools—are anything but fully attended at the present time? I firmly believe this to be caused by the *poverty* of the poorer portion of my country-

men. "Exactly," chimes in some enthusiastic Governmentist—"that is just our position; therefore, we say it is nothing but just to tax those who can afford to be taxed, in order that the poor man's child may not suffer from the poverty its parents cannot help. It is no crime to be poor, you know; and allowing them to grow up uneducated is virtually to punish their poverty." Softly, friend: I admire the *philanthropy* of your argument; but its *wisdom*?—Are you quite sure that the poverty of the lower classes is of that *negative* kind?—that it merely deprives them of the means of *paying* for the education of their children? Does it not, in thousands of cases, both in our manufacturing and agricultural districts, necessitate the parents to find employment of some kind for them almost as soon as they can walk,—the scanty pittance they earn themselves being totally inadequate to support their family? Will these, think you—albeit, they may possess as strong a desire to see their children educated as possible—*can* these—spare their children to go to school, even though it be quite free? Unless, then, attendance be compulsory—and there have been some Governmentists who hint, although obscurely, that it *may* be necessary to have recourse to compulsion—it is plain that any Government scheme will fail to benefit the very classes for whom it is intended. From the very circumstances of the case, it must do so; and the only parties who would be benefitted would be the better class of mechanics, and small tradespeople,—parties who are quite able to pay for the education of their own children, without taxing the community for the purpose.

Now, I should like to know, at this point, whether attendance at the schools proposed by my opponents, is to be voluntary or compulsory? If *voluntary*, I contend that the poverty of the classes for whom they are especially intended, will, necessarily, cause their failure:—if *compulsory*, then we must be prepared either to pay parents for sending their children to the schools, or submit to an increased amount of poor-rate. I am confident that the compulsory system would, by depriving parents of the earnings of their children, increase, to a large extent, the poor-rates. I grieve that this should be

the case: none more so. But let me ask, How is an agricultural labourer, with a wife and five or six children, and a weekly wage of some 8s. or 9s., to dispense with the 1s. a-week earned by perhaps two or three of those children in various ways? Can they live on his earnings, if he take them out of the fields, and send them to school? Let any rational being answer. And the same may be said of many of our unskilled manufacturing operatives. This offering of education to the poor is a mere lopping off of a branch from the iniquities of our present unequal social system. Ask my aid, Governmentist, in any agitation which has for its end the enabling the poor to live by their labour—that will repeal the oppressive laws which rest so exclusively on that labour,—and you shall have my hearty co-operation; for I believe as firmly as I do that to-morrow's sun will rise, that were the springs of industry cleared of all the bad and oppressive laws which now clog their progress,—I say, I believe if this were done, the labouring man of this country would be in a position to spurn with honest indignation any eleemosynary aid in the education of his children. Invite me, then, to assist in such a clearance, and I will help you right willingly. But do not ask me to insult him with free education for foodless children.—He asks for “bread,” I dare not offer him “a stone.”

The frequency with which it is urged that the want of education is a chief cause in the fearful amount of crime which, it is an indisputable fact, exists in our country, and the earnest manner in which “Fides,” and those who think with him, entreat those whose opinions are different, to “try to understand that ‘prevention is better than cure,’ by being more eager to build school-houses than gaols,”—warrant me in regarding this as one of their strongest arguments. I propose, now, to examine it.

Is ignorance really the cause of crime? Of much, I admit it is; but that crime invariably proceeds from ignorance, or that ignorance always creates crime, none, I imagine, would be rash enough to assert. This part of the question has been already put by J. M. S. when he asks, “Have we no gentlemen ruffians—no intelligent

criminals—no Mannings, Rushes, and Sloanes?” Was Eugene Aram an ignorant man? or did we require a system of national education for the instruction of such clever criminals as the will forgers? Are there not many crimes from the punishment of which those who commit them escape in consequence of their position in society, which are much more frequent among the educated, than the illiterate classes of society? If ignorance causes the costermonger to regard the marriage ceremony as non-essential, does education prevent the crime of concubinage among the classes that are understood to be better educated? Is it not a notorious fact, that that crime is more than tolerated amongst the upper classes of society? and that its wickedness is softened down by the inoffensive phrases which are used to denominate it? Why, now-a-days, what is a shameful libertine, but “a gay fellow?” Is it education, or the want of it, that thus produces, in the two most opposite classes, precisely similar results? Say, rather, is it not the offspring of causes which no mere education is sufficient to reach and act upon?

Further: if education be necessary to prevent crime, how are we to account for the fact, that so many uneducated persons are such perfect patterns of all that is antagonistic to crime? The fact is, in my opinion, that those who plead for a national system of secular education as a preventive of crime, have entirely mistaken the means to the end. The mere ability to read and write, with a little geography and grammar, and one or two other matters of general knowledge, is all the learning, I believe, they propose to impart in these schools. Now, far be it from me to say one word in disparagement of these. I desire to see a universal knowledge of them as much as any man. But I humbly submit to my opponents, that such knowledge would not entitle a man to be considered an educated man. Why, I have met with many persons in my time—and my experience is not very extended—who have known none of these,—not even been able to read, never had one hour's schooling in their lives, and yet had as keen a sense of what is right or wrong, and were as ready to pursue the right and shun the wrong, as the most

perfectly educated man. The education that will teach a man to distinguish between good and evil—to cleave to the one while he shuns the other,—that will implant in his mind a veneration for the Being who formed him, with a desire to fulfil the mission intended in his creation,—that will teach a man to love his neighbour as himself,—I say, the education that will do this, must, I think, be something very different to what we should obtain by affirming the proposition now under discussion.

Another argument much relied upon by the Governmentists is, that education renders man much more independent, and thus prevents his becoming so easily the dupe of designing men or bad Governments. Experience seems to me to be against this assertion. Those who make use of it also affirm that education in this country is less, and of a worse quality, than in almost any other country. Well, according to this argument, ought we not to be more under the control of Government than those countries that have a national system of education? Is this the case? Is not the very reverse much nearer the fact? Look at Prussia—one of the models of the Governmentists; would Englishmen, having secured the rights which this *educated* people secured in '48, have been bamboozled out of them in so short a time as the Prussians have? Why, it seems to me as plain as that two and two make four, that if Government provide education for the people, it will do anything rather than make them independent of the Government. Look at the number of masters to be appointed; of course, they will all be friends of the powers that be:—very natural. To these men is to be committed the forming of the minds of the rising generation. Can it be expected that they will inculcate any other than an implicit belief in the wisdom and power of that body to whom they have to look for their annual stipend? It would be expecting them to be more than human to do so. It would be contrary to all experience if they did so. And would such instruction have the effect of lessening the power of Government over the people? "Oh, but look at

America!" Well, I am not afraid to do that. I know America is your pet in this question. But how does the matter stand as regards that country? First and foremost, in America there is *no pauperism*. Every man who will, can find work there; and, consequently, can afford, at least six months out of the twelve, to dispense with the services of his children in providing for their own necessities. Secondly, in America, every man has a voice not only in making the laws, but even in electing the chief magistrate. Give England the same advantages as regards these two positions, and then you may cite America as an illustrative case—not till then.

I must own that I am much surprised at this cry for a Governmental education for the people. Have the hitherto independent sons of England become suddenly degenerate, that they seek *such* interference in this matter? Have they no precedents hanging about their necks like a millstone, which ought to scare them from trusting more power in the hands of Government? Who is it that professes to supply the people with the means of religion? And how have they carried out these professions? Were there no other argument on which to rest my opposition against Governmental interference with education, the miserable bungle it has made in providing religious means for the people, to which a majority of the people are either indifferent or entirely opposed, would be quite sufficient to satisfy me as to the propriety of such opposition. Give them the same power as to education, and, depend upon it, the same results would follow. In a few years, we should have a national system of education—as we now have of religion—despised by some, hated by others, indifferent to many; while *all* would have to *pay for it*.

Such are the chief reasons—and the length at which I have given them will, I trust, be pardoned in consideration of the importance of the subject,—which have had the effect of bringing me to the conclusion that Government ought not "to provide a secular education for the people."

London.

S. H. W.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

"Now take a simile in hand,
Compare the mental soil to land.
Shall fields be tilled with annual care,
And minds lie fallow every year ?
Oh ! since the crop depends on you,
Give them the culture which is due ;
Hoe every weed, and dress the soil,
So harvest shall repay your toil.
If human minds resemble trees,
As every moralist agrees,
Prune all the stragglers off your vine,
So shall the purple clusters shine !"

THE question of Education has long engaged the attention of thoughtful minds. While it is thus growing old, it is constantly presenting some new feature. It alike directs our attention to the past, the present, and the future. In the blessings resulting from its *past* influences we are now participating ; and upon the progress of education in the *present*, the *future* is dependent. We need, then, to approach the subject with all due earnestness ; not regarding it as of mere ephemeral interest, but as a subject indissolubly associated with the destinies of a very large proportion of our fellow-creatures.

We have here to consider Education in connection with Government, or, in the terms of our text, to inquire whether Government ought to provide a "secular education for the people." Something of a *duty* is, therefore, implied. It is not whether a Government *may* or *may not* provide a secular education for the people. It is, *should they*, or *are they bound to do so* ? This leads us to look at the duties of Government in relation to the governed, which must be our starting point.

We have no hesitation in expressing our belief, that there exists on the part of Governments a *moral obligation* to adopt measures for securing to the governed the blessings of peace, good order, industry, virtue, and, as far as may be, the other elements of national prosperity. With a view to the attainment of these ends, Government assumes the power of making laws, establishing institutions, decreeing the bounds of justice between communities and individuals, and of ordaining penalties and punishments for such as offend against all or any of its dictates. But if the

means thus employed fail in the attainment of the ends sought, then more *direct* and *efficient* means should be substituted ; for it is not *enough simply to do a thing*—but it should be done "in the best and most workmanlike manner." If, then, we succeed in showing that Education offers the most direct and effective medium for securing good government, and at the same time affords the best security against the abuse of privilege, or rebellious practices on the part of the governed, we shall contend that Governments, one and all, are bound—bound by the strongest ties of moral and political duty—to provide the means for its complete diffusion among the people.

Government, by virtue of that power which we have seen is part of its prerogative, has framed laws for the guidance of the subject ; has established institutions for the amelioration of his social wants ; has made decrees against collected or individual wrongs ; and has ordained penalties consequent upon disobedience to its commands ;—yet but little progress in the right direction has been made. Both people and rulers are unsatisfied with the *present* state of things ; both begin to suspect that the most direct means for the accomplishment of their objects, have not been employed ; and all, therefore, admit that something else must be done before the regeneration of society can be successfully carried out. While not pretending to greater discernment than those around us, we fancy we can discover that Governments have heretofore begun their work at the *wrong end*. They have made laws, and founded institutions, before *teaching the people to understand and appreciate them*. They have devised punishments, but they have not taught obedience. Here is the fatal mistake, so deplorable in its result ! Hence the present social, moral, and intellectual degradation of the masses. Governments, in this particular, have resembled the "five foolish virgins,"—they have provided the lamps, but have omitted the oil,—and the people are in dense darkness ! In a clever book of poems recently published by Mr Bennett,

is one which deals some sharp blows at Governments for their laggard proceedings in respect to the instruction of the people. We quote only the first stanza :—

“ A people dwelt in darkness,
In gloom, and blinding night,
Till some grew tired of candles,
And dared to long for light.
When straight the established lanthorns
Were stirred with hate of day ;
And loud the lawful rushlights
In wrath were heard to say,
Oh ! have you not your lanthorns ?
Your little shining lanthorns ;
What need you of the sunshine ?
What do you want of day ? ”

We cannot lead ourselves to the belief, that whatever may have once been the case, such a “dark” line of policy could now exist, and far less be openly tolerated.

Seeing, then, that the means heretofore employed by Governments have been insufficient to secure the desired end,—and believing, as we do, that the evils lie in the continuance of *popular ignorance*—we shall now endeavour to show that the secret of successful government and of true national greatness, goodness, and prosperity, consists in the *education of the people*.

One poet has told us,

“ ’Tis Education makes a nation great.”

while another has declared that

“ All the pious duties which we owe
Our parents, friends, our country, and our
God—

The seeds of every virtue here below,
From discipline alone, and early culture flow.”

Plato says, “The evils of the world will continue until philosophers become kings, or kings become philosophers.” The mean is too obvious to need comment. But here is a yet more pointed authority :—“All who have meditated on the art of governing mankind have been convinced, *that the fate of empires depends on the education of youth.*”—*Aristotle*. The following remarks all bearing upon the question, rush upon the memory in rapid succession :—“I think we may assert that in a hundred men, there are more than ninety who are what they are—good or bad, useful or pernicious to society—from the instruction they receive.”—*Locke*. “Man is an animal, formidable both from his passions and his reason ;

his passions often urging him to great evils, and his reason furnishing means to achieve them. To train this animal, and make him amenable to order, to inure him to a sense of justice and virtue, to withhold him from ill courses by fear, and encourage him in his duty by hopes ; in short, to fashion and model him for society, hath been the aim of civil and religious institutions ; and in all times, the end and aim of good and wise men. *The aptest method for attaining this end hath been always judged a proper education.*”—*Bishop Berkeley*. “In whatever light we view Education, it cannot fail to appear the most important subject that can engage the attention of mankind.”—*Stewart*. “The mind is a field, in which, so sure as man sows not wheat, so sure will the devil be to sow tares.”—*Bentham*. “There are several ways of reforming man. * * * The most compendious way is a good education : this may be an effectual prevention of evil, whereas all after ways are but remedies.”—*Tillotson*. “If men considered the happiness of others, or their own ; in fewer words, if men were *wise*, no state would be depopulated, no city pillaged, not a village would be laid in ashes, nor a farm deserted.”—*Landor*. “Reason begins to dictate the education of youth.”—*Watts*. “Where Education has been entirely neglected, or improperly managed, we see the worst passions ruling with an uncontrolled and incessant sway.”—*Parr*. “This (Education) would be a method of forming a man who would answer the end of his being, and make himself and others happy.”—*David Williams*. “We should cherish ardour in the pursuit of useful knowledge, and remember that a blighted spring makes a barren year.”—*Dr Johnson*. “All that we have not at our birth, and that we stand in need of at the years of maturity, is Education.”—*Rousseau*. Need we extend our list ; for it is by no means exhausted ? We think not. Nor need we intrude our feeble testimony after such a phalanx of evidence.

We arrive, then, *a priori*, at this conclusion ;—that the great obstacle in the way of national prosperity, happiness, and virtue, is *the ignorance of the people* ; and the only sure and certain antidote rests in their

education. If, then, Government has failed in the accomplishment of its legitimate ends by the adoption of certain means, or, rather, by the non-adoption of any means, while the plan almost universally admitted as most likely to ensure success, lies open and accessible to them,—are they not bound, alike to their country and their kin, to give it, at least, a fair trial before rejecting it as useless, or what is equally bad, passing it by unheeded ? We think so ; and many others have thought and said so before us. “ For if we must construe those duties (the duties of Governments) by the principle of general utility, it is not less incumbent on Governments to forward the diffusion of knowledge, than to protect their subjects from one another by the due administration of justice, or to defend them by military force from the attacks of external enemies.”—*Prof. Austin on Jurisprudence*. Again : “ The Government generally establishes ministers of justice in every part of the dominion. *The first object of these ministers ought to be, to see that every person is well instructed in his duties and in his rights.*”—*Barlow's Advice to the Privileged Orders*. The good and happiness of the members, that is, the majority of the members, of any State, is the great standard by which everything relating to that State must finally be determined.”—*Dr Priestley*. Education is the most direct and certain medium to the promotion of the “ good and happiness ” of a State. The ancients, indeed, seem to have been far more alive to their duty in this respect than the moderns ; for, “ if we may give credence to the records of antiquity, the institutions of one ancient nation, in order to obviate the mischiefs produced by the ignorance or inattention of parents, provided by compulsory laws, for the public education, according to an established system, of all children born within its precincts.”* Let those who live in a country professing even to “ luxuriate ” under the “ tree of knowledge ” take a lesson from this.

Having set forth the grounds upon which we base our belief that it is the duty of Government to educate the people, it will be expected that we should say a few words upon the *secular* limitation implied in our

present inquiry. This is neither the time nor the place for any lengthened declaration of our particular views touching the question of State interference in religious matters. Thus much, however, we may venture to say—Government being a temporal institution, and deriving its authority from a temporal source, should have jurisdiction only over temporal things. For as “ no man can serve two masters,” so no Government can legislate for both temporal and spiritual interests at the same time, and do equal and even-handed justice to each. For temporal “ acts and deeds ” man is amenable to the laws ; but Religion is a matter of conscience : and of conscience God alone is the judge. Therefore, while it is not the province of Government to intermeddle with religious matters, so in this instance it is particularly undesirable that they should do so. Sound *moral* instruction seldom fails to lead to a conviction of the importance of religious truths ; and these being *voluntarily* applied, according to the dictates of each individual mind, will be likely to become lasting and effective. But accompany religious teaching with even the merest show of sect, exclusiveness, or party, (and in a State having a Church under its immediate protection, some or one of these will assuredly be manifested,) then its genuineness becomes doubted, its worldly bearing suspected, and the charm and beauty which attaches to religion, when sought after for its own sake, is dissolved and gone. Let Education, whenever and wherever attempted, be confined to its legitimate province—the cultivation and expansion of the intellectual powers ; not to fetter the opinions, or bind or restrict the conscience, or narrow or limit the sphere of man's independent judgment or action. In support of our views as expressed on this last division of our subject, let us quote the “ golden opinions ” of several who were members of the Established church. “ *Parliament should have none other than civil functions.* The church of Christ should be legislated for by none but its own members.”—*Archbishop Whateley*. “ *No civil power or legislation can be admitted into Christ's kingdom without making it a worldly kingdom.*”—*Bishop Warburton*. “ Nothing can be more clear and certain, than that as

* Shepherd and Joyce's Systematic Education.

Religion has *God* only for its author, so it is properly *his* care and concern only.”—*Rev. Dr Ibbott*. “Whenever temporal advantages are annexed to any religious profession, they will be sure to call in those who have no religion at all. Knaves will embrace it for the sake of interest; fools will follow them for the sake of fashion.”—*Soame Jenyns*. And to give one modern authority—the Marquis of Lansdowne, on the question of the exclusion of Jews from Parliament, in 1848, thus spoke:—“I have said the Christian religion has made its conquest, *not by any exclusions, not by forcible means, not by acts of Parliament*, but by the conviction that it was Divine—by the exhibition of its virtues—by the lessons it taught to mankind—and by the gentle and insinuating influence it exercised on all who came within its reach.”

We have but little more to say upon the subject. It has often struck us as strange—passing strange—that one of the most important elements to civilization—the education of the people—should be left to casualty and chance; while matters of far less import have, night after night, and year after year, occupied the grave senators of St Stephen’s. But we ever look to the future, and there place our hope, believing that Time, the great leveller, will level all the obstacles which have heretofore impeded our educational progress. Then a brighter and a happier day will dawn—

“And man, at whose creation God rejoiced,
No more in darkness of the spirit dwell;
But with a bright, recovered soul appear.”

C. W., jun.

Social Economy, &c.

IS IT MORE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL TO SUBSIST ON A PURELY VEGETARIAN DIET, THAN ON ONE OF FLESH AND VEGETABLES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

IN offering a few remarks in reply to “Anti-Vegetarian,” we would first thank him heartily for ranking the Vegetarian Society “among the associations of individuals which have the amelioration of mankind at heart.” It is quite evident, that although we may differ from our opponent in some of the views which he has expressed, he does not differ, in purpose at any rate, from what he so charitably describes as the object of the Vegetarian Society. When individuals have one purpose in view, a little difference as to the mode of accomplishing it sometimes only enlivens the pursuit by a little harmless rivalry, and argument, which tend to bring into greater exercise those intellectual and moral powers which carry us onward to success. “Anti-Vegetarian” is mistaken in supposing that the Vegetarian Society wishes to persuade men to subsist on a “regimen consisting entirely of vege-

tables,” and we beg to refer to the “British Controversialist,” page 266, in refutation of this assertion; as it is there shown that the Vegetarian bill of fare, as promulgated by the Vegetarian Society, is very extensive, and admits of all the varieties of food which the most fanciful appetite can reasonably desire; and that the taste for animal substances even, may be gratified (when not involving slaughter) without violating the principles of the Vegetarian society.

The assertion that the principles upon which the Vegetarians base their arguments are false, may arise from not sufficiently understanding those principles, rather than from any well-founded conviction. Instead of examining these principles, “Anti-Vegetarian” goes to the *letter* of Scripture. “The *letter* killeth, but the *spirit* giveth life.” We would, therefore, commend the spirit, rather than the letter, of the Holy

Scriptures; and if we consult that, and examine the general tendency of the Word of God, we shall find that the whole purpose and aim of, as well as the means employed by, the Vegetarians, are not only in harmony with that spirit, but that the great facts recorded, the appointments made, and the prophecies pronounced, are all in perfect consonance with the principles and practices advocated by the Vegetarian society, notwithstanding that some literal expressions alluded to by "Anti-Vegetarian" are capable of being construed into an opposite meaning.

Perhaps there is nothing bad amongst mankind of which an example cannot be found in the records of Scripture; and if we take the literal expression, we shall find it easy to adduce Scripture as sanctioning war, the putting away of wives, as well as numerous nameable and unnameable vices. It certainly, then, can be no proof that Vegetarianism is wrong because the evil which it opposes finds sanction in Scripture history. Few, we believe, in the present age, will attempt to advocate war, polygamy, and debauchery, because these are thus sanctioned; and no one will in the present enlightened state of the world, attempt to cast reflections on the Peace movement, and the Temperance movement, because the vices which they oppose are sanctioned by some literal Scripture records. Why then should the Vegetarian movement be subject to this charge of being anti-Scriptural? Simply, we believe, for the same reasons that these movements have had such opposition to encounter,—because the arguments on which these movements can be advocated, are based on those unalterable principles of human and divine nature, which cannot be overthrown by physical reasoning, or by taking the *spirit* of the Word of God as a guide; and therefore the opponents of these movements resort to texts which, when isolated from the body of the work, appear to sanction those practices which an enlightened reason and spiritual religion alike condemn.

The first and principal text mentioned by "Anti-Vegetarian" is an instance of this kind. If we read the whole account, we shall see that the vision of Peter was intended to refer to *man*, and not to *beasts*; for Peter, after thinking of the vision, came

to the conclusion recorded in Acts x. 28, "And he said unto them, Ye know that it is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company or come unto one of another nation; but *God hath showed me that I should not call any MAN common or unclean*;" and again, in verses 34 and 35 of the same chapter: "Then Peter opened his mouth, and said, Of a truth, I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation, he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." Is it not, we would ask, far more consistent with the spirit and purpose of the Word of God to believe that this vision is intended to teach a principle of Christian charity, as it was interpreted by Peter, than that it was intended to teach Peter to "kill and eat" animals? It is true, a carnal mind, that loves to indulge in the appetites of the flesh, would very readily interpret the vision in this way; but we confess ourselves somewhat astonished that an intelligent writer in the "British Controversialist" should, for want of a more careful perusal of the whole chapter, attach such a sensual and merciless meaning to a passage which so eloquently and beautifully teaches one of the sublimest Christian principles which it is our privilege, as recipients of Gospel truth, to practise and to enjoy. We only ask for "the spirit of the dream" to be imbibed, as Peter evidently imbibed it, and we are quite sure that "Anti-Vegetarian" himself will accept this as the true and legitimate interpretation of "Peter's vision." We do not wonder at "Anti-Vegetarian's" reluctance at taking up his pen to censure and condemn the system, especially when he has to give a carnal, and, to some minds, a gross interpretation of what is so manifestly intended to teach the high spiritual truth that all men are equal in the sight of God. We feel no sympathy with one who has thus to lower the purpose of Scripture to suit his subject, instead of exalting that purpose as worthy of the acceptance of every philosophic mind. We believe this carnalizing of Scripture does, unintentionally, very much to impede the progress of scriptural truth in the world, especially among well-meaning, but partially-enlightened, men. And we should hesitate a long while before we could dare to use the Word of

God in support of the mere gratification of any corporeal appetite whatever. What can be more conclusive than that Peter's vision was intended thus to inspire the apostle with faith enough to affect the Gentiles as well as the Jews—the "clean, as well as the unclean,"—than the results which followed.—See Acts x. 44—48.

We do not wish, however, to press our own view, to the exclusion of that of others. Whilst we claim the right to see this subject according to what appears to us to be the light of truth, we would not deny to our fellow-men the same right; and it is perfectly natural, and consistent with our own views of human nature, as explained in the "Controversialist," pages 227, 228, for a man, in a certain state of moral sensibility, or insensibility, (to whom, as Eliza Cook says, "the butcher's boy is an Atlas, bearing heaven upon his shoulders,") to view the text in question as relating to the slaughter and demolition of animals; but it would be well for all intelligent thinkers on this subject to follow out the idea to its legitimate meaning. We would be understood to be speaking of the *idea* attached to the narrative of Peter's vision, and not of the narrative itself. Suppose, for instance, we imagine Peter understanding the vision in the sense attached to it by "Anti-Vegetarian," he would, of course, wish to obey the Divine injunction, to "arise, kill, and eat," *literally*. He could not do this in relation to the animals which appeared in the sheet, for these were taken up to heaven. The only way, then, in which Peter could literally obey this injunction would be to go to some Jewish or heathenish butcher, and ask for instruction in the art of slaughtering animals. Think with what apostolic sanctity Peter would assume the butcher's garb, take the fatal axe, and aim a blow at the unoffending animal! With what tenderness would he endeavour to obey the instructions of the practised butcher—(unless, indeed, he could learn to kill by inspiration)—in order that he might kill mercifully! What a true disciple of the lamblike Jesus, would he appear, with his limbs besmeared with blood, the steel hanging in his belt, and the knife between his teeth! What pious feelings must it awaken in the heart of the apostle to join the company of those

who delight in slaughter, especially if they were similar to those who fill Leadenhall and Smithfield with their profane language and fiendish menaces! Surely it would tend to give Peter an exalted idea of the Divine teachings with which he was blessed! If this philosophy be true, that it is religious to "kill and eat," there is not, after all, so much anomaly in placing Leadenhall in such close proximity to St Paul's. If this be the true interpretation, this "butcher's temple" might as well have been dedicated to St Peter, and it would have stood well beside the venerable pile dedicated to the other apostle!

Again: even suppose St Peter to have only gone so far as to eat, and to pay some one else to kill, as Christians do in the present day, he is to refuse neither the "clean nor the unclean." "All animals, and four-footed beasts of the earth, and wild beasts, and creeping things," cats and dogs, and other animals, are all "good creatures of God," and are not to be refused. Now, why, we would ask, do not those who assume these texts of Scripture in their literal sense as their rules of conduct, carry them out in the same sense which they seem so desirous of impressing upon others? The reason is this;—they do not eat unclean animals because their flesh *being made of other flesh*, is not so pure as that made from *vegetable food*. In China and Italy the people eat cats; but then they take care to feed them on vegetable food, in order that their flesh may be pure. This fact alone might be sufficient to convince us that the mixed diet is less beneficial than the pure diet. Surely human flesh should be as pure as that of any other creature; and why should man feed on substances which will form blood and flesh of an inferior quality to the blood and flesh of the lower animals? And yet this must be the case, if the objection to eat these animals, which is maintained by flesh-eaters themselves, be valid,—and that it is so, is proved by the fact, that the corpse of a carnivorous animal becomes offensive much sooner than that of an herbivorous one—as is proved by the instance of the cat and the sheep. Blood made from vegetable food will resist the action of oxygen many days longer than that made from flesh. Thus,

then, to carry out the views and opinions expressed and practised by the advocates of a mixed diet, would be, we should think, to convince them, more than anything else, of their mistake.

No, we cannot endure the thought, that Peter could either preach or practice butchery! The very idea of it was evidently opposed to his feelings when the first intimation of it was given; for he said, "Not so, Lord; for I have never eaten anything that is common or unclean."—Acts x. 14. But why is it that our feelings revolt at the idea of Peter becoming a butcher? Is there anything repulsive in the apostles plucking the ears of corn, although on the Sabbath-day? Surely there is a moral in the difference between the two acts! Both are preparatory to the taking of food, and yet how different are the sensations produced by even the *thoughts* of the one and of the other.

We will refer to the other passages quoted by "Anti-Vegetarian" in a future

paper, and conclude the present by thanking our Manchester friend for the opportunity which a statement of his objections affords for replying to them, and thus of eliciting more information on what he candidly acknowledges to be an "important question." It is a question which we have good reason to believe will be regarded as still more important by the world as it grows in capacity to appreciate those principles of life which were propounded to man by the Creator before the fall, in a verse which is to be found at the present time exhibited at the great gathering of the nations, in no less than sixteen different languages, "Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat."—Genesis i. 29. Let it never be said, then, that man, in his departure from primitive laws, can invent a better system than what God appointed for his guidance.

H. S. C.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

THE subject of Vegetarianism, as propounded in modern times, is one which only a portion of mankind, and that by far the smaller, have deemed worthy of serious entertainment. It has, consequently, kept company with a host of others, whose fate it has been to spend a sort of pilgrimage existence, having no settled location, nor hope of rest, till error be overthrown and *they* be triumphant. In this fellowship, Vegetarianism has received its share of the world's mockery. The sapient multitude—by whom nonconformity is held a sure mark of folly—have caged this, one of the choicer specimens of the Utopian family; and to lose no amusement it might be made capable of affording, have spared neither jest nor gibe which could add effect to the ludicrous; while many a man above the common crowd, and ashamed of its uncivil treatment, has scrupled not to be equally unfriendly, passing by, Levite-like, on the other side, and straining a scowl, to escape suspicion of sympathy.

Vegetarianism, however, outlives both derision and indifference, awaiting the re-

formation of men and manners, and in the mean time deserves better of the lovers of fair play than this. It claims to have for its origin the great Originator of all things, and therefore bespeaks our respectful attention. Its institution is coeval with man. Hence it brings to his notice all the claims which age can give it. Moreover, the wise and good have been its disciples, and it becomes not us irreverently to deride their doctrine. But by no means does it follow that because we must not deride we must therefore adopt. The wise and good may have been mistaken, antiquity may betray our confidence, while He who appointed, may have succeeded his first appointment by another more comprehensive, and adapted to general application. That what we have here viewed as possibilities, constitutes the true view of the case, we shall now endeavour to establish.

We may admit at the outset that we are one with the friends of Vegetarianism on every thing but the *main point*. We are equally sensible of the dire havoc which the consumption of flesh inflicts among the

brute creation. Our hearts beat unitedly in detestation of Smithfield abominations; and as a matter of refined feeling, a distorted creature upon the spit would be to ourselves, as to them, an object of the deepest disgust, compared with the same browsing in the mead, or cleaving the corn crops with its golden plumage; though in our case, our exalted preference for the latter would be identical with that which would lead us to choose a world without suffering, immortal fruits, and fadeless flowers; in fact, that paradisiacal perfection which for divers good reasons is supposed to be unattainable in the present state.

The ordinance of the Deity in reference to the eating of flesh is so unmistakable, that it becomes a question whether those Vegetarians who believe the God of the Bible and the Creator of all things to be one and the same being, have not fallen into the grave error of supporting a theory which supposes him to have willed an inconsistency. It supposes that the physical regulations under which He has placed his creatures are unsuited to their physical nature; that, in the present case, at all events, where we should least expect it, God's rule of adaptation had been laid aside. It is the essence of Vegetarianism to assert not merely the equal utility, or the vast superiority, of a diet exclusively vegetable; it passes on to the bold assertion that this diet is alone the proper food of man; and it follows, that if the Bible be acknowledged to be the record of the Divine Will, either its Author has been inconsistent with himself, or the Vegetarian has made a mistake. To say that the language addressed to Noah is solely of a permissive nature, and that the Deity, condescending to the weaknesses and unnatural propensities of mankind, allowed an animal diet, is, we conceive, neither a truth, nor a discharge from the difficulty. It cannot release from the difficulty, inasmuch as it still leaves God consenting without remonstrance, without pointing to his own wiser rule,—*consenting* that man should exist in a state for which He had not designed him. Now though it is an undoubted fact that He does permit evil in the world, He cannot be said to consent to it, but in this imagined evil of the Vegetarian, his acquiescence is

indisputable. "If every living thing that moveth shall be meat for you, even as the green herb" implies no more than permission, then the corresponding language addressed to Adam in reference to "herb and tree" is merely permissive, which is absurd, and as the latter was clearly a regulation adapted to man in the particular circumstances in which he was then placed, so is the former a regulation alike adapted to circumstances of a position which he was afterwards called to occupy. If this doctrine of permission were true, how many points would it involve, disparaging to the Almighty, and mischievous to his creatures;—considerations we have no space to enter upon. We see nothing analogous to it in God's dealings with men. He granted a king to a murmuring people, but in granting he violated not his laws, else was he the "author of sin;" as he sanctions no infringement of his moral laws, so does he establish none to the prejudice of his physical requirements. God, thus acquiescing in the violation of his own arrangements, might authorize the gluttonous man to indulge his gluttony, the slothful his slumbers, the sensual his gratification. There was no need that plagues should in ancient times have followed disobedience of the organic laws, nor fever and malaria at the present, for God might have accommodated, and might still adapt his laws to the excesses of his erring creatures. Are our Vegetarian friends who believe in Revelation prepared to subscribe to this? If not, then we humbly submit they must forego the doctrine which involves so much that is objectionable, and remain in friendship with a principle which, demanding for itself exclusive obedience, virtually impugns the wisdom of the Supreme Being.

Attempts are sometimes made to draw a comparison between abstinence from flesh, and abstinence from intoxicating liquors. It is said they are of kindred principles, and stand or fall together. Against this coupling of things that differ, the writer, as a pledged teetotaller, sincerely protests. The more surprising is it that it should be attempted by Vegetarians, because it may be asked of them,—If God has permitted the use of meats in compliance with the unhallowed desires of man, how is it there

is not a like permission to the use of intoxicating drinks? Does not the absence of permission in the one case, which the Vegetarian teetotaler will be the first to allow, lead to, at least, a strong presumption that a Divine license would not be granted in the other, if a sufficient difference between them did not exist? Beside, that they differ is shewn by experience. Their use is not attended with equal danger, nor is abstinence from both alike advantageous. There are, therefore, no grounds of identity between them.

We are aware that the foregoing remarks are not strictly embraced in the inquiry, whether a vegetable be more reasonable and beneficial than a mixed diet? This we shall presently reply to. But they are fairly a part of the Vegetarian controversy, made such by the constant use of the Bible in defence of Vegetarian practice, and this being the case, we trust there will be no objection to their introduction.

Whether a diet solely Vegetable be more reasonable and more beneficial than another, in the sense in which the inquiry is meant, would, at first seem to belong to the anatomist and physiologist to determine. We should have supposed that in investigating man's position in the order of Creation,—in ascertaining the relationship in which his organization stands to that of the animals who feed with him from the same wide banqueting table,—in comparing his internal structure with theirs, and in submitting every part of it, connected with the assimilation of food, to the most scientific scrutiny, they would be able to give us the benefit of their researches with such definiteness, and with so little of disagreement among themselves, that we could not but consent to abide by their decision. But we find them so much at variance in the inferences they draw upon this subject, that, although one party, following their example, will sometimes trace in a man's masticatory apparatus the true sign of the Carnivora, while the other party will trace as clear an evidence of the herbivora, we believe that each feels that a satisfactory reply must be arrived at by other means. Our friend H. S. C. has attempted a solution on the theory of human progression. He has founded thereon a classification, we

respectfully acknowledge, more amusing than convincing. Because in the natural scale of being, gradations not the most flattering to our species may sometimes appear,—because nature has been so spiteful as to subjoin man to a certain relationship between himself and the monkey, it follows not that we may generalize, at pleasure, on "progressive" principles, subdivide into Cannibalism, Animalism, and Vegetarianism; Animalism proximo to Cannibalism, and our superior selves, forsooth in advance,—any more than we may be allowed to graduate Vegetarian into Visionary, and be at a loss for a higher development! In the first place, to be more reasonable, a Vegetable diet must be shewn to be practicable, and where impracticable, it can have no claim to reasonableness. The facetious "Harold" has already pointed out the unproductive nature of the icebergs, and unless the Arctic Animalists can be made a migratory race, we hardly see their ability to exchange their favourite fat and blubber for

"The living herb profusely wild."

Being, then, unable to conform to the Vegetarian practice, they may be dismissed from our notice, and we are left to inquire, whether a Vegetable diet be more reasonable and beneficial to the other inhabitants of the globe, that is to say, those who live where Vegetables sufficient and suitable for human food are to be found. Here God's rule of adaptation must have its place. Poets and Pythagorean philosophers must stand in abeyance. The incorporeal golden age, which the soul longs for, is not the sphere of the body. *It* is spiritual, not physical, so is its food, and the connection between them. Whether one description of diet be more favourable to the development of our spiritual nature, or not, is not the question; but, which is intended for the sustenance of our bodies? From the general harmony of creation, we might infer harmony here; and what do we find? Man naturally omnivorous—capable of subsisting on all kinds of food; his nature, however, largely accomodating itself to circumstances. How do his organization and position harmonize? Temperate regions exist, and in these, his omnivorous charac-

ter has its due indulgence in the variety of food, animal and vegetable, which everywhere abounds. In colder latitudes where farinaceous food cannot come to maturity, but where animal food may be obtained; and in warmer climates, luxuriant in wholesome vegetables;—in each of them his nature exerts its power of accomodation, and even insists upon conformity to the constitution of things. The voyager northward leaves with his native land his relish for his accustomed food, and obeys the cravings of his appetite, which needs a diet of more stimulating qualities; while he who journeys in an opposite direction, abandons, partially, or wholly, the use of flesh,—both feeling that the inward promptings of nature do but move themselves in accordance with outward circumstances. Thus, then, we have a system, natural, and consequently, harmonious in all its parts,—a system exhibiting as much the principle of adaptation as does man's relationship to the law of gravitation. Vegetarianism, in its proper sphere, is obedience, and therefore most reasonable and beneficial; "animalism," too, is obedience, and in Nature's order is most reasonable and beneficial. The same is true of intermediate life. It is not required that we point out on a globe certain latitudes, and say "Here, and here alone, is the province of Vegetarianism, etc." Where either is the consistent practice, is partly determined by the age of the subject, habits of life, variations of climate, and season of the year. Yet all these are a portion of the system of which we speak, and their influence does but prove its truth. The fact that Vegetarians exist in a state of health and satisfaction to themselves, in regions whose inhabitants subsist principally on a mixed diet, militates not against our position. They are enabled to form an exception by the accomodable power of their nature, which, to a great extent may obey

will, or habit, with impunity. Thousands of beings at the present moment, pass years of health and comfort in sedentary occupation, as foreign to the purpose of their physical organization, as is the captivity of the caged songster to its organization; yet, who ventures to deduce from this, an argument unfavourable to the natural existence of any man in a freer condition, and a purer atmosphere? It will be seen, then, that we do not condemn Vegetarianism, but we confine it to its place. We allow it to be a part of the system which Infinite Wisdom has instituted in the world, but we would have it held only as that part which experience proves it to be; and thus holding it, by no means necessitates an admission of *cannibalism* as another part. And here our Vegetarian friends will allow us to repudiate all those awful results which they attribute to the use of flesh. Unfortunately, men are lustful, sanguinary, warlike; but if this be a consequence of partaking of flesh, surely a change of disposition would be deemed an evidence of change of diet, and how comes it to pass, then, that in the English character (for example) there has been for some years back an increasing hatred to war and desire for peace? Is it that the English have become Vegetarians? We suspect not.

Pioneers of peace, progress, and primeval innocence! we, your bretheren in God's creation, honour your intelligence, as we do your motives; we admire your self-denial, credit your disinterestedness, and cheerfully assign you a chief position among elevated humanity; but do not, we beseech you, assume to yourselves the prerogative of being the sole enlighteners and instructors of your fellow-creatures; lest we deem your exclusiveness to be unworthy illiberality, and regret that your intelligence is dimmed by your indifference to that of others.

B. W. P.

In the midst of our errors how frequently does it occur that we are correct; and when we are, how refreshing is the conviction! how pleasurable—how beautiful are the feelings of which that conviction is the germ! It is true—too true—that, by virtue of some inscrutable perversion of judgment, we often delude ourselves into the belief that we are right when we are wrong.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. XIII.

65. *Complaining* is the expression of uneasiness or pain, grief, reprehension, and accusation. It therefore embraces a wide field of passion, having a diatonic from Peevishness, to the loud and furious invectives of the incensed soul. The outward gestures will, therefore, vary in proportion as the inward excitement is less or greater. Generally, however, the following series of external signs exhibit themselves:—the countenance is distorted, the body contracted, the head bent towards the breast, the upper lip is drawn together, the mouth is open, the teeth chatter or are gnashed, the eyes open and close alternately, as if now wasted and out-worn, and again brightened by a ray of hope; the voice is unequal, tremulous, and broken. When the feeling is violently manifested, it becomes paroxysmal; the hands are clenched, the arms fiercely thrown out, the voice fitful, screaming, and strained, sometimes ending in a swoon, or in death. We may mention the following as well-known examples:—Henry IV.'s Soliloquy on Sleep, Clara Vere de Vere, Dame Quickly on Falstaff's Debt, Desdemona's Assertion of her Innocence, Hermione's reply to her husband, Leontes, &c. Other instances abound in "Venice Preserved," "Douglas," "Virginius," "Rienzi," &c. We beg to subjoin the following as illustrations:—

"Have I not—

Hear me, my mother Earth, behold it Heaven—
Have I not had to wrestle with my lot?
Have I not suffered things to be forgiven?
Have I not had my brain seared, and heart riven,
Hopes sapped, name blighted, life's life lied away
And only not to desperation driven,
Because not altogether of such clay
As rots into the soul of those whom I survey.
From mighty wrongs to petty perfidy
Have I not seen what human *things* could do?
From the loud roar of foaming calumny
To the small whisper of the paltry few,
And subtler venom of the reptile crew,
The Janus glance of whose significant eye,
Learning to lie with silence, would *seem* true,
And without utterance, save the shrug or sigh,
Deals round to happy fools its speechless obloquy."

Byron's "Childe Harold."

Isolda.—

"First, hear me this:—

I need not recapitulate the wrong
Done to an orphan ward by her own guardians,
Who tore her heart from love, and gave her hand
To hateful avarice;—
In which base wrong, Lord Abbot, you had share:—
Aye! though my father died the cross to rescue—
That sacred cross to which I flew for succour;—

But you, its keeper, broke your trust to Heaven,
 And gave the bird forth from your bosom's shelter,
 To the pursuing Kestrel. Worse than he!
 You clenched his grasp with mockery of marriage—
 A robbery and wrong done to a virgin
 The greatest, foulest,—violating ties
 Most dear to heaven—the faith of crowns and altars!
 You bound me to a tyrant, whose oppressions
 Increased my just aversion to that height,
 That him to see or hear was horror to me.
 Oh eyes, be blind!—But what will close the sight
 Of Memory that ever backward gazes?
 Was it a crime that I, thus circumstanced,
 Did not repel the soothing sympathy
 Of one kind friend—the first I long had known?
 For she, his sister, was a griffin-guard,
 And his more fearful mother—something nameless.
 Yet this, *this* gratitude!—for 'twas not *Love*—
 Is all the guilt that guilt itself can charge.
 But him—*him*, I accuse—Yes, *thou*, vile ruffian!
 Of wrongs redeemless as the time o'er past—
 My desecrated youth, and blighted feelings,
 Fond trust betrayed—years minuted with groans—
 Sleep that doth mutter wakefulness with woe—
 Tear-blinded eyes, and heart so heavy-laden,—
 So water-logged with sorrow's welling brine,
 It sinks beneath the wave it once o'ermounted.
 And must foul slander rankle every wound?
 How shall I bear?—Oh, give me patience heaven!
 Look here, and let these witness'd proofs speak for me—
 Pale cheeks, sunk eyes, and blanching hair:—See here:
 Aye, let my sufferings testify *his* guilt."

—Watkins's "*Isolda*."

66. *Fatigue* may result either from severe bodily labour, or extreme mental exhaustion, and is externally expressed by a general air of languor, lassitude, and debility. The shoulders droop, the arms dangle enfeebledly, the legs are moved with great difficulty, as if a weight were attached to them—the eyes are dull, heavy, and half shut—the mouth hangs open, and is stretched in frequent yawns—the features are expressionless and dejected—the voice is weak, drawling, and inarticulate—and the whole frame seems as if ready to sink under the burden of its own weight. Our readers who have seen "Wandering Steenie," in the "Rose of Ettrick Vale," will know what we mean by our attempted description. Others, perhaps, may possess a practical acquaintance with the feeling.

67. *Aversion* is the expression of Hatred and Fear,—which see.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Bolton Albert Improvement Club.—Under this designation a number of young men have formed a society for mutual intercourse and mental improvement. They have obtained a suitable

room for their meetings on Thursday evenings, and have even gone so far as to publish a monthly "Register."

Islington Youths' Mutual Improvement Association.—The third annual meeting of this society was held on Friday evening, June 20, in the School room, Barnsbury Street. The Rev. Wm Owen presided. The Report (which was read by the Secretary) showed an advance during the past year, which was very pleasing, and explained that the object of the Society was the promotion of the religious, moral, and intellectual improvement of its members; and the means which were employed to accomplish this object were—the discussion of religious, moral, and literary subjects; the composition and delivery of essays and lectures; extemporaneous speaking; the circulation of a select library; with contributions to a manuscript magazine.

Mr J. Carvell Williams moved the first resolution, which Mr J. Passmore Edwards seconded—viz., “That it is the opinion of this meeting, that the condition of youths generally is such as to call for some stimulus to the better employment of their leisure time; and that Youths' Mutual Improvement Associations are valuable helps towards accomplishing this object.”

Rev. B. S. Hollis proposed, and Mr Samuel Kinns seconded, the following resolution:—“That this meeting sees with pleasure that such a Society exists in this neighbourhood as the Islington Youths' Mutual Improvement Association, and pledges itself to help it forward by every means in its power.” Both these resolutions were carried unanimously.

The Society meets every Friday evening, at the Class room, Barnsbury School, Barnsbury Street, Islington, at half-past seven, when every information respecting it may be obtained. On the third Friday in every month, a lecture is delivered by one of the members, which is open to all who may wish to attend. Youths especially are welcomed.

Nottingham.—The second annual tea meeting of the Castle Gate Young Men's Mutual Improvement Society was held in the Hound's Gate School room, on Whit Tuesday, June 10, 1851. Upwards of sixty persons sat down to tea, after which R. Preston, Esq., took the chair. The Report, read by Mr W. E. Underwood, the Secretary, stated that during the past year thirty-three essays had been read by the members, chiefly upon controversial subjects. A great desire for knowledge upon such subjects is manifested by the members. The Society is in a generally prosperous condition. His Worshipful the Mayor, W. Felkin, Esq., was present, and gave an instructive address upon the cultivation of right principles. Several members of the Society gave interesting addresses. The number of members in the Society is twenty-two—double the number it was last year.

Glasgow Young Men's Literary Improvement Society.—The third half-yearly meeting of this Society was recently held in Lennox's Temperance Coffee House. Mr Robert Paton in the chair. After a substantial tea, the meeting was addressed by the following members:—Mr Duncan M. West, on the “Benefits to be derived from Mutual Improvement Societies;” Mr James

Ewing, on the “Literature of Labour;” Mr Donald Mills, on the “Progress of Civilization and Science.” Various others of the members contributed to the enjoyment of the evening by songs and recitations; and the meeting broke up at a seasonable hour, after spending a very harmonious evening. This Society was established in November, 1840, and the first year was principally occupied with debates on important questions. At the second half-yearly meeting it was proposed by one of the members that the proceedings should be conducted in the following order:—viz., the first and third Fridays in each month to be occupied with debates; the second Friday to be a conversation on a scientific or other subject; and the fourth to be devoted to the reading of an essay, or the study of Elocution. This plan was adopted, and has succeeded admirably. We have had conversations on the following sciences:—Geology, Electricity, Chemistry, and Astronomy, introduced by an essay read by one of the members. A few of the debates are as follow:—“Ought the working men of Britain to subscribe for a penny monument to Sir Robert Peel?” “Want or Luxury—which produces the most crime?” “Is Universal Suffrage just or desirable?” “Is the taking of intoxicating liquors as a beverage consistent with the character of a moral reformer?” A number of the members are subscribers to your valuable magazine, and from it have derived much benefit.—D. M. W.

Newport (Salop) Young Men's Association for Mutual Improvement.—The second social meeting of this Society was held in the Wellington Road School room, June 4, at the close of its second session; the Rev. W. B. Leach, the President, with whom the association originated, occupying the chair. After tea, at which 130 persons sat down, addresses were delivered by the President and nine of the members, with pleasing effect, who were warmly greeted by the repeated cheers of the delighted auditory. Two anthems were sung in superior style, and all parties appeared happy. During the session, essays have been delivered by twelve of the members, on the following subjects, each person being at liberty to select his own topic, of which he gives notice at the previous meeting:—1, The history of the art of printing, which was illustrated by a case of metal types and a small printing press, both of which were put in requisition by the essayist, who composed and printed during his definition a list of the members' names; 2, The art of paper making; 3, Book-binding, by an interesting representation of the process; 4, The Solar system; 5, The rise, progress, and advantages of the Woollen Manufacture; 6, The growth, qualities, variety, and benefits of Timber; 7, The production, preparation, and various uses of Iron; 8, The science of Music; 9, Advantages of useful knowledge; 10, The formation and benefits of snow; 11, The importance of order and punctuality; 12, Geographical sketch of England and Wales. The meetings are held fortnightly—are commenced with singing and a short prayer; and any young man of good moral character is at liberty to join them as a member.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

60. Having observed in your really valuable publication many exceedingly good "answers to questions," I should feel greatly obliged if you could inform me how I shall obtain such a knowledge of the nature of Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes, Letters of Credit, &c., and of the laws and regulations affecting them, as is necessary for a merchant's clerk.

61. H. W. N. thanks A. C. for his excellent suggestions on early rising, which he is now practising, and solicits the advice of some musical friend under the following circumstances:—I enjoy good music exceedingly, but I have not what is termed an ear for music,—as I can seldom recognize a tune played on an instrument unaccompanied with the words. The only redeeming qualification which I possess is, that joining in singing, I can generally keep in time and tune. Can any prospect of efficiency be held out to such a one in learning to play the piano-forte?

62. I should feel much obliged if one of your numerous correspondents would kindly inform me of the best work on the subject of Monastic Institutions, giving a consecutive view of their rise, progress, and gradual decline throughout Christendom. Southey died, leaving his design uncompleted, and I am aware of no volume in which anything like a systematic history has been attempted.—T. D. M.

63. You will oblige me by giving the names of the principal writers who advocate the view, that "Beauty is inherent in objects," as the gentlemen who defend that opinion in your journal do not quote any.—R. J.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

37. Phrenotypics.—

"Sounds which address the ear are lost, and die in one short hour; but that which strikes the eye, Lives long upon the mind; the faithful sight Engraves the image with a beam of light."

—Watts.

THE system of Phrenotypics which we are about to develop, is based upon the principle expressed in these lines. The eye is one of the principal avenues to the mind: knowledge is most readily obtained through it; and when thus obtained, is longest remembered. The eye may be used in education much more than it has been: it may be trained to observe different positions, and with these may be associated different facts. We all know the advantage of imaginary lines on the globe in assisting us to remember the locality of places; and the question has suggested itself, why not apply this principle to historical subjects? This has been done by drawing imaginary lines across a room, so as to divide it into a number of different compartments, and then locating what we wish to re-

member in these compartments. It is usual for this purpose to divide the floor, walls, and ceiling, each into nine compartments, and each compartment to be numbered as follows:—

Ground Floor.

1	4	7
2	5	8
3	6	9

Front Wall.

11	14	17
12	15	18
13	16	19

Right hand Wall.

21	24	27
22	25	28
23	26	29

Back Wall.

31	34	37
32	35	38
33	36	39

Left hand Wall.

41	44	47
42	45	48
43	46	49

Ceiling.

10		20
	50	
40		30

When the divisions of the room, and the number of each, have become quite familiar to the student, the next thing to be done will be to place in each division that which we desire to remember. This may be done at the commencement, by looking at the first division, and placing in it an imaginary picture of the event we wish to remember, or in imagination placing a word in it, and then several times pronouncing that word in a firm and distinct manner.

Let the student thus practice on the ground floor with the following:—The colours of the rainbow—viz., 1, Violet; 2, Indigo; 3, Blue; 4, Green; 5, Yellow; 6, Orange; 7, Red. The Mechanical Powers—viz., 1, the Lever; 2, the Wheel; 3, the Pulley; 4, the Inclined Plane; 5, the Wedge; 6, the Screw. The Plagues of Egypt—viz., 1, Water turned into Blood; 2, Frogs; 3, Lice; 4, Flies; 5, Murrain of Cattle; 6, Boils and Blains; 7, Hailstones; 8, Locusts; 9, Darkness; 10, Death of the First-born. Let these be properly associated with the different parts of the room to which they have been assigned, and they will be remembered with ease, and any one can be given when asked for. This plan may be applied to universal history, and each square taken for a century; but this branch of the subject we must not take up till next month.—A. C.

48. *Common Measure.*—As the present paper is not designed merely for the private use of S. S., but is intended for any who may require, it, may not be irrelevant in the first place to explain one or two terms that will be used.

The term measure, for instance, does not signify a rule, or a tape which is divided into inches; but a number which is contained an exact number of times in another number—6, for example, is the measure of 12, 18, 24, &c., as it is contained an exact number of times in those numbers. A common measure is a number which measures two or more other numbers in common, not as taken together, but taken separately—e.g., as 6 measures 12, 18, and 24 respectively, it may be said to be the common measure of these numbers.

A number which is measured by any other number is said to be the multiple of that number—e.g., 12, 18, and 24, being each of them measured by 6, are multiples of that number. A common multiple of two or more numbers is a number which can be measured by them both—e.g., 20 being measured by 4 and 5, is the common multiple of 4 and 5; 24 can be measured by 2, 3, 4, and 6, it is therefore the common multiple of these numbers.

1.—If a quantity measures two others, it will measure their sum and difference.

It will measure their sum; for it will measure the greater, and therefore any quantity equal to the greater; it will therefore measure as much of their sum as is equal to the greater. But it measures the less, (hyp.) it therefore measures what the greater wants of their sum; for the greater, plus the less, equals the sum. But it also measures their difference; for it measures or is contained an exact number of times in the less, (hyp.) and therefore measures as much of the greater as is equal to the less. It also measures the greater, and therefore must measure what is left of the greater after the less is taken away. This is the difference. This principle may be proved algebraically in the following manner:—

Let x and y be two quantities having a common measure a , a is also the common measure of their sum $(x+y)$ and their difference $(x-y)$. Since a measures x , it is, of course, contained an exact number of times in x ; let n equal that number, and since a measures or is contained an exact number of times in y , let m equal that number. Then $x=na$, and $y=ma$; therefore, $x+y=n a+m a=(m+n) a$,—i.e., a is contained in $x+y$, $m+n$ times, or it measures $x+y$ by the units $m+n$. Again: $x=na$, and $y=ma$: $x-y=n a-m a=(m-n) a$,—i.e., a is contained in $x-y$, $m-n$ times, or it measures $x-y$ by the units in $m-n$.

2.—If a number measures another, it measures any multiple of that number. Let a measure x by the units in b , then a will measure xy by the units in by .

3.—If a number measures divisor and remainder, it measures the dividend. It measures the divisor (hyp.); it therefore measures any multiple of the divisor; for if a number measures another, it measures any multiple of that number; it therefore measures the number of divisors that are contained in the dividend. But it measures the remainder (hyp.) Now the number of divisors contained in the dividend,

together with the remainder, equal the dividend. It therefore measures the dividend; for if a number measures two other numbers, it measures their sum.

4.—If a number measures a divisor and dividend, it measures the remainder also.

It measures the divisor (hyp.); it therefore measures any number of divisors; it therefore measures the number of divisors contained in the dividend. But it measures the dividend. Now, since it measures the dividend and the number of divisors contained in it, it also measures their difference, which is the remainder; for if a number measures two other numbers, it measures their difference.

The rule founded upon the foregoing principles for finding the greatest common measure of two numbers, is as follows:—Divide the greater of the numbers by the smaller; divide the smaller by the remainder of the last division, if any; divide the first remainder by the remainder of the second division, if any; proceed in this way till some remainder divide the preceding one without remainder,—the last remainder is the greatest common measure.

Let it be required to find the greatest common measure of 72 and 668, the work will be as follows:—

$$\begin{array}{r}
 72)668(9 \\
 \underline{648} \\
 20)72(3 \\
 \underline{60} \\
 12)20(1 \\
 \underline{12} \\
 8)12(1 \\
 \underline{8} \\
 4)8(2 \\
 \underline{8}
 \end{array}$$

Here 4 is the greatest common measure of 72 and 668; for it is the greatest common measure of the remainder 4 and the divisor 8, and the dividend 12. And since 4 is the greatest common measure of the remainder 8, and the divisor 12, it is the greatest common measure of the divisor 12 and the dividend 20. And since 4 is the greatest common measure of the remainder 12 and the divisor 20, it is the greatest common measure of the divisor 20 and the dividend 72. And since it is the greatest common measure of the remainder 20 and the divisor 72, it is the greatest common measure of the divisor 72 and the dividend 668; for every common measure of the divisor and dividend is also a common measure of the divisor and remainder. —G. N.

53. *Fixedness of Purpose.*—The inquiry made by T. W. relates to an important mental attainment, and one that many young men, unfortunately lack. That he feels the want, and desires its removal, we must regard as a healthy symptom. We therefore cheerfully offer a few hints on this subject, in the hope that they will be useful to T. W., and many of your readers. As a preliminary to perseverance in any pursuit, we would say, consider well its nature, and be thoroughly convinced of its importance. Do not attempt everything that suggests itself to

your mind: let deep thought precede action. Having thus determined on obtaining an object, form your plans of operation, and do something every day towards carrying them out. Resist the first temptation that would draw you aside or lessen your exertions, and the power of subsequent ones will be weakened. When inclined to give up, go over again the considerations that led you to commence, and let your own judgment pronounce a verdict on waywardness and sloth. Read the lives of those men who have been the architects of their own fortunes, and have raised the monuments of their own fame. Mark how they lived in continuous action, and laboured with untiring zeal. Ponder, too, the records of the men who have been the opposites of these—whose lives have been failures through the want of fixedness of purpose. There are some passages on this subject in the "Reminiscences of Coleridge," by Joseph Cottle, that it would be well if every young man would read. Genius, without perseverance, is comparatively powerless. We commend to the attention of T. W. the following extracts—the first from Sir T. F. Buxton; the second, from an author quoted by Todd:—"The longer I live, the more I am certain that the great difference between men,—between the feeble and the powerful, the great and the insignificant,—is energy, *invincible determination*—a purpose once formed; and then death or victory. That quality will do anything that can be done in the world." "Take your course wisely, but firmly; and having taken it, hold upon it with heroic resolution, and the Alps and the Pyrennees will sink before you. The whole empire of learning will be at your feet, while those who set out with you, but stopped to change their plans, are yet employed in the profitable business of changing their plans. Let your motto be, *perseverando vinces*. Practice upon it, and you will be convinced of its value by the distinguished eminence to which it will conduct you."—J. M. S.

54. *The Art of Conversation*.—Having recently been much interested in perusing a Lecture on this subject delivered by Mr W. Henty to the members of a Mechanics' Institution in Van Dieman's Land, I am induced to offer an abstract of the "Rules" given by that gentleman, in the hope that they will not be unacceptable to "Incognito," and to your readers generally:—

"It will, perhaps, be expected of me to attempt to give some rules or directions to those who have a desire to aid themselves in this branch of improvement; but the first thing to be noticed is, that too much care as to the thing said, and the manner of saying it, will spoil everything. We turn instinctively from a person who is studying to obtain a surprise over us, by passing off his carefully-prepared impromptu and witticisms, or wresting the conversation aside for the purpose of introducing some treasured joke. No one but likes to see all persons stripped of such artifices and affectations.

"This, then, is the first rule—to be easy and natural, to avoid display, and exhibit kindly openness and simplicity—a readiness to join in the amusement that is going on, not to check or divert it in order to become the leader. But to be at ease is very different from taking things

easy; the essentials of true politeness are requisites in conversation; an effort will frequently have to be made, for each is bound to contribute his quota, and afterwards to listen with due attention. There must be frequent practice, as in everything else, before the habit can be established.

"Sir William Temple says, the first ingredient in conversation, is truth; the next, good sense; the third, good humour; the fourth, wit.

"As to the preparation or getting up of subjects for conversation, it is totally to be avoided; nevertheless, we must distinguish this from preparation of another sort, which is absolutely necessary. A person must have his mind charged or prepared with ideas, and by writing and conversation he will learn to give those ideas proper expression. He must study books and men, obtain a general knowledge of events, and observe the arts of the many actors in the great drama of life; and if he does this with an especial view to the communication and dissemination of his thoughts, whether by writing or speaking, he will be qualifying himself for the part of a good converser.

"With young persons advancing from youth to maturity, their studies and recreations should form the chief subject of their conversation. This will be one test of their having made successful progress; for whether the pursuit be any branch of literature or music, painting, horticulture, natural history, or the like, it cannot be allowed that the mind has derived any real accomplishment until the possessor can hold discourse on the history, the principles, and the practice of the arts or science.

"It is the subject-matter that at all times requires our chief regard. The reading aloud in a family is found useful by furnishing a topic which is common to all. A lecture, if attended by the chief members of any particular circle, has the same result. The pictures that cover our walls will all be capable of serving as objects of discourse; and portraits are especially valuable for this end.

"To assist our mutual improvement, let there be in society an understanding to discard from conversation all useless and unprofitable subjects. Such a course will soon become natural, and suggest others that are both agreeable and profitable. To this we should add the practice recommended by Mason, Todd, and others, and always adopted by Mr Wilberforce, who, before going into company, was in the habit of noting down on a card a few subjects for conversation, which he styled launchers; not that he did this with a view to shine, but merely, when a pause ensued, that he might pre-occupy the ground, to the exclusion of inferior topics. If no topic should occur, and we are not able to adopt the Lord-keeper Guildford's practice of talking in the evening of the books we have read in the morning, I would suggest, that at least one of never-failing interest and importance may be found in the subject of education and educational institutions, which will interest and profit both the young and the old—which will add some excitement to every man in his double duty of humility as a learner, and of his usefulness as a teacher."—L. S.

55. *Mechanics*.—Mechanics is the science in which the actions of bodies upon each other are investigated. These actions may be simple pressures only, as when one body is supported by another; or they may be pressures which are accompanied with motion. This motion may arise from, or be caused by, the mutual attraction which all bodies exercise upon each other, or from the collision of bodies in motion with other bodies, previously either in motion or at rest.

The term Mechanics has a particular and a general signification. Particularly, it is applied only to the mutual relations of solid bodies; but in its general meaning, it includes also those laws which regulate the actions of fluids upon solids. When bodies are at rest, and their mutual actions are such as to retain them in that state, the laws of their actions constitute what is usually denominated the science of Statics. When the bodies are solid, it is sometimes called *Hereostatics*; but if a portion of them are fluid, *Hydrostatics*, or *Pneumatics*—thus distinguishing between liquids and *aëriferm* bodies. When motion, however, is concerned, the laws and phenomena constitute what is denominated the science of Dynamics. Like the Statics, this is also divided into solid and liquid, by the terms *Hereo-* and *Hydro-Dynamics*.

In all the branches of General Mechanics, the investigations are founded upon experiment, and conducted by geometrical and algebraical processes. Hence it forms at the same time a department of experimental philosophy and of

mixed mathematics. When opposing forces or pressures act on a body, so as to destroy each other's effect upon it, and so keep the body in a state of rest, it is said to be in a state of *Equilibrium*. This state is distinguished from mere rest, inasmuch as a state of rest implies the absence of any cause which might set it in motion.

The first general principle of Mechanics relates to the equilibrium of bodies on a lever. A knowledge of this may be ascribed to Archimedes. The extension of the principle to all the mechanical powers was long an unsolved problem; and the solution may be said to have been first made known to the world by the discovery of Hevinus relating to the sustaining power of an inclined plane.

The second general principle may be said to be that of the composition of forces, and its discovery may be attributed to Galileo. Daniel Bernouilli, (about 1726), was the first to demonstrate the rule of the "composition of forces," independently of motion.

The third general principle, according to La Grange, is what is usually denominated "Virtual Velocities." By this is meant those velocities which bodies in equilibrium would have, at the first instant of their motion, in the event of that equilibrium being disturbed. Indications of this principle are found in the writings of Galileo, Wallis, and Descartes; but John Bernouilli is thought to have been the first who showed its utility in solving statical problems.

(To be continued.)

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

The essays received during this month are of a very high order, and amply demonstrate the ability of their several writers. We are sorry that want of space prevents us from inserting the few introductory remarks which we had prepared. Subjoined is the register for the month—

90, B. G. D. (a superior essay—full of thought); 88, J. D. B. (an elaborate essay, which exhibits extensive reading, and a high order of mental power. We think he ought to persevere); Achates, (deserves high commendation for accuracy of expression and clearness of thought); E. S. J. (acute in thought; composed with care); H. T. (executed in an easy and perspicuous style); 86, M. Y. (critical and acute; well done); 80, H. H. H. (very much improved indeed: persevere—you can do better if you try resolutely); 78, W. T. (pleases us exceedingly); J. W. H. (brief, but clear); R. K. (improving rapidly in power of expression); 76, J. N. (is becoming more and more what we wish him to be); E. L. B. (must write more carefully, and revise his papers before committing them to post; he is equal to better things); J. E. (has evidently taken pains to understand his subject); 74, S. H. A. (improving:—take pains, study hard, and you will gain a high place in our

books); Philologus (deserves praise for industry and careful thought). A few others, from several causes, we cannot notice. Illegible writing—neglect of the "rules and conditions"—exclude from being mentioned in this department. Students must recollect that our duties are onerous, and that they ought to lighten our burden as much as possible by care and attention on their part.

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. VII.

1. What are the avenues through which the mind acquires knowledge?
2. What is Intuition? How does it operate? and what are the truths which it reveals?
3. What is Sensation? and how does it act in Idea-production?
4. Can you prove that the senses are generally worthy of belief?
5. What is Memory? how does it act? and what do we learn through it?
6. What is Analogy?
7. Explain the nature, uses, and laws of Testimony.
8. What is Probability?

Notices of Books, etc.

Etymological Dictionary of Scripture Names, accented and Explained. By W. G. Hird. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

In the early history of the world and especially in oriental nations, proper names were expressive of qualities, and thus they were always important and suggestive. The writer of the little work before us, proceeding upon this principle, has with much care collected and classified the scripture names of persons. The roots of many of these words are the same, and they are here grouped according to their affinity, and thus a knowledge of the meaning of comparatively a few words, affords a clue to the meaning of a great number. The work is evidently the result of much careful reading and study, and it will be found interesting and instructive to Bible students.

In case of another edition being required we would suggest the introduction of a general index.

Our Labouring Classes: their Intellectual, Moral, and Social condition considered. By Samuel Cowling. London: Partridge and Oakey.

We have here an essay on the working classes, by a working man, who from "8, Norwich Court, Fetter Lane," writes a dedication "to the Right Hon. Lord Ashley," and publishes a subscription list containing the names of not a few men of title, members of parliament, popular preachers, and well-known philanthropists. This is a new thing in the world, and speaks well for the age. Of the essay itself we need not say much. In thirteen brief chapters it takes up a great number of subjects under the general heads of—The Working Man's Home—Employments—Habits—What the Working Classes ought to be—Remedial Measures—Education—Religious Means—Amusements for Working Men—Wages and Competition—Masters and Workmen—Miscellaneous Observations—Concluding Appeal to Christian Ministers, Masters, and Workmen. The writer's great error appears to us to be, attempting too much in so small a space; hinting at many subjects, and thoroughly discussing but few. Still the work will be read with interest and profit. We hope the sale will be remunerative to the author.

Christianity and its Evidences. By the Rev. J. G. Rogers, B.A. London: B. L. Green, Paternoster Row.

Rationalism is undoubtedly progressing in England. The publication of such works as Froude's "Shadows of the Clouds," and "Nemesis of Faith;" Newman's "Phases of Faith," and "The Soul: her Sorrows and her Aspirations;" W. J. Fox's "Religious Ideas;" Mackay's "Progress of the Intellect;"—the extensive sale of the works of Theodore Parker and R. W. Emerson, as well as the translation of Strauss' "*Leben Jesu*," and the popularity of Thomas Cooper, the Author of the "Purgatory of Suicides," &c., and the expounder of German rationalism to the people,—amply demonstrate this fact. In such circumstances as these, it becomes the duty of the adherents to, and be-

lievers in, the presently-received interpretation, to buckle on their armour both for defence and attack, and to throw themselves boldly into the breach which these men have made. The work before us is the author's contribution to that great undertaking. He has thrown down his gauntlet, and given us his gage. It displays both the author's zeal and his ability, and is well-deserving of careful perusal. It contains many judicious reflections, some acute criticism, and not a few eloquent paragraphs. Having been primarily composed for the lecture room, the style is generally more diffuse, and in many parts more florid, than is pleasant to the mere reader; and this makes it more impressive to the ear than to the eye. It consists of six lectures—I., The Ideal of Christianity,—judicious, able, and interesting; II., The Oracles of Christianity—clear and critical; III., The Antecedents of Christianity—good, but does not in our opinion take a sufficiently extensive survey of the facts of General History; IV., The Records of Christianity—acutely argumentative, and affectionate in remonstrance; V., The Founder of Christianity—beautifully written, exactly reasoned, and pleasingly narrated; VI., The Antagonists of Christianity—loving, yet sincere—glowing with zeal, yet warm with benevolence—containing some exquisite specimens of dialecticism. Taken as a whole, the work presents the evidences in a new point of view, and the author occasionally interweaves a new thread of thought along with the staple arguments,—here judiciously condensed and arranged—which are to be found in Leslie, Butler, Locke, Soame Jenyns, Paley, Watson, Watt, Chalmers, Hall, Taylor, Gausson, Neander, and Schliermacher, &c. On these several accounts, the work merits the attention of the inquiring mind; and we cordially recommend it to our readers.

The Coming Conflict. A Letter to the Lord Bishop of Exeter, occasioned by his recent Pastoral Letter. London: John Gray Bell.

This is the protest of a plain and out-spoken man against the so-called "innovations" in the church, advocated by the Bishop of Exeter and divines of his school. Whatever may be our private opinion of the sentiments contained in this letter, we will confess, that we admire the style in which it is written, having long been of opinion that a greater amount of honesty and plain-dealing might be introduced into this discussion with advantage to the truth.

Popery, the Mystery of Iniquity; and the Pope, the Man of Sin. By Thomas Macklin. London: B. L. Green.

There is some excellence in this little tract. It condenses in a small compass the essence of volumes. It is written with tact, in a chaste style, and is carefully reasoned. It embodies many thoughts in few pages, and makes references to historical facts in corroboration of every important assertion. Half a groat will put it in the possession of any one interested in the subject:—and who is not?

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XVII.

RATIOCINATION.

CONCERNING FALLACIES.

“Although a masculine good sense will generally escape, in practice, from merely logical perplexities, (that is, will cut the knot, for all immediate results of practice, which it cannot untie,) yet errors ‘in the first intention’ come round upon us in subsequent stages, unless they are met by their proper and commensurate solutions. *Logic must be freed by Logic*: a false dialectical appearance of truth must be put down by the fullest exposure of the absolute and hidden truth; since, also, it will continually happen that a plausible sophism, which had been summarily crushed, for the moment, by a strong appeal to general good sense, upon the absurd consequences arising, will infallibly return upon us when no such startling consequences are at hand.”—*Thomas De Quincey*.

“To err is human,” is a maxim which has become so trite and common-place, that its utterance no longer strikes upon the Intellect as the expression of a sad and lamentable fact,—one which ought to be deplored and mourned over,—but, above all, if possible, amended. Instead of awakening such feelings, however, it is now too frequently quoted as a ready, convenient, and indisputable excuse for many of the vagaries, reprehensibilities, inadvertencies, follies, and even the crimes of men; and is thus too often made—although in a widely different sense—like Charity—to cover “a multitude of sins.” We act improperly in so doing. Error ought to be regarded as a disease of the mentality, and every remedial agency which human ingenuity can discover—and in the case of Religion and Morals, which Divine grace has seen fit to impart—ought to be employed, in order that our intelligential nature may be, as far as possible, restored to that state in which it may be capable of performing its proper functions unimpairedly. And, although we may not yet have attained to a complete and accurate diagnosis of each individual mind-malady,—although we may not be able to distinguish definitely between those which are *pathognomonic* and those which are *adjunct*; yet if we can at all discover the causes, indications, and method of cure, of any one or more of these mental infirmities, we shall do well to strive earnestly to do so. Now, one of the chief uses of Philosophy is to effect this;—is to make us acquainted with the nature of our mental constitution, so that we may “discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us.” It teaches us to “anatomize the thoughts and purposes of men;” and thus to gain a knowledge of “our being’s end, and aim;”

and having attained this knowledge, surely it becomes us to apply it, practically, to the remedying of those defects which are observable in the mode of our thought-processes. Philosophy habituates the mind to close, vigorous, accurate, and comprehensive mental exertion; to a ready perception of the truth or fallacy of any given series of propositions. We do not, indeed, readily grant that such an investigation

“*Quale per incertam Lunam sub luce maligna
Est iter in silvis; ubi coelum condidit umbra
Jupiter, et rebus nox abstulit atra colorem;*”*

and yet no one who understands

“*How use doth breed a habit in a man,*”

can doubt the efficacy of training the mind in the detection of errors; of cultivating the truth-percipient faculties; and of diligently educating the thought-powers, so that they may with equal readiness discern what ought to produce immediate and infallible conviction in the mind, and what ought to lead to doubt, or to total disbelief; and by these means be enabled to distinguish between the specious apparency of the sophist's guileful words, the illogical deductions of the untrained or biassed mind, and the sterling gold, fresh from the mintage of heavenly Truth.

Of the sources of Error, we have already spoken at considerable length, in our article on the “*Idols of the Intellect*,” it now remains for us to show how fatally these errors may operate for evil in our ratiocinative processes, and to explain, in as comprehensive and succinct a manner as possible, in what way we may best avoid falling into error in our own reasonings, or most easily and certainly detect the fallacious reasonings of others. Referring to the paper above mentioned for a more complete exposition of these Error-sources, we shall merely sketch, in outline, the principal topics of thought which will serve to render this article intelligible by itself, and then proceed to the chief object which we have in view in the composition of the present paper—viz., to give the reader some information “concerning fallacies.”

There are a few words continually occurring in debate, and which we shall require to use in this article, which it may be well to notice and define—viz., Truth, Error, Falsity, Falsehood, Fallacy, and Sophism.

Truth is the expression of our ideas in such a manner as to give an accurate detail of the objects, circumstances, &c., concerning which we are conversing. Although, from defect in position, opportunity, organization, &c., what appears Truth to one man does not appear so to all; yet there must be some *criteria* for distinguishing between absolute and relative Truth. Of such a nature we suppose the following enumeration to be:—1st, Absolute Truth, must refer to objects, circumstances, &c., which actually exist, or have occurred; 2nd, Our ideas must have been excited by these very objects, circumstances, &c.; 3rd, That the same objects, circumstances, &c., would produce the self-same ideas

* “*Is even as a pathway through the woods, under the scanty light of the uncertain moon, when Jupiter has covered the sky with a cloud, and gloomy night has abstracted the colour from things.*”
—Virgil's *Æneid*, book vi., 270.

in any similarly constituted individual of our race, supposing, in each case, the physical and mental structure to be free from gross defects; 4th, That the comparison of the ideas educed in similar minds, by the same objects, circumstances, &c., is the only test at which we can arrive for the detection of error, or the discovery of Truth. This latter sentence seems to throw us into the hands of the *common sense* philosophers. It may be remarked here, that although the belief of each individual may be true *to him*, it by no means follows that that is absolute truth; so that belief is not altogether synonymous with Truth; for men in different ages have believed opposite things; and men of the present day differ in some things, "wide as the poles asunder," in their matters of belief—*e.g.*, The Ptolemaic and Copernican systems of Astronomy, the Brahminic and Christian faiths, and the philosophies of Hegel and Comte.

"All Error," says Cousin, "is only an incomplete view of the Truth." This we do not hold as a correct definition;—we think that Error consists of two parts—1st, An incomplete view of the Truth; and, 2nd, The formation of opinions *different* from the truth—*e.g.*, The Judaic religion was "an incomplete view of the truth;" the Ptolemaic system of Astronomy was "different from the truth."

Falsity signifies the verbal expression of an error, when that error is believed by the person who utters it, and when, consequently, there is no intention to deceive.

A Falsehood is the verbal expression of some known error, with intention to deceive. Thoughts can only be communicated to others through the medium of words; words, therefore, become the images of thought; but a representation is only true so far as a resemblance exists between it and the thing represented; in like manner, a thought expressed is only true so far as the words accord with that idea; and if the inaccordancy arises intentionally, it is then justly stigmatized and reprobated as a falsehood.

A Fallacy is the verbal expression of a thought, with an apparent, though not a real, correctness;—it may either be accompanied or not with an intention to deceive.

A Sophism is a fallacy uttered with the intention to deceive: one expressly framed in a deceptive way.

It is obvious, from the above explanations of the meanings of terms, that the chief sources of error, either in ourselves or others, are of two kinds—*viz.*, 1st, Intellectual; 2nd, Volitionary.

1st, Intellectual. "The human intellect is like an unequal mirror to the rays of things, which mixes its own nature with the nature of things, and thus distorts and perverts them"—*i.e.*, Consciousness being a mere state of the percipient faculties excited in us by the action of objectivities, which, inferentially, we believe to be external to us, can only inform us of the fact of its own excitation, but cannot, by any possibility, acquaint us with the appearance of things, *per se*. We can only know the *non ego*—*i.e.*, what is beyond, and impresses consciousness, by its influence upon the *ego*—*i.e.*, Consciousness. We can only ascertain, with certainty, the change in the subject—*i.e.*, our

* "Estque intellectus humanus instar speculi inæqualis ad radios rerum, qui suam naturam naturæ rerum immiscet, eamque distorquet et inficit."—Bacon's "Novum Organon," lib. i., aphorism 41.

mind; we cannot acquire an absolute knowledge of the object—*i.e.*, the externality which affects our mind. To us, *the without* is only known by the fact that it produces certain effects on *the within*; and it by no means follows that the cause resembles the effect which it produces. How different, for instance, is the fire, from the pain of the burn which it occasions!—so that our knowledge being merely relative, we can attain to no absolute knowledge of the essences or quintessences of things. We cannot isolate ourselves, and place ourselves beyond the reach of consciousness, because it is only *through* our consciousness that knowledge is attainable. A full acquaintance with our own intellectual incapacity will be of much service to us, by restraining us from entering upon inquiries of which we are unable to attain any certain or irrefragable solution; for “when we know our own strength, we shall the better know what to undertake with hope of success; and when we shall have well surveyed the *powers* of our minds, and made some estimate of what we may expect from them, we shall not be inclined either to sit still, and not set our thoughts on work at all, in despair of knowing anything; or on the other side, to question everything, and disclaim all knowledge, because some things are not to be understood.”*

But it is not only from the incapacity of the Intellect, the oneness of medium through which all knowledge is presented to the mind, or the fact, that all our ideas are the result of impressions on, or rather changes in, the *ego*—that we suffer. Were this the only Error-source, it would be, comparatively, but a small matter; for as we *must* rely upon the intimations of Consciousness, our Experience would necessarily and inevitably be true *to us*, altogether independent of the reality or seemingness of external objects. We suffer much more from inaccuracy of observation, rashness in generalization, and carelessness or precipitancy in inference, than from the circumscribed nature of our mental faculties. Indeed, precipitation and inattention are most inimical to correctness of thought; for, Bacon truly observes, that “a syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the signs of ideas; therefore, if our ideas themselves, which are the basis of all reasoning, are confused, and too hastily formed, nothing that is built upon them can be stable.”† We must not, however, in these remarks, be understood as homologating all the deductions which sophistical minds may draw, or have drawn from the admittedly grave errors into which men may fall by neglecting the due precautions necessary for preparing the mind to perceive and acknowledge Truth. All that we desire to do is, to warn our readers against acquiring that habit of mind which “gains remote conclusions with a jump,”—that over-active impetuosity of mind which so surely indicates the mental characteristic of inconsiderateness. Nor do we wish to lend any encouragement whatever to the opposite tendency, of inert passivity of intellect. When the mind thus lazily adopts opinions, unjustified by facts, and fails to

* Locke's “Essay concerning the Human Understanding,” book i., chapter 1, sect. 7.

† “Syllogismus ex propositionibus constat, propositiones ex verbis, verba notionum tessere sunt, Itaque, si notiones ipsæ (id quo basis rei est) confusæ sint et temere a rebus abstractæ nihil in iis quæ superstruuntur est firmitudinis.”—Bacon's “Novum Organon,” lib. 1, aphorism 14.

exert itself for the attainment of accurate ideas and information, nothing can be expected but that obscurity and confusion should reign paramount in the mind, and that incorrect reasoning will, in all probability, be allowed to pass undetected. The mind should be somewhat like a continental country—the passport system ought to be in active operation, and no idea should be allowed ingress or egress until, upon due examination, it is found to be what it represents itself. We cannot too frequently or too earnestly recommend the sedulous cultivation of habits of accurate observation, careful reflection, and the attainment of a power of sifting particulars, as some of the primary requisites of the intellect zealously bent on Truth-acquisition.

I.—Among Intellectual Error-sources may be reckoned—1st, Those which arise from the circumscribed nature of the human mind; 2nd, Carelessness in investigation; 3rd, Precipitancy in making inferences; 4th, The want of opportunity to form accurate opinions, or to acquire correct information; 5th, The tendency of the mind to give too great prominence to professional or favourite pursuits; 6th, The different views which may be taken of the same event by persons of different idiosyncrasies; 7th, One-sidedness; 8th, The readiness with which we judge of things according to their external appearance; 9th, Fanciful associations of ideas; 10th, The natural bent of the mind; 11th, Narrowness of mind; 12th, Deficiencies in memory, or the perceptive powers, and others of a similar kind.

II.—Volitionary. The will being the agent of the emotions, desires, affections, and passions, as well as of the intellect, is frequently led into error by the impetuosity or insinuating power of some one or more of these; and as each power of the mentality exerts an influence upon the others, the errors of one faculty may be communicated to the whole mind. When the will acts according to the desire of any one or more of the emotional feelings, and causes the intellect to swerve from the execution of its duty, we denominate the result a prejudice—*i.e.*, a premature, illegitimate, and unfairly-arrived at judgment. It is exceedingly difficult to keep the mind passionless and unbiassed;—to preserve “the mind’s eye” always clear, pure, and unimpaired;—and to maintain the intellect in its lofty supremacy;—so free from being flattered by self-love, allured by fancied interests, or excited by personal hatreds, as to prevent it from believing that it perceives the truth, accuracy, or justice of all that it wishes to think or do. This opinion has been eloquently expressed by Jean Paul Richter, when he remarks, that “passion, contemplated through the medium of the imagination, is like a ray of light transmitted through a prism,—we can calmly, and with undazzled eye, study its complicated nature, and analyze its variety of tints; but passion brought home to us in its reality, through our own feelings, and experience, is like the same ray transmitted through a lens—blinding, burning, consuming whatever it falls upon.” But the greater any danger is, the more care ought we to employ, in order to avoid it; so that the very imminence of this liability to stray from truth and right, ought to nerve us up to manly and energetic endeavours to preserve ourselves from being led into error,—“caught up in the Mahlströme of party strife, sectarian contention, love of self, envy of others, or yield ourselves up to any other of the almost innumerable passion-exciting,

desire-creating, or emotion-producing influences, which 'whirl us into error.'” Among Volitionary Error-sources may be enumerated those resulting from—1st, Prepossessions; 2nd, Selfishness; 3rd, National vanity; 4th, Partizanship; 5th, The predominance of imagination; 6th, The various passions and affections of the mind; 7th, The tendency of the mind to run to extremes; 8th, Procrastination; 9th, Love of Times; 10th, Fashion; 11th, Authority; 12th, Depravity of mind, and some other similar “fallacies of the feelings,” &c.

It is not our design, either in the foregoing or succeeding pages, to expose the weaknesses and imperfections of the human mind, or to signalize the Error-sources through which it most frequently and easily receives fallacious reasonings, for the purpose of teaching our readers “the art of imposing upon men,”—of making “the worse appear the better reason.” We do not wish to bring their skill and intelligence into play for such an ignominious purpose. We do not desire to sharpen their mental powers in order that they may attain the mind-subtlety of Hudibras;—

“He was in Logic a great critic,
 Profoundly skilled in analytic;
 He could distinguish and divide
 A hair ‘twixt south and south-west side,—
 On either which he would dispute,
 Confute, change hands, and still confute;
 * * * * *
 For he a rope of sand could twist
 As tough as learned Sorbonist;
 And weave fine cobwebs, fit for skull
 That’s empty when the moon is full.”

Or even the mental legerdmain of Goldsmith’s Schoolmaster, of whom it is said, that,

“Even though vanquished, he could argue still.”

No; our aim is higher; it is to show the mind its own weaknesses, in order that it may guard against being deceived, and, by spreading amongst our readers a knowledge of the most common fallacies, render it less likely that they may be imposed upon by the artifices of the rhetorician or the spurious syllogisms of the sophist. To point out the avenues through which error is most likely to approach, is, in our opinion, the best means of enabling the mind to adopt precautions against their entrance, and to capacitate it for building up defences against the attacks or encroachments of designing men. But it is not to be supposed that every fallacy or sophism will be so easily discovered, or so readily detected, as those which are quoted in the following pages will appear to be; for it is much easier to detect an error when the very passage in which it occurs is placed before you; and as these are generally freed from any extraneous matter, with which sophistical discourse is frequently much diluted, they seem much simpler than they really are. Another reason is, that the examples in any didactic book are commonly as far removed from abstruseness as possible, in order to illustrate the principle as clearly as possible to minds which are, comparatively speaking, unpractised in such pursuits.

A Fallacy has been most felicitously defined by Archbishop Whateley, as “any unsound mode of arguing, which appears to demand our conviction, and to be decisive of the question in hand, when, in fairness, it is not so.” These Fallacies have been variously classified and arranged, from the days of Aristotle downwards. It is our intention to present in synoptic tables, the systems of classification adopted by Aristotle, Mill, and Whateley; and afterwards to present such an abstract of the teachings of logicians as, we think, will be useful and agreeable to our readers.

The Aristotelic classification considers Fallacies as composed of two great classes—1st, Those in which the error is contained in the form of the expression [*in dictione*]; 2nd, Those in which it is contained in something distinct from the form of the expression [*extra dictionem*]. Of the first class there are six varieties; of the second seven; as may be seen in the following table:—


In the Expression.

1. Equivocation.
2. Amphibology.
3. Composition.
4. Division.
5. Accent or Prosody.
6. Figure of speech.

Distinct from the Expression.


1. Accident.
2. From what is true in particular circumstances, to infer as if from an absolute truth.
3. Ignorance of the point in dispute.
4. Assigning a false cause.
5. Deducing a conclusion which does not follow.
6. Begging the question.
7. Many interrogations, as if admitting but one answer.

The fallacies of the first class may be refuted by showing the law of syllogism with whose requirements they do not accord. Most commonly, the transgression lies in an *undistributed middle*, or an *illicit process* of the *major* or *minor* term. Those of the second class cannot be so readily detected, as they require a knowledge not only of the expression, but also of the matter of discourse. This, however, will be farther explained when we proceed to treat of them individually. J. S. Mills's synoptic table of fallacies is exceedingly exhaustive, as it contains not only those which may occur in reasoning, but also those to which we are liable in judgment.



Archbishop Whateley's tabular view of fallacies is, like everything else in his admirable treatise, distinguished for lucidity of arrangement and clearness of exposition.

FALLACIES.




In the belief that in our former articles, we have, at some length, explained the origin and causes of the errors into which the mind is liable to be led, in the exercise of perceptivity, judgment, and generalization—*i.e.*, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd classes of fallacies mentioned in the synoptic table of J. S. Mill, and cautioned our readers to guard against and avoid them; and assuming that the tabular scheme of fallacies which we extract from Archbishop Whateley's able treatise on "Logic" contains an accurate and extensive classification of the various ramifications into which the fallacies, classes 4th and 5th of Mr Mill's table, expand themselves,—we will proceed, in the first place, to give an exposition of those fallacies which are contained under the words "Purely Logical," in the first division of the scheme referred to. Of Purely Logical fallacies there are three varieties—viz.,

1st, Those resulting from an *undistributed middle*. In such apparent syllogisms, the middle term is undistributed in such a manner, as that the major term is compared with one part of the term, and the minor with another part; and the two terms are thus in contravention of the two first axioms, (page 203,)—neither asserted to agree, or disagree "in the *same sense* with one and the *same third*;" but on the contrary, are declared invalid by axiom 3, which asserts, that "if of two things, neither agrees with one and the same third, in the same sense, no inference is deducible;" as well as by Rule I., which directs that "the middle term must be distributed—*i.e.*, taken in its entire extension, at least, once in the premises, else the conclusion will be illegitimate." The following are examples of this fallacy:—

All good men are beloved by their associates.
This man is beloved by his associates;
Therefore, he is a good man.

All beautiful things are useful.
Cranes, levers, pulleys, ploughs, &c.,
are useful;
Therefore, they are beautiful things.

2nd, Those which have an *illicit process* in their terms. In apparent syllogisms of



this sort, one of the middle terms “is distributed in the conclusion, which was not distributed in, at least, one of the premises,” and thus transgresses Rule II., and thus directly violates the *dictum* upon which syllogistic reasoning proceeds,—as it distinctly requires that any affirmation or negation made regarding any term, must be made regarding something *contained under* that term;—if, then, an affirmation or negation be made concerning something *excluded from* that term, the reasoning is obviously invalidated; as may be observed on reading the following examples:—

Money contributes to national prosperity.

Grain, imported from foreign countries, is not money;

Therefore, such grain does not contribute to national prosperity.

Nations which do reciprocate our Free-trade measures, ought to be permitted to import their grain, &c., duty free.

Several countries do not reciprocate our Free-trade measures;

Therefore, those nations ought not to be permitted to import their grain, &c., duty free.

3rd, Those from which, having *negative premises*, an *affirmative conclusion* is deduced, and *vice versa*. These apparent syllogisms infringe Rules III. and IV., as well as Axiom 3:—

All native industry ought to be carefully protected.

[industry;

All the labours of our artizans, agriculturalists, authors, &c., constitute our native

Therefore, none of the labours of foreign artizans, agriculturists, authors, &c., ought to be protected.

All men should purchase in the cheapest market.

The cheapest market is where the best goods are got for least money;

Therefore, no man should purchase anywhere but where the best goods are got for the least money.

It is quite evident that, however seemingly true the conclusions to these apparent syllogisms, the premises are quite invalid as reasons or grounds of action; as they have no illative power, there is no inferentiality employed in their construction.

We intended to devote much more space to the illustration of those fallacies; but we fear that the length of this paper may make it fatiguing to our readers, and we will conclude our remarks with two rules, by which, if properly attended to, Purely Logical fallacies will be easily detected.

1st, In every accurately constructed syllogism, or just process of argumentation, one of the premises must show that a certain conclusion results from some certain assertion; and the other must make it appear quite evident that the conditions of the former premise are fulfilled, and thus that the conclusion is justly inferrible—*e.g.*,

The formal enunciation of vague, common-place generalities from the pulpit, cannot warm the heart, or excite repentance in the soul.

Many preachers enunciate vague, common-place generalities in a formal manner;

Therefore, many preachers cannot warm the heart, or excite repentance in the soul.

2nd, As the premises of every syllogism which is constructed in accordance with the *dictum*, axioms, and rules, contain the middle term twice; so that middle term must, in each premise, bear precisely the same signification. Thus, it will not do to use the following syllogism:—

No man who is destitute of character ought to be trusted.

This man is destitute of character;

Therefore, he ought not to be trusted;

if, in the major premise, we employ the word character to denote all those peculiar moral qualities which constitute an amiable and trustworthy person, and, in the minor, make the same word expressive of those strongly-marked peculiarities which render a man remarkable. Many persons construct their reasonings in this Jesuitical manner, and try to calm their consciences when they do feel a qualm from that too-little-heeded monitor, by the mental reservation, that they did not mean to express by the term, that particular shade of meaning which it ostensibly bore. There are so many minute and delicate gradations in the signification of words, in every language,—but more particularly in our own, that it is not an easy matter, at all times, to detect the “cunningly devised deceits” which men, in the course of argumentation, too frequently employ.

We will finish the topic “Ratiocination” in our next, which will contain an analytic view of the Semi-logical and Non-logical fallacies. Till then, we must say with the old play—

“I pray you, gentle sirs, commend me to your love.”

THERE is a kind of physiognomy in the titles of books, no less than in the faces of men, by which a skilful observer will as well know what to expect from the one as the other.

Religion.

DOES THE DIVINE TRINITY OF FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT, EXIST IN THE PERSON OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE negative of this question has been opened by your correspondent B. W. Several sentiments contained in his paper on the subject, are, by anticipation, replied to in my former article, setting forth the affirmative: nevertheless, I suppose it will be expected that his mode of handling the discussion should be examined: I enter, therefore, upon the task.

At the very outset of his paper, B. W. says, "In reading the Scriptures, we find mention made of three distinct persons." Now it happens, from Genesis to Revelation, there is not a single passage declaring this idea! Here is my statement placed against his. If his is the true view of it, why did he not produce the evidence? He says, "the proposition is capable of the most unanswerable proof drawn from the Word of God;" and yet he has not adduced a single passage to support it. The question is not, whether the terms, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three titles which the Scriptures apply to the Supreme Being; but whether the Scriptures ever mention their being "three distinct persons." These three names frequently occur in reference to the Supreme Being, and so do many others that could be cited; but, surely, we are not to conclude that such different names are intended to express a distinction of persons; for if so, it would be easy to show that the number is not confined to three. It is urged, that the personal pronouns, "I, he, thou," &c., are connected with these three names; but, before this argument can be satisfactorily pressed, it will be requisite to show, that the Scriptures always employ those pronouns to indicate persons. Now, it is notorious that they do not. An instance will suffice—"Jesus said, Put up again thy sword into *his* place."—Matt. xxvi. 52.

But B. W. admits that the idea of these three names expressing three distinct per-

sons, if "taken by themselves, might lead us to suppose that these three persons must be three distinct Gods." Exactly so: and the Athanasian creed expressly states it:—"The Father is God; the Son is God; and the Holy Ghost is God." "But," says your correspondent, "at this stage of the argument, we are met by the solemn and reiterated assurance, that 'the Lord our God is one Lord,' and that 'there is none other God but one;'" and he asks, "How shall we receive these declarations?" I will give my answer, and then consider his. It is assumed by him that these two contradictory declarations are of equal authority; whereas, the one respecting the three persons in the Godhead is a purely human fabrication, unknown to the Church until the third century; the other only is of Divine origination. This latter I receive, because I find it plainly expressed in the Scriptures. This is not the case with the former: it contradicts the latter: it cannot be reconciled with it; and, therefore, I feel myself, as a rational being, called upon to reject it.

But how has B. W. dealt with his own inquiry? Why, he has entirely evaded it: instead of replying, he has conceded that it is unanswerable. He tells us, "We must allow our faith to embrace them (*i.e.*, these two contradictory positions) as true," and not "set up our reason against them." He does not approve of reason being employed upon these mysterious subjects, because, I suppose, he has found the ground to be fragile when reason treads it. In short, he admits that the difficulty of his own question cannot be solved; for when summing up his statement, he says, "Where reason cannot judge, there faith must adore: if we cannot understand *how* these things can be, that is no proof that they do not exist." Certainly; but ignorance respecting them is no proof that they do exist; and, to my mind, the invented

mystery of them is presumptive evidence that they do not. Is it not eminently strange that any one should undertake the defence of a theological dogma, in the reception and belief of which the understanding ought to be intelligently active, and yet, at the very threshold of the inquiry, intimate that reason must be relinquished, and faith substituted in its stead?—a faith, too, from which reason and understanding are to be excluded; and thus a faith without eyes, which must needs be dark and blind! We are told “to look at the practical importance of the doctrine, rather than its mysterious aspect.” Why? Because it is felt that “its mysterious aspect” will not admit of being inspected with satisfactory results. I admit, indeed, that “the practical importance” of a Divine doctrine must always be revered. But what is the practical importance of one which cannot be understood? What is it, but that of inducing a blind submission to a dogma invented by ecclesiastics, and imposed, by their authority, upon mankind, at a time when few could read,—when kings and nobles could not write,—and when the education of the masses was utterly neglected? They, having received the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead on human authority, have been instrumental in propagating it to their descendents in simplicity; and this, and not the truth of the doctrine, is the origin of what B. W. states—namely, that it is held “by the vast majority of those professing and calling themselves Christians.” Majorities, however, are no evidence that their opinions are correct; if so, Paganism would be true. There was a time when Christianity itself scarcely existed beyond the twelve apostles; in that case, the minority were right.

Again: B. W. complains of those who, seizing upon the word person, reason as though it meant “a human person;” this, he asserts to be a “misrepresentation,” and the source whence they have been “successful in making it (the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead,) appear ridiculous and contemptible.” Now, I admit, if any one has stated that these three persons in the Godhead were “human persons,” when the Tripersonalists maintain that they are “Divine persons,” that their doctrine has

not been stated in their own terms, and that so far, it has been misrepresented. But, it was fairly to be expected that this complaint would have been followed up by showing what a Divine person is, and pointing out how he is distinguished from a human person; or setting forth the precise idea which the phrase Divine person was intended to convey. Yet nothing of the kind is attempted; but, instead of it, the reasoners are treated with about seventeen lines of personal tirade, at which they can afford to smile. This is not the way to convince or convert them.

The next paragraph states what is called “the notion of the Swedenborgians.” Now it is true they maintain that the Trinity in God consists in three Divine principles existing in the single glorified person of the Lord Jesus Christ; also, that the name *Father* expresses his essential Divinity, that the term *Son* signifies his Divine Humanity, and that the designation *Holy Spirit* means the Divine influences proceeding from their union. And this view of the Divine Trinity in God is considered to be illustrated by the human trinity in man, which consists of soul, body, and proceeding operation; and hence man is stated to have been created in the image of God. Of this view, B. W. says he knows nothing “so capable of refutation, and so replete with absurdity;” and yet it is remarkable, that he has not succeeded in showing the one, or accomplishing the other. He says, “According to this view, we have the Father, the Son, and a third being, termed the Holy Spirit; and yet, by some undefined process, they are reduced to one person.” Now this statement has some point against the Tripersonal system; but it contains no point which the New Churchman can appreciate. It is intended to ridicule the idea of three essential things constituting the single person of our Lord Jesus Christ;—to sneer at a fact which all nature is capable of illustrating. This, coming from one who professes to hold that three Divine persons make one God, is, surely, neither very graceful nor consistent. Moreover, after having allowed that the parties referred-to, believe the Trinity to consist of *principles*, and not of *persons*, he says, that it is “as though a man should assert that a *father* and *son*, and their in-

dividual or collective action, made one person." Surely this cannot be intended for reasoning: B. W. must have forgotten what he had admitted to be the opinion of those he is opposing. Their view of the Trinity is not as though a man should assert that two persons and their collective action, make one person; but it is as though a man should assert that the essential Divinity, the Divine Humanity, and their proceeding operation, constitute the single person of the Lord Jesus Christ. Besides, the process by which the Divinity and Humanity of the Lord were united in his glorified person, is not, as B. W. asserts, an "undefined process;" on the contrary, it is a process that is most extensively and elaborately explained in the doctrines of the New Church, and therein called the glorification of the Lord; a circumstance, concerning which B. W. appears to be utterly unacquainted.

But he farther observes, "It will not be necessary to examine the passages of Holy Scripture which are generally adduced to prove this scheme of a Trinity of Principles, as they will be found to refer to two important doctrines—viz., the deity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the unity of nature and purpose existing between the Father and the Son." Now, it will be proper to observe this mode of *reasoning* against the doctrine objected to. The passages which prove that doctrine are not to be examined! It is not necessary to adduce them, because it is concluded that they prove that Jesus Christ is God! Now what is the legitimate consequence of this admission? Why, if there is but one God, and Jesus Christ be God,—then he must be the only God," in whom, as the Apostle declares, "dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily;" He being the "*only* wise God our Saviour."—(Jude 25.) But, notwithstanding this fair consequence of the admission, and those plain statements of the apostles, B. W. says, "This theory of the Swedenborgians is destitute of Scripture authority, and utterly opposed to facts recorded in the Word of God;" and he follows up this assertion with a series of offensive epithets, for the substantiation of which there is no evidence produced, and no argument attempted. Your sensible readers,—

those who are capable of estimating a controversy, seeking for the establishment of truth, and who look for calm argument and just judgment in the case which is undertaken, will not, I feel assured, be led away from the point at issue by rude epithets and unproven characterization.

The chief points in B. W.'s communication, are those founded on two passages of the Word, one respecting the prayer of Jesus to the Father; and the other describing the phenomena which appeared at the baptism of the Lord. That respecting the first, is from John xii. 27, on which this commentary is made:—"Now, according to this *new* doctrine, the Son is praying to himself,—is seeking deliverance from himself,—is answering himself,—is glorifying himself; and yet, at the same time, leading the people to believe that his Father was still in heaven, while he was upon the earth." Now this is mere railing, founded in ignorance of the sentiments it is intended to expose. But it is remarkable that Tripersonalists, in urging these objections against the exclusive Deity of Jesus Christ, adopt Socinian sentiments, and, for the time, repudiate their own doctrines; for if they believe, as they profess to do, that Jesus is equal to the Father, then they have to explain why he should have prayed to him; and if he is one with the Father, how it is that such prayers were not petitions to himself? But to these questions, Tripersonalists reply, that Jesus was "inferior to the Father as touching his manhood," and with this fact, they conceive that the difficulty disappears. Now, the New Church holds a similar view respecting the Humanity of the Lord while in the world; and, therefore, the same principle which Tripersonalists adopt to remove the difficulty of their own views, will serve to explain those which B. W. urges upon "Swedenborgians." They believe that the Humanity of Jesus, while in the world, had attached to it some infirmity derived from the mother; but they also believe that this was successively removed, and its place supplied by a Humanity wholly derived from the Father. And, further: they believe this process to be that which constituted his glorification; and from this they argue, that the phrase "Son of God," is not the name of a separate person from "God the

Father," but the proper title of his glorified Humanity. Every one who will reflect, must see that the term Son, in this instance, is to be differently understood from the way in which it is ordinarily applied. Such are the "Swedenborgian" views respecting the Humanity of the Lord. Now, so long as there was any infirmity attached to it, there would needs be, in respect to the "Father which dwelt within," a sense of inferior consciousness, and hence arose all those prayers which he is recorded to have uttered. Illustrations of this are furnished by many express declarations of the Scriptures. The apostle speaks of "the inner" and "outward man;" and frequently intimates that the consciousness of the natural is different from, and inferior to, that of the spiritual man; and this is a matter of common experience—so much so, that if the contentions which take place between them during states of temptation, could become audible, they would, to the ears of an auditor, present the appearance of two persons; whereas, to the eye, it would be evident that they were but one. Moreover, David says, "Why art thou cast down, oh, my soul?—and why art thou disquieted within me? Hope thou in God;" in which passage the Psalmist plainly addresses his soul, or spiritual part, as possessing a different consciousness from that of his external, or natural, part. These facts, on which we have not space to reason, are adduced to show that the prayers of Jesus to the Father do not necessarily indicate the existence of two persons, but that they arose out of that distinct consciousness which was peculiar to the Humanity not yet glorified.

The other passages in which B. W. thinks the doctrine of three persons is plainly expressed, is this:—"And Jesus, when he was baptized, went up straightway out of the water; and, lo! the heavens were opened unto him, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and lighting upon him. And, lo! a voice from heaven, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased." This, we are told, "according to the orthodox view, is all clear; these are the three persons in the Godhead manifesting themselves in different forms." How that can be *all clear* which "orthodoxy" admits to be unintelligible, it is not very

easy to imagine. But what is this which is said to be all clear? Why "three persons in the Godhead, manifesting themselves in different forms!" now if this is clear, it is equally certain that they have no other unity than what is implied in a unanimity of purpose; and thus, instead of maintaining the truth, that there is but one God, they show that there is a triumvirate of Gods. But if there are three equal persons, and the passage was designed to make a revelation of this idea, why were they "manifested in different forms?" Does not the very fact of three "different forms" being indicated, prove that three similar persons were not meant? The only person whom the narrative recognizes with plainness and precision, is that of Jesus. The "voice," as we shall presently see, is no evidence of a separate person from him, and, to infer that the appearance of "the dove" is such a proof, Tripersonalists must say, either that the person of the Holy Ghost was a dove, or that he was in the dove, or that he was a Divine person, whose coming down to Jesus is described as the descent of a dove. The two former notions affect my mind with the idea of a painful absurdity; and the latter, orthodoxy has declined to accept. What, then, is the *clear* evidence that the appearance of a dove meant a Divine person? What is the analogy,—the argument,—the illustration,—to maintain such a position? Surely so crude a notion ought to have some stronger evidence to support it, than the bold assertion of its abettors.

B. W. next cites the opinion of Bishop Beveridge on the subject; but the bishop proves nothing from the passage; and that which he *asserts* concerning it, necessarily leads to Tritheism. It is the obvious consequence of his "orthodoxy." After this, B. W. gives what he is pleased to say, is the "Swedenborgian" view of the passage, but which is not the truth respecting it; and then he proceeds to some railing about their getting a new Bible, and blotting out certain expressions from that which is received. This, a rational sense of a good cause, could well have spared. "Swedenborgians" understand the meaning of such a charge: and in reply, I merely say, that they neither seek for a new Bible, nor remove anything from that which is commonly

so called, and which they solemnly receive and intellectually revere, as the Word of God. Their view of the passage before us is simple, and, as they believe, purely consistent with the doctrine, that "there is but one God." It is to be remarked, that the narrative describes a phenomena that was perceptible to the Lord Jesus *only*: it is a revelation of what he, at his baptism, knew, and experienced. It was he *only* who saw the heavens opened; it was he *only* who saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove; and *none* but he heard the voice. Thus all the circumstances are concentrated in the single person of Jesus Christ, and the narrative is descriptive of his own experience respecting them.

By the heavens being opened, is not to be understood, the presentation of an aperture in the sky; but the opening out of interior Divine things to the perception of the Lord's Humanity, which is called the Son. By the voice saying, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased," was represented the dictate of the essential Divinity within, giving perception to the glorified Humanity, so far as it had now become its proper form; that a process of unition was

going on between them; and the appearance of the dove was to represent the purification which the Humanity was undergoing; while its "descent and lighting upon him," denote that the sphere of Divine things was coming down and providing for itself an appropriate organ, in which man should know his God, and by which he should save his people. Hence he said, "I am the way"—"no man cometh to the Father but by me"—"by me, if any man enter in, he shall be saved."

I here stop, because I am aware that I have already trespassed beyond the limits allowed to a single paper in the "British Controversialist." Some irrelevant matter in B. W.'s communication has led me into a more lengthened notice of it than would otherwise have been required. I trust, however, he will receive what has been said with similar good humour to that with which it has been written. I assure him that I am influenced by no other wish than to establish this truth—viz., that "in Jesus Christ dwelleth all the fulness of the God-head bodily."

E. D. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

How various are the subjects of human research, and how great the achievements of mental power. Man is indeed the monarch of the world, and fain would be the censor of the universe! He has directed his attention to every part of creation that is open to his artificially-extended vision; he has learnt the divers laws which regulate matter, and has become familiar with the numerous circumstances under which it exists. And yet his knowledge on these subjects is not complete, and every year extends his range or corrects its imperfection; and now, after centuries of careful attention to the subject of astronomy, he surmises the existence of a central sun, the light of which has never fallen upon his eyes. But it is with mind and spirit that man's acquaintance is most limited, for there are depths in his own heart which he has not yet sounded, and heights in his own nature to which he has not yet attained.

But this state of the mental and moral sciences cannot be attributed to the manner in which they have been studied, but must rather be traced to the occultness of their own nature. If then this be the case with these subjects, how much more might we expect it in those which relate to spiritual matters, and especially to the nature of the great Supreme. If man ever feels conscious of the weakness of his own intellect, it is when he would direct its powers to the contemplation of his Maker, for then reason pauses, and imagination utterly fails.

These thoughts have been suggested to us by a consideration of the question placed at the head of this paper, and we deem them to have more than an indirect bearing upon some of the remarks of E. D. R., especially those in which he objects to the doctrine of the Trinity on account of its mysteriousness, and asserts that "the very circumstance that it is not to be understood,

is a strong presumption against its truth, and a certain evidence that it is received in blindness." This sentence is strongly marked by E. D. R.'s characteristic boldness, but will it stand the test of cool reflection? We think not. Will our friend maintain that every doctrine which cannot be *fully* understood is untruthful or will he consider it as presumptive proof that it is? If so whose comprehension will he take as the standard of truth? his own, or that of beings above or below him? If comprehension bounds the region of the real, how limited must be the range of creation to the illiterate man, and how much more so to the half intelligent brute! Even on this principle, the doctrine of the Trinity if not fully comprehended by us, and therefore not true, may be otherwise to higher orders of intelligent beings. But we believe truth to be eternal and immutable, and therefore ever remaining unchanged, whether received or rejected, understood or not, by man. And as to the truthfulness of doctrines, what are true doctrines but facts in statement? If our friend accepts this definition, we would ask him whether he disputes all facts that he cannot fully understand, or whether he professes to understand every fact that he cannot deny. If he does either one or the other,—without being inquisitorial, we should like to inquire how far he understands the nature of the vital principle; the difference between the essence of animal and vegetable life; and the mode in which mind acts upon matter. For ourselves we confess that we do not fully understand these, and many other things which we heartily believe, and therefore we cannot find anything here to shake our confidence in the doctrine of a "Trinity in Unity." Seeing that there are some things belonging to the finite, that we cannot fully understand, might we not reasonably expect that it would be thus, to a much larger extent, with the Infinite him self!

But further. Not only are our conception of the Divine Being inadequate, but our language is an imperfect medium for the expression of these conceptions. The terms which we apply to spiritual subjects are, for the most part, those which belong to nat-

ural subjects, and therefore if taken in their original significance, would convey absurd and even offensive ideas. Thus, in the discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity, the term "person" has been taken by E. D. R., and his friends, in its unlimited sense as when applied to separate individuals; and he has thus, as B. W. anticipated, thrown ridicule upon the doctrine. But E. D. R., and all who have studied the subject, are aware that the upholders of the doctrine of the Trinity declare that they do not so understand the term "person" when applied to the Deity; and it is therefore most unfair to charge upon them the consequences which would follow if they did. They do not believe the three persons in the Divine Godhead to subsist separately by themselves, possessing distinct and specific natures, without co-existence in each other; but they always represent these personal subsistences as consistent with the unity of the Divine essence, and only as personal distinctions existing in the same Godhead; and they therefore maintain that the doctrine of the Trinity does not in the least affect the doctrine of the Divine Unity. Let not therefore any one further, in this discussion, charge Trinitarians with views and consequences which they utterly repudiate.*

E. D. R. uses a simple syllogism—but it is unsatisfactory when applied to a subject like this—to show, at once, that both the Unitarians and the Tripersonalists are wrong. "If," he says, "it can be shown that Jesus Christ is God, and that there is but one God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God." If he deems the argument in this form conclusive, what will he say to it when employed by Unitarians in the following manner?—If it can be shown that the Divine Father is God, and that there is but one God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God! Might not this all-conclusive syllogism (?) be taken as the basis of a new sect, when given in another form; thus—If it can be shown that the Holy Spirit is God, and that there is but one God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God! If

* See "Laws of Debate," p. 116, sec. 4.

E. D. R. maintains the force of this syllogism in form No. 1, on what principle will he object to it in forms Nos. 2 and 3? We wait to learn.

We reach the end of our friend's paper before we find the next argument in favour of his affirmative position, and we cannot but be struck with the peculiar course which he has thought fit to pursue, namely to expend his energies in attacking the opinions of others, rather than in substantiating his own. He appears to be aware that it is easier to censure than to improve, and pleasanter to demolish than to up-build. He has pointed out some difficulties which attend the generally received opinion, but we would recommend him, and our readers generally, to go through the whole series of religious and even ethical opinions which they entertain, and tell us how many there are which are not open to any kind of objection, nor attended with the slightest difficulty. Those who have never thought on this subject may be surprized at the result, and anxiously inquire the reason of it. This we conceive to be, the nature of the subjects to which these opinions refer, and the fact that the evidences of their truth are of a *moral*, and not of a *mathematical* kind. We have to weigh the reasons *pro* and *con*, and we ought to adopt that side which has the preponderance. If then E. D. R. objects to the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, because some difficulties attend it, what does he offer in its stead?—a Trinity of "essential principles," the Father being the Divinity, the Son the Humanity, and

the Holy Spirit the Proceeding operation. That this "rational" view of the Trinity does not remove, or even lessen, our difficulties, B. W. has already shown. Thus, according to the Triprincipilists, we have in our Lord's intercessory prayer with his disciples, the Humanity praying to the Divinity that the Proceeding issuing from both might descend upon the believers, and yet that Humanity was the Divinity himself! This is only one instance of the clearness resulting from this anti-mysterious doctrine;—an instance which might be multiplied *ad infinitum*.

That our Lord Jesus Christ was not *solely and exclusively God*, is plain from such reasons as the following.—He exhibited himself as inferior to the Father, 1st in power, (John v, 19,) "Then Jesus answered and said unto them Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of himself;" and in knowledge, (Mark iii, 31,) "But of that day and that hour knoweth no man; no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." 2ndly, He exhibits his inferiority to the Father by praying to him. 3rdly, He declares his inferiority in express terms, *e.g.*, John xiv, 20, "My Father is greater than I." To the simple and sincere student of Scripture, such declarations as these, however they may affect, in his view, the Divinity of Christ, must at once, we should think, close in the negative the inquiry whether Christ is solely and exclusively God.

J. M. S.

Philosophy.

IS LANGUAGE OF HUMAN OR DIVINE ORIGIN?

DIVINE—III.

MAN, without a doubt, is a noble creature. When first created, his Maker endowed him with powers that entitled him to rank only a little lower than the angels. Man in his pristine state, could hold fellowship with his God; and although he is only a wreck of what he was made, he still

manifests such parts and powers, as incontrovertibly assert that he is now capable of attaining to high and holy things.

Man, to use the language of holy writ in application to body and mind, is "fearfully and wonderfully made." Wherever we glance, the powers and achievements of the

human mind arrest our attention, and command our admiration. Mind has subdued earth, air, and seas; and compelled them to unite their powers and their treasures, to enrich God's creature man:—it has stepped across the bounds of space, and soaring to distant worlds, has computed their vastness and determined their weight:—it has bounded across the once pathless oceans, and laid down with unerring exactness, high-roads across the mighty deep:—it has sunk into the gloomy caverns of the deep waters, and pierced the bowels of the earth, fetching therefrom treasures to enrich and adorn mankind:—and by mind, the very elements do man's bidding, and carry with the speed of lightning, his messages through earth, air, and seas. These and ten thousand other things, attest the wondrously inventive powers of the human mind. But one thing was too lofty for the invention of man,—that one thing was language. It needed the power of an Almighty Creator, to call into being those words which could supply to man a fitting vehicle in which to convey his thoughts. Mighty and stupendous as are the achievements of man, he is powerless to create. Give him materials, and he is fruitful in the invention of forms; but it is beyond his province to call into being that which does not exist.

If we can substantiate man's claim as the originator of Language, we at once prove him to possess one of the attributes which can belong only to God. It is as much a creation to originate a language, as a world. He only can do the former, who has the power to bring into being the latter. Man cannot originate a single thought, much less invent a language, which is the garment of every thought. We hear much concerning the creation of genius; but tell us whoever wrote a single thought on paper, which thought was not called into being by something totally exterior to the mind that seemed to produce it. Man thinks, but he only thinks of those things which by some channel are conveyed to his mind. Man speaks, but never speaks till he is taught a language; and if a language had not been prepared for him, he would have remained as dumb as the ape, through all time.

We have no hesitation in affirming that

God must be the author of language inasmuch as every human being comes into the world without a language. Children must be taught the language of the land wherein they are born, before they can make their wants known. This has been the order of things, ever since the first child was born. A. C., his coadjutor "Philologus," or any who think with them, cannot point to a single instance, where any person invented a language for himself. Children have been beholden to their parents, and they alike to those who came into the world before; and so on, until we arrive at the first man.

Is it possible to believe that man could have been the inventor of language, and yet never leave any record of that most important event? Every nation under the sun has its tradition, which points, more or less distinctly, to the facts of man's creation,—his innocence, his fall, the deluge, and ten thousand other minor events; but each and all are silent respecting the truth which A. C. wishes us to believe. Yes, nowhere can we find it recorded either in history, poetry, or fable, that man was the inventor of language. Is not such a silence more powerful against A. C.'s argument, than ten thousand analogical deductions can be, in favour of it? We repeat, that it is impossible to believe that man would have left his offspring ignorant of the fact, if he had been the inventor of language.

A. C. has assumed, or invented, what we will term a *false fact*. He says, that Language starts from a very imperfect original, and that as it progresses, it improves. In other words, according to his *ipse dixit*, we are to believe that the earliest languages were of a very rude and barbarous nature: and that man has, during the lapse of ages, continued to improve them. Surely A. C. cannot be arguing earnestly in thus speaking. We shall look at his reply, to learn what modern language has been improved by the skill of our modern men. Will A. C. tell us, that the modern Italian or Greek is an improvement upon the ancient? Will he be able to show that our modern English has been improved by the invention of modern linguists? To each and all of these questions we fearlessly venture a negative. Our modern English, may not be so rude as that spoken in the time of Chaucer:

but let A. C. not forget that the improved English, as he terms it, owes its improvement, not to the invention of modern linguists; no, but if improved at all, all the improvements are drawn from other and far more ancient languages. Will A. C. be kind enough to show us in his reply, what improved English words have been invented since the time of Chaucer?

If any one thing, more than another, can show the absurdity of those who speak of an invented language, it is simply this fact,—that the *oldest languages are always the richest in materials, the most perfect in analogy, the most uniform in etymological structure*. Philology, too, instructs us that those very words which the advocates for an invented language consider the most difficult to invent, and, therefore, as the last introduced, are, in fact, the *basis of all Languages*. For instance, the pronouns and numerals, which Adam Smith considers of recent introduction, are known to have been the oldest parts of every tongue; for it is just these words which retain their identity in languages which have been longest separate, and have, therefore, become most unlike in particulars. The effect of increased use upon the structure of inflected language, is rather to weaken and corrupt, than to improve and amplify.*

What then becomes of the argument of A. C. which he has founded upon his assumed imperfection of language? To use the language of our great poet, it is as the "baseless fabric of a vision." We hardly need address ourselves to any other point in the argument adduced by A. C. His superstructure must fall, as we have now taken away the foundations upon which it rested. But lest we might let it appear by our silence, that his assertions could not all be met, we will briefly address a few remarks to what he has advanced concerning natural causes. He informs us, but upon what authority, he does not show, that we have no need to attribute Language to the Deity, inasmuch as natural causes are plainly visible. Such an assertion seems bold in the extreme. What! was the confusion of tongues at the Tower of Babel, a natural cause? Will A. C. have the temerity to

contend that no such wonderful event ever took place? If the Bible be true,—and show us the man that can disprove one of its statements,—then no natural causes can be adduced, which can prove that man is the inventor of language.

Perhaps some of A. C.'s natural causes are the organs of speech which every properly formed human being possesses. But we are compelled firmly to believe, that He who gave man the organs of speech, gave also unto him language to be used by those said organs. Our friend has most strangely inferred that because God endowed Adam with the organs of articulation, he consequently left him to invent a language to be used by the said organs. But as A. C. loves the analogical method to prove his doctrine, where we ask, can he find any analogy, that will bear him out in making such an inference? Did God, when he gave Adam the organs of mastication, and digestion, leave him to invent food to be acted upon and used by those organs? Did he, when he had formed the eye, leave man to invent sight? Did he, when he had formed the ear, leave Adam to invent sound? Where then is the analogy? Surely he who gave the organs, it is reasonable to conclude, gave also the language without which the organs of articulation would be useless. And here we cannot refrain from taking up our friend's own logical argument. He says, that God created nothing imperfect, *ergo* he could not have left Adam dumb, because a dumb man is an imperfect man: he needs language. If God had left Adam to invent a language, he would undoubtedly have left Adam in an imperfect state.

Where then are A. C.'s natural causes, which convince him that man is the inventor of Language? We must not go to Nature for the solution of this question; we must go to Nature's God. The God of Nature, who is the God of the Bible, has, in the said revelation, revealed to man, that he it was who originated the diverse tongues used by all the tribes of the earth. We will offer no argument to prove the truth of the Bible account of what took place at Babylon; but we will adduce a quotation, which will show how the ancients understood Language to have had its origin. "Ancient and

* New Cratylus, book i., chap 3, page 52.

profane writers corroborate, by their testimony, the fact of a confusion of tongues as occurring at Babylon. The fable of giants attempting to climb the heavens, probably originated in this fact. Josephus quotes one of the sibyls as affirming that all mankind spoke the same language, till some of them *erected a tower immensely high*, which was overthrown by the gods, who assigned to each a particular language." Alydemes, as preserved by Eusebius, uses similar terms in reference to the remarkable event. The Greeks attributed the divinity of human language to a Divine interposition; though, according to their practice, they have wrought it into fable. Shall we hesitate in saying that the Bible account, after their corroborating testimony, is true? If then, it is true, that the present languages are from God; the one which existed before the many was from God also; for the proof of the many is more than sufficient to attest that God was the author of the one. But this fact becomes self-evident, the more we know concerning the structure of languages. Those who have made Language their study, have demonstrated that though they are not sprung from one parent Language, yet their agreement in so many particulars, is a convincing proof that they all sprung from a common author; and that author is God.

But one more remark, and then we shall wait to see what A. C. can bring forward

in his reply to nullify the force of the facts we have adduced. By attending carefully to the first chapters in the Bible, we learn that Adam held converse with his God. Could he have done so, had he had to invent a language? Must we not, however much it may rob man of the honor A. C. would bestow upon him, come to the irresistible conclusion, that God, before Adam could speak with him, taught him a language?

We have now done. We leave the foregoing in the hands of the intelligent readers of the "Controversialist," and in conclusion, we beg to assure A. C. that, however good are his intentions, he must, before he can argue rightly upon this question, pay a little more attention to the facts recorded in the Bible; to the legends of the ancient and modern nations; and above all, compare the parity of the modern languages, with the far more powerful, brilliant, and pure languages of the ancients. We may boast of our modern inventions, of our steam, our types, and telegraphs; but in all conscience, do not let us arrogate to ourselves the improvement of Language, when, not a word is in our vocabularies, which was not either borrowed from the ancients, or is a mongrel compound, which cannot be explained without the help of some of those languages which it is said we have improved.

Shorncliffe.

W. T.

HUMAN—III.

The origin of Language is involved in such obscurity, as to have been pronounced beyond the bounds of human knowledge. It is one of those subjects that will ever agitate the human mind; and the inquiry respecting it will be eagerly pursued by human reason and curiosity. "An obstinate activity within," and an insuperable desire for self-knowledge, prompts man in this investigation; and hence the importance of the nearest approximation to truth, in relation to this and every other subject. So far as our own investigation has gone, the evidence preponderates in favour of the human origin of Language; and we will now unfold our reasons for this conclusion.

The supporters of the Divine origin of

Language, and among them E. Y., have confounded Language with the means of articulating sounds, and with the natural apparatus of speech. If the question were Did God originally endow man with the means of speech? we should not hesitate to give the affirmative. But since our inquiry regards Language, *i. e.*, the communication of ideas through words and in symbols of spoken sounds, the inquiry, as well as our conclusion, is different. The question, then, is not—Did man invent the instruments of speech, the larynx and glottis for instance? but, "Did he invent the simple signs, the terms, the peculiar sounds, by which certain ideas of his own were originally communicated to the under-

standing of others?" This is a radical distinction, and yet one upon the confounding of which many arguments have been based.

But E. Y. says—"The Creator must have endowed our first parents with the power of forming articulate sounds, made them fully sensible of the power they possessed, and given them an impulse to exert it." If this be admitted, he argues, the Divine origin of Language is admitted also. But there is a vast difference between the mere power of articulation and the peculiarities of sound denotive of ideas. The Creator, we say, originally gave man his vocal capacity; but did he, by supernatural means, cause its exertion, and direct Adam in the *naming* of his ideas? We think not. By a wise providence, the first human mind was brought into relation with surrounding objects, and from the contact of the newly formed intellect with co-existing creatures, thought and speech were elicited. Thus scriptural evidence points to the conclusion that Language was left to the industry and invention of man; for it was as Judge, rather than as Creator, that God watched Adam in the difficult operation of naming the animals.

It may be said, however, that the primary apparatus of speech—the means of articulating sounds—being not of human invention, neither is Language, since the latter must necessarily be based upon the existence of the former; and that, if Language presupposes ideas, their communication presupposes the primary elements. Articulation of sound, truly, is necessary to speech; but is it the originator of it? We admit it is the primary vehicle—the natural medium in idea-communication; but there is yet a wide gap to be filled up before from these crude elements a system of speech for human wants and social necessities can be formed. A natural must be made subservient to an artificial medium; and for the true origin of Language we must look to the human employer, and to what he communicated. With some of the elements of Language man was naturally endowed, and some he had to invent himself; but out of these it was reserved for him by the Creator to originate language by his own unaided will; and thus the mind of man

formed and systemized what was once meaningless and void; and filled up, as his ingenuity could devise, what he conceived necessary to completeness and perfection. To transport industrial products from hemisphere to hemisphere, man has the ocean at command; but we cannot argue from this, that the artificial vehicle, the ship, is of Divine origin, although ocean and air may be to the vessel what the vessel is to its freight—the medium of transportation;—neither can Language, as transporting intellectual product from mind to mind, be called divine in origin, because the means of articulation had prior existence.

That mankind have never been devoid of speech, although at first crude and imperfect, is a truth, corroborated by Scripture; but no argument can hence be founded for giving it a divine origin. A primitive Language there must have been from Adam's time downwards; but so long as his immediate descendants were allied in family intercourse, so long only must that Language have been invariable in character. The time spoken of in Genesis xi., 1, "When the whole earth was of one Language and one speech," proves the unity of intercourse till then, of the human family. But when men, in their vain-glory, would cope with the Divinity—when the Almighty vengeance was inflicted upon them—and when the most vulnerable point of human pride—*Language*—was confounded, did not this imply, in the fullest extent, its human origin? If the Creator had taught man to name ideas, and to build the goodly structure of Language, would he have thus subverted the work of his own hand, or would he supernaturally have confounded what, if divinely formed, must have deserved the character of Divine perfection?

Science and mental philosophy have established no clearer truth than that Language is essentially progressive. Our knowledge of mental operations furnishes us with the fact that Language must progress with ideas; and as ideas rise from simple to complex, so Language similarly ascends. Analogical inquiry corroborates this. Children and savages in communicating their ideas, use terms of the simplest kind; and they display their limited knowledge, by first using nouns or the names of objects,

and, as they progress, turning these into verbs; while the other parts of speech, in use by civilized men, are unemployed. Analogy, therefore, as well as metaphysical science, contradict the *dicta* of Dr. Johnson, that Language "must have come by inspiration." His argument that, "While the organs (of speech) are pliable, there is not understanding enough to form a Language," and that "by the time there is understanding enough, the organs are become stiff," is applicable to children alone. If Adam had been created a babe, this argument would have been plausible; but as the Word of inspiration says otherwise, it is not.

But to conclude, Language, it is evident, is that multitudinous array of words, gradually amassed by man from the contact of his intellect, with surrounding existences;

and as all these words are names of ideas, or are all subservient to their communication, we infer that they are the product of man's intellectual industry and invention. Because certain natural elements were at man's command, we need not deprive him of the credit of moulding them to subserve his purposes. And when we find his Creator exercising the functions of Judge over this greatest of human efforts, appearing to regard Language as the account rendered by man himself of his relation to animate and inanimate things; we at once conclude that Language is the record and notation of human thought and progress, invented by the unaided will and powers of man himself.

R. L. G.

Politics.

OUGHT GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE A SECULAR EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE?

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—V.

Any question relating to the training of the human mind, deserves at the hands of every thoughtful Englishman, an attention which cannot be too deep, too sober, or too candid. And in proportion as the object—the mind—is important, and the interests—those no less of the individual, than of the community of which he is a member—are beyond computation weighty, should be the care with which the propositions of the controversy are balanced, and the wariness with which untenable or hasty conclusions are guarded against. And we feel that those who, with "Philomathos" and the writer of the present paper, advocate, as both reasonable and politic, the provision of education for the people by the State, should be peculiarly cautious; because their principle, if wrong, would necessarily produce, in its adoption, the greater evils. Nevertheless so confident are we of the lawful functions—nay, the incumbent duties of the state in this matter, and so equally con-

vinced of the fallacy of the *other* proposition of "Philomathos," that we will venture to offer a brief vindication of what we conceive to be the just view of the question.

A more curious contrast of conclusions from professedly the same premises, will hardly present itself in the course of this debate than between those of "G. N." and of "Philomathos," as to the actual condition of the rational mind; the one contending that the work of self-education is on the whole going on satisfactorily, and will by and by perfect itself; the other drawing a deplorable picture of the ignorance of the masses, and asserting the imperative necessity of interference and remedy. The latter seems to us the true view of the case; and with the first two propositions therefore of the last named writer we cordially concur. To the last we demur; and as the pith of the question is, not whether *Government* should provide education, but whether *if* provided, it should be *secular*,—

to that we shall address ourselves; only remarking, in passing, that a State must sadly mistake the very elementary principles of good government, if it confine its functions to the physical, the lesser; and leave the moral, the greater, to chance; if it judge and punish, but do not warn and instruct; and its failure in any degree, in these moral functions, may be a reason for amending the agency, but cannot justly be urged for the removal of the obligation.

To go no further then, we assert of "secular education," as understood by its friends, that it is *impossible*. This "G. N." has also asserted and defended, and it need not be much enlarged on here. If indeed "secular education" meant "reading, writing, and arithmetic" as the charity-school phrase goes; if a young person is ready for service in this complicated world of ours, as soon as he or she can put a name to a letter, or cast up figures on a slate, there would be little difficulty on the one side, and no objection on the other. But the instant any species of *moral training* is attempted, the insuperable difficulty begins. The task of teaching morals, irrespective of the Divine Source of moral purity; of inculcating the fear of man, independently of reverence for God; of regulating the mind harmoniously, without appealing to its higher energies, and teaching right principles of action, in a state of being dependent for all its value, and all its laws, upon another yet to come,—upon a simply temporary foundation—is so hopeless that one may well wonder how it can be seriously attempted. The very position of its defender goes to show its impossibility. The temporal and eternal are not opposed, their true interests are the same. Unquestionably, if they *were* opposed, you might teach the one alone; it is because they "run parallel," because they have a connection and a dependence, that you cannot. Let any reader, keeping these propositions in view, think over deliberately the constitution and nature of the mind of man; the ends and purposes of his existence; the bearing of every action of the life present, upon his position in the life future. Is not the present world *designedly* a probationary one? Is not preparation for a higher development the purpose of his being here at all? Are not human society, human laws,

human relations and obligations, the machinery of his moral culture, the indices of his moral standing, the arbitrators of his moral destiny? How then can that be more than a shadow and a mockery of moral training, which professes to effect it without reference to those laws by which alone the mind can be adequately educated and disciplined; on in any comprehensive sense, educated at all? How can immortal mind, in the very nature of things, be taught *beside* its immortality? and if you teach immortality, you at once teach things religious. Education for time alone is simply a chimera.

But granting it possible,—granting the attempt might be made to teach, besides the mere machinery of the intellect, some vague and meagre moral conventionalisms,—we assert, further, that such an attempt would be *unjust*. Can a greater injustice to the recipients be conceived, than to impart in so momentous a matter, by public authority, and with the influence of the State, so contracted and insufficient an education as that contemplated; keeping back things of the most vital, because eternal character; teaching all things but the highest and the best? Is this the office of "nursing fathers and nursing mothers;" is this the Divine purpose in constituted authority? If it were safe, easy, manageable, have you any *right* to do it? Separate communities may supply the spiritual element. But that is a contingency. If you omit either element, why not afford the greater, and leave the *less* to contingencies? It is a favourite argument that the different religious bodies will educate their respective members. So they may; but necessarily at disjointed intervals, and, if the intellect only be systematically trained, day by day, elsewhere, it will be done at a manifest disadvantage. But while *all* are members of the State, and may be taught by it, all are by no means members of any church—and this constitutes the principal reason why education is so much needed. Those who are members of religious communities, and have their children trained under their care, are precisely those who least need the remedy contended for. It is the vast uneducated, many-passioned mass, beyond the control of any merely voluntary, and to them repulsive,

religious systems, that constitute the source of the nation's danger and should engage the nation's solicitude and attention. What is to be done for *them*? Educate them. But how? "In intellect, without God?" In the "beggary elements" of a wildly-animal transformed into a coldly-mechanical being, Bible-less, Saviour-less, without a future hope or fear, without the whispering, (save they light on it by chance,) of an eternity that may bring but a miserable immortality for themselves, and a malediction upon their father-land for teaching them all except *that*? What a stone would this be for the bread of life which, beyond all things, our countrymen require!

And lastly, we impugn secular education, *as such*, as *unsafe*; and that in three respects.

1.—As it regards the individual. What standard of a *man*—in the proper sense of the word, could we expect such a system to produce? A mere creature of temporary circumstances. An intellectual puppet,—proud, as human nature ever is, till the truths of the Gospel have taught it better; careless of the future, because—so far at least as it depended on his education—ignorant of it; and towards his fellow-men, except from policy or the impulses of a rare and capricious natural temperament;—callous and perhaps reckless. Would all the hosts of darkness, all the legions of vice, and profanity experience a moment's fear at a nation thus taught? All the contributors to this Journal appear to exhibit a reverence for religion. But how could you expect to secure that, under "secular education?" Could any sceptic irony be severer than the nation's own conduct, in leaving untaught, except chance might teach it, that which it professed to regard as of the first importance? What opinion could a man entertain of religion, as superior to things secular, if he found he had been carefully tutored in *these*, while *that* was left to be learnt or not, just as it might happen?

2.—To the State, socially. The creation of such a race as that indicated, would be

fraught with the utmost peril to the whole social system. The enforcement of human obligations, where divine had been untaught, would be found, when too late, a simple delusion. The "dangerous classes" would be invested with a power of mischief in proportion to their power of intellect. God dishonoured, man would assuredly be scorned and oppressed. This *might* be prevented by the voluntary action of religious schemes; but with the drawbacks before hinted at, this is only a possibility; and possibilities, in considering a question of cause and effect, we may wish for, but have no right to contemplate as a portion of the argument.

3.—As regards the State, religiously. The Christianity of the national mind would be materially prejudiced. Religion banished from the ordinary and every day gradations of instruction, instead of being blended and intertwined with all; and this going on for years, acting on the plasticity of youth, and having nothing to balance it but occasional, perhaps weekly, tuition in things exclusively religious, and, on that account, to many, less attractive,—who could wonder if the individual mind should contract a contempt for religion, or a conception of it as a Sunday business; and what marvel if the *national* mind should imperceptibly assume a colouring which no well-wisher to his country would desire it to wear?

We are aware of the difficulties of the question. We earnestly condemn the jealousy and rigidity of the Protestant Churches, who we are convinced might with little effort adopt a common basis for the common good. But even though they should still delay the progress of a holy work, we cannot consent to found on their divisions a plea for a scheme which, as Christians and patriots, we cannot contemplate without repugnance and alarm. But we have faith in the progress of truth, and therefore look for an improvement in public opinion, upon this and many kindred subjects.

J. S. J.

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

MR EDITOR,—Perhaps you will allow me to indulge in a few remarks upon the first articles which have appeared in your pages on the negative side of this all-important question. In your No. for May, the most plausible objections to national secular education are stated in a skilful, lucid, and candid manner, by a writer signing himself G. N.; and in your June No., the arguments of a previous writer (Philomathos) are canvassed with great ability by a correspondent who signs himself J. M. S. It is to the papers of these two contributors that I mean to confine my attention.

G. N. arranges his charges against national secular education under four heads, to which I shall briefly advert in their order.

1.—The first is based on the fallacy that the abettors of secular education advocate it to the exclusion of the doctrines of religion. Allow me to ask, Is the time of a child's attendance at school, all the time that he has to devote to improvement? Has he no father, no mother, no Sabbath-school teacher, no pastor? If he has, are not these sufficient to give him competent religious instruction? If he has not these advantages,—if his parents are atheistical,—then the teaching of religion to the child, against the will of the father, is a gross violation of liberty. Christianity asks no unwilling votaries. Her weapons are gentleness and persuasion. Her strongest expression is, "Come." But it may be asked—For this reason alone would you exclude the religious element altogether from the school, and thereby cast obloquy upon the cause of religion? In reply to this, I beg leave to transcribe the following sentence from Dr Chalmers:—"In any public measure for helping on the education of the people, Government should abstain from introducing the element of religion at all into their part of the scheme; and this, not because they hold the matter to be insignificant;—the contrary may be strongly expressed in the preamble of their act; but on the ground that in the present divided state of the Christian world they would take no cognizance of—because they would attempt no control over—the religion of the appli-

cants for aid." But the position can be defended on higher grounds than that of mere expediency; for if purely secular education in the school is unjustifiable, then it must be equally so in the closet. Consequently, it is wrong in me to read any book which does not contain something more than simple secular knowledge. Then, Mr Editor, by this reasoning, I have gone astray in so far as I perused the last No. of your excellent serial, which contained no article on Religion. Further, I must never again study Euclid, Virgil, Blackstone, or Lindley Murray, because they contain nothing beyond bare secular information.

G. N. tells us, that to give a secular education, to the exclusion of religious training, is to repeat by actions the assertion of the fool, "There is no God."

That the view of the question I advocate, does not shut out—far less, prohibit—religious instruction, I have already attempted to show. To see the system in its true working, I would refer to the educational machinery of Holland. There all secular knowledge is given under the superintendence of the State; while all religious instruction is committed to the clergymen of the respective denominations to which the parents belong. From the reasoning of our friend, we might infer that he considers this almost tantamount to the utter preclusion of religion. And yet, where will you find a nation more unostentatiously pious, and habitually decent, than the Dutch.* This evidence is, to me, sufficient.

2.—The second objection which G. N. adduces, should have been brought forward first; for, whenever its validity can be established, the whole question is settled, in the opinion of every sincere truth-seeker. It is, that there is no necessity for Government interference in the affairs of Education, as "the work is being done by other hands." How he has established the truth of this proposition, let a careful perusal of his observations, and of the following comments upon them show. He tells us of "consid-

* See Chambers's "Tour in Holland and the countries of the Rhine."

erable additions to existing facilities for Education"—viz., "schools, mechanics' institutes, lectures, libraries, reading-rooms, societies of various kinds, normal schools, cheap literature, &c." All this is stupendous and imposing; but it gives us a one-sided view of the matter. An elephant is a strong animal, and bulky withal; but put him beside "the Greenland monster," and who suffers by the comparison? The means can only be justly measured by a comparison with the end in view. Apply this to the case in hand, and you will see whether our present educational establishments are adequate to the wants of our country. Has any sensible impression been made upon the masses of the ignorant in our large cities, or our rural districts? Is not the empire of ignorance extending itself more rapidly than that of knowledge? Are intemperance, crime, and brutality, on the wane? If not, how can the work be advancing "rapidly and satisfactorily, by voluntary agency," as J. M. S. tells us? Does not a large proportion of our cheap literature bear evidence of a depraved and uncultivated taste? Both your correspondents have taken this position for granted, without adducing further proof than that to which we have referred. Surely, before advancing such a statement, they were bound to encircle it with a stern array of facts. That our educational apparatus is extensive, we allow; but it is not proportionate to the juncture in which we are placed.

The argument drawn from the English State-church, I think, is quite inconclusive. We do not defend the State-church, but it should be remembered—1st, That in it the power is lodged in the Government; whereas, in the educational scheme we advocate, the control would be equally divided between the Government and the people. 2nd, That in its very original, the Episcopal church was ill fitted for performing the duties of a church, having been established by a capricious tyrant. The fault lies not so much in its being under the Government, as in its original constitution. Look to the educational establishments of Scotland, under the wing of the Established church. Incalculable is the good which they have done to the country, although they are in-

efficient to supply its present wants. Their good effects, on the one hand, show the soundness of the general principle; and their deficiencies, on the other hand, call for such an extension as shall make them commensurate with the requirements of the age. To assert that because the Episcopal State-church has not fulfilled all the ends which a church should, therefore all Government measures must be detrimental, or at least negatively good, is to imitate the Roman emperor who wished that all the inhabitants of the Eternal city had but one neck, that he might decapitate them with a single blow? G. N. informs us that it has been the pressure from without that has been the means of bringing about most of the educational blessings which we enjoy. Is there no pressure from without upon the present topic? All useful and substantial reforms come primarily from the people;—and if secular education have all other prerequisites, it does not lack the "pressure from without." The allegation, that the Government stepped forward to interfere only when it saw that the people were likely to educate themselves, is in the "face and teeth" of facts; for it has ever been the policy of the British government to follow, rather than to lead in this matter.

3.—The third count in the indictment, we consider the weightiest, and to it we answer, that the evils complained of will always be diminishing as the system advances. An educated people will seldom fail being a free people. What has been the cause of the recent triumph of absolutism over Europe?—what but that the people's mental culture not being in proportion to their physical strength, they could not retain the conquests they had won? It is mainly by Education that the people will secure their freedom. But freedom implies a share in the choice of representatives; and the nearest approximation to a perfect state of liberty is that in which the people and their government are identical in design and action;—so that the defects which S. N. points out must always decline in the same ratio as the people become enlightened, and, consequently, powerful. Again: it should be remembered that the teacher and his staff of apprentices are not to be wholly under the control of the rulers

of the country. The latter will have to share their influence with local associations, whose unlimited sway would be as injurious to the teachers as the absolute authority of the Government would be dangerous to the people. It is desirable that there should be established that reciprocal restraint—that mutual check which Blackstone so much extols.

4.—To the last objection we have only to say, that Government in their desire for the welfare of the whole body politic, must look always to the interest and welfare of the majority. There is scarcely any measure but what may be injurious to some parties, and objectionable to many. So that to make this consideration a sufficient reason for the abandonment of an educational scheme would prevent all reform, and, in fact, all legislation whatever.

The paper of J. M. S. is occupied by an attempt to refute the arguments of "Philomathos." In regard to the observations he makes on the appeal of "Philomathos" to religious men, I think it is sufficient to state, that it is not for anything which any parties in this country have done, but it is for what all parties have not done, that he administers to them a well-merited rebuke.

J. M. S. makes his first onslaught on his opponent's proposition, "that ignorance is the main cause of crime." He seems desirous not so much of proving the absolute fallacy of the assertion, as of finding a flaw in the reasoning. It can be demonstrated that ignorance is the parent of crime, from the fact, that knowledge, the opposite of ignorance, is, to a considerable degree, the exterminator of crime. We do not deny that there are "gentleman ruffians"—intellectual criminals." But where is the human rule without exception?—and J. M. S. cannot deny that the cases he cites form but exceptions to the rule. And as the exception is held to prove the rule, the instances advanced by him only establish the truth of the proposition, that as knowledge increases, crime, in the same degree, diminishes. We do not shut our eyes to the other causes of crime which J. M. S. brings forward; but still, is it not among the most ignorant of our poorer and uneducated classes that crime is most prevalent?

J. M. S. endeavours to subvert the proposition that Education ought to be pro-

vided by the Government by a *reductio ad absurdum*. I think in this undertaking he has signally failed; for it is impossible for him to establish a perfect parallelism between what he considers analogical cases. When "Philomathos" asserts that Education is necessary, he does so with reference to the peculiar situation of our country at the present time. Now where are the analogical premises by which J. M. S. arrives at the same conclusion regarding food? Will he assert that there are as many unfed in this country as uneducated? But we ask him, if there came such a crisis in our country's history, that at least seven individuals in every nine were in a state of starvation,—that this national famine was the cause of crime of the blackest dye, and to an incalculable extent,—and that those who had "enough, and to spare," wrangled loudly and angrily with each other as to the fittest way of administering it;—would the Government of the country not be justified in coming forward, and adjusting matters? Moreover, has the Government not virtually asserted, that so far as in it lies, all the people should be fed? Does not every workhouse and parochial relief board throughout the kingdom proclaim this? Do not the grants of money to famishing Ireland declare it? Now, all that we ask is, that as the nation supplies bodily subsistence to those who cannot otherwise obtain it, so it should administer mental nourishment to those who, unaided, are unable to procure it.

The concluding remarks of J. M. S. are unfair and irrelevant, inasmuch as they exceed the limits of the question under discussion. The point in debate is, "Ought the Government to *provide*," &c. If "Philomathos" erred in using an inappropriate term, he was censurable; but it was, surely, unjust, after noticing that aberration, to commit one of a grosser kind, and introduce facts and opinions which were quite foreign to the point.

In conclusion, after having examined all the arguments, adverse as well as favourable, on this question, I am convinced, that in the existing state of matters, that it is the duty of the Government to provide Education, and its wisdom to interfere with nothing but *secular* Education.

Dundee.

Digitized by Google W. K.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

As one of the openers of the present debate, it is our privilege to reply to the various arguments which have been advanced by our opponents: yet as the subject has been so fully dealt with by the various writers, we think it unnecessary that our reply should be long. We shall for the most part confine ourselves to the arguments which have been advanced by W. K., in opposition to our own.

We think that W. K. has, at the outset, fallen into an error in confounding *Education* with *Instruction*. The ideas which are represented by these two words, are, in our estimation, perfectly distinct. To educate implies to draw out, to develop; to instruct, to build up, or to communicate information. A child may be educated physically, mentally, or morally: it can only be instructed mentally. Instruction may indeed, and does, in most cases, form the basis of education; but instruction is *not* education. If we educate the physical powers of a child, and at the same time furnish him with suitable food, we may have a strong man. If we educate his mental powers, and at the same time give him proper information, we may have a learned and a clever man; and if we educate his moral nature, and at the same time furnish him with suitable examples, we may have a virtuous man. Now it does not follow that because a man is strong that therefore he is wise; nor that because he is wise that therefore he is good. A man may be any one or two of these without being the other. By a reference to our former paper W. K. will see that we asserted that "it is impossible to give a *complete* secular education without at the same time giving a religious education; inasmuch as in order to be useful—really useful—in the highest sense of the word, he must possess religious principle in such a state of development as to be able to overcome all temptation to vice; and in order to this there must be religious education!" J. K. however, intimates that the abettors of secular education do not advocate it to the exclusion of the *doctrines* of religion, and that these *doctrines* may be inculcated elsewhere. But

what are doctrines? Doctrines are *instruction*. We contend, however, that if the child is to become a virtuous man, he must be educated in virtue, not merely instructed in certain doctrines of religion, whereas this last is all that could be expected from the plan which W. K. suggests.

W. K. says "if purely secular education in the school be unjustifiable, then it must be equally so in the closet." Doubtless it is; but it does not follow on that account that the reading of a purely secular work is unjustifiable. In order to place the study on a level with the school he must exclude all religious study (for mere reading is not worthy of the name of Education in the study, any more than mere instruction in the school,) from the one, just as he would exclude it from the other.

W. K. complains that a large portion of our cheap literature bears evidence of a depraved and uncultivated taste. If we allow this, does it not rather tell against the position of State Educationists—that a secular education is the great antidote of all human woes, for we think that it must be allowed that the writers of cheap literature are not destitute of a Secular Education. If this kind of Education has done so little for them, what guarantee have we that it would do more for the masses?

W. K. allows that "it has ever been the policy of the government to follow rather than to lead" in the matter of Education; in other words, that it would not be the path of wisdom for the government to do more than they are urged to from without. If the impulse of the people be absolutely necessary to carry forward the work, how much better it would be for the people to do the work themselves than to entrust it to the government! By doing the work themselves they would at least know what they had to trust to; whereas, by trusting to the government, even according to W. K., they are likely to be deceived; and past experience, we are sorry to say, as far as educational matters are concerned, fully bears him out. In our former paper we adverted to the State Church as a specimen of Government Education. W. K. acknow-

ledges it to have been a failure, but attributes that failure to its original constitution. Is it not rather attributable to the circumstance that it is a State Church? Is it not probable that the Episcopal Church would have been incalculably more beneficial to the country if it had been dependent on the voluntary contributions and efforts of its members?

Again, W. K. informs us that an educated people will seldom fail to be free; and that "it is mainly by Education that the people will secure their freedom!"

Now those who profess to know, tell us that the people (generally), in this country, occupy a much higher standing than they did before the introduction of Sunday School instruction; and persons, who have travelled on the continent, inform us that the German people are very much better educated than we are at the present time. But if the newspapers speak truth, the Germans do not possess liberty to anything like the extent we do: nor are they at present in a very fair way to retain the liberty which they possess. Whereas, according to W. K.'s hypothesis they ought, being better educated, to be very far beyond us in this respect, which they are not; not only so, it is a well-known fact, that we, notwithstanding our ignorance, obtained *two hundred years ago*, and have retained to the present day, an amount of liberty beyond that which the German people at *present* possess, notwithstanding that the government scheme of education adopted in Germany, is held up as a model to the world.

Let it not be thought for one moment that we would disparage education, yet we are convinced that mere education is not the thing to obtain, or secure, liberty. It must be *self-education*. If the German people had educated themselves to the extent to which they are educated by others,

they would have had liberty long ago; for being habituated to stand upright, to depend upon themselves, they would long ago have ceased to depend on governments. In this respect, the education of the English is far superior to that of the Germans. To this fact, probably more than any other, we owe our superior standing as a nation.

But, we think we hear it whispered—we secular educationists do not intend to give the Government the entire controul in this matter; we intend education to be managed by local boards, and paid for out of a parish rate. What! then you intend to make the mass of the people paupers, do you? What scheme do you think *could* be more calculated to undermine, and ultimately to destroy that independence which is a principal characteristic in Englishmen? We question whether the founder of Jesuitism himself could have contrived one. Certainly, if you carry this scheme into execution, you may calculate upon a considerable accession to the poor-rates; for if men are willing to send their children to a *parish school*, it is scarcely to be expected that they will object much to apply to the parish for the *necessaries of life*.

It must be allowed that poverty in itself "is no sin," yet we think that even W. K. will admit that *paupers* are not in the very *best* position to maintain independence.

W. K. maintains that "Government in their desire for the welfare of the whole body politic, must look always to the interest and welfare of the majority." In cases where the minority have enjoyed advantages at the expense of the majority, we are willing to grant this. But we conceive a majority has no *right* to crush a minority, even though it may have the *power*. Might does not make right.

G. N.

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

MR EDITOR. The very able and lucid manner in which the debate on the Education question has been conducted, has given me much pleasure, and causes me still more and more to rejoice that such a medium as

your valuable magazine affords, for the promotion and encouragement of a spirit of inquiry,—for the creating of a habit of testing the rationality of opinions, and thus augmenting the likelihood of the triumph

of truth,—exists. It is of the utmost importance that such a work should be widely circulated, as it would materially lessen the number of those parties who possess a fatal facility for accepting opinions upon the credit of great names, rather than from the accuracy of the *data* upon which they are based, and the corrections of the inferences deduced from *these data*. Men who are continually engaged in active thought,—whose minds are alert, acute, and cautious, have an immense advantage over those who are swayed by their feelings, and whose intellect is unacquainted with the dangerous use which is frequently made of the power of sophistry. There is no more frequent way of producing a prejudice against any opinion, than by seizing upon some vague common-place generality, which men are in the habit of employing, and endeavouring to set the question at issue,—whatever it may be,—in seeming antagonism to that “half soulless phrase which men unthinking utter.”

Such is, as we think, the manner in which G. N. and J. M. S. have sought to argue, when the former declares, as a reason for his opposition to Governmental, secular, education, his “attachment to the principles of civil and religious liberty;” and the latter appeals to “liberty-loving Englishmen” against the adoption of the opinions of his “friend Philomathos.” Now let us ask ourselves the following questions, and answer them impartially; and then decide which is right. What is it that produces so much intemperance, so many gross vices, so much animality and want of moral action, amongst the lower classes of the inhabitants of the British Isles;—Education, or the want of it? What is it that causes so much poverty? Is it the knowledge of the vast resources which nature contains,—the mighty powers of mechanical agencies, an acquaintance with the laws of life and sanitation, or a knowledge of the principles of political and social science, which Education would bestow; or, is it the want of it? What is it that makes the people the ready prey of quacks and hypocrites, especially those of a political and religious kind,—Education or the want of it? Can liberty be best prized, or most ably and energetically defended, by ignorant men, or is *he* “attached to religious liberty” who would not suffer the intellect to be

trained without being indoctrinated with the tenets of a sect?

He alone can esteem liberty aright, whose mind is invigorated by knowledge, and whose zeal is enlivened by the examples of the great and good of whose deeds History informs him. He alone can resolutely struggle with his animal inclinations, whose intellect is leagued in bonds of amity with the heart, and he who has no vivid mental apprehension of the mighty evils of vice, will be comparatively impotent to keep his moral or religious resolves.

To J. M. S.'s query, why we charge, by implication, criminality upon the friends of voluntary education, to whose efforts, according to him, “we owe most of the educational institutions which adorn the land,” we simply answer, we do not feel offended at the good they *have done*, but we feel strongly inclined to charge them with criminality because of the immense good which they *prevent from being done*. If they ardently desire the spread of knowledge, why not choose an effectual and universal remedy, rather than a partial and ineffectual one? But is it not rather the fact that they would rather see men remain ignorant, than by enlightening them enable them to see in the clear light of day the folly of their petty schisms and contentions. We fear so; else, why this jealous apprehension of the advancement of intelligence. Does not “Godless education,” in their vocabulary, mean unsectarian education? Or, if not, why this stickling for sectarian points of faith? Why is it impossible to gain some common points of faith and practice on which all can agree? Why does each sect so strenuously oppose any concession? Is it better that men should be both ignorant and irreligious? Or do some of the sectaries believe that as knowledge advances, “their craft is in danger to be set at nought.”

But this is arguing upon their own notion—false though it is—that we repudiate all other Education besides that which is secular. Now so far from this being the case, we expressly stipulate that the clergy of each sect should take the charge of the religious instruction of the people, upon the grounds that the sacredness of the study would be best preserved by that system; while at the same time it is presumable that

these parties will be the most devoted, as well as the best qualified, teachers of "the way to attain a godly life."

We must recollect, however, that while our opponents strenuously oppose any Education, unless it provide for the impregnation of the youthful mind with doctrinal and sectarian dogmas, and thus range themselves in an adverse body to those who desire "that Government should *provide* a Secular Education," and consequently prevent the adoption of a universal plan of instruction,—Education is a thing which is continually going on. There is an Education derived from evil companions, from the intellectual, unrestrained exercise of the animal propensities, from the predominance of natural depravity over the higher qualities of human nature. This is an Education which consists in the outleading of the black-guardizing, pauperizing, vagrant-like, and theftuous elements of the mentality, entirely withdrawn, and apart from any moral guidance, any elevating tendency, any ameliorating influence, nay, directly under the direction of the demoralized and the abandoned. If governmentally-provided instruction would not bring forth "the fruits of righteousness," it would at least produce better fruits than the thorny thistles of criminality, of undirected and misdirected passion, of unreflectiveness, of rash and proud debasement; the production of men and women, "whose glory is in their shame, and who mind (only) earthly things." Can the "Sun of righteousness" shine more luminously through the hazy and murky atmosphere of ignorance, the mists of defilement and debasement, the darkness of intellectual immorality, "the shadows of the clouds" which environ the untaught intelligence, than through the serene sky, the healthy influences, the brilliancy and sunniness of the cultivated mind? Can "the beauty of holiness" be better perceived by the mentally blind, than by the couched and trained eye of the educated man? In the plan of education proposed in my previous paper, the moral nature of man is not ignored, because morality is essential in the attainment of "happiness and prosperity, and avoiding social misery and individual suffering." While, from the very fact of our proposing that the clergy should

bestow their exertions on the religious education of the young, we shew that we do not, in our zeal for the *seculum*, neglect the *secula seculorum*, which are yet to come; that we do not esteem time as the *all in all*, but "point with radiant finger up to God." We ask Government to *provide* a secular education, because it has no right to do more; leaving to the zeal of sectaries, the competition of rival opinion-holders; and to the honest and praiseworthy exertions of the true christian pastor we can look with confidence, that the "Godly up-bringing of the young" will be duly provided for.

But this fact, that Government is only to provide, or legalize a tax for the supply of a secular education, and that that tax is to be administered by local boards, sufficiently refutes the idea upon which G. N. lays so much stress—viz., the mighty system of patronage which it would empower Government to organize.

Is it possible that S. H. W. can have perused my article, in which (page 188,) I have defined what is meant by Secular Education; if so, how should he, with any show of fair play in discussion, write the following sentence? "The mere ability to read and write, with a little geography and grammar, and one or two other matters of general knowledge, is all the learning, I believe, they propose to impart in these schools." This sentence may mean one of two things; 1st, That I had been guilty of misrepresenting the case, and that he did not believe what I said—which is very complimentary—and, I think, undeserved. 2d, That so far as his information went, he believed &c. Upon this latter supposition he cannot have read the definition referred to, and, therefore, he had better turn to it, and give it an attentive perusal. The very able papers which have followed mine, have, in my humble opinion, fully substantiated the affirmative of the question, and I may, therefore, be permitted to conclude in the words of one of the *Edinburgh Reviewers*, who, speaking of our country, remarks that when "a minister of public instruction shall preside over her literature, her science, her arts, and her schools, she will then arrest the tide which has been carrying art and science from her shores; she will the reach that position which other nation

have pre-occupied ; and her free institutions, sustained by a pure altar and an instructed people, will acquire that permanency and strength which can only be derived from moral and intellectual greatness."

Greatly regretting that several pressing

duties of a professional nature have prevented me from more ably discharging the duty of respondent, and confident that good will result from the agitation of the question, I am, &c., PHILOMATHOS.

The Societies' Section.

THE ART OF SPEAKING.—No. XIV.

68. *Commendation* is the expression of approval ; it imparts, therefore, a mildness to the aspect, or gentle lovingness which makes the countenance pleasing. The eyes are bright, the mouth smiling, the hand stretched out friendly. The voice is encouraging and kind. In addresses to soldiery, or to a successful party, these gestures are combined with pride and courage, and the whole manifestations are heightened.

The following extract from a proclamation issued by Napoleon, a short time after the commencement of his Italian campaign will serve as an exemplification of the latter part of the description given above :—

"Soldiers!—In fifteen days ye have gained six victories, taken twenty-one standards, fifty-five pieces of cannon, several fortified places, and conquered the richest portion of Piedmont. Ye have taken fifteen thousand prisoners, and slain or wounded more than ten thousand men.

"You have fought with sterile rocks, rendered illustrious by your bravery, but useless to your country ; you now rival by your achievements the armies of Holland and the Rhine : destitute of all aid you have shewn you could dispense with it. You have won battles without artillery—passed rivers without bridges—made forced marches without shoes—bivouacked without brandy, and often without bread. Republican phalanxes ! Soldiers of liberty were alone capable of enduring what has been suffered by you. All praise be rendered unto you, Soldiers ! A grateful country will owe to you its prosperity ; and, if, as conquerors of Toulon ? you heralded the immortal campaign of 1793, your present victories augur one still more glorious. * * * * *

"You were destitute of everything at the opening of the campaign ; you are now abundantly provided. The magazines taken from your enemies are numerous ; the siege and field artillery have arrived. Soldiers ! your country expects great things from you. Will you justify its anticipations ? The most formidable difficulties are, doubtlessly, overcome ; but you have still battles to fight—towns to take—rivers to pass. Are there any amongst you whose courage wavers ? any who would rather return to the peaks of the Apennines and Alps, than encounter the attacks of a slavish soldiery ? No !—there are none such among the conquerors of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, Mondovi ! All of you burn with zeal to carry farther the renown of the French people. All desire to dictate a glorious peace—one calculated to indemnify your country for the immense sacrifices it has made ;—all desire, on returning into the bosom of their families, to say with pride, 'I belonged to the victorious army of Italy.' "

"Richmond encouraging his soldiers," and Henry "to his soldiers at Harfleur and Agincourt," are other familiar examples.

69. *Jealousy* wrinkles the forehead, corrugates the eyebrows, and half covers the eye, which gleams, with a fierce fiery glare from beneath the knit brows upon the object, the nostrils are stretched open, and the inspirations are frequent and full, the cheeks are indented with lines, the corners of the mouth are drawn down, the lips are pale; and anger, despair, anguish, and detestation are vividly depicted in the visage. But all furious passions are intermitent, so that anon the light of hope brightens the eye, the tides of love begin to circle round the heart, and to beautify the countenance, the mouth wreathes itself in smiles, and the mind seeks to hug the idea of security with sedulous fondness. Then, again, the gloom falls upon the soul, suspicion's poison-shafts rankle in the heart, and darkness falls upon the eye; rage surges in the bosom, and lashes about in fury; pity knocks at the soul, but vengeance denies it admittance; the breast heaves, the pulse quickens, the forehead becomes corded, the eye bloodshot, the face red and fierce. Thus a contentious war of passions is continually taking place with man's heart, for the battle ground. Victory now seems to declare itself in favour of the social affections, and then retracts her word to award the conquest to the worst passions of the depraved soul.—Othello, and Isabella in the "Fatal Marriage," &c., are familiar instances.

70. *Dotage* is the almost constant concomitant of old age; talkative, fond, doting, boastful memories of the past, delight in detailing the transactions which he has witnessed, or in which he bore a part. The eyes and cheeks are hollow, the voice tremulous and broken, the eyes dim, hearing defective, and defect of teeth, (making his garrulous narratives almost unintelligible,) the body stoops, the legs totter, the breathing is laborious and difficult, coughing is frequent, intermingled with sighs, groans, and interjectional clauses.

71. *Folly* gives a light, giddy, unsettled, and incoherent appearance to the gestures and speech. The eyes wander, the absurd gabble is continuous in its stream, although destitute of all continuity of subject or meaning.

72. *Distraction* gives a wild, glaring strangeness to the countenance. The eyes roll wildly, the teeth are set, the mouth is changing in expression, at one time the lips are down tight upon the teeth, again they are relaxed into a curious and unmeaning smile, there is a singular incongruousness between the different portions of the face, the expressions are continually varying, and the face thus resembles a lake in which a view is shadowed, but the shadow is distorted and disjointed by the ruffling of the waves in a storm.

Beatrice.—

"How comes this hair undone?

Its wandering strings must be what blind me so,
And yet I tied it fast. O, horrible!
The pavement sinks under my feet. The walls
Spin round! I see a woman weeping there,
And standing calm and motionless, while I
Slide giddily as the world reels—My God!
The beautiful blue heaven is flecked with blood!
The sunshine on the floor is black! The air
Is changed to vapours such as the dead breathe

In charnel pits! Poh! I am choked! there creeps
 A clinging, black, contaminating mist
 About me—'tis substantial, heavy, thick,
 I cannot pluck it from me, for it glues
 My fingers and my limbs to one another.
 My flesh to a pollution poisoning
 The subtle, pure, and inmost spirit of life!
 My God I never knew what the mad felt
 Before; for I am mad beyond all doubt.

(more wildly)

No I am dead! These putrifying limbs
 Shut round and sepulchre the panting soul
 Which would burst forth into the wandering air.

(a pause)

What hideous thought was that I had even now?
 'Tis gone, and yet its burthen remains here
 O'er these dull eyes—upon this weary heart,
 O world! O life! O day! O misery!"

—Cenci.

73. *Sickness* induces feebleness and weakness in the whole frame, and emaciation in the countenance. The cheeks are thin and pallid, the lower jaw unhinged, the eyes are sunken, lustreless, and without expression, and a general uneasiness seems to sit upon the features. The head hangs heavily upon the breast, as if a burden too weighty to be borne, the voice is weak and tremulous, occasionally a sigh or a groan is emitted, the hand is unsteady and nerveless, the knees shake, and the motion is not so much walking as tottering, and every action bespeaks enervation, languour, dejection, and debility. Sometimes the mind is fretful, and the speech full of murmurings and complaints.

74. *Fainting* is a temporary stoppage of the action of some of the vital functions. Strength and colour fly from the face, the cheek grows wan, the heart cold, and actionless, the nerves relax, the body falls prostrate, and life, for a moment, seems to have forsaken the tenement of clay, in whose pulses it formerly beat; the body becomes pliant, and "moves merely as it is moved;" if unsupported the head and extremities hang powerless and inactive, and if the deliquium continues long, death frequently ensues.

75. *Death*. This is the last scene "in life's eventful tragedy," and is too awful, as well as too multiform for description, for it will be found that Blair is perfectly correct when he says of men that—

"Their ends are various as the roads they take
 In journeying through life."

Julius Cæsar died adjusting his robe, that he might fall gracefully and dignifiedly. Shakespear makes Macbeth rejoice to die "with harness on his back." And the witty Mercutio makes his exit from this life with a "grave" *bon mot*. We may first direct attention to two fine remarks of Shakespear upon this subject, viz.—

"It seems to me a thing most strange that men should fear;
 Seeing that Death, a necessary end
 Will come when it will come."

"The fear of death is most in apprehension,
 And the poor beetle that we tread upon
 In corporal sufferings feels a pang as sore
 As when a giant dies."

The following is an extract on death from the works of Beaumont and Fletcher—

“ ’Tis such a benefit

When it comes crowned with honour, shews so sweet too !
 Though they paint it ugly that’s but to restrain us,
 For every living thing would love it else,
 Fly boldly to their peace ere nature called them ;
 The rest we have from labour and from trouble
 Is some incitement ; every thing alike,
 The poor slave that lies private, has his liberty
 As amply as his master, in that tomb ;
 The earth as light upon him, and the flowers
 That grow about him grow as sweet and flourish :
 But when we love with honour to our ends,
 When memory and virtue are our mourners,
 What pleasure’s there, Evanthé !
 Only my virtuous maid, we want our senses ;
 That benefit we are barred—’twould make us proud else,
 And lazy to look up to happier life,
 The blessings of the people would so swell us.”

THE NATURE AND USE OF POETRY.

HAVING thus endeavoured to develop a scheme of the human faculties as a groundwork for our argument, we now come to the second section of our discourse,—viz., the particular essence, or central phenomena, of Poetry in the human mind.

In our attempted analysis of the mental faculties, there were three distinct modes of operation recognized by the human mind.—1st, the Intellect, consisting, (as is generally admitted,) of two distinct powers or modes of action,—viz., the perceptive, and the reflective, of which the former places the individual in relation with external or objective existence generally ; the latter realizes, representatively, abstract notions, or ideas, of those existencies revealed by the perceptive and other faculties.

2nd. Another mode of mental action recognized, is that of pure feeling, consisting of those desires and instincts necessary to man as an animal, and an animal not of a solitary, but of a social nature.

And 3rd, those higher emotions denominated either the Moral Sentiments, the Intuitional Consciousness, or the Moral Sense. These, by a kind of higher perception, bring the man into conscious relation with the Good, the Beautiful, and the True ;

which trinity, in their highest vision,—their loftiest synthesis, bring us into the immediate presence of a Divine Personality, A ONE,—an I AM,—in whom is realized, and from whom flows, as from an ever-boundless and inexhaustible source, the elements of Goodness, Beauty and Truth, to fill and supply Nature, animate and inanimate.

Leaving now the vast synthesis thus presenting itself to our view, we descend to one of its elements—to the consideration alone of the Beautiful. The sense of this—the faculty by which it is cognosed, is one and the same with that which is commonly termed the Imagination. This faculty, according to Schlegel, takes precedence, and, we think rightly, of the logical or reasoning powers. Imagination is the pioneer of Reflection, going out into the illimitable ; it appropriates new tracts and regions to be afterwards cultivated by the plough and harrow of Reflection. In Art, Reason supplies the hard indispensable outline ; Imagination, the soul and life.

The Imagination, then, or Sense of the Beautiful, is the subjective essence of Poetry in the human mind. A capacity of seeing, enjoying, and describing the Beautiful that shines in Nature, animate or inani-

is the necessary qualification of the Poet. As the Prophet is an individual whose perceptions of the spiritual have been heightened to an extraordinary degree, in order that he may be able to understand the deep things of God, so is the Poet a man gifted with an extraordinary capacity for discerning the Beautiful.

The poet is, however, not merely a seer of the Beautiful, he is also a Prophet of Beauty, and delivers its messages to men. Hence the excellence of his prophecies will depend, to a great extent, upon the development of his intellectual nature; for pure feeling being beyond verbal communication, and all intelligible language requiring more or less logical form and coherence, it follows that every great Poet must also be a great Philosopher,—a truth worthy of the enunciation of a Coleridge.

Welling up from the fountains of his being, emotions come to the Poet "too deep for words," as he contemplates this wondrous Universe; surrounding him, with its resplendent shows; varying from the microscopic moss, to the star-lit empyrean with its innumerable galaxies.

But the Poet does not stop here. Upward through the glittering sun-beam motes of Eternity, he wings his daring flight, until, at length, he arrives in the presence of the Absolute, who, amid the awful magnificence of Eternity and Infinity, sits enthroned, a Triune Being, combining in his very essence, the highest and purest elements of Goodness, Beauty, and Truth.

Having thus arrived at the highest synthesis of the Beautiful, we shall retrace our steps, and endeavour to characterize a few of its forms. It was affirmed, that the Deity is an impersonation of Beauty in its highest forms. The next subordinate forms, are those pure spirits which doubtless surround his throne; for, shall a chain of being stretch from man to the bounds of inanimate nature, and not from man upward into that infinitude that separates him from God?

Coming down, then, we know not through how many ranks of being, we at length arrive at this little point in the world of Existence, *Me*. We will now endeavour to analyze that beauty of which we know most—the beauty of the Spirit of Man.

The highest form of Beauty is that of Mind,—that which is visible when the soul acts in accordance with the laws of Virtue, and no jarring arises to interrupt its natural and healthy action. The laws by which Mind is, or ought to be, governed, are the principles of Truth. Truth, therefore, is equivalent to morality, or Spiritual Law. Again, the embodiment of this divine Law into Action;—this is Goodness. What then is beauty? I answer, that celestial calm, that not fabulous "music of the spheres," which distinguishes the continual passing uninterruptedly of Truth into Action, or life; for Life is Action. The glory of Ancient Art, consisted in the free and unconstrained obedience of the Artist to the laws of form. In like manner, the more approaching to perfection will the Revelation of Beauty be in the human soul, in proportion as the Truth finds a more or less ready embodiment in the Life. In corroboration of this, it may be remarked, how frequently we see in actual life, this mental Beauty triumph over even physical deformity. On the other hand, mere physical Beauty becomes, by the interruption of the Truth in the process of being embodied into Life, deteriorated; its flowing lines become harsh and defined.

But while Mental Beauty by its reflex action upon the physical organization thus discovers itself, it is, nevertheless, more or less modified, as Intellect, Passion, or Sentiment, is most predominant in the individual mind.

When the Intellect possesses the ascendancy, there will be a certain hardness of form perceptible; when Passion is predominant, the tendency will be sensuous; but when the Intuitional Consciousness or Moral Sentiments exist in greatest development, then will be visible a certain majesty—the image of the Deity originally implanted in Man.

But the equally balanced development of Passion, Intellect, and Sentiment, is that in which Beauty arrives at its fullest expression. We shall now briefly recapitulate.—

Beauty is an element which issues—as light from the solar orb—for ever from the "Father of Lights, with whom there is no variableness, nor shadow of turning;" which,

streaming abroad throughout the Material and Spiritual Universe, marks the presence and meeting of Goodness and Truth, and which may therefore be termed their Shekinah, or visible symbol.

But what is Poetry? I answer, the embodiment of Beauty into ideas, by the help of the logical consciousness.

In the first section, it was said that all impressions, whether of perception or intuition, must become *formal* or *notional* before they are capable of communication.

The Poet or Prophet of the Beautiful is, then, an individual, possessed of a deeper intuition of this element in Nature, and who reveals the same to his fellow-men by the aid of the logical consciousness. Hence the truth of Coleridge's maxim, that every great Poet must likewise be a great Philosopher. For the former, to be understood, must possess a command over the logical faculty, which is peculiarly the province of the latter.

HAROLD.

(To be continued.)

VERSIFICATION.

The value of rhymed verse depends entirely upon the thought or thoughts enshrined within it; it is but the setting, to add lustre to the gem; and as the sculptor cannot, by any labour, give the marble, however mutely life-like, a living, breathing spirit, so, no more can any poetaster, by the most perfect arrangement of syllabic quantity elevate *mere* verse above a "sorry mechanism," which may, and does, sometimes, "tickle the ear," but cannot charm the soul. To the true poet, verse is an instrument not essential, often undesirable and embarrassing; for the conceptions of his intellect, frequently lose rather than gain by the restraint of rhyme; and to him it is nothing but an "exterior form," an added grace, not an essential beauty.

To the dilettanti poet, whose ear is sufficiently good, and whose command of language is extensive enough to fabricate rhythmical quantity, the faculty of versifying is but the "echo of true poetry;" and like the fabled youth of old, who fell in love with his own watery self, he is in danger of mistaking his own artificial vapourities for the babbings of the Castalian fount.

But to the aspirant for poetical honours, without the qualification above named, who makes a quantity of verse without rhythm, without quality, without sense,—to him verse becomes a "lying self-assertion;" for unendowed with a single essential for poetical composition, he has cheated himself into the belief that his productions, (because they are in some sort a jingling approximation to rhyme,) are the utterings of a poetical spirit, when, in fact, they contain ample evidence of inability for writing even prose.

Verse, then, in the hands of others than those gifted with discretion and ability, is either a dangerous or stultifying vehicle. And to this class of persons we would say, examine your own mental conformation, your usual and most frequent course of thought; for poetry is but the flowering into thought of the best and truest emotions of our inner being. You will, therefore, do well to try your poetical efforts by the thought—have I given expression to those emotions, does my effusion contribute to my own innate sense of the poetry of the subject I have chosen to write upon? If it does this, well and good; if it does not, burn it. And it must be borne in mind that fondness for poetry, even if it amount to love, and deep reverence for its higher manifestations, does not, by any means, indicate the ability necessary to write poetry. The liking you have for poetry is nothing more than a cognate faculty with the power which enables you to criticize a painting, or appreciate a statue, and a mere relish for poetry will do as little towards the writing of a sonnet, as the possession of the critical faculty alone will enable you to draw a cartoon, or carve an image. The power to do is the product of the discernment; but the possession of the latter by no means implies the other qualification.

Study, and a keen perception of the beautiful and true, in nature and art, coupled with a depth of feeling that no cultivation will give, if not naturally bestowed, are necessary elements in a poetical character, and be assured that, if these are wanting, any attempts at verse making will prove either a waste of time or self-deceptive.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

The *Printers' Athenaeum, London*.—This is the title of a proposed Literary and Social Institution for Printers, Bookbinders, Typefounders, and the working classes generally. Its object is the intellectual elevation of its members, and the promotion of their social enjoyment, apart from objectionable places of resort. The institution is intended to comprise a Lecture Hall, a Reading Room, a well-selected Library, classes for

the study of various subjects, &c., &c. The annual subscription is to be thirteen shillings, but persons now paying ten shillings in advance, will enjoy the privileges of the Institution for one year. We need scarcely say that we cordially sympathize in the objects of this movement, and hope that its promoters will bring it to a successful and useful issue.

West London Mental Improvement Society.—The members of this Society, with a goodly number of their friends, were conveyed, by "special train," to Hampton Court, on Thursday, July 31st. The day was particularly fine, and great satisfaction was expressed with the whole of the arrangements, which were successfully carried out by Messrs. Camp, Hughes, White, and Morris, members of the Society, and the Secretary, Mr. H. C. Freeman; as also with the great attention paid to the comfort of the friends, by their host, Mr. H. Row, of the "Cardinal Wolsey." After visiting the palace and gardens, and dining together, various recreations were pursued on the river, and in the field, with spirit and decorum until five o'clock, when the whole party sat down to tea. Another hour was then pleasantly passed, when all returned to town, greatly delighted their day's excursion.

The Society still holds its weekly meetings in the school-room of the Robert-street chapel,

Robert-street, Grosvenor square. During the past month the members have met five times; the 1st meeting being for prayer; the 2nd, a lecture, by W. Partridge, Esq., "On the History of the Early Britons;" 3rd, an essay, read by a member, "On Education," followed by discussion; the 4th, a lecture by professor Elvins, "On John Howard and Prison Discipline;" and the 5th, for "Elocution." The society is still progressing, and its general condition is satisfactory. The "*Controversialist*" continues to prove useful and interesting to the members, many of whom are supplied regularly with it, and recommend it to others.

H. C. F.

[We respectfully acknowledge the kindness and courtesy of the secretary, and committee of this society, in "earnestly recommending" our work to the members, in their last annual Report.—Ed.]

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

37. *Phrenotypics and Chronology.*—If the friends who have entered our Phrenotypical class, have become thoroughly familiar with the divisions of a room, that we suggested in our last paper, they may now proceed to appropriate a square to a century, commencing with square No. 1, and, "locating" the following

OUTLINE OF ANCIENT HISTORY.

Century.

- 1st—Creation. Fall of Adam and Eve.
- 2nd—Murder of Abel.—Seth born, A.M.,* (130).
- 3rd—Enos born, (235).
- 4th—Cainan born, (325).—Mahalaleel b., (395)
- 5th—Jared born, (460).
- 6th—
- 7th—Enoch born, (622). Methuselah b., (687).
- 8th—
- 9th—Lamech born, (874).
- 10th—Adam died, (930).—Enoch translated, (987).
- 11th—Seth died, (1042).—Noah born, (1056).
- 12th—Enos died, (1140).
- 13th—Cainan died, (1235).—Mahalaleel died, 14th— [(1290).
- 15th—Jared died, (1422).
- 16th—Shem, Ham, and Japheth born, about (1516).
- 17th—Methuselah died, (1656).—Deluge, (1656).
- 18th—The Building of Babel, and confusion of tongues, (1757).
- 19th—Egypt founded by Mizraim, (1816).—Nahor born, (1849).—Terah b., (1878).
- 20th—Sicyon founded in Greece, (1915).—Nahor died, (1997).
- 21st—Noah died, B.C.,† (1998).—Abraham born,

* The years are given A.M. for the first twenty Centuries.

† The years are given B.C. for the second twenty Centuries.

- (1996)—Call of Abraham, (1921).
- 22nd—Sodom and Gomorrah destroyed, (1898). Isaac born, (1897).—Inachus founds Argos, (1856).—Shem died, (1846).
- 23rd—Shepherd kings expelled from Egypt, (1743).—Joseph sold by his brethren, (1729).—Jacob and his family settle in Egypt, (1706).
- 24th—Jacob died, (1699).—Joseph died, (1635).
- 25th—Moses born, (1571).—Athens, Sparta, and Corinth founded.
- 26th—Thebes founded.—The Israelites leave Egypt, (1401).
- 27th—Ehud, the 2nd judge, Deborah and Barak judge Israel, (1316).
- 28th—Argonautic Expedition.—Tola and Jair, judge Israel, (about 1206).
- 29th—Siege of Troy, (1193, to 1184).—Samuel born, (1171).—Samson born, (1161).—War of Heracleidæ.
- 30th—Saul king of the Hebrews, (1095).—David, (1056).—Solomon, (1015).—Temple built, (1004).
- 31st—Rehoboam, (975).—Revolt of ten of the tribes of Israel, (975).—Homer the Grecian poet fl.
- 32nd—Elijah translated, (896).—Carthage founded by Dido, (869).
- 33rd—First Olympiad, (776).—Rome founded by Romulus, (753).—Captivity of Israel, (721).
- 34th—Josiah, (641).—Jeremiah begins to prophesy, (about 610).—Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon.
- 35th—Final Captivity of Judah, (588).—Babylon taken by Cyrus, (538).
- 36th—Battle of Marathon, (490).—Herodotus, Socrates, and Plato fl.—Malachi the prophet fl.
- 37th—Aristotle and Demosthenes, fl.—Alexander the Great conquers Persia, &c.
- 38th—Euclid fl., (298).—First Punic War, (263). Second ditto, (216).—Archimedes slain, (206).

39th—Carthage and Corinth destroyed by the Romans, (146).—Fall of Numantia, (138).
 40th—Civil war in Rome, (88).—Britain invaded by Cæsar, (55).—Birth of our Saviour.

The above outline may appear uninteresting, but if it be firmly impressed upon the memory, it will be found of great service to the student of history. On the Phrenotypical principle, it may be readily committed to memory by repeating the facts over the different divisions of a room, or placing them on slips of paper in their divisions, and going over them until they can be read with the eyes shut! Let our friends go over the above outline several times a day, and they will be ready to take up "Modern History" with our next. History has two eyes, one of which is Chronology, and the other Geography. It is important, therefore, to memorize the periods of its principal events.
 —A. C.

55. *Mechanics.*—(Continued from page 319.)
 —A general method of solving mechanical problems was discovered by D'Alembert, and it may thus be enunciated:—If there be impressed on bodies motions which they are forced to change, in consequence of their mutual actions, those motions may be considered as compounded of the motions which the bodies do really take, and of those which are destroyed. Whence it results, that those last must be such, that if they alone existed, the bodies would be in equilibrium.

In order to avoid the decompositions of motions which this principle requires, an equation is frequently made between the general analytical expression for those forces and the observed motions.

Besides the principles already adverted to, there are several others which it may not be amiss to state in this paper. One of these is denominated "*the preservation of living forces*," and is a consequence of the discovery of Huyghens concerning the movement of the centre of gravity in a compound body; for the space described by that centre is expressed by the quotient arising from the sum of the products of the mass of each body, into the distance it passes over, divided by the sum of the masses; and since the space descended by bodies when acted on by the gravity is proportioned to the squares of the velocities, it follows that the sum of the products of the mass of each body into the square of the velocity is constant, whether the bodies move gently in any manner, or whether they descend freely through equal vertical spaces.

The preservation of the centre of gravity is a principle which contains the discovery of Sir Isaac Newton, that the motion of the common centre of gravity of bodies is not affected by the mutual attraction of the bodies.

The *preservation of areas* appears to have been discovered almost simultaneously by Euler, Daniel Bernoulli, and Chevalier D'Arci, about 1750. According to the latter, it is an extension of Newton's theorem, that the radii vectores of revolving bodies describe equal areas in equal times; and it consists in this:—that the sum of the products of the masses of revolving bodies into the areas described by their radii vectores about a fixed point, is proportional to the time. Or that the sum of the products of the masses

into the velocities, and into the perpendiculars let fall from the fixed point on the line of direction of the motions, is constant.

The Lever, (from *Levare*, to lift up,) is the name of a common mechanical instrument, consisting of a simple bar of wood, or metal, by fixing one point of which, called the fulcrum, a pressure at the end more distant from the fulcrum, is made to counterbalance a larger pressure at the nearer end; or if both ends be equally distant from the fulcrum, equal pressures are made to balance each other.

The lever, considered as one of the fundamental principles of mechanics, receives its most simple form in the application of the common lever; this instrument assumes a degree of theoretical importance, which will justify some discussion of the subject; and the principle of the lever, which is often confounded with the lever itself, must be explained. Thus, when it is said in popular writings on mechanics, that all machines are reducible to the lever, and the inclined plain, it is meant that every mode of communicating or relieving pressure, is capable of being explained upon the principle of one or other of these machines.

The first explanation of the principle of the lever is given by Archimedes, and given in so simple a manner, that while his method has always been the best popular view of the subject, it has never been surpassed, or even equalled, in rigour or purity, when considered as a foundation for the science of statics.

It assumes two principles;—first, that when a system is in equilibrium, the state of rest will not be disturbed if additional pressures, such as compensate each other, and would, by themselves, produce no motion, be introduced or removed. Secondly, that when a weight is made to rest by being attached to an immovable point, (say, is suspended by a string,) the point, or pivot of suspension undergoes a pressure equal to the weight of the system, whatever may be its form, or the disposition of its parts. Thus, a cylindrical, or prismatic bar of uniform material, will necessarily rest, if a pivot be passed through its centre, or a section in the middle of its length, as there is no reason why it should preponderate on either side. Now, divide the bar into any two parts, and from their middle points suspend weights equal to the weights of the parts; also apply counterpoises of equal weights at the same points, by means of strings passing over pulleys; the equilibrium will then be undisturbed; take away from the system the parts of the bar and the counterpoises, (which are equal, and opposite to one another,) and the equilibrium will subsist between the remaining weights, which are those first suspended. The points of suspension being in the middle of the lengths of the two parts, are at distances from the pivot, (at the middle of the whole length of the bar,) which are inversely proportional to the suspended weights.

Perhaps the most simple way in which the preceding result can be stated, is as follows: when a weight P, placed at K, balances a weight W, placed at L, about a pivot A, the number of pounds in P multiplied by the number of feet in K A, gives the same product as the number of pounds in W multiplied by the num-

ber of feet in A L. (Any other units of weight and length will do equally well, provided the same be used in both.)

P ————— W
K ————— L

The product of a pressure, and the perpendicular let fall upon its direction from a fixed pivot, or fulcrum, is sometimes called the moment, sometimes the leverage, of the weight; in English treatises on mechanics it is customary to call one of the pressures which balance on a lever, the power, and the other the weight.

Lever is further divided into the first, second, and third kind; the first having the fulcrum, the second the weight, and the third the power in the middle.—G. N.

(To be continued.)

ERRATA in last Article—for Herostatics, read Stereostatics, and for Heroe, read Stereo.

57. *Trinity College, Dublin.*—Course of Study, and Fees.—The Matriculation course for Trin. Coll., Dublin, is as follows:—

Greek.—Homer's *Iliad*,—first eight books.

Novum Testamentum,—the Gospels of St. Luke, St. John, and the Acts.

Xenophon,—*Anabasis*, first three books.

Lucian,—The Dialogues, selected in Walker's edition.

Euripides,—*Hecuba*.

Latin.—Virgil,—*Æneid*, first six books.

Horace,—Odes, Epodes, Satires and Epistles.

Juvenal,—Satires 3, 10, 13, 14.

Terence,—*Andria* and *Hautontimorumenos*.

Sallust,—*Conspiracy of Catiline*, *Belium Jugurthum*.

Livy,—books 1, 2, 3, 21.

A slight change was made in these subjects for Matriculation examination last year.

Entrance Fees £16

College Fees, per year, (irrespective of tuition.) 15

B.A. Fees 12

M.A. Fees 16

The course is one of four years, at the expiration of which B.A. is granted; and M.A. in three years after.

Entrance examinations are held in July and October. The fees given are those of *pensioners*—which class embraces the majority of students. The fellow commoners fees are *double* in every item, but they can get through the course previous to B.A., in three years. The Sizarers embrace a limited number, who have passed a more severe examination in the entrance course, and on payment of £5, get their lectures, examinations, and degrees, free of charge.

There are many prizes in Hebrew, German, &c., which if obtained by a student, greatly lighten, if not altogether meet, his College expenses. Students are not required to reside in college, but must attend two six-weeks' courses of lectures yearly.

In reference to the last question, the answer to it will depend very much on previous attainments, and natural talent. Taking these as up to the average, I should say that a student could get through very creditably by six hours' a day study.—A. C.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

Want of space precludes us from doing more this month than subjoining our "register of progress," which, it will be seen, is highly satisfactory. In our next issue we will develop the scheme upon which the prizes and certificates will be distributed.

J. J., (Newport,) is thanked most kindly for his hints;—many improvements in this department are contemplated: time will develop them;—meanwhile, suggestions are always welcome, when respectfully made. W. R. B.'s, (White-chapel,) suggestion is under contemplation; something will be done shortly, in the matter; 89, Achates—H. T., and E. S. J. (highly satisfactory); 80, W. T., J. W. H., and G. F., (persevere); 77, E. S. B. (better); J. N. (you have mistaken consciousness—that power by which we become acquainted with our own thoughts—for conscientiousness, that moral attribute by which we distinguish right from wrong. Too much care cannot be taken to gain an accurate knowledge of the meaning of terms); 75, Philologus, W. K., M. Y., S. H. A., J. C., Philo, and Student.

Will those students, whose papers have not been noticed in this department, be kind enough

to send their real names and addresses in order that explanatory notes may reach them individually?

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. VIII.

1. Give a general outline of the principles of Induction.

2. Mention the chief processes which are necessary to perform Induction efficiently? and give illustrations of their use.

3. Explain what is meant by the phrases *latens processus*, *latens schematismus*, and *prærogativa instantiarum*.

4. What are the chief classes of *instantiæ* "which ought to possess the chief claim to our regard in endeavouring to interpret any series of facts"?

5. What are Mills's "four laws of Inductive Inquiry"?

6. Is Induction a reasoning or an investigative process?

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XVIII.

RATIOCINATION.

CONCERNING FALLACIES.

"An amendment of the general habits of thought is, in most of the departments of knowledge, as important as even the discovery of new Truths."—*Sir James Mackintosh.*

"Prejudices, I should think, would be a sort of property, which, like paving stones in a man's pocket, it would be kind to free him from as soon as possible."—*G. P. E. James.*

"WHEN we wish to see an object distinctly through a glass, we take care to wipe the glass free from all specks and dust." So ought we also to do with the mind. We ought to exercise the utmost vigilance and caution in the removal of every hindrance to the attainment of accuracy of mental perception,—every obstacle and impediment to the acquisition of truth. To do this effectually, we must consider it an all-paramount object in mental culture to become acquainted with the most common violations of the necessary laws of thought which the mind is liable to commit, and to gain a knowledge of the most usual fallacies—those specious apparently-legitimate syllogisms which

"Keep the word of promise to the ear
But break it to the heart,"—

which men are in the habit of employing. These will generally be found to abound in equivocal terms. Like the heathen oracles of old, they are double-meaning and indefinite. To sophistical reasoning the defects of language are a great assistance; for it is copious in seemingly synonymous terms, and phrases of nearly-allied signification. The taste which men have acquired for Rhetorical ornaments, and the custom, which our luxuriousness of ear has rendered necessary, of varying the terms and diction of our discourse, is another aid, if not sometimes an actual temptation, to the palming off of an elegantly-expressed ambiguity or sophism for the unadulterated ore of truth; thus reasoning *with* words instead of *by* them. Our own language, indeed, from its multiplex derivative sources, its copious verbology, its abundance of apparent parallelisms of expression, and its luxuriant variability of phrase, is peculiarly available for the concealment of Sophisms, and the utterance, in specious language, of errors in thought. Sophisms, like eastern serpents, are most frequently found hidden beneath the fairest flowers. Now as "Error is only effectually to be confounded by searching deep, and tracing it to its source,"* it becomes us, as rational creatures, to study well the error-

* Sir J. Herschell's "Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy," page 9.

liabilities of our nature. And let it not be thought, when comparing the high aims now enunciated, with the exemplifications contained in these brief articles, that the whole purpose of the science is to teach men to expend their "ingenuity and industry" upon the *λογος ἀκανθώδης*—the thorny subtleties of a vain and sterile science, either upon *mere words*, or upon *πυγὰς difficultes*, (laborious trifles,) which have never yielded, and are never likely to yield, any substantial benefit to mankind, * for there can be little doubt that, however apparently simple the given examples may be, if the principles be fairly illustrated by them, any party who thoroughly studies the subject will find that these principles are omni-applicable in the detection of all errors of a similar nature, however much they may differ in the comparative importance of their several subjects. It is thus, indeed, that all sciences are taught; their principles are illustrated by references to the most simple specimens within reach of the mind of the author. To exemplify them by reference to the highest department of truth, with which they concerned themselves, would exhibit the grossest pedantry, as well as the utmost injudiciousness.

Having proceeded thus far with our preamble, we have thought it advisable to check our wayward course, and with due regard to the impatience of our readers, we shall now set about the fulfilment of the promise made in our last, viz., to present "an analytic view of the Semi-Logical and Non-Logical Fallacies."

In the purely Logical Fallacies, spoken of in our former article, the erroneousness of the reasoning is quite evident, from the mere form of the expression; in other words, from their direct violation of the laws of all true reasoning. The Fallacies of which we are now about to discourse, differ from these considerably. They appear to conform to the requirements of the reasoning faculty, and do not bear broadly on their front the evidence of their deceptiveness; hence they are much more likely to escape detection than the class of which we have already treated. "Now, here it is," say the opponents of Logic, "that the vanity of the Study appears most prominently; for here it leaves the greatest difficulty untouched." With all due deference to those high authorities—those worshippers of Ego—who, with a wave of the hand, and a toss of the head, would consign the most perfect, finished, positive, and practical science which has been bequeathed to us by the genius of ancient time, to "the tomb of all the Capulets,"—we most humbly and respectfully depone—1st, that any accusation brought against a science to the effect that it does not perform more than it professes to accomplish, is clearly irrelevant. 2nd, That to charge any *single* science with worthlessness, because it cannot efficiently perform that which it would require *all the sciences combined* to effectuate, is decidedly unfair. 3d, That first to misapprehend the purpose and province of a science and then to charge that science with the consequences arising out of that misapprehension is a sheer case of "*petitio principii*." 4th, That they completely ignore the indirect aid which Logical science gives for the detection of such Fallacies—*a*) by training the intellect to accuracy of thought; *b*) by pointing out the invariable *modus operandi* of the reasoning faculty; *c*) by teaching us where the fallacy is most probably

* Enfield's History of Philosophy," preface, page iv.

to be found, and *d*) by informing us on what principles to condemn the fallacious argument when discovered. 5th, That if Logic is not "*the Science of Reasoning*," one of three things must follow—*a*) there is no Science of Reasoning; *b*) the Science of Reasoning is "part and parcel" of some other science, or *c*) the Science of Reasoning is yet undiscovered. Are they prepared to maintain any one of these *theses*? They may answer by accusing me of being one of those whom the Greek satirist contemptuously called *ἐμποροὶ λήρου, λόγῳ ὑποκριτῆρες*—traffickers in trifles, arbiters of verbalities; but this is scarcely argument, and until argument can be produced they will, perhaps, excuse my demanding *that* prior to conviction.

Semilogical Fallacies are such as have a *middle term* of an ambiguous signification. In the purely logical Fallacies the major and minor terms are compared with *different* parts of *the same middle term*, but in those now under review, the extremes are, in reality, compared with *two* different *middle terms*, in consequence of the variability of meaning, alternately attached to the middle term—*i.e.*, in its being, while apparently the same word, employed in *two* diverse significations. This ambiguity may appear in many different forms, some of which we state below, *viz.* :—

I. The ambiguity may originate in *the term itself*, and may thus produce, 1st, the fallacy of *equivocation*, and 2nd, the fallacy of *figure of speech*. The former signifies the employment of a middle term in such a manner as that in connexion with each of the extremes, it may be understood in a different sense—*e.g.* ;

Whatever is capable of receiving a double meaning cannot have proceeded from a perfect moral being.

The Bible contains many passages capable of receiving a double meaning ;

Therefore the Bible cannot have proceeded from a perfect moral being ;
in which the words "double meaning," in the major proposition, signify equivocal or ambiguous, and in the minor, a primary and secondary signification. There are many words in our language capable of this *duplicity*—in both of its significations—of import *e.g.*—*apparent*, meaning plain, visible, and seeming, not real; *charge*, command, accusation; *grateful*, thankful, or pleasant, agreeable; *nervous*, weak in the nerves, or energetic; *prefer*, to make choice of, or to promote, &c., &c. The latter imports the use of a *middle term*, which is *paronymous* (*i.e.*, connected by grammatical affinity, as noun, adjective, or verb, &c., or derived from the same root,) with one of the extremes, as if it were coincident in signification, or synonymous with it—*e.g.*,

He who is well-known as a designing character ought never to be trusted.

All engravers are professional designers ;

Therefore engravers ought never to be trusted.

It was a fallacy of this kind which a popular orator is reported to have employed for the disparagement of a rival, who was at the time suffering from ill health, when he said "The gentleman has said he cannot venture himself in such an atmosphere, but this is the atmosphere in which I delight to breathe;" where a metaphorical sense of the term atmosphere is adroitly substituted for the literal signification, and yet this is said to have created a *divertissement* in his favour.

II. The ambiguity may proceed from the different *applications* of which the word

is susceptible. The difference of *application* may result, 1st, from accident; 2d, from neglecting to distinguish between the "first and second intention" of the terms; 3rd, from a resemblance or analogy between the things spoken of, or the words employed to designate them; 4th, from the same name being adopted as the sign of correlated things—*i.e.*, such as are connected in *time* or *place*; as *wholes* and *parts*, *cause* and *effect*, &c. As an example of the 1st species of the fallacies contained in this class, we quote the following from an old work in our possession, to which, as it wants the title page, we cannot more particularly refer:—

Nothing is better than heaven.

A penny is better than nothing;

Therefore a penny is better than heaven.

Here in the major proposition *nothing* is used in a *positive* sense; in the minor, however, it denotes a *negation*, and hence the signification in each is diverse.

Of the 2nd sort we consider it necessary to remark that words in the hands of the sophist are exceedingly flexible, and that a very slight divergency is frequently quite enough for his purpose; now to aid the reasoner in the detection of such fallacies, Logicians request us to note that words are, in general, changeable in their meaning in as far as they possess *a*) an etymological import, *b*.) a vague and general signification and *c*) a special and applied sense. The etymological signification of a word is that which it bears in the original language to which it can be traced,—*e.g.*, *thing* means all that we are able to *think* about. The general signification is that which includes and comprehends all the special senses of a term, and is what Logicians denominated the "first intention,"—*e.g.*, the word *line* signifies "extension in length," and consequently includes and comprehends within it, all the particular significations which it receives in Mathematics, Geography, Perspective, Military tactics, Angling, &c., and in common conversation. The special signification of a term is that limited and circumscribed sense in which it is employed in some one branch of knowledge, or in accordance with some professional technicality or conversational usage; this corresponds with what Logicians call the "second intention;"—*e.g.*, the word *physician*, which in its general sense ought to signify "one acquainted with the *Laws of Nature*"—*νόμοι φύσεως*,—is in a special sense employed to denote "one acquainted with the *Laws of Nature*, so far as they relate to health and disease." It was a fallacy of this kind which was employed during the rebellion of 1745, by the use of the word "pretender," which, in its general sense means a claimant, and in its special signification, a *false* claimant. The following syllogism will be found invalid, if in the major we understand the word in a special, and in the minor in its general signification.

Those who have aided or abetted a pretender ought to be punished.

Prince Charles is a pretender to the British throne;

Therefore those who have aided or abetted him ought to be punished.

Regarding the 3rd species of class 2, we may observe that there is a tendency in the mind to speak analogically, and to apply the same terms to objects or attributes which *resemble* each other; thus we employ the words *sweet* and *beautiful* to characterize sights and sounds, while in reality, *sweet* is only applicable to *tastes*, and beautiful only

to *sights*; so *acute*, which is originally applicable to a *cutting* instrument, is applied as a characterizing adjective to angles, sounds, tastes, sensations, and mental capacities, &c. and thus we talk of "*ploughing* the deep," "*skimming* the surface," "*fathoming* a subject," "*overturning* an argument," "*weighing* an assertion," "*hunting* up a figure," "*pursuing* a topic," "*defeating* an object," "*crushing* an opponent," &c. In all these and similar cases, Logicians call the *primary* signification proper, and the secondary one *improper*; and it is necessary in all cases to observe that the *same sense* is always applied to the *same term* throughout the whole of the *same piece* of argumentation; thus the following apparent syllogism is invalid, because enthusiasm in the major signifies *zeal*, and in the minor, that *wild insanity* which was displayed ἐν θυσία in the sacrifices of the ancients.

All who worship the God of the christians truly, must be filled with enthusiasm.

But all enthusiasm is madness;

Therefore all who worship the God of the christians truly, must be filled with madness.

Numerous errors originate in that sort of ambiguous terms, contained in class 4th. As instances of the *kind* of indefinite terms which constitute this class, we may instance *heat*, which signifies not only the quality of *producing* certain impressions in us, but also the *impressions* themselves;—sensation, which denotes both the faculty of mind which is capable of being impressed, by any external object, through the senses, and each effect pleasurable, painful, or indifferent which reaches the mentality through the operation of any cause external to that mind; when we employ that figure of speech denominated *Synecdoche*, in which the whole is spoken of as a part, or a part as the whole; we are liable to become the dupes either of our own inattention, or of the wiles of the Sophist—*e.g.*, the following syllogism is fallacious, because it does not allow for the figure of speech contained in the passage to which it refers:—

If the Scriptures command us to do that which is absurd, they cannot be divinely inspired.

But they command us "to preach the gospel to *every creature*,"—*i.e.*, to insects, fishes, birds, and animals, which is absurd;

Therefore the Scriptures cannot be divinely inspired.

The specific which Logic recommends as a preservative against being imposed upon by any one of the fallacies contained in either of the two classes of which we have now spoken, is to demand a definition of the suspected term or its applications *in so far as regards the argument at issue*, and then to show the incongruity of signification which has been admitted into the apparent syllogism..

III. This class contains those fallacies which may arise from the artful manner in which the question is placed before the mind of the hearer; and thus it comprises the fallacy of many interrogations. It is a very convenient circumstance for the sophist that the mind of man is exceedingly desirous of Rhetorical ornamentation, and of being pleasurably stimulated by figures of speech and the *curiosa felicitas* of dict; hence the beauties of style are highly valued, and knowing that while the mind quiring pleasure, the acuteness of the intellect is less actively displayed, the sophist

naturally cultivates the “art of pleasing,” with much assiduity, and adapts his style to the purpose in view. *Erotesis*, or interrogation, by enabling him to conceal the duplex signification which he wishes to have attached to any particular phrase, becomes one of his favourite means of stultifying the mind. It admits of two varieties—1st, That in which the terms of the question are so arranged as to involve more than one question, each of which requires a different answer, while it in appearance requires only one—*e.g.*, Ought we to act according to expediency?—meaning either ought we ever to act according to expediency? or is expediency a proper rule of action? 2nd, That in which the question is put in such a way as to leave the *extent* of the question indefinite—*e.g.*, Do not children owe subordination to their parents? meaning either subordination *in all things* or *in those only* which are *just*. This species of fallacy is avoided by shewing the distinction between the questions, and answering them in turn.

IV. This class is composed of those apparent-syllogisms which become ambiguous from the *context*, or from the arrangement of the words in a sentence. It comprises, 1st, fallacies of ambiguous arrangement; 2nd, fallacies of division; 3rd, fallacies of composition; 4th, fallacies of accident.

In case 1st of this class, the terms are so disposed that they may readily be understood in two senses. Some of the ancient heathen oracles afford excellent specimens of this sophistical artifice, *e.g.*, the response of the oracle of Apollo to Pyrrhus the King of Epirus,—Aio te, *Æacida*, Romanos vincere posse, which may either signify, “I tell thee the Romans are able to conquer you,” or, “I tell thee thou art able to conquer the Romans.” Our own Shakespeare has been successful in imparting a similar indefiniteness to one of his witch-prophecies, when he says,—

“The Duke yet lives that Henry shall depose.”

which may mean either that the duke shall depose Henry, or that Henry shall depose the duke. In the fallacies of the 2nd sort comprehended in this class, the middle term is used *collectively* in the *major premise*, and *distributively* in the *minor*—*e.g.*,

All the taxes levied upon the inhabitants of this country, per annum, amount to about £76,000,000.

But this amount divided among 26,000,000 of inhabitants gives less than £3 per annum, to each person;

Therefore each person in this country is lightly taxed.

Here it may be shewn that what is true of a *collective* whole, is not necessarily true of each individual unity;—*e.g.*,

All the apples on this tree are worth five shillings.

This is an apple on that tree;

Therefore it is worth five shillings.

The 3rd species of fallacy comprised in this class, is precisely the reverse of that which precedes it. In the seeming syllogisms which it comprehends, the major premise is employed in a distributive sense, and the minor in a collective one, thus assuming that what is true of *some* of the individuals of a class, is true also of *all* the individuals in that class;—*e.g.*,

Monopolies in the corn trade, the manufacture of certain kinds of goods, the selling of particular sorts of commodities, the granting of certain privileges, &c., &c., are beneficial to the several monopoly holders.

But these monopoly-holders constitute the whole community;

Therefore a system of monopolies is beneficial to the whole community.

Here it will require to be shewn that the several monopolies are only beneficial when held *separately*, not when each individual or class has a peculiar monopoly of his own, and so in all other cases the fallacy lies in assuming that what is true of the *single* members of a class is true of all that class taken together.

Of the fallacy of accidents, case 4th., there are three varieties, viz., a) when what is predicable of a thing simply, and absolutely, is assumed to be true in *particular circumstances*; b) When what is true of a thing *under certain circumstances* is assumed to be true concerning it, *absolutely* and essentially; c) When what is able to be predicated of a thing *under certain circumstances* is predicated of it in *other*, and these *differing circumstances*. These fallacies are to be controverted by shewing the difference between the thing itself,—simply and absolutely considered,—and the concomitant circumstances with which it is surrounded in the given instance—*e.g.*,

The true Church of Christ has existed since the days of the Apostles.

The Protestant churches have not existed since the days of the Apostles;

Therefore no one of the Protestant churches can be the “true Church.”

Those who are over-credulous ought not to have their statements relied upon.

The Ancient Historians were in many instances over-credulous;

Therefore they ought never to have their statements relied upon.

It is the right of a Briton to be free. (Meaning so long as he is obedient to the laws of his country.)

I am a Briton; (one who has transgressed the laws;)

Therefore I ought to be free.

By shewing the variable and partial uses of the terms employed, or the circumstantial difference implied, we extricate ourselves from the necessity of admitting the fallacious reasoning.

Non Logical or Material Fallacies, are such as contain errors in the opinions assumed as premises, or in the conclusion deduced, rather than in any readily-perceptible divergence from the syllogistic form. Of such Fallacies there are two species. 1st. Those in which the premises are unduly assumed. 2nd. Those in which the conclusion is irrelevant, *i. e.*, not such as is demanded by the argument.

I. In the class whose premises are unduly assumed there are several nearly related but distinct species of Fallacies. 1st. Those which involve a *petitio principii*, *i. e.*, in which premises are employed, either equivalent, in reality, to the conclusion, or necessarily involving it. 2nd. Those which are denominated by Aristotelians *non causa pro causa* *i. e.*, assigning a reason which is either insufficient as evidence, not itself adequately proven, or not necessarily connected with the conclusion which is sought to be established by it. 3rd. *Reasoning in a Circle*, in which, in a series of arguments, the same

facts or opinions are employed both as the *media of proof* by which the conclusion is to be established, and the conclusion which is supposed to be proven by them. There are many contrivances employed, and many disguises put on, by the Sophist, in order to avoid detection in the use of such seeming-arguments; sometimes terms are made use of which are widely different in appearance, but which, in reality, possess the same signification; sometimes by diffuse and wordy disquisition he is enabled to separate the premises so far that the *real point* which *ought* to have been proven is lost sight of, and another *somewhat* like it is substituted in its place; at other times he introduces as a premise an assertion which, along with something else, by which it is concealed, involves the conclusion.

1st. The following apparent argument is invalid, viz.:—

Induction is the only true science of Reasoning;

Syllogistic Logic is not Induction;

Therefore Syllogistic Logic is not the true science of Reasoning:

because in the premises the point is already definitely assumed by the exclusion of all other sciences of Reasoning except Induction, i. e., the major premise distinctly involves the conclusion deduced from it. Now to reason on the assumption that certain opinions are accurate, which have not been proven, and are not at all likely to be granted in any discussion upon any topics between parties who properly understand the terms employed, is manifestly to lay a foundation upon broken reeds, while to attempt to prove a opinion by asserting that same opinion in different phraseology is obviously absurd.

2nd. As an example of the Fallacy *non causa pro causa* we might adduce the anecdote which is related of Charles II., and Milton, viz., Charles II. having seen Milton, who at this time had, in consequence of the strenuous exertions made by him in favour of popular liberty, become blind, thus accosted him:—"Think you not that the crime which you committed against my father must have been very great, seeing that Heaven has seen fit to punish it by such a severe loss as that which you have sustained?" "Nay, sire," Milton replied, "if my crime *on that account* may be adjudged great, how much greater must have been the criminality of your father, seeing that I have only lost my eyes, but he his head." As another example, we may subjoin a succinct account of "Ricardo's Theory of Rent." Ricardo asserts that the varying fertility of different soils is the *cause* of rent, and defines rent to be the difference between the produce of the same amount of capital on an inferiorly fertile soil, and that which is superior. Hence it will follow that were there no inferiority of productive power in different soils, there would be no rent. Syllogistically thus:—

Whenever a cause is inoperative, the effect cannot result;

The varying fertility of different soils is the *cause* of rent;

Therefore were there no soils of differing fertility, there would be no rent.

Now it is quite obvious that this is a flagrant Fallacy—an instance of "*non causa pro causa*," for in point of fact the scarcity of fertile soil in comparison to the wants of mankind, and the consequent *competition* between parties for its possession, is that which causes rent to be offered and taken, and it is because the better sorts of land pay rent that the inferiorly productive soils are taken into cultivation.

3rd. Of "Reasoning in a Circle," we may subjoin the following instance, viz.:—

The Scriptures being divinely inspired, whatever they declare to be true must be so ;

The Scriptures declare that God exists ;

Therefore that God exists is true.

Here it is evident that the being of God is presupposed in the fact of the Scriptures being divinely inspired, and then we deduce the fact of God's existence from the declaration of that book which He is said to have inspired, thus assuming His existence, in the very act of *proving*,—which is absurd. The above class of Fallacies are generally couched in a vague ambiguity of phrase, which throws the mind out of its reckoning. Obscure diction, sly insinuations, cunning inuendos, artful twining together of words, hardihood of assertion, &c., are some of the means employed by the sophist, either to ensnare or brow-beat his opponent. In order to prevent ourselves from being made his victims, we must call for explicit expression, clear unambiguous diction, plain statements, and the authorities on which they rest, and a collocation of words perfectly free from the possibility of our being uncertain of the meaning attached to them. At the same time we must shew the defects of perspicuity or accuracy under which his phraseology labours—the inexactness of his statements, the want of connection between the reason or cause assigned by him, and that which is the real one ; and otherwise use every available means to reform him, as well as to acquire truth for ourselves.

II. The class of Fallacies which are included in the characteristic of having *irrelevant conclusions* may be more lengthily defined as consisting of such specimens of reasoning as substitute for the conclusion which truly results from the premises, or which the question at issue demands,—another essentially different, though related to it with various degrees of nearness or remoteness. Of such Fallacious methods of procedure there are several sorts, viz.:—1st. Changing the point in dispute. 2nd. Reasoning from alternate premises to alternate conclusions. 3rd. Proving only a part of the conclusion. 4th. Proving too much. 5th. The Fallacy of objections. 6th. The suppression of the Truth.

1st. The species of Fallacies which are included under this head are frequently very dexterously and covertly performed ; this is materially assisted by a series of nicely rounded and sonorous periods, in which a series of pseudo-synonymes have been employed, all bearing some general relation to the signification of the real term—some slight connection in apparent meaning to *the term* requiring, for the time being, to be shrouded in mist. In long, keenly-contested, and exciting debate, this Fallacy is very often employed, the losing party's egotism gains the ascendancy over his love of truth, and, by a wily stratagem which can only be adequately described by the use of the Vulgar Americanism "dodge," he manages to create such a "*sensation*" by a collocation of fine-spun sentences, that he is able to escape from his unlucky *locale* and gain a new vantage-ground. Thus, if in the present much-disputed Educational question a person should *prove* that it was necessary that all the people should be educated, instead of proving that the people, in general, were *not* educated, and should then proceed as if he had proven *that* to advance a claim for state-interference, he would be guilty of the fallacy of changin'

the point in dispute. Of course, if ingeniously and showily advanced, such a sophism might pass undiscovered; but the fallacy would not, on that account, be the less egregious.

2nd. The fallacies comprehended under the title "reasoning from alternate premises to alternate conclusions," is of very frequent recurrence in oral debate or disquisition, although it may sometimes also be found in written works, but then it creates a prejudice against itself, by giving the work a loose, disjointed, and incoherent appearance; the web of thought seems loosely and carelessly woven. Thus a person may reason from the probable to the possible, and from that again to the probable; from justice to expediency, and back again to justice; from the particular to the universal, and thence to the particular again; from the abstract to the concrete, and revert to the abstract; from the absolute to the absolute and accidental conjoined, and thence recur to the absolute and *vice versa* in each case. It is by a fallacy of this description that slave-holding is sometimes sought to be justified; *viz.*:

It is expedient that slaves should be held; (*Here follow certain illustrations of the truth of this proposition.*)

But true expediency must always accord with justice;

Therefore it is right and proper that slaves should be held.

3rd. "Proving only a part of the conclusion" is a very common fallacy with inexperienced thinkers, and is not unfrequently a useful instrument in the hand of the Sophist. It is not always easy to keep before the mind's eye a clear and definite idea of the *extent* of proof required in order to establish a given proposition, and in the self-esteem of the auditors, the disingenuous speaker frequently finds a potent ally. He has only to address a few words of flattery to them on their general intelligence, to assert that the inference is perfectly clear, that any one of ordinary sagacity may readily and easily find proofs in everything around him, and that all who are not wilfully blind or virtually insane must arrive at the same conclusion as he has arrived at, and of which he might have convinced them more at length, by adducing other innumerable and irrefragable proofs, did he not feel that he would in so doing be guilty of at once insulting their judgment and wasting their highly valuable time. There is an admirable article entitled "Plenty more in the cellar," in one of "Old Humphrey's" works, which is a clever exposé of this fallacy, but which from its length we are precluded from inserting. Thus if it be wished to deny the professional skill of any party it will not do to give as a reason that the person became a bankrupt: such an argument would prove too little as it would still require to be shown—which we opine could not—that success invariably attends professional skill, and that such skill may not be combined with deficiency in business habits, etc.

4th. This kind of fallacy is the reverse of the last mentioned. In it the speaker *proves too much* for the point which he wishes to establish, and consequently invalidates his argument. Of such fallacies the following is an instance. "In all demonstrative sciences," says Hume, "the rules are *certain* and *infallible*; but when we apply them, our *fallible* and *uncertain* faculties are very apt to depart from them and fall into error." He had forgot surely that the rules of the demonstrative sciences are discovered by our "*fallible* and *uncertain* faculties" and have no authority but that of human judgment.

If they be infallible some human judgments are infallible. * * * He claims *infallibility* to certain decisions of the human faculties in order to prove that *all* their decisions are *fallible*.”*

5th “The fallacy of objections” is an exceedingly unfair method of reasoning, and despite of its frequency of use, is altogether inadmissible as a correct process of argumentation. It consists in a person’s advancing a series of objections against an opinion, and requesting you to reject that opinion on account of the objections urged against it. Now this is not the proper way to put an argument; for it must be considered whether there are more or greater objections urgeable *against* that opinion, than *for* it; as well as whether there may not be *more* and *greater* objections against the opinion sought to be *substituted* for it. “But,” the Sophist will say, when he is beaten out of this stronghold, “we do not wish you to accept of our opinion, we only wish you to judge impartially; we only wish you to remain unpledged to any one of the opinions so long as such objections are capable of being urged against it.” Such a mode of arguing involves a Fallacy, for it is a virtual call for a decision in his favour, while he *seems* only to request neutrality. “Not to resolve, is to resolve,” says Bacon. Hence it follows that to remain neutral is to decide in favour of the Sophist’s proposition. In all such argumentations the objections should be carefully balanced, accurately weighed, and the decision given to that opinion against which the fewest and least important objections can be produced; *e.g.*, if the argument for the “division of labour” be assailed by the objections that it degrades the character of the common artizan, and reduces the operator to an almost instinct-moved animal,—that it debilitates the body, and renders the habits enervated—that it introduces an insipid uniformity into life, and produces a general torpor of the intellect, and the annihilation of every manly virtue, these objections must be compared with, not only,—Firstly, the advantages resulting from the division of labour, but also, Secondly, with the disadvantages connected with its abolition. Some of the advantages are,—it increases the dexterity of the manipulative power of the artizan—concentrates his mind on the perfection of his work—adds to the likelihood of invention—enables the work to be more expeditiously performed—multiplies the conveniences of life, and renders them, in consequence of their cheapness, more readily attainable. Some of the disadvantages of its abolition are,—the impossibility of every man producing, making, bartering, doing, &c., everything for himself—the discomforts and semi-barbarism which would ensue from this—the differing tastes and capacities of men—the absolute necessity for some such division of labour for the maintenance of Government—the making of laws—the spread of education, and the cultivation of science, &c. Were we to remain undecided upon this question because of the objections urged against it, we could not adopt the division of labour, and consequently would, virtually, be giving a decision in the objector’s favour.

6th. *Fallacies of the sort denominated suppressio veri* may be employed in a thousand different ways; they are all however characterized by the fact that they contain a skilful evasion of the *point* of an argument by an ellipsis of some essential term in it; or, when

making an attack, by leaving out some qualifying word or phrase by which an erroneous impression may be created, and an unfair advantage gained—*e g*,

The National Public School Association will not permit *sectarian* religion to be taught in Schools.

Any Association which advocates the abolition of religious education in Schools, may justly be stigmatized as an infidel one ;

Therefore the National Public School Association is an infidel body.

We beg pardon for occupying so much space with this subject in this month's issue, but as we were anxious to finish the topic "Ratiocination" according to promise, we hope we may be forgiven. We shall endeavour to be less verbose in the treatment of "Method" which we shall begin in our next. Meanwhile there are a few Latin technicalisms in common use among Logicians, which we think it may be advisable to explain. This we shall do most briefly. *A priori*,—Reasoning from the cause to the effect. *A posteriori*,—Reasoning from the effect to the cause. *Argumentum a fortiori aut, ex magis probabili ad minus*,—An argument from one established conclusion to another which ought to be stronger *e g*. If we ought even to love our enemies, how much more ought we to love our friends. *Argumentum ex concessio*,—Reasoning from the truth of a proposition on which it was agreed to give up the contested point. *Argumentum ad iudicium*,—Reasoning by an appeal to common sense for a substantiation of the facts stated. *Argumentum ad ignorantiam*,—An argument derived from our opponent's ignorance. *Argumentum ad hominem*,—An argument founded upon the proposed principles belief or opinion of our antagonists whether these are right or wrong. *Argumentum ad fidem*,—An argument which is derived from our reliance upon testimony. *Argumentum ad verecundiam*,—An argument drawn from the modesty of our opponent by quoting an authority which he will be ashamed to have the egotism to disregard. *Argumentum ad populum aut passiones*,—An appeal to the prejudices, passions or feelings of the mob. *Reductio ad absurdum*,—A proof of the truth of anything by shewing the folly or absurdity of a contrary opinion. All the above mentioned kinds of arguments although perfectly warrantable and admissible in particular circumstances are generally fallacious when employed as absolute proofs. They may be employed in order to arouse attention, disarm prejudice, silence quibbling, produce carelessness in the expression of arguments, shew the probability of a thing which is thought improbable, &c. But they ought seldom to be employed as positively and irrefragably demonstrating a general or absolute truth.

In conclusion let us exhort each reader to labour diligently for the acquisition of accuracy of thought ; freedom from self-delusion, or readiness to be deceived by Sophistries. Let not our labours in the composition of these articles be "the mere record of a vain endeavour" to aid the "good time coming ;" but may they in after days produce fruit in the keenness and closeness of the reasoning of those who have studied them. Let the instructions, which we flatter ourselves they contain, be carefully digested by their minds and received into the thought-circulation of their mentality, in order that they may at all times be able to avoid the snares of the Sophist.

Religion.

DOES THE DIVINE TRINITY OF FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT, EXIST IN THE PERSON OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

WE enter upon the present question impressed with a deep and settled conviction that the inquiry is full of practical importance, and hence that the subject is neither *incomprehensible*, nor an *inexplicable* mystery; but like all other mysteries (for one it surely is,) it is capable of being unfolded and elucidated in due time. The doctrine of the existence, nature, and attributes of the Christian Deity has been revealed, and is thereby placed within the sphere of human knowledge. As a set-off to the deductions of those who would shelter themselves under the plea of incomprehensibility, the following extract from the pious and learned Dr Watts, contained in his "Solemn Address," appended to the "Improvement of the Mind," may be admissible. "Hadst thou gracious Father informed me in any place of thy Word, that this divine doctrine [of the Trinity] is not to be understood by men, and yet they are required to believe it, I would have subdued all my curiosity to faith, etc. *But I cannot find thou hast anywhere forbid me to understand it, or to make these inquiries.*"

The unity of the Godhead is allowed by all who acknowledge the being of a God. Pagans teach that the Divine Being is *one*, but they divide him into a countless host of *subordinated personalities*. Charge them with polytheism,—they take offence and asseverate that you misunderstand their creed. Ask them "Is not Vishnu God?" "Yes," say they. "Is not Brahma God?" "Yes." "Is Brahma the same person as Vishnu?" "O, no; quite distinct." "Are not these then two separate beings, and therefore two distinct gods?" "How stupidly ignorant you are of our religion; there is *one only* great all-pervading spirit." It would seem from this, combined with analogous circumstances, that their is an influx from the eternal world

into the interiors of the human soul, bearing an intuitive testimony *that there is a God, and that he is one*; for even those who profess faith in a tripersonal deity will shrink instinctively from the imputation of tritheism. Now, the more the character, life, and teachings of the Lord Jesus Christ are contemplated in a devout and unbiassed spirit, the stronger grows the conviction that the Deity is *one in essence and in person*, and that *He* is indeed the only-God of heaven and earth, in whose glorious person is comprehended a Divine Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit—three essentials, but one God.

Although this is not the occasion to discuss the merits of the tripersonal scheme, yet duty requires the passing statement that the view of it presented by J. M. S., in the third paragraph of his communication, is *incorrect*, as may be demonstrated by reference to the printed creeds of all Trinitarian Churches, and to all the reputed orthodox writers, of any eminence, upon the subject. His fine-drawn "personal distinctions in the same Godhead" is utterly opposed to the explicit, and generally received, tenet "*that each person by himself is God and Lord*," which also completely refutes the premise assumed by him, that *Trinitarians do not understand the term person, when applied to the Deity, to denote separate individuals*. Why it was for the very purpose of establishing upon ecclesiastical authority the existence of *three distinct and separate individualities* that the famous Nicene Council was convoked. J. M. S. very justly remarks "the terms which we apply to spiritual subjects are, for the most part, those which belong to natural subjects, and therefore if taken in their original [acquired] significance, would convey absurd and even offensive ideas." The term *person* is then cited as an instance. This is mentioned as being

used in its *unlimited* sense, which implies that it has also a *limited*, or *more restricted* sense,—a view in which we entirely concur. What that *limited meaning* is in which alone it is applicable to the trinity in unity, our friend has not defined. We have no objection whatever to the adoption of the word in its primitive or scholastic signification, as discriminated from its corrupted and usual acceptation. The term is a derivation from the Latin *persona*, literally *a character*. The substantive comes *through* the participle *personans*, resounding, from the verb *persono*, to sound through. It was customary in the representation of the ancient drama for the characters to wear masks, *through which the sound* of the dialogues was transmitted, for which reason the mask itself was called *persona*. Most Latinists employed the word in this its primitive meaning, to denote *a character or phase* assumed;—thus Cicero “I sustain of myself *three characters* [*tres personæ*]—my own, that of the adversary, and of the judge.” In this sense (which is the proper signification of the term,) the phrase, *tres personæ, sed unus Deus*, (three persons, but one God,) might with consistency and propriety be adopted to express *the threefold character* assumed by the august Ruler of the universe in relation to his creatures, as their Creator, Redeemer, and Regenerator. But it is forbidden by every principle of enlightened reason, and by the whole design and tendency of the Sacred Scriptures to employ the word in its unlimited sense, which implies distinct individuality, so properly repudiated by J. M. S.; otherwise the notion of tritheism is inevitably engendered.

The paragraph which terminates the paper of our friend, contains a few passages selected from the Holy Writings, intended to show that the Lord Jesus Christ is not solely and exclusively God. He might have quoted *much stronger expressions* for this purpose; but as he has not done so, we have only to deal with those adduced, which, proving beyond dispute the inferiority of the Son to the Father, and *that only*, are, when rightly understood, perfectly compatible with the position advanced by E. D. R., namely that of the Lord's sole and supreme divinity. They are some of the very passages upon which the doctrine is established.

E. D. R. has maintained that in *the person of the Lord*, the Father, and the Son, were united; of which we have an analogy in the union of soul and body in man. To affirm then that the Son is inferior to the Father is precisely equivalent to saying that the body is inferior to the soul, a position which no man of ordinary intelligence would controvert. We are not arguing that the *mode* of union subsisting between the Lord's Divinity and Humanity, denoted by the terms Father and Son, is clearly discernible upon a superficial glance. Neither is the union which exists between the soul and the body perfectly clear at first sight. Both are nevertheless subjects capable of exposition under the Divine guidance. All we affirm, is what has been verbally acknowledged even under the most degenerated forms of Christianity, that *such a union does exist*. Our opponents call it the union of Divinity and Humanity in the person of the Lord; we, and the Scriptures, maintain it to be a union of the Father and the Son. They, it is true, speak of two other personalities *out of Christ*, a sentiment which we eschew; for in him we can discern the Father and the Son; and as that which proceeds directly from a Divine Being can be no other than *spiritual*, hence termed His *Spirit*, and proceeding *through* a glorified humanity is fitly called *Holy*—we have in him also the *Holy Spirit*.

The first passage cited by J. M. S. is from John v., and part of the 19th verse, “Then answered Jesus and said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, the Son can do nothing of himself.” This was uttered in reply to the Jews who “sought to kill him, because he said that *God was his Father*, making himself equal with God.” We now reiterate the same assertion for which blinded Israel sought to stone, and ultimately crucified, the Saviour. It was an object in the divine economy, by the assumption of humanity to conciliate mankind. When, therefore, the Lord had probed the hearts of the Jews, and shown their *then* incapacity to acknowledge his equality, or identity (for the term will bear that meaning) with God himself, He in the purest mercy brings down the truth, as it were, into a lower sphere, accommodated to their more carnal apprehensions, and dwells

on the inferiority of the Son to the Father. No violence was done to the truth by the presentation of this lower view of it,—an assertion which could not be supported upon the Trinitarian scheme, wherein two separate persons are understood to be co-eternal and co-equal in power, wisdom, and glory. It is an everlasting truth that the Son, or the visible humanity, was “inferior to the Father,” or the essential in-dwelling divinity, which was invisible; which “no man hath seen at any time,” and “which no man can see and live.” But how was it inferior? Simply thus. It was an *organ* specially provided by Jehovah as a means or instrument for accomplishing the great purposes for which the “Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.” As an organ, the humanity was employed to effect all the Father’s objects, and it hence became “obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.” In this condition of working out the will of him that sent it into the world,—in all its states of spiritual conflict, trials, sufferings, and obscurity, it was undoubtedly inferior to the divinity, for *that* cannot suffer or endure temptation. This is however, but one aspect of the case. We are assured that “Christ was made perfect through sufferings.” Was not the Humanity then *perfect* from conception? Had it been, it never could have endured temptation, for that which is perfect is exempt from hereditary defilement, and without this there is no ground for temptation. The human nature, then, derived from the Virgin, contained within it the *elements of evil*; wherefore it “was in all points tempted like as we are.” Continually withstanding and resisting evil promptings, it was yet “*without sin*,” and in proportion as these successful struggles against the evil and false suggestions, arising from beneath,* were carried on, the infirm maternal nature was gradually extirpated, and a divine, all-glorious humanity, in which the Father might for ever dwell, was successively insinuated from above* in its stead. This process, known as the Lord’s glorification, is treated of in every page of the four Evan-

gelists, and frequent direct references to it are made therein, and by the Apostles. This is not the place to discuss the topic, but the above few remarks were deemed necessary to show how the once apparent inferiority of the Son to the Father is consistent with the doctrine of revelation, that the Son is himself the only God, or, as it is expressed in Scripture language, “In him dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily.” There may, then, be inferiority of *essential constituents*, without implying *distinction of personality*. By the view thus briefly sketched, it may be easily perceived how the Son was *unable* to do anything of himself, and how, ultimately, he came into possession of “all power in heaven and on earth,” that is, omnipotence, which is expressly declared.

The second passage brought forward to impugn the sole divinity of the Lord, is one which implies *inferiority in knowledge*. “Of that day and that hour knoweth no man; no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.” It doubtless appertains to omniscience alone to possess a perfect knowledge of futurity. It seems curious, therefore, upon first inspection, that after the Lord had virtually claimed this divine prerogative to himself by foretelling what should happen in “the consummation of the age,” (rendered in our translation “the end of the world,”) that he should, notwithstanding, profess to be unacquainted with the “time of the end.” How will Trinitarians interpret it as a *literal fact* consistently with the divine foreknowledge which they attribute equally to each of the three persons in the Godhead? We believe it is explicable only according to the uniform principles of New Church theology. It must be obvious that if a knowledge of futurity be possessed by the Father, he can communicate some information of forthcoming events to whom he will; and, by parity of reasoning, from whom he will he can withhold such knowledge to the extent he may see fit. Upon this principle then, the passage under notice may be classified with the previous one, and both admit of the same interpretation. As the human nature of the Lord could *do nothing of itself*, but was the organ of accomplishing the Father’s will, so it could enjoy fore-

*The terms *from beneath* and *from above* do not in Scripture phraseology always refer to *locality*, but are most frequently representative of an *external* and *internal state or condition*.

knowledge only to the extent the Father might communicate it; and it is good for the human race that prevision is withheld. But in proportion as the humanity is glorified, or made Divine, in the same ratio was prescience, and ultimately omniscience, possessed. Hence the propriety of the apostolic expression "*the only wise God*, our Saviour," and many other phrases which, without this explanation, are obscure, and incapable of evolving any rational and coherent sense. The Son *ascended* in wisdom, power, and holiness, as the Father *descended*; or, in other words, the assumed humanity became divine only in proportion as the essential in-filling divinity was more and more closely and intimately united to, or conjoined with, it; hence, when the process of glorification was completed, the Lord's words were *literally* true, "I and my Father are one," "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," and during this important process he frequently refers to it as a *going to the Father*. The passage now under consideration does not teach that the knowledge of futurity is impossible, but rather that it is the property only of the Father. It must be observed that the original Greek *ει με* (ei me) in this passage, is very inadequately rendered by the English *but*. The primary meaning is *if not*, or *except*, and is so given in many places. Its introduction here, would tend very much to show the personal identity of the Father and the Son. Substituting the word *except* for *but*, the passage would read, "But of that day and hour knoweth no man; no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, *except the Father*," that is, supplying an elision very common in the dead languages, *except [he were] the Father*. But even retaining the present rendering, the passage is not at all ambiguous, and will afford no argument against the position occupied by E. D. R.

It will be needless to dwell upon J. M. S.'s next point, that of the Son praying to the Father, as this has been already considered by the gentleman who opened the debate. His last objection is founded on the declaration "My Father is greater than I." This point has been conceded throughout by the very nature of the arguments in favour of the question. None but Trinita-

rians would attempt to say that the Father was *not* greater than the Son, and with them the *equality is merely nominal*. Let us look at the terms of the annunciation to Mary, previous to the incarnation. "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee, therefore, also, that *holy thing* which shall be born of thee, shall be called the *Son of God*." The *holy thing* was intended to be inferior to its divine originator, or human redemption could never have been effected. If God could have saved the human race without descending and taking upon himself their fallen nature, he never would have manifested himself under this peculiar form. The circumstances of the case demanded his descent. In the quotation before us the meaning of the term *Son of God* is clearly defined; it is nothing more than the appellation of the *holy thing*,—that is, the Lord's humanity; for it was this which was born of the Virgin, "begotten of the Father," not, however, "before all worlds," but in process of time, and hence denominated the *only begotten Son of God*. This, the simple heart imbued with innocence, would think was amply sufficient to convince the Unitarian denier of the Lord's divinity of his mistake. The appellation implies that the assumed humanity was nothing less than a *very derivation* from the Father, as in truth it was the manifested *form* of God, the express image of his person.* To confound the *image* with its *original* is certainly absurd. The human body is the *image* of the soul; the two are not identical, nor on the other hand, are they two distinct personalities. The one is inferior to the other, is the organ of the other, is the medium of displaying or manifesting the other; and so in the person of Christ was "God [the Father, the in-dwelling Divinity] manifested in the flesh" [the Son, or the humanity]. The position here defended is explicitly maintained in numerous passages of the sacred volume, where the sense is so palpable, that a child can understand it, till sophistry interposes and perverts the simple

* It should be observed that this is the only passage of Scripture in which the term *person* is applied to the Godhead, and here it is a mis-translation. The Greek is properly rendered *substance* and not *person*.

meaning; as, for example, "*God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself*;" "*Christ, who is over all, God blessed for ever*;" "It shall be said in that day, Lo, this is *our God*, we have waited for him;" "They shall call his name *Emmanuel*, which, being interpreted, is, *God with us*;" and, "This is his name whereby he shall be called, *Jehovah our Righteousness*;" "The Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works," and many more to the same purpose; all of which distinctly prove the *exclusive Deity of the Lord, and the duality of his nature*. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to refer to the mis-called third person in the Trinity, farther than to offer an extract or two demonstrating his *impersonality*, and evincing it to be a *holy sphere or emanation, from the glorified humanity of Jehovah Jesus*. "He [Jesus,] *breathed upon the disciples, and said unto them, Receive ye the Holy Spirit*;" "If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you." The sense in which this *sending of the Comforter* is to be understood, is apparent from the declaration, "The Holy Ghost was not yet [given]* because that Jesus was not yet glorified," so that we see the *Holy Spirit, as it now exists, had not being prior to the Lord's glorification*; whence, after his ascension, it was *poured out* in a remarkable manner, on the day of Pentecost. Having bestowed some degree of attention on

*The word *given* does not occur in the original, and is, therefore, put in *italics* in the common version.

E. D. R.'s papers upon this subject, we feel free to confess that his fundamental positions appear to us to be perfectly tenable, and receive the fullest possible confirmation from the Word of God; and, as a consequence, all objections to them are founded either in an inadequate knowledge of the subject, or a misapprehension of Divine revelation.

Before concluding, we cannot refrain from tendering a word of caution to our friend J. M. S., which we do in the best spirit. He has not only presented an unwarrantably favourable aspect of the tripersonal side of the question, but, we are sorry to say, has grossly misrepresented the opposite view; this, however, we are willing to attribute to ignorance of the matter he attempted to oppose. The interests of truth demand our greatest caution in handling conflicting sentiments, and it is far better to concede at once that our gaze is weak, than to endeavour by ridicule, or any other artifice, to strengthen that which in the very nature of things is incapable of receiving support. To confound the Humanity with the Divinity in the person of our Lord, betrays but a very imperfect acquaintance with the affirmative of our question. To say that "the humanity was the divinity itself," would be to say that *God suffered on the cross, that the blood of God was shed on Calvary*, which sentiments are the natural concomitants of tripersonalism; but for ourselves, we can have no sympathy with such a notion as would attribute passibility to the divine nature.

C. G.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—III.

Although my mind has long been settled upon the doctrine of the Trinity, I still feel great interest in its discussion. It is an important doctrine as being, what may be termed, the corner stone of the creeds of the majority of professing Christians, and it is, therefore, desirable that all should hold correct opinions respecting it. I learned, with great pleasure, that it was to be discussed in the pages of this useful magazine, although I could have wished the question had been differently worded.

I cannot refrain from expressing my

surprise at the papers which have already appeared on this question. I always understood that Trinitarians believed this to be a doctrine, to reason upon which was heresy, and that before the plain declarations of the Scriptures upon this subject, reason ought to pale its rays and hide its diminished head. I therefore anticipated that those who took opposite sides on this question would eschew argument and logic, and in the plenitude of their reverence for Divine revelation, mainly oppose each other with Scripture texts. I had pictured to

myself Scripture passages forcibly dragged from their context, and compelled to submit to the indignity of having meanings placed upon them, the very opposite of that they were intended to convey. Judge of my astonishment when I found that the greater part of the first, and no inconsiderable portion of the second papers, were composed of arguments drawn from reason.

The affirmative articles on this question, are the most logical explanations of the Trinity I have yet met with, but, unfortunately, they are not equally Scriptural. If Jesus Christ is God in the full acceptation of the word, and if in God there be a Trinity either of persons or essential principles, then it is clear that in the person of Jesus Christ this Trinity must exist. But here logic will not allow us to stop. If the Father be equal to the Son, and this I think will not be denied, the same Trinity, or a similar one, must exist in his person as exists in Jesus Christ. Again, it is believed that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father and the Son, so that in his person a Divine Trinity must exist. It is bad logic to say that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are all equal, but that it is only in the person of the Son that the Trinity exists. Thus, if the affirmative of this question be true, we must be prepared to affirm either that the Son is superior to the Father and the Holy Spirit, or that there is a Trinity of Trinities, or that the Divine Trinity exists in the three different persons of the Trinity. But we are told that the Son is the only member of the Trinity to whom personality is ascribed, and therefore the only one who has a person. How then can the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, be equal?

Let us now see how far the New Testament agrees with the affirmative of this question. Is the Trinity centred in the glorious person of him who declared "that of himself he could do nothing," John v, 19; and that to sit on his right hand and on his left, was not his to give, Mat. xx, 23? Was it the "only wise God" who said, "Of that day and that hour no man knoweth * * neither the Son, but the Father," Mark xii, 32? Did Jesus know that he and his Father were one and the same person when he said, "It is written in your law, the testimony of *two* men is true; I am one

that bear witness of myself, and the Father who sent me beareth witness of me," John viii, 17, 18; or when he taught us to pray to the Father, and afterwards forbade his disciples to pray to *him*, John xvi, 23; or when he prayed that his disciples might be one with him in the same way in which he is one with the Father, John xvii, 11? Did Christ in his own veritable person die upon the cross? If so, did the Almighty Creator and Upholder of the universe cease to exist? If this had been the case would not all nature at that moment have been blotted out of existence? If Christ in his own true person died, and the Creator and Sustainer of the universe did not die, does it not follow that they are two persons, having distinct and separate existences? And if it be affirmed that the Creator and Christ are one and the same person, and that the Creator did not cease to exist, is it not denying the reality of Christ's death, and thus contradicting the Scriptures?

I am aware that we shall be told in answer to some of the above questions, that in many passages Jesus Christ speaks of himself with reference to his human nature alone; but on what authority is this assertion made? In what part of the New Testament is this revealed, and who shall settle which passages refer to his humanity, and which to his divinity? If this assertion be true, has not Christ taught, in the most forcible way it is possible to teach, viz., by example, the Romish doctrine of equivocation and mental reservation? It is, however, a mere assumption, not countenanced by a single passage of the New Testament.

The only passage which can by any force of imagination be thought to teach the exclusive Deity of Jesus Christ is that in which he says "I and my Father are one; he that hath seen me hath seen the Father." That this passage is not to be understood literally is proved by John xvii, 11, referred to above, and by his after declaration, "No man hath seen God at any time."

But we are asked if Jesus Christ is God, and there is only one God how can we escape the conclusion that he is the only God? This is good logic again, but like that I have answered before, it will not bear carrying out to its full extent.

Let us try it. We have undoubted au-

thority for believing the Father to be God ; Christ himself calls him the only true God ; how then, by the same logic, can we escape the conclusion that he is the only God ? Again, tripersonalists, to whom the question is addressed, believe that the Holy Ghost is God, and yet there is only one God—*ergo*, by the same logic the Holy Spirit is the only God. So that by following out the logic of E. D. R. we have three only Gods !

Thus I cannot subscribe to the affirmative of this doctrine, because it involves us in perplexing contradictions, is at open variance with the plainest declarations of Jesus Christ, and renders the simple narratives of the Evangelists a collection of unsolvable enigmas.

F. J. B.

Philosophy.

IS LANGUAGE OF HUMAN OR DIVINE ORIGIN?

DIVINE—IV.

THIS question of the Origin of Language cannot be positively answered. Reason cannot afford a demonstration, and there is no authority upon which to rely. The inspiration of Moses is not a postulate granted ; nor does his antiquity give value to a tradition which must have been remote even in his day. We are thrown back upon conjectures, to be tested by the rules of probability.

Let us regard the infancy of mankind by the aid of a rational imagination. The few human beings who then possessed the earth were children in years, but not in powers. They were neither savage nor inexperienced. The destiny of the future race was not entrusted to a crude animal, less perfect than the creation over which he was appointed sovereign. Because civilization grows and spreads, we falsely presume that it must have been a seedling ; rather it must have been a plant struck in a good soil, developed and hardy enough to have withstood the chances of an untried climate. The first man was not a babe : he had no mother to guide his infant steps, to tune his voice, to supply his food, or to guard his life. He was prepared with innate knowledge and instinctive experience to sustain an existence, less precarious than ours, because more precious. The metaphysical theory of a pure intellect, the blank sheet of the mind, cannot refer to him, for an instantaneous creation gave birth to immediate wants, which reason was expected to satisfy without

preparation. The instinct of brutes is the agent of Providence, to secure their existence and pleasure ; its promptings cannot be mistaken or disregarded. But man's fate is in his own keeping ; all nature is his domain, and he has the risk of a great proprietor,—a large reward with proportionate hazard. To enjoy such privileges he is prepared through slow years of childhood by lessons which his faculties gradually expand to receive. Our primal ancestor passed through no pupillage ; had he been left by God in ignorance, fruit might have poisoned him, water have drowned him, or wild beasts have devoured him. Had he not possessed language he could have held no communication with his partner ; if they had separated they might never again have met : he would have been as children are, thoughtless and improvident. His intellect, unexcited by the vigour and beauty of a new creation, would have fallen into the imbecility of a solitary and silent being. He would have shown no sign of majesty, no mark of God, no intimation of the future greatness of his kind.

Such are the consequences of the natural theory which circumscribes the power of the Creator within the limits of decent probability,—the same theory which makes God and nature antagonists, and man the arbitrator in every speculation of modern philosophy. Nature, to us, is human experience, her laws are our observation of the sequences of cause and effect ; she has no personality.

Nature is truth, and as we know nothing of the essence of things, we are not competent to distinguish this truth in innumerable instances. Water descends; and we say naturally: it might have ascended as naturally. We are not competent to affirm that anything probable is out of the course of nature; more especially when the probability is great, and approved by a cool judgment. A creation is something new, the mode of which we cannot anticipate; it is analogous to nothing existing; it is very different from successive generation; it is a fact concerning which we can presume nothing, *a priori*. But although we may expect prodigies, we are not to believe, upon human evidence, anything which is inconsistent with our knowledge. Though we cannot deny, we may doubt; at the same time inclining to some hypothesis which concurs with reason. In fine, we may look for wonders, but not absurdities, and must credit that a strange condition had unusual exigencies.

Let us more particularly apply these opinions to the question of the origin of Language. In the first place, it is equally possible that God might have given, or that man might have invented Language. There is no absurdity implied in either supposition: consequently, the question rests upon which contains the greater probability. Let us recur to our original example. If the first man received no Divine instruction, would his natural faculties alone have lifted him above a state of idiocy? History informs us that savage tribes have retained the same simple and brutal customs, for thousands of years. There are authenticated stories of wild men found in woods who had nothing of humanity except its form. What authority is there to believe that mind, without the impulse of society, will put forth its powers; or that in society, without disposing circumstances, it will commence the march of progress? What are the inventions of barbarians? The pressing wants of nature are miserably relieved; discomfort gives no impulse to the genius of those who are wretchedly content, generation after generation. What mean the Indian tradition of strangers who taught the use of the bow, of corn, of fire? If the great ancestor of mankind was a savage—and to admit this, grants something beyond sheer nature—the current

of human genius would have stagnated at its source.

Language is a skilfully contrived system. Even its rudest form displays invention far above the talent of the naked inhabitants of the wigwam. It would be a difficult task for an English labourer, accustomed to the fullness and expressiveness of his native tongue, to compose a vocabulary of nouns, adjectives, verbs, and prepositions, sufficient for daily use. The original difficulty is forgotten because it is so easy to enlarge and improve, as if the present perfection of the printing press was a slur upon the sluggish fancies which failed to originate so obvious an invention. The mere articulation of voice would be an obstacle to a feeble intellect. Wild men, it is said, do not speak, but ejaculate; and it is remarkable that derived languages differ but little from the parent language in the number of elementary sounds. If the first man, or men—and no philosopher has distinguished more than a few races—were inferior to modern savages in direct proportion to their antiquity, the supporters of the absolute development system have to reconcile somewhat incongruous facts and chances. They must also explain why the talented ancestry of the Chinese and Peruvians could invent a spoken language, and yet remain satisfied to write in hieroglyphics and feather painting.

From all these difficulties we are extricated by assuming a Divine original. We assign an interposition proportioned to a want without incurring the imputation of being fanciful. Language is so necessary in the simplest transactions, that the mere rudiments of art and science can never be attained without it. There could be little interchange of thought; the intellectual faculties would grow torpid; the first decisive step up the hill of knowledge would never be taken; man would walk on the dull level of the most brutish ignorance; progress would have no beginning. But the last and most perfect work of the Creator was not cast upon the world helpless and comfortless. Traditions of the earliest times bear record of an immediate Providence. Such a notion would not have arisen if man had been forsaken by his Maker. A true worship has existed from the first, for we can ascribe no other period

for its birth; in a barbarian age we expect idolatry and atheism to arise. If God gave religion he gave it as a crowning gift to intellectual beings,—not to fierce or drivelling savages. He was the parent of the infant race, and tended it with a parent's care. He taught them all that was necessary for a pleasurable existence: he gave no superfluities, because they would have been hurtful. An age of innocent simplicity had no ploughs, no spindles, no engines, no arithmetic, no geometry, simply because they were not needed. God provided against primitive, pressing wants; he gave the few instructions requisite to support life in cheerful health,—he gave Language for use, for comfort, and for worship—and he gave religion because hope is a blessing, and the hopes of religion are the greatest of blessings.

There are many objections to this theory, which it would be difficult to answer, but none can affect the strength of its probability; it can only be set aside by a theory more probable. If any argument be drawn from the paucity and simple structure of original language, this will be worthless, unless it can be shown that a Divine Language must of necessity be copious and involved. Paley remarks of the mechanism of the human frame, that many difficulties are overcome precisely as one would think they should have been.

Another objector can see no marks of original civilization in the existing barbarian tribes. To this there are two answers. First,—a lapse into barbarism is far easier than an advance into refinement; and secondly, the history of Moses has not been taken into account. Those who credit his inspiration upon such matters, will see great changes early effecting the patriarch family, and the earlier a divergence, the greater would be the dissimilarity of the branches in the course of ages. Or, there is room for philosophical discussion as to the number of original races. But whether there were few or many, and whether they were equally or variously gifted, does not materially affect our question. The enlightenment of one might have been reflected upon the rest: and certainly no human beings at this day are so helpless and brutal as must have been the first man, unassisted by peculiar guidance. Nor, finally, is it unworthy of reflection that every race at all eminent, has owed its civilization to the influx or contact of strangers. Conquest and colonization have carried it with them. Civilization has no spontaneous growth. It appears to have existed at the beginning—the little leaven to leaven the whole lump.

H. T.

HUMAN—IV.

E. Y. throughout his paper on the Divine origin of Language, alludes in a self-gratulatory spirit, to the odium which certain famed sceptical writers have attracted towards this side of the question; forgetting that the odium is not attachable to the theory of the Human origin of Language, but to the injudicious advocacy of it, by these writers. Having no sympathy with the preposterous opinions promulgated by the Monboddoo school, concerning the original status of the race, we shall pass them unnoticed, and, of course, pass also the remarks which E. Y. has founded on them. Bailey, in "Festus," aptly expresses our view when he says—

"Giving God honour, never underrate
Yourself; after him ye are everything;
But mind, God's more than everything. He is
God."

The point to be determined in the present debate is—Is Language directly assignable to the Deity? We own that indirectly language is assignable to the Deity, inasmuch as to Him we are indebted for every gift we possess, but that the words emanated from Him we are inclined to dispute. Our opponents must, from the nature of the question, maintain that the idea of a spoken medium was originated, and, by way of example, to some extent elaborated by the Divine mind.

Man is fitted to hold intercourse with his fellow-man; his constitution so plainly indicates this, that we are warranted in saying he could as little resist the tendency to speak, as he could the tendency to associate with his kind; both are natural, the one as much so as the other. Indeed, without

speech, man would have been an anomaly in creation—the possessor of purposeless parts; language alone gives a satisfactory solution of the design implied in the faculties with which he is endowed. Thus far E. Y. and Harold (for this is the ground which Harold takes,) agree with us, but from this point we “each take off our several way.”

The common impression is, that language is so extensive, so complex, so diversified, such an admirably simple means of communicating ideas, that it is utterly impossible man could have originated it. But to form a correct estimate of the scope of language in primeval times, we must, in imagination, retrace the various progresses of mind, and from the idea of man as we find him now, deduct the enlightenment which has, since the early dawn of time, been gradually accumulating.

Mind individualizes, or distinguishes between objects, in proportion only as it is developed; undeveloped mind generalizes merely. In the vegetable kingdom, for example, undeveloped mind perceives the great classes only into which that is subdivided, as trees, flowers; while developed mind, besides distinguishing these great classes, separates each class into individuals, as trees into oaks, pines, elms; flowers into lilies, violets, daliahs, and so distributes names till each different sort of tree and flower has a distinctive appellation. The same principle is observable in every department which engages the two orders of intellect. It is plain then, that the vocabulary of those who individualize, must greatly exceed, in copiousness, that of those who generalize. From the nature of things the early fathers of the race could not be the possessors of developed minds. Surrounded by unmodified nature, they could not be susceptible of a tithe of the impressions to which men are, who live in the age of public journals, railways, and electric telegraphs.

On a thoughtful examination of its claims to a Divine origin, Language, it is found, is defective in some essential characteristics. It is ephemeral; all other of God's works are eternal. It is bounded by the thinkings of those who still employ it, instead of comprehending the thinkings of future times along

with those of present and past times. It is transitional, it fluctuates as ideas fluctuate. It undergoes, continually, a process of accretion and decadence; were it of Divine origin it would be unchanging and unalterable. A slight acquaintance with language will convince any unbiassed mind of the truth of these assertions.

Language is coeval with the dawn of man's intellectual powers; speaking of it, with reference to nations and peoples, it has, like everything originating with man, its rise, its progress, its decline; “it grows with his growth,” it widens as his wants and his knowledge increase, and becomes more and more copious as civilization advances. But a period arrives, at which, even the most approved usages of speech having become familiar, cease to command attention, and are abandoned for novel, though frequently objectionable forms of expression. Hence are introduced numerous corruptions and fastidious refinements; these elements are fateful to the existence of language; it rapidly degenerates, and is as rapidly supplanted by a creation, purer and more robust. This, by the way, is effected, not uncommonly, by violent means. To illustrate our point we might adduce, as examples, the classic languages of ancient Greece and Rome, but every one is acquainted with the histories of those countries sufficiently to trace in their civilization the causes which led to the vitiation of their languages. These languages, though not extinct, are obsolete; they are preserved chiefly for the sake of their earlier literatures. The languages of our own day are wanting in the elements of permanence. Although established for the purpose, it has defied the best efforts of the literary academies of Italy and France to give a fixedness to the languages of those countries. The English language has not escaped the influence of time; even W. T. must have marked the extensive innovations which have been made since the Elizabethan era. If we go north of the Tweed the unending nature of language is still more observable; the vernacular of the Scots has been almost entirely displaced by the gradual advances of English. In a couple of centuries, if not less, it also will have become obsolete. Daily observation convinces us that the people of Scot-

land are rapidly assuming the manners, habits, and pursuits, mercantile and literary, of the people of England. The de-nationalization of the Scottish language arose from the cession of the crown of England by Elizabeth, to James VI. of Scotland, in 1603 ; the union of the two kingdoms in 1707 ; the removal of the court and senate to the English capital, and the consequent withdrawal of those who best maintain the purity of a language, the literate and the nobility. Languages are modified and multiplied by conquest and colonization. In Lower Bengal a language is in process of formation by an intermingling of Indian and English speech.

Language bears an analogy to the other inventions ascribed to man, considered as a whole. As physical difficulties arise, man bestirs himself for the purpose of surmounting them ; hence the multitude of inventions which the mind-made world presents. To announce that in primeval times there existed none of the appliances of art by which man is now aided in the culture of the soil, in the manufacture of fabrics, or in any of the wonder-works of art, is simply a truism ; man's wants being few, these were not called into existence. To assert that language did not then exist in its fullness is, for the same reason, scarcely less a truism ; although both have their origin in the necessities of the race, yet from its nature and use, speech would naturally precede the adoption of means for the subjugation of nature.

Language, as it now exists, from its magnitude, compared with any single invention, is apt to lead one to a belief of its Divine origin. But this belief arises from an imperfect apprehension of the things compared. Language results from, and is matured by, the mental action of whole peoples. It is subordinated to the use of the world's inhabitants, all are interested in acquiring and in improving it. Every science, and art, and contrivance, "whatever stirs this mortal frame," contributes to its enlargement. If it were, as the steam-engine is, the result of an individual mind, the comparison would be just.

But to conclude, we imagine that if Language were of Divine origin we should, while employing it, be conscious that we are employing a medium which has emanated from God, and that we should be doubly conscious of this while inventing terms. Now we appeal to the experience of our readers whether, while employing or adding to Language, they have felt the remotest consciousness of having to do with any other than a merely human means of intercourse.

Language cannot be looked at in any other light than as the spontaneous result of human faculties ; a result at first insignificant, but through time assuming an imposing aspect, the consequence of being developed by the reciprocal transference of ideas, the ever-varying scenes of life, and the reflectiveness natural to the race.

J. N.

Politics.

IS IT DESIRABLE THAT THE REVENUE OF THIS COUNTRY SHOULD BE RAISED ON A SYSTEM OF INDIRECT TAXATION ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

The present question is an important one and cannot but be interesting to all who have given any considerable amount of thought to the subject.

To persons who are acquainted with the workings of society in our own country, and who have watched the steady increase of taxation, even during recent years of peace, it appears desirable that some method should be adopted to put a stop to our

prodigal expenditure, especially when it is remembered that this expenditure presses with considerable weight upon the labour of the poor.

Among a variety of questions which have been propounded with this design, is the one under consideration. Abstractly considered, there can be no doubt that a system of direct taxation has many features which commend it to our attention and render it

at least worthy of careful consideration before it is opposed. Whether as a practical measure it would accomplish all that it professes, is matter for further consideration. We say it is worthy of consideration. There is much that may be said in its favour. There is something about it which appears reasonable. When we consider all men as equal in the sight of God, and in natural rights, it appears reasonable that they should know the exact amount of obligation which they owe to the community in which they live, and the exact amount of taxes which they are called upon to pay: this under a system of indirect taxation is extremely difficult. It also appears reasonable that they should be able to judge with some degree of exactitude of the honesty or dishonesty of their public servants; and a system of direct taxation would furnish them with data on this subject; for if every man had to pay directly to the officers of Government, his contribution to its expenses, he would be able to judge not only of the general economy or extravagance of the Government, but also of the equity exhibited by Government in the manner in which it apportioned each man's burden to the advantage which he derived; or, what is about the same thing, to his means. We need not state that an indirect system of taxation does not so readily furnish these data. Besides this, it is but reasonable to suppose that if the Government had to collect the taxes directly from the people, this very circumstance would furnish them with a strong inducement to make their expenditure as light as possible, consistent with efficiency.

It is no part of our business to controvert any of the positions which we have intimated as favourable to direct taxation, but rather to show that whilst a system of direct taxation is theoretically the most perfect, practically it is incapable of being carried out in anything like either an equitable or a satisfactory manner, in a complicated state of society like our own.

One primary law in political economy is, that all taxation should be paid out of income. If in private life a man lives upon his capital, he is considered a spendthrift, and not without reason. So also in a State. Wherever a State is brought to such a pass in financial matters that the Government is

obliged, to any considerable extent, to tax the capital of the country as a whole, the end of that State draws nigh; for it is by capital that labour is employed, and by labour that wealth is produced; consequently it is from labour and capital combined that the State derives its revenue. Hence if the capital of a country be taxed, the means of future income are proportionally curtailed. If it is impolitic to tax the capital of a country in the mass, it must be unjust to tax the capital of any class of subjects in particular; for if the country as a whole, does not pay taxes upon capital, no class of subjects ought to be called upon to pay such taxes.

A Legacy duty, examined by this light, will be found to be unjust, inasmuch as it is a tax not upon income but upon capital. Now a Legacy duty is a direct tax. No doubt it was laid because it furnished a ready method of raising a considerable amount of money with little expense. It is however not the less unjust on that account. It will appear not less unjust when tried by another test. "A tax should be regarded as the purchase money of value received." Now the money value of Governmental protection to any one person, must be measured not by the capital which he possesses, but by the income which he derives from it. A tax upon Legacies however is a tax upon capital, and consequently cannot be regarded as the purchase money of advantages derived from Government. Thus the Legacy duty is an evidence of the difficulty of levying just direct taxes. We need not state that the same remarks will apply to the Probate duty.

Since each person is interested in the protection of the State, to the extent of his income, and since income alone can be justly and wisely taxed, the simplest and most equitable mode of taxation would appear to be that which after assessing the annual income of each person, arising from all sources, should take from him, directly, a certain portion of his income, as his share of the general contribution. Practically, however, even such a scheme abounds with inequalities. For a tax to fall equally upon all the assessment must be equal. But how is this to be accomplished? Either by the voluntary statement of the individual, or by

investigation and proof. If it is effected by the former the equality of the tax must depend upon the honour of parties under strong temptation to dishonesty; and thus the dishonourable part of the community would be lightly taxed, while the more conscientious portion would bear the principal part of the burden. If it is to be effected by the latter, that is, by investigation and proof, still the dishonest would have the advantage, for some sources of income being capable of direct assessment, are not capable of being concealed, while other sources are known only to the possessor, upon whose statement reliance must be placed.

Supposing however that by proof, or by declaration, or by both combined, a fair assessment could be made, mere income is, after all, a most unfair criterion by which to judge of a person's ability to bear taxation. One man has a freehold estate, or money in the funds, producing an income of £1000 a year, which will descend to his children after him; another, by an uncertain profession, obtains a similar amount, dependent not only upon his life, but upon his health, and a thousand accidents. The annual incomes of these two men are alike, but how different are their circumstances! For the latter to occupy a similar position to the former, he must not only have £1000 a year at his disposal, but his income must be sufficient to permit him at the same time to insure his life for a sum which at his decease would produce £1000 a year for his family. And even then his position would be more precarious than that of the proprietor of land or funded property; for should his health fail, and he be unable to pay the necessary premium, this advantage would be lost. Unequal however as would be the position of these two men, they would be assessed alike, and be charged with an equal amount of taxation.

Suppose however that the professional *man* should save half his income, instead of insuring his life, he would still be charged upon the whole, and thus his *capital* as well as his income would be taxed, which would be unjust.

Again, the case of annuitants may be mentioned as one of undoubted inequality. Here is a person who invests his money in permanent securities, and who retains his

capital. He derives from it a small income, and therefore pays a small amount of tax. Another purchases an annuity, but parts with his capital. As his income is larger proportionally than that of the capitalist, he pays a higher tax. The first pays a tax upon the net interest which he derives from his capital, and his capital remains untaxed; the second receives interest for his capital, but in addition to this he receives back annually a portion of his capital, which together with the interest goes to make his income, and which evidently ought not to be taxed.

The strongest objection to an income tax, however, is the inquisitorial nature of the investigation into men's affairs which it renders necessary. By the mass of contributors this is considered by far its worst feature. Supposing the exposure of a man's affairs would do him no injury, yet it is an offence to his feelings; and as such is attended with no small amount of hardship. Some persons are anxious to conceal the amount of their wealth. It is probable that such would find but few who would sympathize with them. There is another class of persons however with whom most would sympathize:—those who do not like to expose their poverty. And how many men are there who, feeling that to do this would be to degrade themselves in the estimation of the world, tug on by means of the most untiring industry, and the hardest economy, to retain their position! How many a man, thus situated, would rather submit to an unjust impost, than allow his circumstances to be fully disclosed!

Apart from matters of feeling, such an exposure of men's affairs as a strict income tax implies, is calculated in many cases to produce real injury. Men of business, often from a dread of competition, take pains to conceal from others, especially in the same trade or calling, the application of their capital, the rate of profit realized, their connections and their credit, all of which must be disclosed, perhaps to their serious injury, when there is an investigation of their profits.

From the foregoing it is evident that while an income tax is, in theory, one of the most perfect taxes of a direct nature which can be made, practically it is incapable of equitable adjustment.

Further, direct taxation in any form is unpopular. People do not like taxation of any sort, but the more direct the taxation, the more unpopular does it become; in consequence of this, "indirect taxes," or "taxes upon merchandize" have been in favour with most Governments. These taxes "are least felt by the people, because no formal demand is made upon them. They are so wisely contrived that the people scarcely know that they pay them. For this end it is of great consequence that the seller should pay the tax. He knows well that he does not pay it for himself: and the buyer who pays it in the end, confounds it with the price." It is a great merit in a system of taxation that it is popular, inasmuch as it is but a part of the general Government. But this is not the only merit of indirect taxes: they require not that minute inquiry into men's affairs which is essential in a system

of direct taxation: and then they may be so levied as not to interfere to any considerable extent with the productive power of the country, by being placed upon articles which are commonly called luxuries. Such taxes become to a great extent optional, are paid willingly, and realize a very large amount of revenue; as, for instance, the duties on tobacco and spirits.

But it is said that indirect taxation from the very facility of collection, is liable to abuse. Granted. But is there no method of avoiding the abuse without losing the great advantages which the system confers? Would not a more complete representation of the different classes of the people in that House which grants the taxes, do somewhat in this way? If so would it not be wise to make that for the present a principal object sought to be attained?

L. I.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

EVERY man is interested in the system of Taxation adopted by his country, because every man is more or less affected by it. There is, however, an old adage that "what is everybody's business is no one's," and certainly in the matter of Taxation its truth has been most amply verified. When considering the subject we have sometimes wondered at the great ingenuity displayed by former legislators in devising a system of Taxation, at once so complicated and diffusive as to embrace within its range almost every necessary of human life, and yet withal so disguised as in many cases to assume the appearance of a "protective agency," rather than stand in its true character of a fiscal burden upon the industry and necessities of the people! Still more however have we been surprized that our forefathers should have remained blind to the inevitable consequences of an unchecked continuance of this evil!

We know, indeed, that in former times there was a great hatred to TAXES, when so called. Hence legislators were encouraged to work under a mask; and in lieu of a *direct* tax of *Ten per cent.* they would make an *indirect* one of 50 or 100 *per cent.*, "because it pleased the people

better." Things have now changed. We all know that the revenue must be kept up, and although the task may be "grievous to be borne" it is only in accordance with the principles of Englishmen to look evils fully and fairly in the face, and, whatever their magnitude, to grapple with them, and, if possible, by fair and direct means, to remedy or overthrow them.

We look upon *Taxation* as an evil—coming, indeed, strictly within the catalogue of "necessary evils"—but still none the less an evil; and therefore our aim should be to keep it, as much as possible, within compass, upon the principle ingeniously laid down by M. Say (the French political economist), that the "best of all taxes is the least."

Adam Smith, the father of our highest political economists, bequeathed to us a code of principles regarding Taxation, from which few, if any, subsequent writers on the subject, have shown much desire to depart. They may be thus briefly stated.—

1st. That the subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the Government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities, i. e. their income.

2nd. The Taxes which each individual is bound to pay ought to be *certain*, and not arbitrary; and the time of payment, the manner of payment, and the amount to be paid, ought to be clearly understood by each individual.

3rd. Every Tax ought to be levied at the time and in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it.

4th. Every Tax ought to be so contrived as both to *take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public Treasury.*

How far a system of *Indirect Taxation* can be made to accord with these fundamental principles, we shall see in the progress of our enquiry.

We should, perhaps, here state, for the benefit of our numerous juvenile readers, that Taxes are said to be *direct* when they are taken from income or property, and *indirect* when imposed upon the articles on which the income or property is expended. Of the numerous Taxes of the present day the *Income and Property Tax* is the most *direct*, and if simplicity instead of complexity had been studied by its promoters, it would have been one of the least objectionable.

Now, looking at the system of *indirect Taxation*, as at present in force in this country, one of the first points which strikes us is its inequality of pressure upon the different classes, or even the individuals of the same class. The fact is obvious. The Taxes are levied upon the *expenditure* of the people. The poor labourer who receives his eight or ten shillings per week, and immediately expends it for the support of his family, pays perhaps 30 per cent., or about one-third of the whole amount towards the revenue in some shape or other: but the rich merchant or trader, with his ten thousand per annum coming in, *expends* perhaps not more than one-fourth of his income and escapes three-fourths of his quantum of taxation; while he could a thousand times better afford to pay it than the poor labourer we have spoken of. Where then the equity of such a system? Or how far is it in accordance with the principles above quoted?

Again; with an indirect system of Taxation there is no certainty as to the *amount* each individual shall pay, any more than as to the time and manner of payment. These matters are left to *chance*, and determined accordingly. If a person purchase a pound of sugar for sixpence, he pays threepence, or one hundred per cent., upon the actual price of the commodity, for duty. If he purchase a pound of 3s. tea he pays 2s., or two hundred per cent. duty! If, however, he choose to purchase 4s. tea, then he only pays one hundred per cent. duty; or for sugar at 9d. per pound he only pays fifty per cent. duty. Thus upon the cheaper commodities the duty is disproportionately heavy, to the detriment of those whose limited incomes compel them to make such purchases. Hence the inequality and the inequity of which we have spoken! Many other instances similar to the above might be given.

Another serious objection to indirect Taxation, or to raising the revenue by imposing Taxes upon different commodities, is that it leads to *smuggling* and contraband dealing, by which the fair dealer is undersold, and, if not completely ruined, made at last a victim of his own uprightness and honesty, while those less scrupulous prosper. This is not a mere assertion. Those extensively engaged in trade, can too well testify to its truth; while those interested in the social progress and welfare of the people, mourn the tide of moral degradation, which is constantly flowing from the present state of the Customs and Excise Laws!

Perhaps, however, now that the test of *Economy* is beginning to be applied to public, as well as private matters, (and why not?) we may better succeed by drawing attention to the *great saving to be effected* by a direct, instead of an indirect mode of Taxation. We must keep before us Adam Smith's principle of *taking out, and keeping out of the pockets of the people, as little as possible over and above that which is brought into the revenue.* What is the machinery at present in operation in the revenue department? Throughout the length and breadth of our land, our eye meets one continued body of revenue officers. Every inch of our coast is guarded by men in

custom-house garb whose bounden duty it is, "even at the bayonet's point," to prevent the free introduction of those bounties in which other climes and other countries are so rich. Every town, yea, every village, and hamlet is subjected to the almost daily supervision of excise officers. Every shop-keeper is, in point of fact, a tax-collector; for he collects of his customers the duties imposed upon the articles they purchase; while assessors, supervisors, surveyors, receivers, and comptrollers, constitute the higher branches of the service, and inflict a fearful "sweating" upon the "gold-dust" which, by virtue of their office, they handle. The actual, and direct expense of collecting the revenue of this country, at present, is estimated at £3,000,000 per annum. And if we could only form a cash-estimate of the further *indirect* loss, by restrictions to trade, preventing some persons from purchasing in the cheapest market—others from selling in the dearest—and all from that freedom of production and barter which in a great commercial nation like our own is so much desired, the figures would look even more serious. How different the case were a direct and uniform system of raising the revenue adopted! At one sweep, at least a moiety, and perhaps three-fourth's of the present staff of paid officials might be dispensed with—their salaries retained in the pockets of the people, and their energies, now in a manner wasted, directed into a channel, not only profitable to themselves, but conducive of increased national prosperity! The sum to be annually saved by such a course, Mr. Revans, (a gentleman who has bestowed much attention on the subject, and sometime since published an interesting pamphlet thereon,) estimates at no less than *two millions and a half*; while all obnoxious interference with matters of production and commerce might be avoided, much personal inconvenience spared, and moreover, every subject made to contribute, not by chance, but by equitable calculation, his proportion towards the support of the government and the state.

One other objection only, shall we now urge against the present system of indirect Taxation; and that is, its tendency to discourage habits of prudence and forethought among the people. Let one example suffice,

and let that one be the subject of duty upon *Insurances against fire*. Common sense says it is prudent to establish institutions for the protection of persons from the ruinous consequences of fire. Our legislators say, "Well, at least, you shall pay for your prudence;" and accordingly a duty of 3s. per cent. is imposed upon the gross amount of all insured property,—except agricultural farming stock, which is specially exempted. It was, no doubt, thought advisable to humour John Bull a little in this particular. Now it is a notorious fact that this duty amounts, in many cases, to 300 per cent. upon the premiums at which Fire Offices are willing to take upon themselves all risk of damage and loss. Can Englishmen much longer submit to a tax upon their own prudence? Where is the course of inconsistency to end—add that of consistency to begin? Shall the stamp upon each fire-policy, and the red blot on the corner of each newspaper, much longer deride us for our supineness? Or shall our preachings for cleanliness be mocked at by a duty on soap? These, and a hundred other similar annoyances, compel us to take our stand on the negative side on the present occasion.

But to conclude. We have deemed all tortuous argument and lengthened reasoning unnecessary to the present inquiry, and have therefore merely strung together the above simple, yet obvious considerations, by which we have been led to the following conclusion:—That an *indirect* system of taxation has these disadvantages:—

1st. Unequal pressure upon the different classes of the community;—taxing the poor to a proportionably greater extent than the rich.

2nd. That it is alike uncertain the amount each individual shall pay, and the time and manner in which the payment shall be made.

3rd. It affords direct encouragement for for illicit and contraband dealing,—sacrificing therefore the interests of honest traders, rendering them victims to their own uprightness, and the trickery of others,—promoting thereby much immorality.

4th. Causing an undue and injurious interference with trade and commerce, and moreover, in this country, wasting ~~some~~ *two and a half millions* annually, of money drawn from the pockets of the people.

5th. Discouraging habits of prudence and forethought by the imposition of impolitic duties and restrictions upon the means employed for the furtherance of these ends; and, finally, operating in almost every particular, contrary to the principles laid down, and acknowledged, respecting Taxation and Revenue.

We therefore assert it to be *inexpedient* to raise the revenue of this country upon a system of *indirect taxation*; and if the question extended so far, we should be prepared to show the advantages resulting from

a *direct* system—these indeed will be surmised from what has been here necessarily said thereon;—and we now leave the question to the Jury—our readers—merely asking them to set aside all pre-conceived prejudice and partialities, if any such they have; to look fully and fairly at the merits of the case, and from facts and sound references to draw their conclusion—*alike* whether it be adverse to, or confirmatory of, the views we have here stated.

C. W. Jun.

Social Economy, &c.

IS IT MORE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL TO SUBSIST ON A PURELY VEGETARIAN DIET, THAN ON ONE OF FLESH AND VEGETABLES?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

B. W. P. in his article on the Negative side of this question, sets out with the candid assertion, if I understand him rightly, that his refined feelings revolt against the spectacle of “a distorted creature upon the spit,” intended to minister to his bodily wants. I would ask, is this feeling to be dismissed and slighted, merely because it is opposed to the conventional usages of society, or the still stronger argument in favour of an animal diet, “I like it”? Does it not rather afford an additional argument in favour of Vegetarianism, that such a course cannot be resorted to without violating some of the highest feelings that home themselves in the soul of man? Universally there is placed in the heart of man an abhorrence of blood; but why should this feeling be so general, if he is to support his life and health by taking the life of animals? It would have been more natural that a feeling of enmity had reigned there. But no! so instinctively do we recoil from the horrors of the slaughter house, that we individually attach the most debasing ideas to the epithet applied to those engaged in shedding the blood of animals. “To butcher” has become perhaps the most opprobrious term we can use for an act of murder and cruelty. We cannot imagine the

most exalted spirits, those to whom we are in the habit of looking for advice and guidance, in the garb of a butcher, knife in hand, ready to plunge it into the submissive neck of the gentle sheep; and we must not forget, that much as we may have deteriorated from the divine original from whence we started, we do still at times exhibit sparkling scintillations of a present Deity; and we should place no man—no “image of God,” in a position that so debases him; for many sacrifices of ennobling feelings must take place before we can deaden ourselves to a disregard of the pain that the animals are put to.

The Being whom we are in the habit of worshipping as a God of love, of benevolence, and of justice, would be forfeiting his character as such, if he did really implant in the heart of his creatures feelings so entirely at variance with the duty he is declared to enforce; and we are driven back upon the question which appears to me to be the foundation of the whole,—Does the structure of man indicate him to be a carnivorous, omnivorous, or frugivorous and graminivorous animal? Now this question is so plainly solved by the facts of physiology, and anatomy, that any impartial student can come to but one

conclusion; viz., that man is essentially a frugivorous and graminivorous animal. I would enter more at length into this branch of the subject, but seeing that H. S. C. has taken "Anti-Vegetarian" in hand, and will therefore necessarily bring forth arguments to elucidate this part, I refrain from enlarging upon it.

God speaks through all his works; each exhibition of Nature is really a saying of God, and as far as we truly study Nature, so far do we read what God says. Thus every science is the interpretation of a revelation. Now we believe that one and the same God gave the Scripture of Nature, and that of the authorized volume more generally received; hence they must agree if rightly understood, and the latter be not affected by the human medium through which it flowed. And to prove such a possibility, we have merely to bring to remembrance the fact that previous to the meeting of the Council of Nice, many books now reviled were accepted as inspired, and were then first placed on one side, as being of human origin. We have however but human authority for the decision, and know not but that if subjected to a still keener investigation, some portions, now accepted, might be rejected likewise, as it is certain there are portions of those then excluded that are exceedingly beautiful; indeed, it it must have been so, or they would not have received for so long a time the reverence of mankind. This may then account for some discrepancies which are thought to arise between the Bible, and communion with God through Nature. Again, the translation we now possess, is acknowledged by all to be very unsatisfactory; and it is, therefore, very uncertain what some texts do really mean. Thus B. W. P. gives one, viz., "Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you, even as the green herb." I should like to know the value of the word "moving" here, as it may allude to the green herb as possessing vegetable life, thus; Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; *for example*, the green herb, &c." And this view seems borne out by the import of the following verse, viz.:—"But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat;" which is as impossible to do as eating an orange

without its juice. But however that may be, we know that in the first period of man's existence on earth, he was intended to live on the fruits of the earth, and we have no reason to suppose, on the contrary, the facts of physiology and anatomy force us to an opposite conclusion,—that after his fall the slightest change took place in his organization. Indeed, I think, the general tenor of Scripture, the spirit thereof, tends to show that the use of flesh, as the food of man, was in opposition to the working of a benevolent God; that the flocks and herds were not kept for such a purpose, or else why should Moses have demanded of God, when the Israelites murmured for the flesh-pots of Egypt, "shall the flocks and herds be slain for them, to suffice them?" (Num. xi, 22,) and that the token of the fatness of the promised land, was not that it would yield fine oxen and sheep, but that it was a land overflowing with milk and honey.

But the Bible may be wrested to any purpose, and it is scarcely fair to make it a text-book of science. As it cannot teach us astronomy, or geology, so also it has a much higher mission than that of indicating what we may eat or what we may drink. We should be careful that we do not make an improper use of it by accepting the letter which killeth, while we too often reject the spirit that giveth life.

I agree with B. W. P. that the ill effects of drink are more apparent than those of animal food, but it remains to be proved that the former is really essentially more deleterious in its consequences than the latter. Before such a statement can be accepted, the assertion made by vegetarians, that the consumption of flesh is a greater cause of disease must be disproved. I believe it will not be going too far to declare that the most virulent and noisome diseases to which "the human race is heir," are the result of the pernicious habit, *which it also inherits*, of devouring the flesh of animals in whom those diseases are first developed; as scrofula in the pig, &c. The germs thus imbibed, and nourished by continual additions, silently spread, till effects are produced in the constitution entailing consequences upon future generations, of a much more deadly character than those of drink. For full illustration on this point, I would

refer the reader to "Graham's Science of Human Life."

With regard to the arguments brought forward on the point of climate, I cannot perceive their applicability. It may be allowed that in a high latitude flesh suits the human system better than in the tropical climates, but it does not hence necessarily follow that a farinaceous diet, if attainable, would not operate better in the economy of health. And this appears to be borne out by facts; if we look to the peasants of Sweden, Norway, and Russia, who although living on a coarse farinaceous diet, are healthy, robust, and well-formed; which is more than can be said of the natives of Kamschatka; at the same time that they are living in as northern a clime as the latter; and in the region of Siberia, it is asserted that those who have been accustomed to live on a vegetarian diet are enabled to endure the cold much better than others habituated to the use of flesh. Now the Kamschatdales are of the same species as the Swedes, Norwegians, and Russians, and if the assertions made of man's physiological adaptation to vegetable regimen be true, one of two things must follow; either that these people can live on a vegetable diet were they now here, or they cannot, and must be violating some of God's and Nature's laws, in living there at all. The land produces nothing but a kind of moss or lichen; and the bears, and few animals that are able to live at all, eke out a miserable existence. We are told such food will not afford sustenance to man; then through that fact God speaks to them, and invites them to seek a more genial clime. They are violating the laws of nature, that demands certain conditions for the development of man. But not alone does nature appeal to them in the difficulty with which they gain food. By exercise and fat, and furs, the inhabitants are enabled to obtain, and to retain the warmth requisite for the due circulation of their blood, but in spite of all the exercise, in spite of the gallons of oil, in spite of the rolls of furs, merely dwarfed specimens of man are produced. In

figure and in expression they are but little removed from the animals, and in mind they present a void,—an unenviable degree of mental inactivity. But as vegetarians, we desire to find out those conditions that will operate in producing *men*, fine specimens of the species. The world now requires men of stout frame, active and healthy mind, tender, but full-grown heart. We shall not find Kamschatka produce such, and it would seem that conditions that are the price of blood and cruelty must be a drawback to the formation of such characters. In all climates where man can live healthily and vigorously, there a vegetable diet is applicable. If man is to be classed among the animals organized to abstain from flesh, then the inference is obvious; he cannot but be out of his clime if it makes a demand upon him for this forbidden food.

The foregoing arguments have been based upon an "if." I refrain from enlarging on the physiological phase of the subject, for reasons before stated; individually I have no doubt upon the subject.

One more observation and I have done. I think a little reflection will afford B. W. P. abundant evidence that so large a quantity of flesh is not now eaten by Englishmen as formerly. The time has gone by when the baronial boards were groaning beneath the loads of flesh provided for meals, morning, noon, and night. In the aggregate a greater number of animals may be slaughtered, but whether it is so great in proportion to the increase of population, is open to question; and if we consider the improved cultivation of our land, and the increased facilities of obtaining foreign fruits and vegetables, it appears as if our diet was gradually undergoing a change. The resignation of flesh, as an article of diet, is one of the conditions believed to be demanded by the laws of nature for the development of a healthy state, but while this is insisted on, we must not forget that many laws must be obeyed; this is but one, although of great importance.

G. W. W.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—IV.

ANTI-VEGETARIAN has, in my opinion, most ably answered the arguments of H. S.

C., in his second article, upon all points but one, which he leaves untouched; a pro

upon which H. S. C., in his third article, lays considerable stress, viz., the appointment of man's food at the creation, Gen. i, 29. Upon this point, and upon another, which is slightly referred to by H. S. C. in his third article, when he says "that the taste for animal substances even, may be gratified (*when not involving slaughter,*) without violating the principles of Vegetarian Society," I mean the principle of *mercy* towards the animals which are usually slaughtered for man's food, a principle which is thus propounded in the preface to a standard vegetarian work,* in the form of a question, as follows:—"Is man justified in slaughtering animals for his food, seeing that by means of a beautifully organized structure they are rendered exquisitely sensible both of pleasure and of pain?" I say, upon this point, and the preceding, I propose to offer a few words in reply, believing that in so doing (if there be any force in my arguments,) I shall destroy two of the chief reasons upon which the Vegetarians rely for the adoption and advocacy of their principles, and that, in so far, I shall be answering the question at the head of this paper. But I shall reverse their order, and take the last argument into consideration first.

First then, let us see how far the plea of mercy is of any force or validity.

Mercy, it is true, is one of the highest attributes of the Deity, and consequently among the greatest of human virtues. But all-merciful as the great God is, He is, at the same time, all-wise; and in His infinite wisdom, He has seen fit to ordain that all His creation shall rest, for its preservation, upon one universal law—the law of equilibrium; that law, by which "there is kept up a constant action and re-action throughout every department of nature;" that law by which one force or power counteracts an opposite force or power, and effects a balance, or equilibrium, between them. Thus, the air at the equator is heated and rarified by the vertical rays of the sun, and by this means is thrown out of equilibrium with the colder and denser air of the poles: to restore the equilibrium, the cold air of

the poles rushes towards the equator, while the heated air of this region is carried aloft, and borne towards the poles; and thus is a constant action and reaction taking place; and but for this, the tropics would be uninhabitable. So it is in all other departments of nature. Thus we see some animals endowed with predaceous faculties; faculties which induce them to kill and to feed upon animals of a weaker and more inoffensive character. "A discovery," says Lyell,* "of Rolander, cited in the treatise of Wilcke, affords a good illustration of the checks and counter-checks which nature has appointed to preserve the balance of power among species. The *Phalena strobilella* has the fir cone assigned to it to deposit its eggs upon; the young caterpillars coming out of the shell consume the cone and superfluous seed; but lest the destruction should be too general, the *Ichneumon strobilella* lays its eggs in the caterpillar, inserting its long tail in the openings of the cone till it touches the included insect, for its body is too large to enter. Thus it fixes its minute egg upon the caterpillar, which being hatched, destroys it." And why, it may be asked, is this? Why is it that God has made the happiness and the well-being of one animal to depend upon the torments and the death of another? Are they not all equally His? Has He not an equal regard for all His creatures? Certainly He has; but for the general good of all He sacrifices the happiness of individuals; and who shall dare to say He is not both wise and merciful in such ordination? If it were not for devastating causes, if it were not for the existence of predaceous animals, the variations of climate, the introduction of new species into particular localities, the increase of certain species at certain periods, and other like events; there would be an undue increase of particular species, to their own detriment, and the detriment of others. The existence of predaceous animals is a fact, and can only be accounted for on this all-wise, all-merciful principle—the preservation of the balance of power among species. Where then is the force or validity of that plea of mercy which should induce man to withhold his hand from taking the life of an animal for

* Fruits and Farinacea, the proper food of Man, by John Smith.

* Lyell's Principles of Geology, 7 Ed., p. 645.

food, when the all-merciful Father himself has ordained that the sustenance of some animals shall be sought in the death of others ?

I know the predatory and carnivorous propensities of some species have been attributed to the fall of man, whose sin, it has been said, entailed a curse, not only upon himself, but upon the lower order of animals ; and which not only destroyed the peace and harmony that reigned between man and all the inferior creatures, but involved the inferior creatures themselves in mutual enmity and distrust, and rendered some, bloodthirsty and carnivorous. But such an idea the science of geology has completely exploded. Geology abundantly establishes the fact, that ages incalculable before man's origin, the earth was tenanted by animate creatures, which, even in their first and lowest forms, exhibit among them species, whose characteristics unquestionably denote their predaceous dispositions, and which are continued through a long succession of improving forms up to the latest and highest. Where then, again I ask, is the force and validity of the plea of mercy ? It is merged and overwhelmed in the plea of general good.

I will now turn my attention to the second point, and examine the passage upon which it is sought to establish the fact, that vegetable productions were alone originally intended by God as the food of man. And if I succeed in proving the insufficiency of the evidence afforded by this passage (Gen. i. 29) to this end, I not only destroy the reliance to be placed in the testimony of the passage, but if there be any truth in scripture, I prove that God intended that the flesh of animals should constitute part of man's food ; for the language addressed to Noah, after the flood, can then, no longer, with any show of reason, be regarded as permissive merely, but imperative.

The 1st chap. and 29th verse of Genesis reads as follows:—"And God said, Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree, yielding seed ; to you it shall be for meat." Now if this verse proves that vegetable productions were alone intended by God to constitute the food of man, then I contend

that the 30th verse in like manner proves that God intended vegetable productions should alone form the food of *all* animals of whatever description, not excepting the carnivorous ; for the 30th verse is worded in a similar manner to the 29th., "And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat : and it was so." But the peculiar organization of the carnivorous brutes of the present day, which is essentially different from the organization of the herbivorous and frugivorous animals, clearly demonstrates that this could not have been the meaning intended to be attached to the 30th verse, unless indeed it be imagined that with the supposed curse entailed upon them by the fall of man, their organization has since undergone a total change, suitable to their altered condition ; a supposition too absurd to be seriously entertained, no where warranted in scripture, and completely disproved by Geology, as we have already seen. But if this 30th verse cannot reasonably be supposed to mean that "the green herb" was to be the *only direct* source of nutriment to the beast of prey, (and no one *can* interpret it so,) then neither can the 29th verse be supposed to have a similar signification, and to exclude all other than vegetable products from the fare of man. But the 30th verse will bear a more rational interpretation, and so will the 29th. We know that "*every herb bearing seed,*" and "*every tree in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed,*" is not good for man as "*meat.*" Then the word "*every*" in this 29th verse, must have a qualified or limited meaning ; and I therefore understand it to mean, that every herb, and every fruit which *is* good for man's food is given to him for "*meat ;*" and not "*every herb bearing seed,*" and "*every tree in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed,*" *indiscriminately and without exception.* So in like manner must the word "*every,*" in the 30th verse, be understood in a qualified, or limited sense, and the passage be taken to apply to every beast, every fowl, and every creeping thing *adapted to feed upon the green herb ;* and not to every beast, fowl, and creeping thing *indiscriminately and*

without reserve. These verses will, however, admit of another interpretation. It is ascertained that the nutriment which is derived from animal food, is in fact, vegetable matter assimilated from the vegetation on which the animal has been feeding. In this *indirect* way, *every* green herb may be said to have been given for meat, to every beast, and fowl, and creeping thing, in the unlimited sense of the said word "every;" and in this *intermediate* way, *every* herb bearing seed, and every fruit of *every* tree, may be said to have been given as meat for man, for I may say, there is no vegetation, the most poisonous, upon which some creature does not live, which is either directly fed upon by man, or constitutes the food again either directly or indirectly, of those creatures which man appropriates to his own eating.

Let us see how far the Gospel sanctions or discountenances the partaking of the flesh of animals, bearing in our mind at the same time the vegetarian plea of mercy.

Our God and Saviour Jesus Christ,—the merciful, tender-hearted, compassionate, Jesus,—he who inculcated the cultivation of dispositions of love and mercy "Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful," (Luke vi. 36,) and who displayed both love and mercy in all his actions during his sojourn on this earth—do we nowhere find that he sanctioned the partaking of the flesh of the inferior creatures? I need scarcely remind my readers of his feed-

ing the 5,000 with five loaves and *two fishes*, and, again, feeding the 4,000 with seven loaves and a *few little fishes*, of his partaking of broiled *fish*, and of the miraculous draught of fishes taken at his bidding. Again, did he not sit down to "meat" with Simon the Pharisee (Luke vii., 36)? Do we not find him at the marriage feast in Cana of Gallilee? Do we not read also of his eating and drinking with publicans and sinners? Now as the flesh of animals was eaten by the Jews, and we have no right to suppose that it was absent from the table upon either of these occasions, or that our Saviour refused to partake of such food, when (doubtless) offered to him, (a circumstance so singular we might expect to have been recorded,) we have every reason to believe that he did partake of it. And when we bear in mind the advice contained in 1st Tim. 4th chap., quoted at full length by Anti-vegetarian, and which I do not find H.S.C. has taken any notice of, I think we have abundant evidence to convince our opponents of the harmlessness and legitimacy of partaking of flesh.

It appears then, from the line of reasoning I have pursued, that fruits and herbs cannot be proved from Scripture to have been the only originally allotted food of man; nor is there any warranty for the plea of mercy to be found, either in the examination of the physical works of God, or gathered from the inspired writings of the Bible.

CARNARIUS.

The Societies' Section.

THE USE OF BOOKS.

THE following is a brief outline of a lecture recently delivered by Professor Watts, of Spring Hill College, to a literary society in Birmingham, and from the interest with which we feel sure our readers will regard the subject, we have been induced thus to present it to their attention:—

It has been said, that the value of anything may be determined by the attitudes and positions you can place it in; and secondly, in how many different aspects you may regard it. If we judge by these rules, man must be a very important being. Suppose, for instance, we compare man with an oyster—you may say some things of the latter, but many more of the former. In how many various attitudes may man be regarded? Look at him in his position in creation; view him nationally, physically, and professionally. View

man in connection with his habits of thought and study; and to lower the circle, look at him in relation to books, and there we have the book-buyer, the book-seller, the book-maker, the book-printer, the book-binder, &c. It is my object to-night to show the connection of man with books, and to give a few hints that may assist in their selection and right use.

1.—The selection of books. I remember reading a letter of Dr Doddridge's, in which he speaks of his favourite authors as *personal* friends; and such is their true character. It has been said, that "writing is speaking at a distance, and reading hearing at a distance;" if our friends are far away, they may communicate with us by letter as a substitute for *personal* intercourse. Books perform the part of friends

to us :—some friends we go to for assistance in the necessary purposes of life, others because of their refinement of manners and interesting conversation, and others again, because of their cheerfulness of disposition ; and so it is with books. First class books are those which will be of service to us with respect to the necessary purposes of life. And here we must first mention the Bible, which is designed to prepare us for the life to come. With respect to other religious books, those are most valuable which tend to illustrate and enforce the truth and authority of the Scriptures. Then there are those books which belong to our professions, but to these I need only refer. There are some books which are necessary for us as men—necessary for the cultivation of the faculties which God has bestowed upon us.

A knowledge of ourselves is very important. I dare say you have seen the advertisement of a book bearing the singular title of "The House I Live in;" it means our body. We ought to know something about that, not merely that we may admire the wisdom and goodness of God ; but also that we may rightly use the creature, and not pervert it from the purposes for which God gave it being. I wish we had more books on this subject, popularly written. Dr Carpenter's work on Animal Physiology deserves honorable mention.

It has been said that Logic is a subject with which all should be acquainted ; and, certainly, it will be of great value to you. Among other important subjects, is a knowledge of the elements of science. It is desirable that you should know something about the earth on which you live, and something about this country, as well as other lands. The knowledge of political geography is important in this day, when every one reads the newspaper ; but physical geography should not be overlooked. Rising a step higher, we form an acquaintance with natural history, which is full of interest to all. I consider these subjects to belong to the higher class which no one ought to neglect.

I come now to books which admit of a large amount of what may be termed the "literary element." Many of these refer to history, with which, as a lower species, biography is connected. History has been described as "philosophy teaching by examples;" much therefore depends upon the truthfulness of the historian. Sir Robert Walpole disregarded all history, and when he wished his History brought to him, he would say, "Bring me my liar"—and, certainly, many historians cannot be depended upon for their veracity. Perhaps the history which comes nearest to ourselves, is the history of our own country, and to this we should give attention. Hume's history is beautifully written, but is very partial in its statements, and very defective in not exhibiting its evidence. Smollett's is sprightly, but has too much of the dash and sketchiness of the newspaper style. Sir James Mackintosh's history is a work well begun, though marked by all the qualities of the lawyer. Next to the history of England is that of France, the most celebrated writer on which is Boesuet ; but the principal works in French on this subject cannot properly be called histories, but memoirs, personal histories, or contributions to history. Passing by ancient history, I come

now to speak of poetry. There are few minds not capable of receiving refinement from poetry, and to impart this, and not instruction, is its great object. There are few first-rate didactic poems. True, we have Akenside's "Pleasures of the Imagination," and Armstrong's "Art of Preserving Health;" but it is only in a secondary way that the main characteristics of poetry may be said to belong to them. The true use of poetry has been described by De Quincy as producing "the consciousness of power." I think it does us good only when it causes us to feel that we are better for it, that our thoughts are nobler, and our aspirations purer. The poetry of the affections appeals to all, and is appreciated by all. The highest kind of poetry has in it so much of the imaginative as to be creative, and to arouse in those minds which are imbued with it, the faculty of creating images, which they otherwise could not do.

Books are distinguished from each other not only by the subjects on which they treat, but by their quality. There are three kinds of bad books which I would have you leave untouched—1st, Those which are immoral in their tendency, 2nd, Those which would lessen our reverence for the word of God, and 3rd, Those which are characterized by a false style.

II.—We have now briefly to consider the right use of books. I suppose you all to have a small library of your own, and a large one to which you have access. First you must proportion the amount of any particular class of reading to the time you have at command. If you have little time for reading, a greater part should be given to books calculated to improve the mind, but if you have a greater amount of time you may read, with a feeling of propriety, books which are calculated to amuse and cultivate the mind. But the question may be put, How should I read ? Read with attention—with great attention at first. I recommend you, if you would read with profit, to read with a pen in your hand for the purpose of noting down anything that may strike you. It is well to have a commonplace book by your side, for the purpose of making extracts. An index rerum as recommended by Todd, will be of much service to you ;—it will aid in fixing in your memory the things which first strike you. Making analyses of books is very useful, the only condition being that you should use this method with good books, and not with worthless ones. Another improving method is that recommended by Dr Dwight—namely, to read what is well written, lay it by, and afterwards to endeavour to re-write it from memory, and compare what you have written with your author. First efforts should be short ones ; and if you fail in them, do not be discouraged ;—the man who has never failed, has never succeeded. I do not recommend late reading, because it is important that you should preserve your eyes ; early reading is much better,—it is good for the whole body as well as the eyes. If now and then you read in an evening, do so with the intention of putting down what you can remember of it in the morning. I strongly recommend those who wish to learn the art of expressing themselves well, according to good models, to adopt this plan ; they will find it very serviceable to them.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

The *Dundee Dialectic Society* having finished its first session, recently held a social meeting, in Lamb's Temperance Coffee House; Mr. Pat. Dow in the chair. The secretary read a report of the proceedings of the Society since its institution, from which it appeared that it had been in existence for about five months; during which time twenty-two meetings had been held, for the purpose of discussing important questions, and reading essays on interesting subjects. The chairman, in his address, congratulated the members on the manifest success that had attended their labours, and in offering them an incentive to prosecute with increased zeal the laudable exercises they were engaged in, alluded to the necessity that existed for young men, earnestly to embrace every opportunity for cultivating their mental faculties. The present is emphatically an age of restless activity in every department of human enterprise, and, therefore, if they desired to keep abreast of their compeers, in the race of life—if they must seek an enlarged acquaintance with the productions of the great minds of this and other eras—if they longed for a purer taste to appreciate the beauties of elegant diction, a juster discrimination to distinguish between truth and error, and a greater grasp of intellect to comprehend the loftiest speculations, they must, with the enthusiasm of youthful minds, avail themselves of the many means for mental culture that now exist. Literary attainments and scientific knowledge are not now confined to a favoured few. The power to wield the pen is no longer esteemed an Herculean task. To be able to defend our characters, when motives or actions are misrepresented,—to possess the training that enables us, manfully, to join in a conflict of argument, and intelligently to express our sentiments,—are essential elements in the education of the young,

and hence the necessity for young men entering the arena of a discussion class; there to interchange sentiment, and engage in a conflict of opinion.

Several other addresses were delivered by the members, interspersed with recitations, &c., and the meeting concluded; those present having enjoyed, in the course of the evening, "the feast of reason, and the flow of soul."

G. K.

Albert Club, Bolton.—On Thursday, the 7th of August, the first meeting was held, when about eighteen members were present. The Rules were agreed to, and officers elected. In the preparation of these rules, great assistance was derived from the "model code," given in the *Controversialist*, and it was resolved that the work be added to the library.

The second meeting was attended by about forty persons. A paper on the Fruits of Improvement Societies, addressed to the existing circumstances of the Society, was read by the Librarian, Mr. Chas. J. Kenyon, and an essay, on Rhetoric by the Secretary: a short discussion afterwards took place. The presence of Mrs. Butler, the Elocutionist, was expected on this occasion; but in consequence of the arduous nature of her profession, the members were disappointed. In her letter of apology she says:—"I may express my hearty concurrence with the views and objects of the Society, which are evidently to improve, elevate, and humanize the crude realities of life, and such must be the result of careful moral and intellectual training

'The vase may be broken—

But the scent of the flowers

Will cling to it still.'"

About 100 books have already been promised to the Club Library.

The Inquirer.

QUESTIONS REQUIRING ANSWERS.

64. W. J. wishes to know the course to be pursued in order to gain admission to the "English bar, and the probable cost in the shape of fees, &c.

65. Can any of your readers inform me what is the difference between the Electro Biological theories of Dr Darling, and Mr Braid of Manchester?—C. M.

66. I should feel much obliged if some of your Correspondents would inform me what is the course of legal study requisite for an English Barrister; what is the best plan to adopt in pursuing that study; and what are the forms to be gone through, as well as the time and expense necessary.—D. G. B.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

36. *The Cultivation of Memory.*—Memory, it seems, is not a distinct faculty, nor does it appear to possess a distinct phrenological organ, but is the active and healthful condition of each faculty, and its correspondent organ, in the human frame. Whatever, therefore, tends to promote a healthy flow of blood, and to exercise the brain so as to promote its vigour, is sure to improve the memory.

Mental power is illimitable! The store of vital energy is boundless! To doubt this would be to doubt omnipotence itself. The reception of this power, therefore, depends upon our individual condition, and consequent receptivity. The light and heat of heaven fall equally on the

stubborn rock and the fertile valley, but the difference of result arises from the depth of cultivation to which the soil is subjected. It is just thus with human beings. Human being, in its present condition, consists of both soul and body; it becomes equally necessary that both these should be disciplined, in order that the powers of either may be preserved and increased. Addison beautifully remarks, "As I am a compound of soul and body, I consider myself as obliged to a double scheme of duties; and think I have not fulfilled the business of the day when I do not thus employ the one in labour and exercise, as well as the other in study and contemplation." The result of this little piece of practical philosophy is to be seen in Addison's productions.

But exercise is not the only requisite in physical discipline, although it is perhaps the most important. The great principle is, to increase vital action, and, consequently, vital power for activity. One of the chief functions of activity in the human body is in the external covering; the healthy performance of these functions cannot be enjoyed unless the skin be kept thoroughly cleansed from the impurities which should escape from its pores. When the value of water becomes generally known, there will be no wonder that the ancient wells of Assyria, Egypt, and Palestine, and even our own country, were so highly prized as to become, many of them, "holy wells."

Let it not be supposed by those who have not practised the application of water to the skin, that this is either difficult or inconvenient. To such as have not the convenience of baths, a very good substitute may be enjoyed in the simple application of the same operation to the whole surface of the body as is commonly applied to the face and hands, with an extra "dry rubbing" to complete the process. The head of the student particularly requires this attention: sufficient water should be used to thoroughly cleanse the hair, and leave the head cool, and capable of calm and vigorous exercise. The application of cold water to the surface of the head is a most agreeable reviver of the brain, and promotes that healthy circulation which is essential to the performance of its important functions; consequently, simple as it may seem, this process is very important in the cultivation of memory.

Food is the material from which the brain and all the other organs of the body are made; if, therefore, these organs are to be strong and healthy, it becomes of the highest importance that these should be such as to produce the purest blood, and, consequently, the most substantial bodily powers. It is essential, too, that the food be such as not to overtax the system, so as to absorb the nervous energies for its digestion, leaving the brain and other organs in a languid condition; for nothing is so destructive to mental vigour, and, consequently to memory, as an oppressed condition of the stomach, or a full habit of body.

The man who takes simple, unexciting food, can soon discover by instinctive perception, if he will observe it, when he has taken sufficient food at a meal. And by observing promptly this perceptive power, its vigour increases, so that that which may at first be *imperceptible*,

(owing to long neglect of its authority,) becomes after it has been exercised or attended to, a faithful and unerring guide.

The great advantage of this course of life is the power which it affords over the passions and appetites; for although these become all keen and sensitive to the highest degree of enjoyment, they likewise become more than ever controllable, and under the government of reason and judgment. Thus the mind is relieved of one great cause of bad memory—a morbid condition of the nervous system. This is of incalculable benefit to the student, as it is to every individual who would be free from the "bondage of the flesh." The delight which is experienced by the vigorous condition of all the physical senses thus induced, is beyond adequate description. Keenly alive to every impression, the mind becomes in complete familiarity with, and in easy cognizance of, every passing event; the sight becomes clear, and the form, colour, and arrangement of the landscape and every other scene, make a deep impression; it is received through the senses by the mind, it comes in contact with the spirit, and it is as lasting, because the spirit is eternal. The mind thus invigorated, can always recall with the most vivid conception the scenes of past and passing life. The memory is thus a source of high enjoyment.

The sense of smell receives the passing gale, rendered odorous by the blossoms of the flowers and fruits, perchance a field of clover, of beans in flower, an orchard in full bloom, or some other familiar exhalant of Nature; the mind is acted upon by the grateful impressions, and if it has other sensibilities acute, as it most probably will have, it must become itself grateful, for such pleasures of existence are rendered more and more replete and lasting, as the recipient of them becomes faithful to the wisdom they are designed to teach. Every offensive odour becomes quickly recognized as unfit for man to receive, and if, before it can destroy the acuteness of the sense by which it is detected, it be removed, the body is preserved from its contamination, and the mind (and therefore the memory) unimpaired.

Taste and Touch become more and more alive to the impressions from without. These are speedily received by the inner sense or Instinct; the Reason and Judgment are quickly alive to their duties; and if anything be presented which is not congenial to the purpose for which it is intended, and it be at once rejected as unwholesome, the body is again saved from injurious consequences, the instincts preserved in their legitimate power, the memory with all its treasures defended from all base aggression. The Hearing, too, is alive; every word which falls from the orator or instructor makes a permanent impression on the mind, which is actively at work, and arranges what it hears, and deposits all that it requires for its own service in the chambers of its storehouse, the memory; there to be ready whenever the judgment shall require it, for its service in all the various conditions and circumstances of life. And if all the faculties are thus devoted to their proper use, the memory does indeed become a rich treasury.

Thus the speaker, the writer, the artist, the teacher, the man, possesses servants ready to

minister to his necessities—servants who become obedient to his will just in proportion as he treats them with respect and confidence, keeps them in proper exercise, feeds them with proper food, and treats them with considerate attention and kindness! What a happy family group do all these human faculties present when all arranged in order, and thus kept in submission to their parents—love and wisdom! And just as a united family combines together on particular occasions to promote certain ends, which all deem to be essential to the common weal, and, consequently, on these occasions become more powerful,—so the human faculties on particular occasions, such, for instance, as public speaking,—the advocacy of some great truth,—all unite together for the utterance of sentiment and the expression of emotion,—the physical, intellectual, and the moral powers are all exerting themselves for the attainment of the purposes sought, and on these occasions become more powerful for the end, than the less stimulating influence of common-place occurrences will occasion. The memory at these times becomes far more retentive, and facts and arguments which had appeared forgotten or dormant rush into the mind with a vividness, a clearness, and a force, which are not experienced on ordinary occasions. This is another confirmation of the principle I have attempted to explain in these papers—that memory consists in the active and healthful exercise of *all* the mental faculties, and their physical organs; hence the necessity for proper physical and intellectual culture combined.

The statements I have made are capable of being borne out, not only in my own experience, but in the experience of many with whom I am acquainted; whilst they are supported by the unalterable and fundamental laws of the human constitution, and the most recent results of scientific investigation.—A DISCIPLINARIAN.

37. *Phrenotypics and Chronology*.—We now draw the attention of our readers to the following useful

OUTLINE OF MODERN HISTORY.

Century.

- 1st—The Crucifixion, A. D., (33). First Persecution, (67).—Jerusalem destroyed, (70).—Final conquest of Britain, (86).—Second Persecution, (95).—New Testament completed
- 2nd—Adrian emp. (117).—3rd and 4th Persecutions.—Ignatius (107).—Justin Martyr (165), and Polycarp (167), suffered martyrdom.
- 3rd—Severus builds the second wall across Britain.—5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th, Persecutions.
- 4th—10th Persecution.—Constantine the Great (306).—Persecution ceases, (313).
- 5th—Rome plundered by Alaric, (410).—French Monarchy founded, (420).—Saxons settle in Britain, (457).—Western Empire ends (476).
- 6th—Justinian emperor of the East, (527).—Bellarmin fl.—Augustine sent to preach the Gospel in Britain, (596).
- 7th—Mahomet's flight, (623).—Saracenic Conquests.—Venerable Bede born, (773).
- 8th—Pepin king of France, (752).—Charlemagne ditto, (768).—Western Empire re-

vived, (800).

- 9th—English Monarchy founded, (827).—Scotch Monarchy, (843).—Alfred the Great, (872).—Trial by jury instituted.—Oxford University founded.
- 10th—Normans settle in France.—Hugh Capet, king of France, (987).
- 11th—Canute the Great, (1017).—Norman Conquest, (1066).—Pope Gregory 7th.—Crusades commence, (1095).
- 12th—Council of Clarendon.—Thomas-a-Becket fl.—Conquest of Egypt by the Turks, (1169).—Ireland annexed to England, (1172).
- 13th—Magna Charta, signed by John, (1215).—Roger Bacon, (1214).—(1284).—Wales annexed to England, (1284).
- 14th—Battle of Bannockburn (1314).—Wickliffe, (1324).—(1384).—Persecution of the Waldenses and Albigenes.
- 15th—John Huss, the martyr, (1416).—Printing invented, (1440).—Constantinople taken by the Turks, (1453).—America discovered (1492).
- 16th—Henry 8th king of England.—Reformation of the Church.—Elizabeth, (1558).—Defeat of Spanish Armada, (1588).
- 17th—Crowns of England and Scotland united, (1603).—Charles 1st, beheaded (1649).—Restoration, (1660).—Revolution, (1688).
- 18th—Union with Scotland, (1707).—Scottish Rebellions, (1715).—(1745).—United States of America acknowledged, (1783).—Louis 16th, beheaded, (1793).
- 19th—Union of Great Britain and Ireland, (1801).—Slave Trade abolished, (1806).—Battle of Waterloo, (1815).—Victoria, (1837).—Revolutions in France, (1830) and (1848).

Next month we shall show how Phrenotypics may be applied to Geography.—A. C.

42. *The Study of History*.—"Tyler's Elements of General History," is the best book A. S. can commence with; the Chronological Table given above he may make of much service to him, and also an Essay on History which is being prepared for our pages.—Ed.

55. *Mechanics*.—(Concluded from page 380.) Composition of forces. The word composition is of very general application, and signifies placing together.

"A magnitude is said to be compounded of two others, when it produces the same effect as the other two put together. Thus if we increase a line in the proportion of 4 : 6 and then increase the result in the proportion of 6 : 8, the original line is increased in the proportion of 4 x 6 : 6 x 8 or of 24 : 48; hence the proportion of 24 : 48 is said to be compounded of the proportion of 4 : 6 and 6 : 8."


The effects of which it is in our power to form a distinct conception are of two kinds :—
1st, Those in which there are only two kinds imaginable, and those two diametrically opposite with our neutral intermediate state.

2nd, Those in which the diametrically opposites have an infinite number of intermediate gradations. Loss or gain is an instance of the first, change of direction is an instance of the second. Suppose at the rate of an inch to a shilling, guineas were measured northward from a given point,

and losses southward : we could easily make it a necessary consequence that the balance, if any, is represented by a line northward or southward, according as it is for, or against. But if you draw a line eastward or westward, it will be readily admitted that such a line will not present itself in any necessary connection with the sum lost or gained, or which is neither lost nor gained. An immense number of modes of composition will present themselves, in which addition and subtraction are the processes by which the composition takes place. If I go three miles northward and two miles further, I go in effect $3 + 2$ miles, or five miles northward. Other modes, as in the case first given, will present themselves, in which multiplication and division are the processes. In all these cases magnitude alone is concerned : but whenever both magnitude and direction are included in the components, it is obvious that we have both magnitude and direction to consider in the result. For instance, if I walk a mile eastward, and then a mile northward, the effect is that I walk north-eastward, as far as direction is concerned ; as to magnitude however, I go not 2 miles, but only $\sqrt{2}$ miles, or 1.414 miles nearly.

Here is an instance in which the components are represented in magnitude and direction by two sides of a triangle, while their total effect is represented by the third side.

In the composition of forces, the effects are generally of the second kind, being composed of both magnitude and direction. The law of composition is as follows :—



In what sense soever the actions at P can be represented by P A and P B in magnitude and direction, in the same sense can the joint effect be represented by P C, the diagonal of the parallelogram in both magnitude and direction ; or P A and A C being the actions, (A C being equal to P B in both magnitude and direction,) P C the third side of the triangle is their united action. Thus, if at the same instant we communicate motion to P in the directions of P A and P B with the velocities P A and P B per second, the result is that we communicate to P a motion in the direction P C at the rate of P C per second. The same holds good of pressures and momenta, and even if we give P two separate rotations, which would separately carry it round the axis P A and P B in angles per second, which are in the same proportion as P A and P B, the result will be a rotation round the axis P C, with an angle per second, which is to the angle P A (or P B) as P C is to P A (or P B). The above principle is fully demonstrated in most works on the elements of Mechanics. The one which is before us is entitled "The Elements of Statics, Dynamics, and Hydrostatics," by Samuel Newth, price 6s. As Exercises in Mechanics, perhaps the student cannot do

better than use "Tate's," price 2s. Rudimentary Mechanics," by Charles Thos. Binson," one of Weale's series is an interesting volume, and will do much to smooth the way in studying principles.

We have to acknowledge ourselves indebted for many of the preceding remarks to Knight's Penny and National Cyclopædias.—G. N.

58. *Wandering Thoughts.*—The admission of J. B., that "when reading, his mind often wanders," is simply to be attributed to a want of attention. If the subject be interesting, or if J. B. wishes to gain any knowledge or information from it, it can scarcely be possible for his mind to wander. Whenever, in reading, the mind does wander, it clearly indicates that the reader is not paying proper attention. When inattention is the obstacle, J. B. has only "to remove the cause (inattention), and the effect (that of his mind wandering) will cease. A writer on this subject says, "Let the mind of the student be deeply impressed with a conviction of the importance of the habit of attention, and of the practicability of making great and indefinite progress in acquiring the power of fixing attention. Let him resolve that he will daily make the most vigorous efforts ; that he will summon the full energy of his mind whenever he is engaged in study ; and that he will never tolerate in himself a habit of languid and intermittent application. Let him be assured that if ever he allows this, he not only loses his time and frustrates his immediate object, but that he injures the tone and impairs the vigour of his mind. When you remit your attention," said Epictetus, "do not fancy you can recover it when you please, but remember that by the fault of to-day you will be in a worse state to-morrow, and a habit of not attending is induced. Why should you not preserve a constant attention ? There is no concern of life in which attention is not required."—J. G. R.

60. *Bills of Exchange, &c.*—A Bill of Exchange is a note ordering the payment of a certain sum of money at a specified time and place, to a person therein appointed, in consideration of value received by the drawer. Bills are of two classes : Foreign and Domestic. *Foreign Bills* are those which are created abroad and paid here ; or *vice versa*. Domestic *Inland Bills* are of two sorts : the first, properly called a Bill, is drawn by one person upon another ; the other, denominated a *Promissory Note*, or Note of Hand, is made at once by the party who is to pay it without being drawn upon any other person. The following forms may be useful to many of our readers.

(Form of a Foreign Bill.)

London, February 11th, 1851.

Francs, 2,500.

Three months after date, pay this our first of Exchange (second and third not paid*) to the order of Messrs. Philippart & Son, two thousand five hundred francs for value received, as advised by

* Foreign Bills are mostly drawn in sets of two or three, all alike, excepting the words *first*, *second*, and *third*. By transmitting a second, and sometimes a third Bill, at different times, or by different mediums, loss or miscarriage is guarded against ; the first that comes to hand is paid, and the others are given up.

Thomas Smith & Co.
Messrs. Kialmarok & Son,
Paris.
(Form of an Inland Bill.)
Birmingham, June 2nd, 1851.

£236 : 5s. 6d.

Three months after date, pay to my order the sum of two hundred and thirty-six pounds five shillings and sixpence, value received.

John Jones.

To Messrs. Morgan & Co.,
Nottingham.
(Form of a Promissory Note.)
Manchester, July 1st, 1851.

£120 : 5s. 0d.

Two months after date, we promise to pay to Mr. Henry Horton, or his order, one hundred and twenty pounds five shillings, for value received.

Wright, Smith, Wright.

There are generally three parties to a Bill of Exchange; the drawer, the acceptor, and the endorser. The usual mode of accepting is to

write across it in the centre. Some write "accepted, payable at such a house." If a Bill fall due on a Sunday, or a holiday, it must be presented for payment on the preceding day. There are, in most countries a few days of grace allowed for taking up the Bill, beyond the term of payment. On Bills drawn on any place in the United Kingdom, three days are thus allowed.

Further information on this subject will be found in the "Clerk," and the "Banker's Clerk," two valuable little works, published by Houlston and Stoneman.—L. S.

62. *Monastic Institutions*.—Perhaps the under-mentioned work may meet the wishes of your correspondent:—Fosbroke's (Thomas Dudley) *Encyclopædia and Elements of Archæology, and the British Monachism, or the Manners and Customs of the Monks and Nuns of England*, 122 engravings, 3 vols. roy. 8 vo., published at £3 : 13s. 6d., but may now be had through the cheap book shops for £1 : 10s.—L. S.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

We are glad that our students have begun in right earnest to labour diligently, as we see evidences in their performances of the efficacy of such perseverance. *Labor omnia vincit*. A press of matter prevents us making many remarks upon the Essays presented to us by our students for perusal; we can only find time to express our general satisfaction with their various efforts. Differing as they all do in mental peculiarities, opportunity, and style, it gives us much pleasure to observe that they are all animated with the same laudable ambition, viz., self-improvement. According to promise it falls upon us in our present issue to detail the method which we intend to follow in the distribution of the prizes promised at the commencement of this section. It is simply this, that on the 16th of December the markings for the year will be made up, all Essays received by that time being registered and counted, and those students who stand upon the list nearest the point of attainment—which, at the rate of 100 marks per month, will, in ten months, be 1,000 marks, shall receive the highest prize, the two next on the list receiving other prizes in the ratio of their merit; while those who have not reached the prize-point and yet are deserving—in the opinion of the Editors—of commendation for successful effort and advancement, will receive "certificates of merit" to that effect, duly certiorated. This we think will be at once the fairest and the most simple plan we could adopt—the fairest because it will not only give a chance of reward to superior intellect, but also to patient and persevering effort—the simplest because the method may be understood by all, and the calculation of their point of attainment made by each of the contributors for himself.

The register for this month is unusually favourable and satisfactory. 92, D. G. B., (intelligence, perseverance, and care, are evident in

these papers); 91, H. T., (highly pleasing; executed with care and judgment); 90, E. S. J., (you have evidently made *excellior* your motto); 89, Effort, (we are glad to see that you have made another "effort" so successfully; go on); 86, Ruth, (we are pleased in hearing from you again, and are happy to be able to praise you); 80, Robin, (accurate and clear); H. H. H., (very much improved; our hint has been serviceable); T. W., (is a young but highly intelligent writer; persevere); 79, R. K., (we are sorry we let your paper escape last month, it was marked 78; pray accept our apology: labour and you must succeed); 78, T. T., (much chaster in expression, and every way improved); I. N., (very nicely reasoned); E. S. B., (your essay is very clearly expressed, and displays acuteness of mind); 75, J. E., (clear and plain); S. H. A., (very well done). We are sorry that we have lost the signature attached to one of the essays, the number of marks attached to which is 90—perhaps the owner will claim it—describing its subject, etc., and we will mention it in our next.

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. IX.

1. How many classes of Idols are there, and what are they?
2. Explain the general characteristics of the Idola tribus, and mention a few of them.
3. What are the Idola species and their general characteristics?
4. Describe the Idola fori, and give a few illustrations.
5. What are the Idola theatri? Explain how they influence the mind.
6. What rules must we observe in order to avoid errors in judgment?

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XIX.

ON METHOD.

"There are certain ideas, or *forms of mental apprehension*, which may be applied to facts in such a manner as to bring into view *fundamental principles of science*; while the same facts, however arranged or reasoned about, so long as these *appropriate ideas* are not employed, cannot give rise to any exact or substantial knowledge."—*Whewell*.

"By Method, I understand a collection of certain and easy rules, of such a nature as to prevent any one, who shall have observed them with accuracy, from assuming, at any time, the untrue for the true, by which, no exertion of the mind being uselessly expended, but, on the contrary, science being gradually increased, a person may attain to a true knowledge of all those things of which his capacity permits the attainment."—*Descartes*.

"THE word METHOD (*μεθοδος*) being of Grecian origin * * * it is in the Greek language that we must seek for its primary and fundamental signification. Now, in Greek, it literally means a way, or path of transit. Hence the first idea of *method* is a *progressive transition* from one step in any course to another."* Accepting this account of the primal import of the term, and influenced by a maturer consideration as well as a deeper and more comprehensive study of the subject, we are now inclined to give the word Method a wider and more extensive significancy than that given to it in our introductory article. Our recent studies have enabled us to become more conversant than before with the chief metaphysical writers of Germany and France, especially Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel amongst the former; and Descartes, Buffier, Cousin, Jouffroy, Comte, &c., among the latter; while we have of late been necessitated to bestow a considerable degree of time and attention to a re-perusal of most of the metaphysical articles of Sir Wm. Hamilton, Thos. DeQuincey, Dr. Ferrier, G. H. Lewes, &c., as well as the works of Bacon, Brown, Coleridge, Hallam, Whewell, Mill, Maurice, Morell, &c. In the course of these studies we have become so convinced of the great, nay, indispensable, importance of Method in the acquisition of knowledge, that we beg our readers to accept of the following amplified definition of that term—viz., *Method is the arrangement of our ideas, that is, the results of our perceptivity, judgment, and ratiocination in such a manner as shall best facilitate the acquisition, remembrance, and communication of knowledge*. According to this definition, it will appear that Method consists of these three parts—viz.:—I. Those arrangements of ideas which relate to the facilitation of the acquisition of knowledge, including a theoretical and practical acquaintance with the

* Coleridge "On Method," p. 14, Ency. Metro. New Ed.

rules of syllogistic logic, and the principles of philosophical investigation generally. II. Those arrangements of ideas which have reference to the storing up of knowledge in the memory, comprising an acquaintance with the laws of logical classification and division, together with an aptness in applying them; as well as a knowledge of those laws of mnemonics and of simple and relative suggestion which are discoverable by the study of the mind. III. Those arrangements of ideas which assist in the communication of knowledge, comprehending the classification, co-ordination, and succession of ideas, the laws of composition and criticism, &c., which are necessary for the interchange of information.

“All things in us, and about us, are a chaos, without Method; and so long as the mind is entirely passive, so long as there is an habitual submission of the understanding to mere events and images, as such, without any attempt to arrange and classify them, so long the chaos must continue. There may be transition, but there can never be progress—there may be sensation, but there cannot be thought; for the total absence of Method renders thinking impracticable, as we find that partial defects of Method proportionably render thinking a trouble and fatigue. But as soon as the mind becomes accustomed to contemplate, not *things* only, but likewise the *relations* of things, there is immediate need of some path, or way of transit, from one to another of the things related;—there must be some law of agreement or contrast between them—there must be some mode of comparison; in short, there must be Method. We may, therefore, assert that the *relations of things* form the prime objects, or, so to speak, the materials of Method, and that the contemplation of those relations is the indispensable condition of thinking methodically. Of these relations of things we distinguish two principal kinds. One of them is the relation by which we understand that a thing *must be*; the other, that by which we merely perceive that it *is*.” * The former is that which is to occupy our attention in the present article, the latter we shall briefly notice in our next.

Method is a collection of rules which, if we follow out legitimately, will realize a given end. A Method, however, will and must vary according to the end pursued. In our present paper we shall assume that the attainment of true knowledge is the aim of the reader, and we shall arrange our remarks for the purpose of aiding him in the accomplishment of this praiseworthy and honourable design. In every investigative process about which our minds can be employed, there must be some definite and particular *points* which require elucidation, arrangement, and consecutive ordination, and that department of logical science which teaches the *modus operandi* of classification in such a manner as shall make each antecedent point tend to the explanation and ready comprehension of its sequents, is included under the term Method. Considered as effecting this object, the study of Method is all-important, for it is through such instructions as these that we are enabled to carry up every fact to successive platforms, and find in every fact a germ of expansion. True it is that this seems to demand a comprehensive eye and a well-balanced soul; but it must be recollected that strict discipline is necessary in order to acquire these, and that if we wait until we feel ourselves possessed

* Coleridge “On Method,” p. 15.”

them we shall wait long indeed. Rather let us at once begin to culture our intellect to cope with the necessities and requirements of our being, and labour diligently for the attainment of that "philosophic habitude of soul" which the study of Method is calculated to superinduce. Method demands of us, as an initiative, that we should lay restraints upon our mental powers—that we should determine the channel in which the mind's activities should flow—and that we should aim at the concentration and subordination of the intellect. We must not be mere passive recipients of impressions—mere reservoirs of stagnating thought—mere changelings, whose minds are agitated into thought-ripples by every wind of circumstance that fans them—but men of steady, stubborn thought, who will not stand appalled at obstacles, but are determined to search diligently for truth "until we find it." If we be so, Method will be most willing to become our ally. It will teach us how to keep the object—*id quod jacet ob oculos*—at which we are aiming, continually before us, and so to change our position in regard to it as shall enable us to see the light falling upon it in the greatest number of directions. Thus only can true knowledge be attained. "To try wrong guesses is apparently the only way to hit upon right ones. The character of the true philosopher is, not that he never conjectures hazardously, but that his conjectures are clearly conceived and brought into rigid contact with facts. He sees and compares distinctly the ideas and the things—the relations of his notions to each other and phenomena. Under these conditions it is not only excusable, but necessary for him, to snatch at every semblance of general rule, to try all promising forms of simplicity and symmetry,"* for "it must be obvious to the most superficial thinker, that discovery consists either in the detection of some concealed relation, some deep-seated affinity which baffles ordinary research, or in the discovery of some simple fact which is connected by slender ramifications with the subject to be investigated; but which, when once detected, carries us back by its divergence to all the phenomena which it embraces and explains."†

Some of the pre-requisites of Method—some of those essentialities without which no Method can be philosophically excogitated, properly understood, or practically applied, may now be mentioned. We must possess an acquaintance with the nature of those powers whose operations we are desirous of directing, wherein they can serve us, and wherein they are likely to fail. We must know how our intellect may most easily be brought to perform its functions with accuracy, and what precautions are necessary in the reception of the reports of our senses. This requires a knowledge of the elementary powers of the mentality as well as of the laws which govern their operations. We must know how truth may be evolved from truth—how the variable and complicated may be reduced to sameness, simplicity, and unicity—how the mind must proceed in the "manipulation" of facts in order to educe the sciences and the arts. We must analyse the movements and doings of the mind, observe and experimentalize upon our own thoughts, and become practically conversant with the best methods of employing them. Hence results the necessity of studying the syllogistic logic, in order that we may learn

* Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i., page 373.

† Brewster's Life of Sir Isaac Newton, page 336.

the necessary laws by which conclusions may be legitimately and determinately deduced from given premises. But we must do far more than this: we must bring the multifarious and insulated phenomena which surround us, within the grasp of generalized principles—we must read our experience attentively, and thence gain new premises for new syllogisms; and when our own experience is too limited, we must enrich our minds with the experiences of others, or acquire an artificial experience by the employment of experimentation, and from all these sources gain the materials on which to syllogise in future. The qualities, attributes, relations, &c., of the objectivities around us must be carefully conned and observed, in order, if possible, to unicalize the divergent rays of things, and to concentrate their apparently aimless diffusiveness into definite *foci*, that thus we may be able to generalize slowly, going from particular things to those that are more general, and from those to others of greater extent, and so on until we arrive at the universal laws of nature.* We must study the principles which pervade nature—the causes which operate in the production of effects—the modes of operation which natural objects follow—the sequences in which they advance, recede, or otherwise exert themselves—distinguish between concomitances or concurrent facts and those which exert a causative agency—learn the limits by which causes and effects are conjoined, and acquire a knowledge of the universal and immutable as contradistinguished from the transient and individual. We must discover the grand centres round which, as in an orbit, phenomena revolve—from which their utility and beneficiality are derived. Facts must be observed in their concrete form, their coincidences and similarities traced out, until from them extensive and abstract generalizations and *formulae* are deduced, and then these elemental forms of reasoning must be re-pursued from the abstract and generalized to the concrete and particular. Every conception must be subjected to the rigid test of experiment, and the deliberate inquiry and plodding drudgery of induction and deduction must be undeviatingly pursued. In Method we must believe the doctrine of Milton, when he makes the assertion that

“——— in the soul
Are many faculties, which serve
Reason as chief,”

and make every other faculty subordinate to it. The senses and reflection conjoined, may yield the elementary ideas, memory may store them up, judgment may arrange and classify them, but reason must co-ordinate, deduce, and infer. When we are

“Voyaging through strange seas of thought alone”

she must direct the helm, consult the compass, and survey the chart. Unless such be the Method pursued by us in all our investigations, we may depend upon being named as belonging to that class whom the satirist stigmatizes as

“By dint of experience improving in blunders.”

Let us, by all means, avoid this, by examining calmly, observing carefully and minutely, experimenting perseveringly, analyzing accurately, and thinking methodically, ever looking upon each idea as the embryo of a new truth, which, like the favourably-planted

* Bacon's Nov. Org. Aphorisms, 19 and 104.

acorn, may fructify, and grow, and re-produce; for "we know that a physical principle, when it becomes a scientific truth, has a thousand-fold application, of which we knew nothing before. * * The moment a broad principle is educed and brought into the light of a scientific fact, we can at once apply it to every branch of human knowledge; we can clear away with it a thousand errors or absurdities which cluster round the region of unphilosophical thinking; and by its suggestion can point the way to new developments of noblest truth."* It is from such generalization as this that knowledge derives all its value. "Without it our information would be reduced to scattered and unconnected facts, which, like separate filaments, would be utterly destitute of strength. If knowledge be power, it is because its threads are bound and twisted together in general theorems. And theory, so far from being inconsistent with practice, is practice itself, and that in the most extensive meaning of the term. The theorist differs, it is true, from the practical man; for the one is conversant with facts collectively, the other individually. The one is a wholesale dealer in experience, the other only retails it."†

It must have been observed from our preceding articles, as well as from the opinions expressed in this one, that we are no exclusives—no bigoted and devoted followers of any schematist. In philosophical speculations we can aver—

"Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri."

We believe that science has an *obverse* and a *reverse* side—that each fact is related on one side to *induction*, and on the other to *deduction*—that the mental energies of man must be regulated and trained, and must have their activity subordinated and determined by the study of the syllogistic *formulae*, as well as invigorated and exercised, stimulated and quickened, enriched and fertilized by the practice of the laws of the Baconian Induction. We must not only know how to develop thought, but also how to acquire the elements from which thought is to be eliminated. Facts must form the food which we are mentally to digest, receive into the circulation of our Reason, and employ in life, business, study, and action. If to trace effects to their causes, to become acquainted with the Laws of Nature, and to learn the invariable sequences of phenomena, be the object of all science; and if facts be the manifestations of law—the effects of an intelligent pre-co-ordination of phenomena, then it can only be by the study of facts, that a knowledge of the laws on which facts depend, can be attained—that science can be rendered possible. But each fact must be looked at by the eye of Reason, in the light of common sense, and interpreted by the aid of phenomena of a kindred character, before its scientific value can be settled. We must institute a rigid and severe process of analization, in order to ascertain all the ingredients which enter into the causation of any phenomenon and separate it from all foreign or adventitious admixture: having done so, we can infer that all similar phenomena are the result of the same causative elements. Thus far Induction will bring us, but there is another process, no less necessary and imperative, viz., to take this general truth as a torch-light to farther discoveries,—to go forth and demand of phenomena whether they homologate the inference, whether they support

* Morell "On the Philosophical Tendencies of the Age," p. 167, 168.

† Dr. Dionysius Lardner's Discourse on the Advantages of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy. 1829, p. 26.

the theory. Not only this but the work of *prescience* is yet all to be done ; events have to be calculated and foretold ; and having thus acquired the law, man has now to go farther forward, has to conquer the realms of practice, and institute the arts ; these latter processes are the task of deductive philosophy. The Empiricist may scorn Theory and deal skilfully with isolated particulars,—the man of details may talk with apparent learnedness,—the practical man may pride himself on his inductions of particulars, but unless Theory be verified by deduction, science is but as

—“a tale

Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing,”

and can never become what it ought to be, a vast classified collection of fruitful and immortal truths,—the mother of the arts and the ameliorator of life.

In farther prelecting on the present topic it may not be unadvisable to lay before our readers a few remarks on *the true method of science*. Science is systematized knowledge—knowledge co-ordinated by the eye of Reason in the light of law. True science consists not of mere orderly tabular or schematic arrangements of fact ; this is but the natural history,—the preparatory step to true science. Perceptivity furnishes the mentality with the conceptions. Judgment (in its function of induction) supplies the classification, by which the mind is placed in a position to apprehend the relations of things—whether obvious or latent. Ratiocination connects phenomena by a principle of causality by which new truths may be correctly evolved, and by which future phenomena may be calculated. Perceptivity gives the term,—Judgment, the proposition,—Ratiocination, the Syllogism. Science invariably begins with individualities, but if it terminated there, it would be empiricism and not Science. Not until we rise from specific phenomena to general laws can we be said, with truth to have attained to a scientific view of realities. Thus alone can truths receive a scientific connective, and a true union-bond. Science is not the educt of sense but of reason,—is not the result of mere perceptual activity but of mental, *i.e.*, rational idea-elimination. Sense is incapable of observing the *power* by which phenomena are evolved. Reason's well-trained and clear-visioned orb alone can gain a glimpse of that essential element in all philosophically-conducted speculation—a colligating conception. Gravity, Electricity, Magnetism, Time, Space, Force, &c., are not given in the sensational portion of man's nature, but in the ratiocinative part. Hence it follows that Induction is not the *logical*, but the *chronological* beginning of science. Nature is so adapted to the constitution of our minds that it is continually placing us in such circumstances as gradually “excite its vegetating and germinating powers to produce new fruits of thoughts, new conceptions, new imaginations and ideas,” and these we must arrange and classify. Individualities must be separated into that which is *essential*, and that which is *accidental*. Science originates with the analytic powers, but cannot be completed without the aid of the Synthetic faculty. By Analysis we mean the resolving of a complex whole into its elementary parts, that power by which we are enabled to discriminate the essence of a thing from its accidents. By Synthesis we understand the placing together of a number of discriminated facts, in order to educe from them a definite truth. The former constitutes Induction, and proceeds upon the truth of the axiom that *whatever is true of all the constituent*

specificities, is true likewise of the constituted generic idea. The latter constitutes Deduction, and proceeds upon the reverse maxim, viz.,—*Whatever is true of the constituted generic idea, is true likewise of all the constituent specificities*, or in other words, viz., those of the Aristotelic dictum,—“Whatever is predicable or predicated, concerning any term distributed, whether affirmatively, or negatively, is predicable, or may be predicated, in the same sense, concerning any or every thing contained under that distributed term.” Induction, it will now be seen, investigates and assimilates a plurality of objectivities, and reduces them to a unical, all-inclusive idea. Deduction, on the contrary, begins with ideas unicalized,—possessed of a mental oneness,—and predicates unicality of attributes to each of the plurality of thoughts contained, or bound up together, in those generic ideas. The one examines the *physical* wholes of things, the other their *logical* wholes. What is true of a logical whole is true of each of its parts; what is true of a physical whole, however, is not so. The one collects the facts of phenomena, and strives therefrom to acquire a general idea or law, the other posits this idea or law, and endeavours to classify phenomena under it. The former receives and operates upon ideas in their greatest *comprehension*, the latter in their greatest *extension*. “In fact, between the *deductive* method and the *inductive* method there is only this difference, that in the former we begin with the *major* and *minor* premises, and *deduce* the *consequent*; whereas in the latter we begin with the *minor premise* (the observed conditions) and the *consequent* (the attendant phenomena,) and from these *infer* the *major premise*,—that is, the law or generalized fact.”* Thus it is evident that these methods are not antagonistic, but mutually aidant,—not rival, but co-operative systems,—the one is but the necessary complement of the other. To reason without having a solid substratum of facts is certainly folly, and is, of all things, the most likely to lead us to the formation of erroneous opinions. Indeed, such an unqualified and preposterously exclusive advocacy of the Inductive philosophy is quite unwarrantable, and seems justly obnoxious to the ridicule cast on it by Kant, viz., that such a method of philosophizing must be pursued, “under the vain glorious fancy of seeing farther and more surely, by means of mole eyes fixed upon the earth, than with eyes fitted to a being to whom God

“Os homini sublime dedit: cœlumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.” †

“The Philosophy of Fact” is unattainable except through “The Philosophy of Thought,”—a knowledge of the laws of the mentality. To found reasoning upon facts, to collect, examine, and compare them, to deduce from them certain generalized rules for our direction regarding them, and to try the re-applicability of our rule to the given series of facts about which it concerns itself, is the only way to attain Truth. Unless used in this manner the most extensive tabular collections of “Instantiæ” would serve us but poorly, and the seeds of experience would be infertile, and unproductive. Our adoration of Baconism has reached its culminating point, and we are now beginning to see that it is

* “The Theory of Human Progression,” p. 506.

† “—— gave a lofty countenance, and who was ordered to gaze on heaven, and raise his face uprightly to the stars.”

by a judicious employment of Aristotelianism and Baconianism combined, that science must attain its perfectionment.

Our readers have already had presented to them a brief but comprehensive abstract of "Induction," (vide Articles VIII and IX,) and they ought now to be in a position to understand an explanation of those points in which it is deficient. This topic has been frequently insisted on in previous papers, and we do not intend here to recapitulate the arguments formerly employed, but we are, at present, desirous of indicating four several and distinct defects, which we believe to be chargeable against the Baconian Philosophy, viz. :—

1st. Its *formulae* presume that the topic under investigation is new, and the pathway hitherto completely unexplored,—pre-supposes us to have no experience already collected,—and admits of no deviation from its laws, whatever be our former acquaintance with the subject.

2nd. It assumes that every definite *effect* has its own definite and individual *cause*, and does not provide any *formulae* for the evolution of those cases in which many *effects* flow from the same *cause*.

3rd. It assumes that every definite *cause* has its own definite and individual *effect*, and does not provide any *formulae* for the evolution of those cases in which many *causes* combine to produce one *effect*.

4th. It furnishes us with no key to the explication of the neutralizing operation of different causes.

Did space permit, we could follow these classifications up with illustrative examples in proof of the positions taken, but viewing our rapidly diminishing sheet, we are warned to forbear: however, lest it should be supposed by any one that we are unprepared to substantiate the above charges, we may name the following instances in which Induction would be inefficacious were its *formulae* strictly observed, viz., crime, an effect which proceeds from many causes; extravagance, a cause which produces many effects; and the equilibrium of forces wherein causes neutralize each other.

We intended in this paper to give a summary view of the Methodology of the most famous of the continental philosophers. We perceive now that that would extend our article far beyond its due and proper limits, and remembering our recent transgression and our promise of future amendment, however much tempted by inclination to go on in our intended way, we think it will be most advisable to abstain for the present, and confine our remarks to the explanation of the Methods of the celebrated French Philosophers, Descartes and Comte.

Réné Descartes Duperron was born at La Haye, in Tourrain, on the 31st of March, 1596, (at this time Bacon would be 35 years of age,) of Breton parentage. His mother died a few days after his birth, and he himself was exceedingly sickly. At an early age he entered the college of the Jesuits at La Flèche, and therein studied the Classical Languages, Mathematics, Logic, Rhetoric, and Physics. Here he attained an idea of the almost complete darkness which overshadowed the tree of knowledge, and resolved to set himself, in his after life, the task of dispersing that darkness, and gaining some of the goodly fruit which grew upon that tree. The futility of the science of that day for practical purposes, and the incompetency of philosophy to give fitting responses to the

inquiries of an earnestly inquiring soul, yearning to behold, if possible, truth face to face, was made woefully evident, and he determined to seek no other science than that which he could find in himself, or else in the great book of the world. He afterwards entered the army, and past his life, for a time, in camps and travel, but at length in the year 1629, when he was 33 years of age, he retired to Holland, and engaged in the execution of his youthful design. "He did not desire," he said, "to rebuild the town in which others dwelt, but to re-construct the dwelling-place of his own intellect. He might for this purpose employ old materials; but the plan must be new, and the ground must be thoroughly cleared." * Thus, for the first time, was the experiment which Bacon desiderated, attempted, viz., "No one has yet been found of so constant and severe a mind, as to have determined and tasked himself utterly to abolish theories and common notions, and to apply his intellect, altogether smoothed and even, to particulars anew. Accordingly, that human reason which we have is a kind of medley and unsorted collection, from much trust and much accident, and the childish notions which we first imbibed; whereas, if one of mature age and sound senses, and a mind thoroughly cleared, should apply himself freshly to experiment and particulars, of him better things might be hoped." Proceeding upon this principle Descartes postulated a preliminary doubt, which may be best explained in his own language, viz., "In order to rid oneself of all prejudice it is only necessary to determine, not to affirm or deny anything of what we formerly affirmed or denied, until it has been carefully re-examined. But we are not, on this account, prohibited from retaining in our memory the whole of the notions themselves."† This doubt then, as a mere *pro tempore* suspension of the Judgment, was negative not positive. He resolved, so far as concerned his philosophic inquiries, to consider all his former impressions as if they had never been,—to regard, as far as was practicable, his mind as a blank;—he doubted the existence of the world, of God, of Truth. Thought then was to re-conquer as much from the realms of doubt as it was able; stripping his mind of everything except his own existence he postulated that as certainty in the famous axiom *cogito ergo sum*, "I think, therefore I am," and then sought to establish some first principle from which another might be logically deduced, until by a direct, obvious and rigidly sequent train of reasoning he should attain a knowledge of all truth. Mighty labour! Was it capable of accomplishment? At all events the attempt was praiseworthy. In order to its accomplishment a method was requisite,—rules required to be laid down. They were these:—

Rule I. Never accept anything as true which is not clearly known to be so; *i. e.*, carefully avoid rashness and prejudice, and comprise nothing within the proposition except what is so distinctly presented to the mind as entirely to preclude doubt.

Rule II. Divide each difficulty under examination into as many parts as possible, so that each part being more easily conceived may be more readily understood.

Rule III. Commence all investigations with the most simple and easily understood objects, and from these ascend gradually to the knowledge of the more complex.

* "Discourse on Method," part 1st.

† Vide "Lettre de M. Descartes à M. Clerseilier," in Jules Simon's edition of "Œuvres de Descartes." Paris: Charpentier, 1851, p. 367.

Rule IV. Make enumerations so complete, and reviews so circumspect, as to insure that nothing essential to the attainment of the truth may be omitted.

Consciousness being thus postulated as the basis of all certitude, and these rules being laid down for the guidance of the mind, all that was necessary for the attainment of the primary elements of philosophy was to consult consciousness what ideas, impressed upon, or residing within it, were most clearly and distinctly cognoscible by it, and then this was to be considered as truth. Only to indicate the results of such a philosophy would occupy much space; we now merely mention a few. Having thought as a posited fact, we discover that our thoughts are limited, but that we have an idea of infinitude. Infinity of thought implies infinity of power, and perfection; for we observe that our power and perfectibility increase in exact ratio with the extension of our power of accurate thinking. Infinity of thought, power, and perfectibility, constitute our idea of God. But our mentality is impressed, we feel, by something different from itself. Things which differ in their properties are diverse in their nature, hence we not only infer the existence of matter, but also the essential distinction between *matter* and *mind*. That cannot be an essential portion of Deity which implies limitation in space or power. Matter, if self-existent, would limit him in space, and imply his powerlessness to create it; therefore matter is not self-existent, but created, and its creator is God. We have thus deduced from the one posited fact—thought—the facts of God's existence—the existence of matter—the distinctness of matter and mind, and the necessary creation of the world. Such are a few of the results of this philosophy. Descartes, during his life, was persecuted as an Atheist. He died at Stockholm, whither he had been invited by Queen Christina, of Sweden, A.D. 1650.

M. Auguste Comte is an illustrious living philosopher, who, between the years 1830 and 1842, published a large and most valuable treatise, in 6 vols., 8vo., entitled "*Cours de la philosophie positive*," which has met with but scanty encouragement from the public, and yet bears evidence, in many parts, of profound thought, acute analytical skill, and a comprehensive range of mental vision. We are far from wishing to be understood as homologating all his opinions, and yet we think there is so much of merit in his method that we would be glad if the brief and hurried glimpse which we can now take of the general scope of his writings should incite any of our readers to thirst for more information regarding his system—perchance incline them to seek the fountain-source itself. All that we can undertake just now is merely to notice *results*, not *processes*; starting apparently from the suggestion contained in Bacon's *Novum Organum* Aph-80—viz., that no effective progress in science could be made until the several sciences had been individually expanded, and the several facts contained in these sciences brought back again to a general philosophy. The problem which M. Comte sets himself, is the discovery of a science possessed of the requisite *generality*. He found philosophy in a singularly unsettled state—one party denying that a general science was possible, and another asserting that general science was the great desideratum of the age. Positive science was thus, in his opinion, scarcely general enough; and general science was not sufficiently positive. To construct a science in which these defects would be avoided, he accepted as his mission. To do this, however, it was necessary to learn, if possible, the

natural law of mental evolution. Looking at the method in which men have made advances in knowledge, he perceived that each science had a definite chronological course to fulfil, in which it passed through three distinct and successive stages—viz., 1st. Fetichism, or the mystical era, in which each effect is believed to proceed from the direct agency of supernatural beings, *e. g.*, the mythology of ancient nations. 2nd. The metaphysical era, in which men engage in vague and futile attempts to discover the causes and essences of things, *e. g.*, astrology and alchemy. 3rd. The positive era, in which, mind having advanced, men no longer believe in the mystic mythology of the early ages, or in the imaginary occult qualities, formalities, and quiddities of the metaphysical stage, but look upon creation as the result of a complex series of laws according to which all events begin, proceed, and terminate. Physical science, history, mental and moral philosophy, and sociology, equally confirm this view of humanitarian progression. In fixing our eye upon Science we find it readily divisible into two grand genera—viz., the pure and the mixed. The pure sciences are those which are possessed of definite and distinct laws, from which, independently of the existence of external objectivities, might be deduced equally unambiguous results. The mixed sciences are those which result from the study of natural objects, hence they are composed of mixed rules, *i. e.*, rules derived both from induction and deduction. There are six pure sciences, each differing from its sequent in being less in *comprehension* and greater in *extension*—viz., Mathematics, which concerns itself with the ideas of *number, quantity, and extent*:—Astronomy—which refers to the distances, sizes, and forms of the solar orb and the planetary bodies; the orbits in which they career, and the forces by which they are moved,—is, in other words, the science of gravitation:—Physics, whose special consideration is expended upon the larger masses of matter, and in the ascertaining of the laws relating to weight, electricity, light, caloric, magnetism, and sonorousness:—Chemistry, which studies the laws which regulate the molecular composition of bodies, and determines the conditions which preside over their definitive combinations, *i. e.*, the atomic affinities of unlike substances:—Biology, whose office it is to explain the laws of life, from the lowliest vegetable to the loftiest animal—describe the organic functions and faculties, and study the whole physical, moral, and intellectual nature of man:—Sociology, which looks upon society in order to discover the laws of social evolution—the successive phases and changes which society presents and undergoes—distinguishes between the transitory and unstable, and the necessary and permanent. This, he asserts, takes in all that is knowable by the human intellect. Such are the pure sciences and their offices; any discovery made in one of the antecedents, creates the possibility of progress in the sequents. From the base upwards this is applicable, but from the apex to the basement there is no descent of improveability. Thus we have given us the law in which progress is possible, and are certified of the futility of any other course. The foregoing is but a brief and rapid glimpse of the *leading* idea of this great work. Could we follow it out more fully by illustration and explanation, our readers would see the great importance of the step which this great philosopher has taken. Had we space for the necessary *adversaria* which, as an antidote, it would require, its value would be made more evident by shewing how suggestive of thought it was, merely in the requisites necessary for

limiting, circumscribing, and correcting it, pruning its extravagances, correcting its viciousness, and supplying its defects. Another opportunity, in a future series of articles, must be seized for this; meanwhile we shall conclude this article with the following rules for the guidance of our students in making methodical inquiries:—

Rule I. It is necessary to *know* before we begin to *reason*.

Rule II. The subject of inquiry should be clearly and distinctly comprehended.

Rule III. The subject of inquiry should be carefully detached from any extraneous matter.

Rule IV. If the subject be compound, separate it into its component parts.

Rule V. Begin with the most simple, and proceed gradually to the most complex consideration.

Rule VI. Let no step be taken unless sufficient evidence upon the point be attainable.

Rule VII. Be careful and cautious in the searching out of middle terms, in order that the path from the known to the unknown be gentle and easy.

Rule VIII. If it be necessary to reason upon things which are, as a whole, incapable of being otherwise than obscurely comprehended, proceed only so far as the way lies clear before you.

Rule IX. The nature, kind, and degree of evidence necessary for the proof of any particular topic, must be accepted in any inquiry regarding that topic.

History.

DID CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY THE EXECUTION OF KING CHARLES I ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE I.

"A divine right to govern ill is an absurdity : to assert it is blasphemy."—*Bolingbroke*.

"A brave and haughty monarch (Chas. I) had failed in his efforts, by policy or force, to establish absolute power on the ruin of all popular rights. With long-suffering patience the popular leaders had striven to restore to his hand the sceptre, under such restrictions as should prevent its ever becoming a despot's rod; and when all faith in his promises and intentions became hopeless, they judged him, and doomed him as a traitor to the laws—well-knowing that a very small minority of that sovereign people, in whose name they acted, dared to sympathize in such a deed."—*Daniel Wilson, F.S.A.S.*

THERE is no duty more obnoxious to the feelings of a faithful and impartial historian, if the attainment and recordance of truth be his sole object, than that of handing down to posterity the misdeeds of our own monarchs, yet I question whether it is not

more painful and harassing to the critic when it falls to his lot to disinter those records, and to expose them to the scrutinizing eyes of an enlightened, civilized, and progressive community. Historians who have recorded "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," are rare, and there is, unfortunately, quite as much misrepresentation on this subject as on that of the character of Oliver Cromwell. The reason is easily explained. Charles endeavoured to make despotism supreme in England; Cromwell on the contrary, legislated for the public good, and asserted full and entire liberty, whether civil, social, or religious. By these endeavours, he succeeded in raising to himself a monument, "which," to quote the language of his biographer, "it has been the fortune of few kings to erect,"

and which will remain to the remotest generations of time. Historians, in days of yore, wrote to gain court favour and precedence, and this simple fact at once removes the mystery respecting the counter statements which have been recorded of the English Revolutions of 1640 and 1688. From the consideration of the subject before us, as in all cases where history is to be consulted, two very important and useful lessons may be derived, viz., that when monarchs resort to illegal means to obtain and extort that which is unjust or contrary to human reason or right, they will eventually incur the vengeance of those over whom they wish to tyrannize, and failing to take warning as Charles did, after having provoked a spirit of rebellion to his unlawful demands, they may terminate their career by meeting a violent death. On the other hand, so long as kings appeal to the intelligence and integrity of their countrymen, as to the truth and justice of their desires, confidently relying on them for an appropriate response, they will assuredly secure their love, confidence, and assistance, and more than this, the people will ever be ready and willing to sustain them when emergencies arise. From the unhappy catastrophe which took place in front of Whitehall, on the 30th January 1649, as well as from the events of the preceding 25 years, an invaluable lesson may be derived, by kings and rulers anxious to extend their own power and prerogative in opposition to right or reason. The moral suggested, for aught we know to the contrary, may have been well considered by those whose lot it has been to govern since that direful period, and one example of the folly and madness of endeavouring to grasp, and so exercise undue power, may have effectually prevented others from pursuing a similar course. But notwithstanding this example there are monarchs who now assume despotic power, and depend only on the bayonet and the sword for protection against the assaults of their depressed and insulted people. Let us cherish the hope that kings and queens will henceforth learn to govern their subjects by those principles which are most in accordance with human nature that they may touch those secret springs of thought and action, which will endear their people to them, and at the

same time elevate them socially, morally, intellectually and religiously.

My motive for the foregoing is to prepare the reader for the recital of a series of conflicts, long and unpleasant, between an unfeeling monarch and an oppressed people. My feelings cannot be conceived to be of a pleasant character; concerned as they are with—

“Scenes of strife and blood, and hideous
roar and fiends’ shouts.”

It is necessary to state before proceeding directly to the consideration of the question, that Elizabeth and James I, both assumed unlawful power, but neither carried their despotic acts to the extent which Charles did. James was the father of the last-named prince, and educated him in the same pedantic notions he had himself imbibed. His ideas about “Divine right” were monstrously absurd. He contended that his will was God’s, and that no person had the least authority to question his acts, or dictate to him. He was qualified to command, they to obey and to be in subjection to his “Divine right and will.” Charles speedily imbibed these extravagant sentiments. The result, despite the good education he had received, gradually developed itself, and ended in rebellion, and the loss of its unfortunate parent.

I will now proceed to give a summary of the illegal acts which Charles committed; at the same time I would have it distinctly remembered that for some few of them he was not wholly responsible, his prime minister, Buckingham, having assisted in recommending the commission of several despotic and ill-timed deeds. After the death of his coadjutor, Charles was his own prime minister; he was consequently then responsible for all legislative transactions. Although often warned of the nature of many of his proceedings, and of the misery and woe it would entail on the people—the probability being that he would be the sufferer—and although oftentimes entreated by his best friends and political supporters to desist and retrace his steps, he shrunk not from carrying into execution all schemes that coincided with his feelings and wishes. Charles was responsible (in conjunction with Buckingham) for the levy of tonnage, poundage, and ship money.

the sale of the offices connected with the State, and the extortion and extraction of forced loans, termed "benevolences." It is worthy of note, as showing the shifts to which Charles was driven, that he instructed the clergy to preach the doctrine of "passive obedience" to the king's demands; or as a popular writer quotes the exact words I will give them likewise:—"They were to show *illimitable* obedience to the king on pain of *illimitable* damnation."

All of their illegal acts were proceeded with against the leaders of the popular party. John Hampden, the illustrious patriot, who refused to pay the assessment of 20*s.* ship money, as well as Sir John Elliot, Sir Thomas Wentworth, (afterwards the apostate), John Pym, Sir George Catesby, were all thrown into prison for their refusal to pay the required sum. Upwards of 100 gentry shared the same fate. The lower class of people were sent to work on the king's ships, &c.

Another proof of the vacillating conduct of Charles was his consenting to sign the death-warrant of the unfortunate Sir Thos. Wentworth, Earl of Strafford. This ill-fated nobleman had previously espoused the people's cause with great earnestness, but he deserted the party he had fondly loved, and joined the imbecile king in his tyrannical government of Ireland, &c. Being impeached by the Commons for high treason, Charles solemnly asserted "that not one hair of Strafford's head should suffer." On the news of the signing of the warrant by Charles being communicated to him, he exclaimed, with uplifted hands and eyes, "Put not your trust in men, *neither in PRINCES*, for in them there is no salvation." There never was a time in which the truthfulness of these words was more emphatically realized than in the present instance; nor is there an example on record of a sovereign exhibiting a greater want of firmness and courage than Charles evinced on this momentous occasion.

Seeing from these, and numerous other acts, that the least confidence could not be reposed in the king, and that he was determined to try all unlawful means which could be devised to oppress the people, the Commons and Lords passed the famous "Declaration of Rights," which was a

renewal of Magna Charta, and intended to curb the monarch's despotic power. The bill prescribed, amongst other things—1. That no freeman ought to be restrained or imprisoned unless some lawful cause of such restraint or imprisonment be expressed. 2. That the writ of *habeas corpus* ought to be granted to every man imprisoned or restrained, though it be at the command of the king or privy council, if he pray for the same. 3. That when the return expresses no lawful cause of commitment or restraint, the party ought to be delivered or bailed. 4. That it is the ancient and undoubted right of every Englishman that he hath a full and absolute property in his goods and estate, and that no tax, loan, or benevolence ought to be levied by the king, or his ministers, without consent of Parliament.* Sir Thomas Wentworth thus spoke on the bill. He had not apostatized at the time referred to:—"We vindicate what! a new thing? No, but our ancient, legal liberties, by enforcing the laws made by our ancestors by setting such a seal on them that no libertine spirit shall dare hereafter to disregard them." The earl little thought that, in a few months, he should be as antagonistic to the sentiments he then uttered, as he was hearty in supporting them at the time. His subsequent conduct and political career afford a melancholy comment on the above-mentioned enunciations, and at the same time prove him to have been unworthy of that cause which he had formerly supported and graced by his eloquent and forcible orations. He proved himself to be as great a despot as his royal master; and the exclamations that he made on hearing of the signing of his death warrant, are as applicable to his own case as to that of the unfortunate monarch; and no extenuation of the punishment he suffered would have sufficed for the enormities which he perpetrated during his administration.

The declaration thus passed was presented to the king. He came to the House, and instead of announcing his assent in the usual

* Commons' Journal. To shew the validity as well as the justice of these demands, it is worthy of remark that they *now* remain the same as when passed, with one exception—viz., the 2nd. This is left to the discretion of the judge, and is seldom refused.

way—viz., “*Loit droit fait comme il est désiré*,”* he said, “The king willeth that right be done according to the laws and customs of the realm, and that the statutes be put in due execution that his subjects may not have any cause to complain of wrong or oppression contrary to their just rights and privileges, wherein he holds himself bound in conscience as well as obliged in his own prerogative.” The difference between the two replies is marvellously evident, and is at once detected. “According to their just rights and privileges” saith the king. But what were their “just rights and privileges” was a matter of mere construction. The Commons were not to be deceived by such evasive and crafty answers, but immediately summoned the Duke of Buckingham, accused him of being the author of this and other evils, and impeached him of high treason. Here is one of the numerous instances evinced by the Commons, of wisdom, moderation, and good sense. They laid the axe to the root of the evil by impeaching the prime minister, not the king. And yet there are historians, and would-be philosophers, who cavil at the “injustice with which Charles was treated, and the unconstitutional legislation of his parliament.” Had the parliament merited such contempt and contumely as these have endeavoured to cast upon them, they would have accused the king of that crime which was imputed to his minister. But the king interfered with the impeachment by giving legal assent to the “declaration.”

The bill passed, twelve subsidies were granted, amounting, according to various accounts, from £150,000 to £500,000. The Commons afterwards voted that “whosoever should henceforth levy tonnage, poundage, or ship money, without consent of Parliament, would be adjudged guilty of high treason.” News was immediately received by the House that Charles was coming to seize five of the most popular members. In the interim he had set his seal on their goods, papers, and documents. The Commons thereupon ordered the seals “to be broken,” and the person who had affixed them to be brought before

them. Charles went down to the House, escorted by 300 soldiers, took the speaker’s chair, and demanded that he should tell him where the five members were (who had recently left, by command of the House, in order to avoid bloodshed). The speaker, on his knees, declared that “he had neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak but as the House directed.” Looking at the places usually occupied by the absent members, he exclaimed, “Since I see the birds are flown, I expect you will send them to me, otherwise I must take my own course to find them.” Cries of “privilege, privilege,” resounded as he left the hall. A gross breach of privilege had been committed; the Magna Charta, two months before assented to, had been unwarrantedly set at defiance. The five members were brought to Westminster in triumph, escorted by the people, the militia, and even the Thames watermen. On Charles hearing this he exclaimed, “What! do these water-rats, too, forsake me?” Yes, all had forsaken him, finding that no dependence could be safely reposed in him. This was the commencement of the revolution—this last act was the harbinger of civil war. The ruin of the throne was inevitable; liberty was endangered, as well as life and fortune, if Charles was left to ride rampant and roughshod over a depressed miserable people;—a people, too, who would be the first to protect the monarch from insult if he were unjustly assailed;—a nation which, had the position of king and people been reversed, would have fallen down at the feet of their king and entreated for mercy and forgiveness. Charles acted illegally by his rapid and violent dissolutions of parliament, and by reigning without *one* for eleven years. His perfidy and depravity are further exposed by the two remarkable documents, which were found among his private papers, taken at the battle of Naseby, and afterwards published. It appears from these (his private letters) that at the treaty of Oxford he had secretly registered in the council book his protest that, in calling the Lords and Commons together at Westminster a parliament, he did not acknowledge them as such, but that he looked upon them as “banded traitors,” to whom he

* “Let right be done as desired.”

owed neither forgiveness nor good faith; that he termed his own followers of both Houses assembled at Oxford, a "base," "mutinous," "mongrel parliament;" that he designed bringing into England an army of Roman Catholics from Ireland, and a foreign army under the Duke of Lorraine, a popish prince, contrary to his express and solemn word.

The last document I shall quote is the one that was sent by the Earl of Glamorgan (Charles the First's secret agent) to Charles II. He says, "One army of 10,000 men was to have come out of Ireland through North Wales; another of a like number, at least under my commander-in-chief, have expected my return in South Wales, which Sir Henry Gage was to have commanded as lieutenant-general, and a third should have consisted of a matter of 6000 men, 2000 of which were to have been Liegeois, commanded by Sir Francis Edmonds, 2000 Lorrainers, to have been commanded by Col. Browne, and 2000 of such French, English, Scots, and Irish, as could be drawn out of Flanders and Holland." * * The maintenance of this army of foreigners was to have come from the pope, and such Catholic princes as he should have drawn into it, having engaged to afford and procure £30,000 per month, out of which the foreign army was first to be provided for, and the remainder to be divided among the other armies. "And for this purpose had I power to treat with the pope and other Catholic princes, with particular advantages promised to Catholics for the quiet enjoying their religion without the penalties which the statutes in force had power to inflict upon them. And my instructions for this purpose, and my powers to treat and conclude thereupon, were signed by the king under his pocket signet, with blanks for me to put in the name of pope or princes, to the end that the king might have a starting hole to deny the having given me such commission; if excepted against by his own subjects; leaving me, as it were, at stake; who, for his majesty's sake, was willing to undergo it, hasting to his word alone."

From the numerous proofs which I have adduced of the depravity of Charles's heart,

and his utter abandonment of governing by law established, I will leave it to the candid judgment of the reader to say whether Charles was, or was not, guilty of treason of the highest and most flagrant character, and, therefore, worthy of death. The last quoted extract evinces the desperate and infamous measures to which he vigilantly and unscrupulously applied himself in order to achieve his fiendish purposes, as it discloses the perfidious, corrupted, and depraved state of his heart. After laying a well-organized scheme for the destruction of the people's constitutional liberties, he resorted to the basest and most subtle means to fasten the guilt which he had incurred upon a second party in order that he might escape the vengeance of the people. Had not the parliament succeeded in reducing its enemies, and taking the life of Charles, the latter would in all probability have succeeded in his deeply-conceived plans, and caused still further bloodshed. After these transactions, will any rational person, acquainted with the facts, contend that Charles did not merit the death he met? If there be such persons, what are the facts on which they build their case? Are the foregoing true, or are they false? If true, there is at once an end to the controversy, for no one will deny that the acts amounted to high treason;—if false, let them prove them to be so. Happy shall I be for one should they succeed. To me the attempt appears futile and hopeless. Should my opponents succeed in proving the falsehood of the extracts quoted, and also that Charles was a good, and wise, and benevolent prince, as Goldsmith reports him to have been, there is no apology which I would not make as an atonement for the strictures contained in this article; nay, more, it will be consolatory to my feelings to know that when our continental neighbours take up the future History of England to examine those traits of statesmanship which have distinguished her kings and protectors, they will find the personal qualities and policy of Charles I. portrayed in characters of more pleasing and commendatory terms than those in which I have felt it my duty to represent them.

Cheetham, Manchester.

J. G. R.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—I.

IN taking the negative of this question, I am aware that I occupy an unfavourable, because an unpopular, position, but I believe it is in accordance with the principles of justice and humanity; and such a one as my theoretic opponents would themselves actually take, did similar events occur in our own day.

Before we can be prepared to pronounce an intelligent verdict, we must be acquainted with the facts of the case; and it will be well for us to mark the bearing and conduct of the Parliament towards the King during the whole of his reign, as well as the character and conduct of the King himself.

When Charles ascended the throne, he manifested great impatience to summon the Parliament together, and his ardour little liked the necessary delay. When the members met, he addressed them in a speech marked by simplicity and cordiality. He lightly mentioned the occasion he had for a supply of funds, but left the matter to their generosity. It soon appeared that his confidence was misplaced, for they only granted him a sum of money so small, that many regarded it as only a cruel mockery, rather than as a serious design of supporting him. The fact is, on the accession of Charles I., the Commons had determined to reduce the power of the King, and they commenced by keeping him short of cash! No wonder that an act like this poisoned, at the fountain head, Charles's generous flow of feeling towards his Parliament and people; and no wonder that the frequent repetition of this act led him at length to attempt, however unwisely, to govern without a Parliament. When that attempt failed, and he was compelled to call a new Parliament, so far from lending him aid, it constituted itself his judge, and raised armies to battle against him. It would be vain to attempt here to record the various encounters between the King and his Parliament, much less to minutely trace the whole course of the civil war; enough for us to say that, after a continuation of some years, it terminated favourably to the Parliament; that Charles placed himself in the hands of the

Scotch, and was by them delivered up to his enemies—the Parliamentary leaders. But their reign was of short duration; for no sooner had they subdued their sovereign, than their own servants rose against them. The army becoming dissatisfied, took possession of the person of the King, marched against the Parliament, and subdued it—excluding some of its members, and making others tools to perform their purposes. The King now offered to resign his power into their hands for his lifetime, provided it should revert to the crown at his decease. This offer was rejected, and four propositions were made to the King, to which he felt bound not to accede. A remonstrance was then drawn up by the leaders of the army, requiring the punishment of the King for the blood spilt during the civil wars!

To this course the Commons at first refused to be accessories, and passed a vote tending to accommodation with the King. The soldiers excluded the majority of the members by force, and influenced the others entirely. "The Lords unanimously rejected the proposition that the King should be brought to trial. Their House was instantly closed. No court, known to the law, would take on itself the office of judging the fountain of justice. A revolutionary tribunal was created. That tribunal pronounced Charles a tyrant, a traitor, a murderer, and a public enemy; and his head was severed from his shoulders before thousands of spectators, in front of the banqueting hall of his own palace.*"

This, then, was the execution, the justice of which we are now called upon to consider, and concerning which our opinion will be gathered from the following remarks:—

I.—We maintain that it was contrary to the laws and institutions of the country. The king acted rightly in refusing to plead before his judges, for the constitution of England did not recognize the crime with which he was charged, nor any court by which he could be tried. Where were his

* Macaulay's *His. England*, vol. II., p. 127-8.

"peers" to form his tribunal, or why was a privilege conceded to the meanest subject, to be denied to the King? If his enemies deemed the law in this respect defective, why did they not seek its emendation? But instead of doing that, they acted in opposition to the law, placed themselves above it, and were thus guilty of no mean crime themselves in attempting to punish what they considered a crime in another.

Here it may be said—"True, the laws did not provide for such a case, but the people, who are the source of all power, declared that the King ought to die." This we deny, and contend,

II.—That the execution was unsanctioned by the people. The representatives of the people who constituted the House of Commons, refused their sanction to the ulterior measures against the King, but the leaders of the army—irresponsible men—had determined upon his death, and in one night, by the celebrated *Pride's Purge*, they excluded 160 members of Parliament from their places, in order that their own partizans might pass certain desired resolutions, which after doing, they determined that those who were absent and would not agree to their resolutions, should no longer be considered members of the House! We presume that even our opponents will not attempt to defend the injustice, nor admire the craft, of a course like this. But it may be asserted, that the House of Commons ought not to be taken as the *real* representatives of the feelings of the people, and that the true expression of these feelings must be sought among the people themselves. Let us then adopt this course and turn to the historic page, and what is the result? *Hume* says, "It is impossible to describe the grief, indignation, and astonishment, which took place, not only among the

spectators, but *throughout the whole nation*, as soon as the report of this fatal execution was conveyed to them. * * * All men united in their detestation of those hypocritical parricides, who, by sanctified pretences, had so long disguised their treasons, and in this last act of iniquity, had thrown an indelible stain upon the nation." But if the testimony of *Hume* is objected to as that of a partial witness, we will cite *Thomas Babington Macaulay*, the favourite historian of our opponents' school. He says, "The military saints resolved that, *in defiance of the old laws of the realm, and of the almost universal sentiment of the nation*, the King should expiate his crimes with his blood. * * *

His memory was, in the minds of the great majority of his subjects, associated with those free institutions which he had, during many years, laboured to destroy: for those free institutions had perished with him, and, amidst the mournful silence of a community kept down by arms, had been defended by his voice alone."

Here we leave our case, although we might have carried it a step further, and shown that the execution of Charles I. was contrary to the principles of justice; but we abstain from this, lest it should be said that we trenched upon forbidden ground. Enough has been advanced for the purposes of justice, and the refutation of our opponents. It will be perceived, that we have not attempted to justify the whole of the conduct of the King, much less to claim for him the honours of "Saintship" or "Martyrdom;" we are aware of his faults, and regret them; but we maintain that his punishment was greater than his crimes, and was administered in an unlawful and unjustifiable manner.

JUSTITIA.

THE art of printing has, perhaps, contributed more essentially to the welfare of mankind, to the advancement of society, and to the promotion and diffusion of political, physical, and ethical truths, than all the arts beside. It is, in fact, an art that is "preservative of all arts." Wherever it is known and encouraged, the progressive improvement of society is certain, and the march of mind secure and unembarrassed. But where the press has never shed its light, or dispensed its intellectual treasures, the night of ignorance, and the gloom of superstition, rests upon the soul, and obscures the intellect of man.

Philosophy.

IS LANGUAGE OF HUMAN OR DIVINE ORIGIN?

DIVINE—V. (CONCLUDING REPLY.)

WHEN we consider the many advantages which the possession of language confers upon the human race—how it ministers alike to our substantial comforts, and to our most refined pleasures—that it is the storehouse of the wisdom of past ages, and, like the boundless ocean, bears to every land the rich freights of knowledge entrusted to its care; on the other hand, surveying the tokens of Divine goodness with which the world abounds; noting the means and adaptations by which the well-being and the enjoyments of the various orders of creatures are secured; and remembering, meanwhile, that man is the only animal physically adapted, and therefore evidently designed, to enjoy the advantages of an *articulate language*, we are irresistibly led to conclude that the same Divine Being which designed our frame, and gave us the organs of speech, also supplied our race with that instrument of thought and of speech, without which man would have remained irrational and savage, have lost his heritage of immortality, and have become—instead of the chiefest glory—the blot and the plague of a beautiful, and otherwise perfect, world.

But independently of this *prima facie* evidence in favour of the Divine origin of language, there are one or two considerations not yet mentioned in this debate which, by showing man's inability to invent his own language, lead us directly to the same result.

Language is essentially an art, and confessedly a very difficult one, too. Now it appears to us that man, in a savage state, and while destitute of language, is utterly unable to invent any art whatever. Because, in the first place—not to speak of the impossibility of combination in any degree, which is generally essential to difficult inventions, and which the want of language would effectually prevent—art being the application of certain general laws and

principles to some special end, man, when in this state, is necessarily confined to the results of his own very limited experience, and consequently cannot possibly acquire that general knowledge, the possession of which is known to be indispensable to the invention of an art; and because, secondly, man, in this destitute state, is unable to carry on any process of reasoning—such process being also evidently necessary to an invention. That language is necessary to the prosecution of thought, one's own consciousness can testify, for we all know that we cannot reason at all except in the forms of speech; and that it is conformable to the most enlightened reason, one or two words by way of quotation will suffice to prove. John Stuart Mill says, "Language is evidently, *and by the admission of all philosophers*, one of the principal instruments or helps of thought." "For language is an instrument of thought, as well as a means of communicating it." "Reasoning usually takes place by means of words, and in all complicated cases can take place in no other way. (System of Logic.) Archbishop Whateley speaks to the same effect, but still more emphatically; and I refer your readers to his first book on Logic, particularly to his reference to the case of Laura Bridgeman.

Again, I observe, that language is an art, the invention of which by man, in his primitive state, would be attended by great, if not insuperable, difficulties.

That language is an art, is sufficiently proved by the uniform language of writers on the subject, and will not, I apprehend, be doubted by those conversant with it. The difficulties attending its invention, however, may admit of a varied estimation, but cannot wholly be denied by any. One of the most learned and respectable of the authors who have opposed our view of the case, (Dr. Adam Smith,) sufficiently indicates his estimation of its difficulties by declaring, emphatically, "That before

language could be invented *they must have associated for AGES.* * * * Nay, he is decidedly of opinion, that before the invention of an art *so difficult as language*, men must not only have herded together, but have also formed some kind of civil polity, have existed in that political state a very long time, and have acquired such powers of abstraction as to be able to form general ideas." This opinion, coming from such an authority, will not be challenged, I suppose, by J. M. S., and the friends who believe in the human origin of language. The precise difficulties, however, which I conceive to lie in the way of the invention of language by man, are these:—The first is indicated by the fact, that man in the state in which we have supposed him, would be insensible to the loss he sustained by the privation of language. Man, in his primitive condition, is connected by many strong links of resemblance with the lower animals; and distinguished from them only by his superior *capabilities*. The lower creation undoubtedly possesses means of communicating with each other; and there is no reason to believe—indeed it would be to impugn the Diving goodness to do so—that they feel the want of any other than those they possess. If, then, we believe with our friends on the other side, that God having made man, left him destitute of an articulate language, we cannot surely believe that He would deal so harshly with him as to inflict the sense of a want which he could not satisfy nor remove. But if man was not conscious of this want, then he lacked the only inducement he could have had to attempt the invention of an articulate language.

The next difficulty we notice, is, that man, in his primitive state, even though he should feel the want of an articulate language, would not possess the mental ability necessary to its invention. We have already seen that, to a great extent, language is necessary to mental development; and that mental ability must be brought to the invention of an art. But if man, when created, was thrown entirely upon his own resources, and left destitute of language, it is impossible to suppose he would be able to attain to mental vigour and power; and consequently he would be mentally incapacitated for the

task of inventing an art of so much difficulty as language undoubtedly is.

These difficulties are such as would be incidental to man's condition. The next, which is the greatest, belongs to the very nature of language, and the consideration of it alone would prevent us from believing in the ability of man to invent his own language.

Language is based upon articulation. We have already said, that man is physically *adapted* for an articulate language, and that this affords *prima facie* evidence in favour of the idea of the Divine origin of language; but independently of this, there are great objections to the supposition that man could, of himself, evolve this latent power, and apply it to its destined and appropriate use. In the first place, it is well known that those unfortunate people who have never enjoyed the use of the sense of hearing, are unable to utter *articulate* sounds. It is to be observed, that if the power of articulation were *instructive*, mere *deafness* would not prevent its use, though, for obvious reasons, it would render it unavailable for the purposes of speech. But since such persons are incapable of the power in question, it is evident that it is not *instructive*, but *acquired*. It is also worthy of remark, that those savages who have at various times been found in an isolated condition in their native forests, have been found unable to utter any but *inarticulate* cries. And another fact, tending to show how much this power is due to education, is, that foreigners, who have not commenced the study of the English language before the age of 30, never learn to pronounce it with propriety. If, then, this power of articulate utterance is not instinctive, but acquired, and to be exercised must be learned, nothing more is required to show that man is indebted for such power to an external and a higher source than himself.

We have, then, endeavoured to prove, 1st. That man, destitute of language, would be utterly unable to invent any language whatever. 2nd. That language is an art, and one, the invention of which, would be attended by peculiar difficulties; and we therefore accept, as a legitimate conclusion, that man was incompetent to the invention of language; and of course, as the only

alternative, that language is of Divine origin.

These considerations, with those which have been brought forward by other writers, are, we think, sufficient to outbalance those

which have been stated by our opponents, and to enable our readers to decide that language *is* of Divine origin.

IRENE.

HUMAN—V. (CONCLUDING REPLY).

Much of the difference of opinion which prevails among men, is rather apparent than real; and arises from their attaching different meanings to the words which they employ, or failing fully to comprehend the ideas of each other. This appears to be the case to some extent in the present debate. Are we to understand by the word "language" the *power* to express our ideas in vocal symbols, or simply the *vocal symbols* themselves? If the former, then we must all admit that language is of Divine origin, but, if the latter, then to us it seems equally plain that language is of human origin. We may here remark that throughout this debate, we have understood the term language in the latter sense only; and we would fain hope that this declaration may conciliate our friend "Harold," whom we were sorry to see in the ranks against us; although it will not disarm our opponent W. T. of that rude club which he uses with such unmeasured force, and sometimes with such fatal effects.

W. T. commences his onslaught by denying that man has the power to *invent* language, and asserting that "it is as much an act of *creation* to originate a language, as a world." But here the objector does not distinguish between a *creation* and an *invention*, although he very properly remarks "give man materials, and he is fruitful in the invention of form." Now we maintain that the materials of language were given to man. His mind was full of weighty thoughts, his heart stirred by various emotions, the organs of speech were his, and the medium of sound encircled him, when

"to speak he tried, and forthwith spake," giving utterance, at least, to exclamations of wonder and admiration.

Another objection to which W. T. and other writers attach great importance, arises from the fact that neither history nor tradition tells us anything of the invention of language; and it is added, surely they would have done so had language been of

human origin. But why should we suppose that this would be the case? Are we referred to the fact that we are in possession of the records of *many* of the great achievements of man? Then, we reply, that this argument is of no force, as it is not maintained that we are in possession of the records of *all* the great achievements of man; and further, had this been the general rule language might have been expected to have formed an exception, for it must have existed prior to all records, and it would not have been natural for it to have chronicled its own birth. But if the force of these objections should by any expedient be weakened, and the argument remain unimpaired, our opponents must remember that it may be turned against them with fatal effect. We need only ask whether, if language be of divine origin, it is possible to believe that man would have left his offspring ignorant of the fact, or that the Scriptures—those records of God's dealing to man—would not have recorded it? We accept without hesitation (notwithstanding W. T.'s unfair insinuations) the Scriptural account of the confusion of language at Babel, and the record of that fact gives weight to our previous question.

W. T. objects to our arguments from analogy, and puts a series of questions to us which by no means heightens our estimate of his perceptive powers. He inquires in a tone of triumph, "did God, when he gave Adam the organs of mastication and digestion, leave him to invent food to be acted upon and used by those organs?" evidently supposing that there is some analogy between food and speech! Absurd. What is speech but the result of the exercise of certain organs? and any analogy between it, and the subject he has referred to, would not be in food but in the act of mastication itself; and who will assert that it was necessary for man to learn that of his Maker! This is the first pearl from W. T.'s string of strange ones! The others may be left undisturbed.

There is but one other point in our opponents paper that we need refer to, and that is, the assertion that language does not improve as it progresses, and therefore could not have started from the imperfect original which an invented language must of necessity have been. But on what does W. T. base this assertion? He admits that the English language as spoken in the time of Chaucer was *ruder* than at present, but surely he will not maintain that it was *better*. Do not the 50 or 60 thousand words in our modern English, afford greater facility for the expression of thought with ease and elegance, than the scanty stock in primitive times? And if they do, we are safe in asserting that our language has improved. But it will be rejoined by W. T. that the *elements* of language have not increased, and that is what he understands by improvement. The elements of a language are the simple and articulate sounds which are represented by its alphabet, and these from their nature, cannot be expected to increase in themselves, but they may in the number of their combinations, and these again in the variety of their arrangements ;

and thus it has been with every living language, and this is what we call "progress" and "improvement." Will W. T. demur? We think not. The fact must be evident, to all who have studied the matter, that language like all human things is subject to alterations and improvements, and to us it appears that the question of the old poet is natural, and his assertion truthful, in that stanza where he says—

"Great works must perish, and shall words pre-
sume
To hold their honours and immortal bloom?
Many shall rise who now forgotten lie;
Others, in present credit, soon shall die,
If custom will, whose arbitrary sway,
Words, and the forms of language, must obey."

We feel that it is unnecessary to say more in reply to W. T.; and there is nothing in the papers of other opponents but what has already been ably answered by the writers who have very efficiently supported our position. To them we feel that our thanks are due, as well as to the readers of the *Controversialist* for the patient hearing which they have given to this case.

A. C.

Politics.

IS IT DESIRABLE THAT THE REVENUE OF THIS COUNTRY SHOULD BE RAISED ON A SYSTEM OF INDIRECT TAXATION ?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

THE affairs of a great nation, like our own, can never be carried on without great expense; and in order to meet that, there must be taxation. The proper theory of taxation is undoubtedly, as far as possible, to tax each man in proportion to his ability to pay, and to the interest which he has in the country to be protected. To do more than approximate to this, will always be impossible. But the question is, whether direct or indirect taxation will provide the most equitable and economical system of collecting the revenue. In writing in favour of indirect taxation, I am far from thinking it advisable that the whole of the revenue should be raised in that manner.

In fact, so far as the income and assessed taxes are concerned, I see no objection whatever to direct taxation. But a great proportion of the revenue is derived from the sale of such articles as intoxicating liquors, tobacco, and snuff; the use of which contributes greatly to the injury and demoralization of society; and it could scarcely be advisable to give an impetus to their consumption by abolishing the customs and excise duties. It seems to me most conducive to the general weal, to place such restrictions on them as may limit their sale without going to the opposite extreme, where the law defeats itself by the production of smuggling. If indirect taxation

were abolished, the duties on all obnoxious articles must be removed, and, in consequence, a great injury would be inflicted on society. Surely no philanthropic individual can advocate a policy which would give to the labouring classes of this country greater facilities for demoralizing themselves; and, in fact, cheapening their own ruin. I know there are some who seem to think that little increase in the consumption of such injurious articles would take place by the abolition of the duty; they talk as though people drunk for fashion's sake, rather than from appetite. But every-day experience will disprove this. The result of such a change would be to substitute the use of spirits for beer amongst the great bulk of our population,—a change certainly not very desirable. Were there no other argument in favour of indirect taxation, I, for one, should consider this quite sufficient. But I think it may be shown that many of the advantages which the advocates of direct taxation claim for it, will vanish on a close scrutiny.

It is a common argument amongst them, that taxation, as at present levied, presses unjustly on the labouring classes. Now I think it may be shown, without much difficulty, that the labouring man is not heavily taxed unless he indulge to a considerable extent in tobacco or intoxicating liquors. In that case I grant working men pay largely towards the revenue of the country; and many of them will often spend as much in intoxicating compounds in the course of a fortnight, as they would otherwise pay in taxes during the whole year. Food, clothing, and necessaries of life, excepting one or two trifling articles, are duty free; and if these trifling duties are abolished, you exempt a man entirely from taxation so long as he abstains from luxuries. This would be scarcely just; for all, rich and poor must contribute to the revenue in proportion to their means, as we all equally share the protection and advantage which our country and our laws afford. The labouring man, though he possesses no landed property, has still his labour and his liberty, which are his capital, and for the maintenance of which he is bound to pay a share of the taxation of the country.

Another favourite argument of the advo-

cates of direct taxation is, that the present is a more oppressive and expensive method of collecting the taxes than a system of direct taxation would be. How they make this out it is somewhat difficult to imagine. At present, the duty is levied in the port or warehouse, and the consumer, who actually pays the tax, is spared the annoyance of the tax gatherer's visits, which would not be the case if all taxes were levied directly on the individual. People are accustomed to look upon the tax-gatherer as a very great nuisance, and the advocates of direct taxation clamour loudly against this; but were their system adopted, he would become a much more regular visitor at our doors than now. We should be painfully reminded of every penny we paid; and though the amount of taxes were no more than we now pay, the manner of levying them would be much more disagreeable.

Then consider the trouble and expense of collecting these taxes from the spendthrift or the drunkard. The collector would have to be armed with full power to levy immediate restraints upon all offenders, which would create great discontent, and, in the end, be as expensive as our present system of excisemen and custom-house officers. Besides this, we should be quite as far from an equal adjustment of the burdens of state; for if we established a tax of so much a head, the man with 15s. a week might have to pay as much as the man with 25s. a week; and the continual fluctuations of wages would present an effectual barrier to the solution of the difficulty. The amount of taxable articles which a man consumes is, perhaps, the fairest index of his ability to pay taxes, excepting always the amount spent in intoxicating compounds. It is true that those who consume great quantities of these last-named articles pay a greater share than others to the revenue of the country, while they are generally least able to afford it. But it is also true that the system which they thus support makes the greatest demand upon the revenue of the country; and the drunkard, when his intemperance has thrown him upon society, often receives back the amount he contributed to the revenue in more prosperous times.

NEGATIVE ARTICLE.—II.

It must, I think, afford sincere satisfaction to every reader of the *British Contriversalist*, to observe the kindly feeling manifested by most of the combatants who have entered into this literary arena, and the spirit of candour with which they have acknowledged the force of opposing arguments, and the strength of offensive positions. I was much struck with this in reading L. J.'s able paper in the October number, where he acknowledges the theoretic consistency of Direct Taxation, while he contended for the practical superiority of Indirect Taxation. He is evidently open to conviction, and if I can show that his objections to a well-matured system of direct taxation are weak or futile, I may win him, and many of my readers, over to "my way of thinking." This hope now induces me to take up "the thought-tracing quill."

The first, and, in my opinion, the weightiest objection which L. J. brings forward against a system of direct taxation, is the practical difficulty of obtaining a just assessment either by voluntary statement, or investigation and proof: he forcibly remarks, "If it is effected by the former, the equality of the tax must depend upon the honour of parties under strong temptation to dishonesty; * * * if by the latter, still the dishonest would have the advantage" through some sources of income being capable of concealment. While this objection does little honour to the political morality of my fellow countrymen, it must be confessed that, under present circumstances, it would apply to a numerous class, for there are many who now think it but a slight deviation from the path of rectitude to evade the claims of government. But it may be inquired how this state of feeling has been produced; and we reply, plainly by that wanton waste of public money in which our rulers have indulged. Were a stricter economy pursued, which we believe direct taxation would render necessary, many a man would cheerfully pay his quota towards the public expenditure who now either pays reluctantly, or, possibly, not at all. To show that this opinion is not opinion, I may mention a few instances of

public virtue which were cited many years ago by that able political economist, Jeremy Bentham:—"The canton of Underwald, in Switzerland, is frequently ravaged by storms and inundations, and is thereby exposed to extraordinary expenses. Upon such occasions the people assemble, and every one is said to declare, with the greatest frankness, what he is worth, in order to be taxed accordingly. At Zurich, the law orders that, in cases of necessity, every one should be taxed in proportion to his revenue, the amount of which he is obliged to declare upon oath. They have no suspicion, it is said, that any of their fellow-citizens will deceive them. At Basle, the principle revenue of the state arises from a small custom on goods exported. All the citizens make oath that they will pay, every three months, all the taxes imposed by law. All merchants, and even inn-keepers, are trusted with keeping, themselves, an account of the goods which they sell, either within or without the territory. At the end of every three months, they send this account to the treasurer, with the amount of the tax computed at the bottom of it. It is not suspected that the regente suffers by this confidence." Upon this the writer referred to observes, "It is true, indeed, that a great revolution behoved to take place in the sentiments of the people, before the happy events at which I have now hinted, could take place in this country. But this revolution, great as it may appear, would certainly take place in consequence of a change in the system of taxation. A system of moderate taxation, like everything else, would foster and promote itself. Under its mild regulations and laws, the unreasonableness of smuggling would appear. The people would soon have less prejudice. They would venerate the revenue code; and this would enable and inspirit the minister to go on in reformation."

The next objection of L. J. to a system of direct taxation is, that "mere income is, after all, a most unfair criterion by which to judge of a person's ability to bear taxation." This assertion is based upon the fact of the sources of income being so vari-

ous; as illustrated by the instances given. But our friend appears to forget that even now, persons whose incomes exceed £150 per annum, are required to state the various sources of that income; and that one of the easiest things imaginable would be to fix upon rates of taxation according to a just and recognized scale.

With respect to the supposed case of a professional man saving half his income—£1000—and the inference drawn that it would be unjust for him to be charged upon the whole, and thus his capital be taxed, we surely need only remind our friend that the charge upon the £500 would be made upon it as *income*, and not upon it as capital. If a man who could afford to lay that sum by annually ought not to be taxed, will L. J. tell us who ought?

The objection founded on the case of annuitants, is the same as that respecting the various sources of income, and may be satisfactorily answered in the same way.

We now come to our friend's "strongest objection"—viz., the inquisitorial investigation into mens' affairs, which direct taxation would render necessary; but this we believe would be more imaginative than real. The same objection was loudly urged against the enactment of Sir Robert Peel's income tax, and many were the dire effects that were to flow from it. At present, they are still to come. We have heard of no honest, but under-water-tradesmen ruined by the exposure of their circumstances, nor of the hopes of any aspiring families being blighted by the public disclosure of their real circumstances. In fact, there has been no exposure, nor any disclosure, beyond the "*commissioner's*" *sanctum*, and there they have been made with a definite object in view. If such have been the results of the experiment as tried upon a small and imperfect scale, we have nothing to fear from its repetition and extension.

If these objections remained undiminished in their force, they would yet be weak compared with those which have been brought against a system of indirect taxation, which must always bear unequally upon the poor. An indirect tax, to be productive, must be levied upon some article of general consumption, or some necessary of life, and, therefore, must fall upon all classes alike, apart from the amount of their income, which is very unequal justice. Take, for instance, the following items:—For every 20s. which the working classes spend for tea, they pay 10s. duty; for every 20s. they spend for sugar, they pay 6s.; for every 20s. for coffee, 8s.; for every 20s. for soap, 5s.; for every 20s. for beer, 4s.; for every 20s. for tobacco, 16s.; for every 20s. for spirits, 14s. Now, the working classes spend a much larger portion of their income upon these articles than the upper classes do, and consequently this indirect taxation presses most heavily upon those least able to bear it. Ponder the following case:—"On the 18th February, 1842, the case of Wm. Gladstone, a labourer, was laid before Parliament. He received 11s. for a week's wages, 7s. 7d. of which he spent in necessary articles of consumption, as follows. (It is presumed that the brandy was necessary on account of sickness). Tea, 1 oz.; coffee, 2 oz.; sugar, 8 oz.; flour, 8 lb.; ale, 7 pints; brandy, $\frac{1}{4}$ of a pint. The cost of these articles, duty free, was 2s. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.; the duties were 5s. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ d.; showing 5s. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. paid for taxes out of an income of 11s. per week! Can any nobleman or gentleman in the land show that, like this poor labourer, he ever paid so nearly one-half of his income in taxes?" We trow not.

Space and time forbid us now to pursue the subject further; but perhaps we have said enough to awaken thoughts in our readers, and to merit a reply from our opponents.

L. G. G.

WHEN once a concealment or deceit has been practised in matters where all should be fair and open as the day, confidence can never be restored, any more than you can restore the white bloom to the grape or plum that you have once pressed in your hand. How true is this, and what a neglected truth by a great portion of mankind! Hood is not only one of the most humiliating vices, but sooner or later it is most to lead to the most serious crimes.

Social Economy, etc.

IS IT MORE REASONABLE AND BENEFICIAL TO SUBSIST ON A PURELY VEGETARIAN DIET, THAN ON ONE OF FLESH AND VEGETABLES?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY

It is the surest sign of confidence in his position, that a discussionist keeps closely to the subject proposed, and does not wander from it to adduce arguments which only go to prove something which may not be disputed by his opponent, and which does not really affect the subject proposed. We would respectfully submit that the opposite of all this has characterized the scriptural arguments adduced by "Anti-Vegetarian." What, we would ask, does the passage from John vi. 11 prove? Does it prove that a diet of *flesh* and vegetables is more reasonable and beneficial than one of a purely fruit, farinaceous, and vegetable character? It seems to us to simply show what we have not disputed, viz., that man is provided with the means of choosing for himself; and the passage itself expresses this idea: "and likewise of the *fishes as much as they would*."

Apart from the disputes of learned authorities, who state that the Hebrew word *hagarim*, translated "raven," signifies "strangers or visitants," who are believed to have been persons who took pity on Elijah, we would ask, even supposing it true that they were actually ravens that supplied him with flesh under these peculiar circumstances, does it prove that this diet is the best on which man can habitually feed? We have never undertaken to prove that flesh-meat is not good for food; all we seek to establish is that a diet obtained directly from the vegetable kingdom is *better or more beneficial*; we adduced *scientific* arguments in support of this proposition, and instead of being met on the same grounds, we find our opponents leaving all the sciences which apply to the subject, to go to scriptural texts, the translation of which is, to this day, a *subject of dispute among the most profound scholars*.

Another peculiar circumstance is referred to—viz., that of Christ's eating broiled

fish and honeycomb when he appeared to his disciples. This is equally a subject of dispute among lexicographers; whilst theologians are by no means agreed as to whether it was the body or the spirit of Christ which the apostles saw; and if it were the spirit, how it could literally eat broiled fish is a mystery to be solved in some other discussion than the present. Dr. W. A. Alcott has, we think, given a very reasonable reply to this objection; he says, "An Essene Jew, who was in the habit himself of partaking of very simple dishes, would never suspect a brother Essene of whom it was said that with fish and honey before him 'he took and did eat,' as partaking of anything but the honey. And were it to be said of the writer of this article that, while in Worcester or Boston, broiled fish and honeycomb were set before him, and he took and did eat before them, no one would ever suspect that he ate anything else but the honey. He has fish and flesh, with other accompaniments, placed before him a hundred times a-year, he takes and eats, but not of the flesh and fish. * * We do not say positively that nothing but honey was eaten on this occasion. We only affirm that it cannot be *proved* that anything more was made use of. And if this statement contains nothing which, by fair construction, can be brought as *proof* in the case, we know of none that can."* And then, as to "*forbidding to marry and commanding to abstain from meats*," we may ask how can this apply to Vegetarians, who do neither the one nor the other? We quite agree with the Rev. John Brown on this subject, reserving the liberty to use our own judgment, as we believe every one else will, as to what is proper for our food; and we showed in our first article, that convictions on this subject will always vary with the states of different individuals.

* American Vegetarian, p. 113.

"Anti-Vegetarian" concludes this part of the subject by saying—"Then, surely, there is sufficient in these quotations to *justify* flesh-eating," which remark shows that he has been labouring to do just what we attempted to do in our opening paper; but to *justify* a practice is one thing, and to prove it to be *more beneficial* than any other is another. Why has not "Anti-Vegetarian" attempted this ?

Instead of adopting this course, however, he proceeds, in the second place, to state that "Flesh-eating is *justified* by nature, because there is a similarity between the teeth of man and those of the herbivorous animals." Now the fact is, man's teeth, taken as a whole, are neither herbivorous nor carnivorous in their structure, but they resemble those of *another* tribe of animals, the natural food of which is fruits and farinacea. The possession in a mere type or partially developed form of the canine tooth, no more indicates that man should partake of flesh than the possession of the type of the organs of lactation in male animals indicates that they should share with the female the pleasures of supplying the first food to the young. Baron Cuvier has well explained the development of the eye-tooth in man. He says—"fruits, roots, and the succulent parts of vegetables, appear to be the natural food of man; his hands afford him a facility in gathering them, and his *short and canine teeth, not passing beyond the common line of the others*, and the tubercular teeth would not permit him either to feed on herbage or devour flesh, unless these aliments were previously prepared by the culinary processes." We might proceed to quote Linnaeus, M. Daubenton, Gassendi, Sir Evered Home, Ray, Lawrence, Lord Monboddo, Mr. Thomas Bell, Mr. Dunlop, and many other eminent authorities, who support the views of Cuvier on this subject, and we think this array of authority of greater weight than that of the unknown writer in the *Family Tutor*, or of Dr. J. S. Wilkinson, and Dr. Barnes. The alimentary canal in man measures 12 times the length of his body, and therefore the assertion of Dr. Wilkinson, that ruminant animals possess it from 11 to 28 times the length of the body, tells against his own argument; the lion's alimentary canal being,

as he states, only from three to five times the length of the body. This organ, too, in the carnivora, is smooth throughout; whilst the colon in the graminivora and frugivora, as *well as in man*, is cellulated.

That animal food is easier of digestion than vegetable food cannot be taken as a truism, because ease of digestion depends very much upon the nature of the gastric juice prepared to receive the food; and whilst the lion might digest flesh very quickly, and vegetable food with difficulty, the cow's experience would be the very reverse. And so the man who has been accustomed to a large consumption of the flesh of animals can digest fruits and vegetables with difficulty, perhaps, but it is simply because nature has accommodated herself to the diet, and supplies that gastric juice which is best adapted to the food habitually taken; whilst the Vegetarian, who takes vegetables, farinaceous substances, and fruits, in their unadulterated state, unmixed with animal food, can digest this diet with the greatest ease. Dr. Beaumont's Experiments showed that vegetable and farinaceous substances, on the average, digested 22 minutes 23 seconds *sooner* than animal food. And the *Medico Chirurgical Review* says, speaking of fruits, "We would especially suggest their employment in cases of aggravated dyspepsia," and proceeds to express doubts whether the "entire dietetic treatment of dyspepsia, ordinarily practised, is not fallacious."

Several persons have directed our attention to the tables adduced by "Anti-Vegetarian" as proving the very opposite of what our friend intended them to prove. We only ask an examination of them, therefore, as they show, most completely, the economy of Vegetarianism. He has mistaken his way by supposing albumen alone to constitute nutriment, whereas carbonaceous substances are equally essential to the animal economy. If, instead of saying "from the foregoing table it will be seen there are only three vegetables which exceed the amount of nutriment contained in flesh," he had said "I have only chosen to mention three vegetables," he would have shown the real state of the case. The fact is, *all* farinaceous substances, in their dry state, contain very much more nutriment, either for the supply of muscle or of heat, than flesh does ;

and as the price is commonly about from $\frac{1}{8}$ to $\frac{1}{4}$ that of flesh, the difference is very striking. Whilst peas, as "Anti-Vegetarian" states, supply for 6d. as much albumen as flesh does for 2s. 4d.; they also supply 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of the other kind of nutriment, thus reducing the price of 1lb. of nutriment obtained from peas, from 6d. to less than 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ d., or about $\frac{1}{12}$ of the cost of nutriment obtained from the flesh of animals! It is surprising "Anti-Vegetarian" did not see this.

Whilst, therefore, the scriptural arguments he has adduced are not intended or calculated to do more than "justify" the use of flesh, which is what we have attempted to do, in some degree, under certain conditions and circumstances of life, we respectfully submit that the scientific arguments altogether fail in proving a diet of flesh-meat superior to one consisting of fruits, farinacea, and vegetables, inasmuch as the facts adduced in their support prove the very opposite of what they are supposed to support. In fact, "Anti-Vegetarian" seems to have been so shaken as to the justness of slaughter, as to think it necessary to defend what we have not disputed, rather than to refute what we did advance.

The remark as to the control of the passions does not affect the argument adduced, because it was never argued that the Vegetarian system would control the passions; it is the man who, as "Anti-Vegetarian" says, receives "the influence from above" who can alone govern the human propensities. That a Vegetarian diet will afford the best preparatory discipline to the physical system, and through it to the mind, for this reception, by affording a bland unexciting nutriment, can scarcely be denied; and it is acknowledged by all theologists as a most important duty to "keep the body under" or "in subjection to the spirit;" and all who have noticed the effects of different kinds of food in this respect, will agree that food of this character is best adapted for the purpose. As to "depression of spirit," and "sprightliness," we submit that nothing is so likely to cause this as the *undue* exercise of any of the human passions; and it is this which the Vegetarian practice is well-calculated to aid us in avoiding. There is a great difference between the boisterous mirth of the sensualist and the

tranquil and ever-increasing joys of the man who is unceasing in his endeavours to realize, in the strength of his moral purpose, and with the blessing of his God, that state of active usefulness which will enable him to use every faculty without abusing it, and to thus control, to a great extent, the circumstances of his life, by first learning to control himself. It is this victory, which, in its very contemplation, raises, rather than depresses the spirit; whilst the consciousness of its gradual attainment adds a lustre to the eye, and a sprightliness to the countenance, which no mere gratification of the senses can ever secure; the latter is the pleasure of excitement, which ends with its duration; the former is the enduring satisfaction of confidence in the teachings and support of that infinite wisdom and benevolence by which our race is sustained and capacitated for a peaceful and happy existence.

Our limits in this article not permitting us to reply at length to B. W. P., and Carnarius, we may just remark, that as the former acknowledges the scriptural arguments adduced do not apply to the question under discussion, and can at best but be supposed to justify the flesh-eating practice, without, in any way, proving it to be the best, we need not enter further into this part of the subject. It would not be difficult, however, to show that what appears justifiable under one dispensation or condition of mankind, may become unjustifiable in a more advanced stage of human progress, and particularly is this the case in relation to the destruction of life. If we contrast the state of public feeling now with what it was in the chivalric ages, we can see a wide contrast as to the estimate which is formed of the sacredness of life; and the efforts now being made for the protection of animals, and by the Vegetarians for doing away with the practice of slaughter, are, apparently, but so much evidence of the growth of the same principle of respect for life in every form.

The argument in relation to climate is not fully borne out in fact, as the *Penny Cyclopædia* shows that vegetable and farinaceous food forms the principal support of the labouring population of all the *northern* countries of Europe; and the *Medico Chi-*

surgical Review, after devoting two long articles to Vegetarianism, comes to this conclusion:—"That, by the substitution of oleaginous for farinaceous constituents, a vegetable diet may be adapted to the sustenance of man, *even in the coldest climates in which he can support life.*" We could adduce facts to prove that there is no place which man can inhabit which is not capable of producing some form of vegetable food adapted to his sustenance and support.

We do not attribute the lustful dispositions of men to flesh-eating; but we submit that these dispositions can be best held in subjection, if men, in seeking to subjugate them, adopt a purely vegetable diet; and the relative dispositions of vegetable-eating animals, as compared with the carnivorous creatures, illustrate the principle that vegetable food is less stimulating to the passions than animal food. The idea started by B. W. P., in conclusion, is one which never entered our minds—that of Vegetarians being the "sole instructors" of mankind.

We respectfully submit that the argument of Carnarius, attempting to screen man for slaughter behind the carnivorous races, is appealing to an inferior order of creatures as *examples* to a superior, instead of regarding them as affording us instruction. It is true, if "Carnarius" wishes to be carnivorous, he cannot do better than follow such examples, and he may, by dint of practice, even become expert in butchering, if not delighted with the shedding of blood. But we confess we have a dislike to the practice, and however it may have been considered necessary in the past and present condition of mankind, and is a part of the inferior tribes of animals, (which fact is as much an argument for *cannibalism* as for *animalism*), we feel confident, and the universal prevalence in every human heart, (which is not callous by familiarity with slaughter,) of a repugnance to killing, is, to us, a satisfactory proof, that when the better part of a man shall predominate, this practice will be as naturally discontinued as bull-baiting, duelling, &c., have been cast aside, to make way for a more humane and merciful civilization. We would, in all deference, say that, whilst we are merely men, and are imperfectly formed, we can-

not expect to fully understand the attributes and ordinations of God; and rather than seek to advocate bloodshed by appealing to these mysteries, we would rather repose faith in the practice of a principle which accords with the spirit and letter of the first appointment of man's food, and with the prophecy which relates to the summit of Christian perfection, when "they shall not hurt nor destroy in all my holy mountain, for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord as the waters cover the sea"—Isaiah xi. 9. We believe it is only because this time and state is not yet arrived, that we yet hear the cry of suffering and behold the struggles of death; and it will be in proportion as a practical "knowledge of the Lord" shall be extended, that His merciful attributes shall become realized in life. Thus the paradise of the future will be one of wisdom and innocence; and not of innocence alone, as was the case in Eden. It is to this end we would aspire, and, however far we may fall short of its attainment, so long as the effort leads us continually in that direction, and the practice we inculcate keeps constantly in mind the connection between our daily pursuits and our moral discipline; thus combining conviction with experience, we feel impelled to arrive at the affirmative conclusion of the question under discussion.

We trust that all we have advanced will be taken in the spirit of kindness and good will, for we do not attack individuals, but practices which we believe to be at variance with their best interests, whilst we would seek to establish those customs which we believe are calculated to promote the health, prosperity, and happiness of mankind.

H. S. C.

With respect to the chemical view of the question, on which H. S. C. lays particular stress, we cannot do better than draw his attention to the following remarks, with which we have been favoured by Mr. J. Johnson, of Manchester. He says, "I am tempted to supplement those able essays which have appeared against Vegetarians in the *British Controversialist*, with a word on the nutritive property of animal food. Vegetarians say that "one hundred pounds of flesh-forming substance can be obtained f

wheat for £2 : 4s. 7½d., whilst the same amount from beef would cost £11 : 13s. 4d." Liebig, in his Chemical Letters, seems to oppose this statement; for he says, "In the restoration and production of the forces, wheat surpasses rye, rye surpasses potatoes and rice, and flesh surpasses all other food in reference to these effects." "Oh! but you forget," say the Vegetarians, "that you have only the fourth, or 25lb. in the 100, of nutritive matter; all the rest, according to Playfair, is water." Liebig has made the same statement, with an addition, which Vegetarians have hitherto found it convenient to pass over. "Fresh meat," says he, "contains more than three-fourths of its weight of water; but this water is not *pure water*, but juice of flesh—soup, with all its active ingredients, organic and inorganic." To this fact, which has been so signally overlooked by Vegetarians in their tables, Liebig has added his opinion of the contents and qualities of this juice or soup. "The juice of flesh contains, beyond a doubt, the conditions necessary for the formation of the whole muscle, and for the production of its peculiar properties." "No one estimates more highly than the hospital physician, soup, as a means of restoring the exhausted strength of his patients. It cannot be replaced by any other article of the pharmacopœia. Its vivifying and restoring action on the appetite and the digestive organs, the colour, and the general appearance of the sick, is most striking." Is it reasonable, with this evidence from the first chemist of the age, for Vegetarians to reiterate their statements that flesh eaters pay 6d., 7d., or 8d. per lb., as the case may be, for water;

which water they could improve by going to the pump. It must be deduced from Liebig's statements, that the solid matter in flesh is highly nutritive; that the juice of flesh is also highly nutritive; and that both together, as Liebig has said, "common observation teaches us, possess a greater nutritive power than all other kinds of food." Computing, therefore, as we are justified in doing, the whole, and not a fourth, of flesh as nutritive, it costs only 13s. 8½d., (and not £9 : 8s. 8½d., as Vegetarians state) more than wheat, to obtain 100lbs. of flesh-forming principle. And Liebig having demonstrated its superiority over wheat, and indeed over every other kind of food, it must be considered to be the cheapest kind of food, if, as social economists teach correctly, that "the best article is the cheapest." Muller says, "The further a substance is removed in composition from that of albumen, the less nutritious will it be, and the greater expenditure of the digestive powers is required for its conversion into chyle." Is any further evidence needed that animal food is the best—most nutritive food? In Denmark, decided opinions upon the subject are entertained; a diet of bread and water for four weeks, is considered equivalent to the punishment of death. Philosophically, then, a mixed diet—animal food and vegetables—is the best diet upon which man can subsist. In addition to the voice of science, we have divine authority. Cowper says:—
 "On Noah, and in him on all mankind,
 The charter was conferred, by which we hold
 The flesh of animals in fee, and claim,
 O'er all we feed on, power of life and death.
 —Feed then, and yield thanks for thy food."

NEGATIVE REPLY.

The cry of the present age is—"What shall we eat and drink? and wherewithal shall we be clothed? Society seems artificialized to such a degree, that it is apparently incapable of becoming more so to any great extent: and although a few warning voices have been raised to testify against the vice of the times, although we have been told—what our own convictions re-echo—that man is not merely a "Patent Digester"—yet society still continues—that same society which affects to pity the poor Hin-

doos—to immolate itself before the shrine of its Juggernaut-Mammon.

It is remarkable also—how those very spiritual laws which regulate the mental and moral nature of man have become in their practical forms impregnated with the gross, materialistic character which belongs to the age. The special modes of religion which have arisen out of and in combination with this materialism, and are worthy of notice, are for the rich and educated classes—Puseyism, for the poor and illiterate—Mormonism,

And so accordingly with the other movements of the times,—Chartism, Universal Suffrage, Protection,* Teetotalism, Vegetarianism, Bloomerism—all are re-echoes, in one way or other, of what shall we eat and drink, and wherewithal shall we be clothed?

Each of these movements is, by numerous followers, put forth as a rival to the universal Vegetable Pills,—as a cure not only for the “bad legs” of society, but for all diseases mental or bodily which can afflict mankind.

Our present business is however with the last but one of these Holloway-Pill movements. As the opener, negatively, of the Vegetarian Question, it falls to us also to close it, which shall be our endeavour in the following remarks. And by way of preface we beg candidly to tell our Vegetarian friends that they must not think it offensive should they even see the Quixote of their movements, H. S. C., mauled as soundly as his illustrious prototype was, when he mistook a flock of sheep for the army of Pan-something-o the iron-handed. For they cannot reasonably expect any mortal, supposing him even to have subsisted for fifty years on cabbage and swedish turnips, to swallow such a quantity of small arguments as we have been treated to by H. S. C, without having both his Combativeness and Destructiveness excited. And this we undertake to show is really their character.

Where are the facts to prove that man is conditional in relation to food, as H. S. C, asserts; as that Cannibalism, Animalism, and Vegetarianism, are respectively the dietetic state of mankind in barbarianism, semi-barbarianism, and civilization. Savages are not necessarily cannibals, any more than civilized men are necessarily Vegetarians. If the one condition imposed the other, then the Hindoos ought to be the most civilized of people, and the British the most barbarous. If we are to accept H. S. C's inductions, then may we not as rationally assert that Vegetarianism has rendered the Hindoos idle, cowardly, truckling slaves? With what a series of beautiful and exact inductions does he conclude his first paper.

* I do not disparage these movements any further than for the universal panacea character assumed for them by some of their advocates.

The following is incapable of being paralleled —“Nunna subdued the warlike spirit of the Romans by the exercise of the principles he learnt from Orpheus and other ancient poets; first, in his own case, and then by a clever contrivance he induced the citizens to cultivate the land around their city, and to subsist upon the vegetable food it produced:—*He thus secured Rome from war during the forty years of his reign.*” We ask the common sense of our readers whether this is not Whateley illustrated with a vengeance. We do not envy H. S. C. the clearness of head induced by the greenness of his diet.

This second paper is at least more consistent with the principles of reason. But almost to reiterate a former question,—If a vegetarian diet elevates mankind thus, morally, physically, and intellectually; why are not the equatorial nations who subsist principally, some of them wholly, on vegetables, the most morally, physically, and intellectually civilized nations upon earth.

Paper the third is occupied with the discussion of a passage of Scripture which in our humble opinion is only profaned by being dragged into such a brute, gross question of breakfast and dinner.

Does H. S. C. remember the passage “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man, but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man.”

Now for his coadjutor G. W. W. In the first place we assert, and appeal to the principles of mental philosophy for confirmation, that there exists a destructive tendency in the mind of man, and moreover that this tendency is highly proper and necessary as man is at present constituted. G. W. W. cavils about the present translation of the Bible, telling us, it is acknowledged by all (P) to be unsatisfactory! Would a new one support a Vegetarian gospel? But absurdities multiply upon us. Might not G. W. W. devote himself as a missionary to persuade the poor benighted Esquimaux to leave their native country, in order that they might enjoy the benefits of Vegetarianism?

In conclusion, our readers, we trust, will be admonished to fix their thoughts upon higher considerations when they witness the perversion of two amiable minds, as H. S. C.

and G. W. W., when wholly set upon the trifling pursuits of sense.

Let us "seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness," let us first think upon the infinitely higher subjects of religion and morality, and then "other things shall be added unto us."

Let every young man and woman have higher opinions of the dignity of their nature, than to form pet creeds of such despicable trifles as Bloomerism and Vegetarianism.

HAROLD.

THE NATURE AND USE OF POETRY.—(CONCLUDED.)

BEAUTY is thus an element in a trinity, but a trinity as closely blended into unity as the three elements which compose the solar rays. How strangely close the analogy! Truth,—does it not, like heat, warm and expand the human faculties?—Goodness, like the chemical principle, nourish and purify the soul?—and Beauty, similar to the principle of colour, attract to the mind, by its variegated tints, its thousand, happy, yet changeful aspects? But again we say—Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, however they may exist apart, are nevertheless, in their natural order, essentially blended into a unity. What, then, is the relation subsisting between those conjoined, yet distinct, principles?

Truth, it was said before, is the abstract law—Goodness the embodiment of that law into life—while Beauty is the harmony which accompanies, and renders *visible*, this transition of the eternal law into action. Light, to employ our former illustration, is the visible element which, on being analyzed, is found to exist in conjunction with heat and actinism; Beauty, in like manner, is capable of being resolved into Goodness and Truth. Beauty is thus the *manifestation*, or external symbol, of the two latter principles.

We shall now discover its uses as a visible manifestation of these principles.

The picture-book leads the child to unlock the treasures of learning;—the virgin loveliness of her, the fairest of her sex, leads the youth to the—if rightly performed—ennobling duties of husband and father: the gorgeous robes, the Urim and Thummim, the purple and fine linen, the golden cherubims and mercy seat, the pillar of cloud by day, and fire by night,—above all, the sublimities of Sinai lead the world to the

glorious truths of Christianity. By this phantom of Beauty we are allured onwards to Goodness and Truth. Ah! that stillness which sleeps on the summer cloud—those tinted hues which fall on the western hill—that glory which plays beautiful as evanescent around the setting sun—are they not the voice of God calling to us through nature, "Come unto me all ye ends of the earth?" Does not the beholding of such scenes—the sweet moments we pass in communion with nature, and through nature with God, awaken in our souls—it may be an unconscious apprehension—yet not the less an apprehension of a future and glorious state of existence?

Of such a nature are the offices of true Poetry; she is the handmaid of religion—the priestess of Truth. From the first dawn of existence, the prospect presented to our view is replete with dazzling imagery, charged with which we rush to seize the tempting object; but alas, it eludes us, and appears seemingly as far distant as ever. But not in vain has the effort been made: we have, in spite of our disappointment, secured some little doctrine, some fragment of Truth. Again a brighter landscape appears to us—again forgetting our disappointment we rush forward in the chase, but again are we doomed to the same experience. This is the education of nature and providence. Thus, in the words of the poet,

"The intelligible forms of ancient poets,
The fair humanities of old religion,
The power, the beauty, and the majesty
That had their haunts in dale, or piny mountain,
Or forest, by slow streams, or pebbly spring,
Or chasms, or watery depths,"

all combine to lead the docile mind up to Truth and God.

HAROLD.

The Societies' Section.

REPORTS OF MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT SOCIETIES.

Annual Meeting of the Rusholme Road Young Men's Improvement Society, Manchester.—The 8th anniversary of this Society was celebrated on Wednesday, October 1st., in the school-room in connexion with the Rusholme-road Independent chapel. The room was tastefully decorated for the occasion with laurel and evergreens, and between two and three hundred members and friends sat down to tea. The president of the Society, Mr. George Darling, afterwards took the chair, and the proceedings were opened with prayer. The President, in an introductory address, observed that, on looking at such interesting assemblages in connexion with the Society whose 8th anniversary they were met to celebrate, he could not but remember its humble origin, when, eight years ago, half-a-dozen young men met together in a class-room, once a month, for mutual improvement. By the energy of those individuals, its meetings had increased from monthly to weekly, its numbers from half-a-dozen to 50, its subjects from common-place to those of a high literary and scientific character; and since its commencement nearly 200 young men had been in connexion with it. Such facts were pleasing, and calculated to stimulate them to yet greater and more persevering exertion.

The late Secretary then read the report, from which it appeared that the Society numbered 45 members from the age of 18 upwards; that during the past year there had been 50 meetings—39 devoted to discussion, 5 to recitations, 3 to lectures, 2 to business, and 1 to devotion.

Mr. Leo Grindon, to whose kindness the Society was much indebted, had delivered two lectures, the first on "The True Theory and Functions of Poetry;" and the second on the "History of the English Language." A third lecture, on "Respiration," had also been gratuitously given by Mr. T. J. Wilkinson, who merited the thanks of the Society.

In the course of the evening, addresses were delivered by Messrs. G. East, W. Tebb, E. Wilde, Bellhouse, Bumby, and Ulph, members of the Society, on the following subjects:—"The Claims of Young Men," "The importance of being actuated in the investigation of subjects solely by a search after Truth," "The Past, the Present, and the Future, in relation to Science and Human Progress," "The Educational, Temperance, Peace, and other great movements of the day." Messrs. Tubbs and Hague, honorary members, and Mr. Shileto, also addressed the meeting; the latter observing that, through the influence of the Rusholme-road Society, a

similar institution had been established at York.

In accordance with a previous arrangement, two books, *Calmet's Dictionary of the Bible*, and *Tupper's Proverbial Philosophy*, each bearing an appropriate inscription, were presented to Messrs. Tebb and Bumby, the present and late secretaries, for having spoken best at the Society's meetings during the past year, which were briefly acknowledged by the recipients.

Mr. James Griffin, (minister of the congregation at Rusholme-road,) expressed his cordial approbation of the proceedings, which had been to him a source of unmixed pleasure and satisfaction—harmony and brotherly love seemed to reign throughout; and although distinctions had been made by the awarding of testimonials, yet, instead of envy, they appeared but an additional incentive to the prevailing good feeling in the Society. He also observed that, although he had not often been privileged to meet with them on such occasions, yet they had at all times his warmest sympathy.

The meeting was characterized by its lively interest, good feeling, and determined resolution for yet more increased success, and terminated about half-past 10.

Musselburgh Young Men's Society.—This Society was instituted in 1848. A few young men, who had been for some time in Edinburgh, and there belonged to a Society for mutual improvement, came to reside in the vicinity of Musselburgh, and there being no Society in the latter town, they resolved to attempt establishing one. Having mentioned the circumstance to some of their acquaintances, a meeting was called by private circular, at which a previously prepared code of laws was read, and, with some modifications, adopted; a president, secretary, and other office bearers, chosen; and the meetings fixed to be held fortnightly. Such a Society had been a desideratum, and it was no sooner established, than a number of young men came forward and cheerfully joined it. In a short time there were upwards of thirty members; the time of meeting was changed from once a fortnight to once a week; and since that period it has continued in a flourishing condition, and been the means of accomplishing a vast amount of good. Essays are read in rotation by the members, and debates or conversations are occasionally engaged in. The professed objects of the Society are—religious, moral, and mental improvement. A course of lectures is delivered each winter, and the Society possesses an excellent library of 300 volumes.—J. S.

The Inquirer.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS.

37. *Phrenotypics, Chronology, and Geography.*
—If by the aid of the "magic squares" our

readers have succeeded in committing to memory the principal events of history, some of them will yet desire that more intimate acquaintance with Chronology, which a knowledge of the

dates supposes. Nothing is more difficult to commit to memory than a long array of figures, and hence the various plans to facilitate the labour which have been employed. The following is the best we have seen. Represent the digits by certain consonants, and employ the vowels at pleasure to form with the consonants suggestive words or phrases. The following should be committed to memory :—

1 B. or C.	4 J. K. or S.	7 P. Q. or Z.
2 D. or F.	5 L.	8 R.
3 G. or H.	6 M. or N.	9 T. or V.

The following is the *modus operandi* :—Take for instance the fact of Babylon being taken by Cyrus, which happened 538 years B.C. From the consonants representing the figures, we may form the sentence *Lo a He Ro!* Again, Carthage and Corinth were destroyed 146 B.C., from which we get the date-word *Be So M* which reminds us of the Besom of destruction sweeping over the devoted cities. These date-words and phrases, may be formed by each reader *ad libitum*.

The annexed table of cypher-numerals will be found useful.

0 W. or X.		
0 —es.	00 —st.	000 —th.
		000,000 —y.

Take for instance the birth of Abraham as about 2,000 B.C., and by means of the above tables, you form the very suggestive word *Faith*.

It will readily be seen that phrenotypics may be applied with advantage to geography, especially according to the following plan for remem-

bering the principal points of interest connected with a country.

1 Boundaries.	4 Face of the Country.	7 Government
2 Extent and sub-division.	5 Production.	8 General Character.
3 Climate.	6 Population.	9 Religion.

We have thus hastily stated the *principles* of a system of phrenotypics, from which we have derived considerable advantage ourselves, and which we therefore hope will be of service to many a reader. If, through want of space or obscurity of expression, any portion of our instructions have appeared unintelligible, we shall be happy to give further information on application being made to the Editors of this Magazine. —A. C.

56. *Herodotus and Xenophon.*—*The Life of Cyrus.*—To the query of H. A., it would be, indeed, difficult to return a correct and satisfactory answer, and yet it may be made the medium of diffusing some information regarding the authors referred to, and may yield an opportunity of submitting a few considerations which may lead to acquiring a more probable account of the early life of the great Persian monarch of whom that query speaks, viz., Cyrus. In the hope that we may accomplish this, we beg most humbly to lift "our grey goose quill." Herodotus has frequently been styled the Father of History, because that, with the exception of one book, the Holy Scriptures, his is the oldest known work to which the title of history is strictly applicable. He is supposed to have been born about the 74th Olympiad, i.e., B.C. 484, and to have died subsequently to the 93rd Olympiad, i.e., B.C. 408. His place of birth is said to have been Halicarnassus, a Dorian city on the south coast of Caria, in Asia Minor. He is said to have recited the first draught of his immortal work at the games held in the 81st Olympiad, i.e., B.C. 456, at the early age of 28. The object which he had in view was to collect and preserve all that could be learned of the great events which immediately preceded his own times—to give an account of the wars and negotiations of the Greeks, from the commencement of the protracted struggle which was waged between the Greeks of Asia and Europe, and the nations which were banded together under the rule of the great Persian monarch Cyrus, down to the discomfiture and defeat of Xerxes and Mardonius. His History may therefore be said to extend from the accession of Croesus, B.C. 560,

to the battles of Platæa and Mycale, and the capture of Sestos—a city on the shore of Thrace—by the Greeks, B.C. 478—a period of nearly one hundred years. He travelled in every part of the globe which was accessible to a Greek—into Egypt, Babylon, Phœnicia, Scythia, and Thrace, in order to procure the most correct and accurate intelligence which was attainable. He examined the natural products and inspected the physical condition of each country, and carefully remarked the changes which had been wrought on these by the labour and ingenuity of man, as well as by the unceasing operation of natural causes. We are, certainly, much indebted to him for the preservation of much information which would otherwise have been irretrievably lost; and although there can be little doubt but that there are many fictitious circumstances mentioned in the course of his narrative, the general accuracy of his details of the great Asiatic movements, and the general simplicity and unaffectedness of his style, entitle him to considerable credence and trustworthiness. The passages of the History of Herodotus, which relate to the life of Cyrus, are contained in book 1st (Clio) chapters 83-214; many digressive remarks are, of course, interwoven with the narrative, e.g., in chapters 130-140 he describes, at some length and with great accuracy, the manners and customs of the Persians.

Xenophon appears before us in a most attractive character, at once a Philosopher, an Historian, and a General. He was born in Athens in the 2nd year of the 84th Olympiad, i.e., B.C. 443 (when Herodotus would be about 41 years of age). He was a disciple of Socrates, accompanied that philosopher to the Peloponnesian war, and fought bravely in defence of his country in the battle of Delium, B.C. 428, in which the Athenians were defeated. In the year B.C. 401, he joined Cyrus the younger in Asia. Of his doings in this expedition he has given a full account in his "Expedition of Cyrus." After his return into Greece he connected himself with Agesilaus, King of Sparta, and fought along with him against the Thebans in the battle of Chæronea, and afterwards retired with his wife and two children to Scillus in Elis as an exile. There he spent the remainder of his life

in the composition of those historical works which have immortalized his name. He removed subsequently to Corinth, and died there in the 4th year of the 106th Olympiad, i.e., B.C. 353. His chief works are the *Memorabilia* of Socrates—a continuation of the "History of Grecian affairs," which Thucydides left incomplete, beginning with the 21st year of the Peloponnesian war B.C. 411, and terminating with an account of the battle of Mantinea B.C. 362,—the *Anabasis*, or Expedition of Cyrus the younger against his brother Artaxerxes,—the *Cyropædia* or Education of Cyrus. The two latter are those which chiefly relate to the life of Cyrus. His style is simple, unadorned, familiar, direct, and undigressive, but wanting in dignity and elevation. Although possessed of much political information, his historical works contain no political reflections, and no disquisitions on the respective merits of the several political or civic constitutions which came within his observation. Gracefulness of composition, perfect propriety of style, freedom from false brilliancy or mere wordy splendor, are exhibited in all his writings. It would appear ridiculous after the decision of the accomplished, erudite, and accurate historian Alexander Fraser Tytler—who asserts that "it is impossible to reconcile or apply to one man the different accounts of him (i.e. of Cyrus) by Herodotus, Ctesias,* and Xenophon,"† to attempt any collation of those authorities for the purpose of eclecticising the truth; we shall, therefore, merely give a brief synopsis, in parallel columns, of each of the authors, and leave the decision of the question to the judgment of the reader.

* This Ctesias was a Cnidian by birth, and physician to Cyrus the younger, whom he attended in his expedition. He was taken prisoner in the battle in which Cyrus was slain, and was employed to heal the wounds of Artaxerxes; this he did so well that he was chosen "Physician to the King." In this situation he found leisure to write a History of the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, and Indians, from the time of Ninus and Semiramis, B.C. 2075, to the 3rd year of the 95th Olympiad, B.C. 398. His works are now lost, and we have only a few extracts from his Histories scattered up and down among the ancient authors. His account of Cyrus differs considerably from those transmitted to us by Herodotus and Xenophon, but he is not generally regarded as trustworthy or veracious.

† Elements of General History, p. 38.

Synopsis of the Life of Cyrus, by Herodotus.—Astyages, King of the Medes, had a daughter named Mandane, who was given in marriage to a Persian named Cambyzes; in consequence of a strange dream which Astyages had, which was interpreted to mean that Mandane's issue would reign in his stead, he determines to have the child destroyed. At its birth, (B.C. 599), therefore, he commands Harpagus to destroy it. Harpagus, not relishing his commission, gave the child to Mithridates, an herdsman who kept the cattle of Astyages near Ecbatana, towards the Black Sea, in order that he might dispose of it. Cyno, the wife of Mithridates, had given birth to a dead child that day, and they determined to retain Mandane's son and bring him up as their own child. When Cyrus was ten years of age, he was by his playfellows chosen king, and having whipped during his reign a lad named Artembares, he was ordered to appear before

Synopsis of the Life of Cyrus, by Xenophon.—Cyrus was the son of Cambyzes. King of Persia, and Mandane the daughter of Astyages, King of the Medes B.C. 599. He was beautiful in person, amiable in disposition, and remarkable for *naïveté* and intelligence. He was carefully educated after the manner of the Persians, and was expert in all the athletic and warlike exercises which formed part of the education of the youth of Persia. When he attained his twelfth year, his mother, Mandane, took him with her on a visit to the court of her father and his grandfather, Artaxerxes. The Medes, at this time, were very luxurious, but Cyrus despised their luxury, and would not adopt their effeminate habits. Here he learned, and perfected himself in the art of riding, and was the mediator and solicitor of favours for the whole court, and a universal favorite. He remained in Media till he completed his sixteenth year. After this his father

Astyages. He immediately recognized the features and deportment of his own family, and his suspicions were aroused. Mithridates, by his confession, confirmed his suspicions, and the king's anger was so enkindled against Harpagus that he slew his son and served up the limbs of the child at a feast to the father, and then exhibited the head, hands, and feet. Harpagus dissembled his rage, but determined to be revenged. The Magi assured Astyages that Cyrus, having exercised kingly authority already, he had now no more to fear from him, treated him kindly, and with many presents restored him to his parents. Cyrus having attained his majority, Harpagus incited him to revolt against the Median yoke. He assumed the command of an army. Astyages summoned him to his presence. Cyrus said he would see him sooner than he wished. Astyages collected his army—gave Harpagus the command. Harpagus deserted to Cyrus. The Medes were defeated. Astyages impaled the Magi, and called to arms all the Medes. In a second engagement he was conquered, and the Persians acquired rule. Cyrus became king B.C. 559. Crœsus becomes King of Sardis B.C. 560—becomes jealous of the increasing power of Cyrus—consults the oracles of Delphi and Amphiaraus as to the probability of his conquering Cyrus. The oracles return the ambiguous answer that, "if he waged war against the Persians he would overthrow a mighty empire." This he thought referred to the Persian empire, not *his own*. He consults it again, and is told that "when a *mule* shall be King of the Medes, then it would behove the Lydian to fly to Hermus." Crœsus, knowing that a *mule* could not be a king, was quite well pleased, and sets out on his expedition, crosses the river Halys, and is met by Cyrus at Pteria. A battle takes place, and, after great slaughter, the armies separate at nightfall, Crœsus retires, Cyrus follows, lays siege to Sardis, takes it B.C. 546. After various minor matters are related, Cyrus marches against Babylon, besieges it, turns the river Euphrates from its course, and becomes master of the city B.C. 538. Inspired with love of conquest, he resolves to attack the Massagetsæ—lays a third part of their army by stratagem—takes many prisoners, among whom was Spargapises, the son of Tomyris, Queen of Massagetsæ. He commits suicide, and Tomyris, eager for revenge, marches against Cyrus with a great force, routs the Persians, slays Cyrus, cuts off his head, and throws it into a vessel full of blood B.C. 529.

recalled him to finish his education. When his grandfather died, Cyaxares, Cyrus's uncle, succeeded to the throne. No sooner had he ascended than he was embroiled in a hot war. He dispatched ambassadors to Cambyses to ask aid. Cyrus was sent with 30,000 infantry. The Armenians, who were tributaries of the Medes, refused to send their subsidies, and revolted. Cyrus defeated them. Cyaxares and Cyrus, in conjunction, march against the Babylonians. Crœsus, King of Lydia, and Neriglissor, King of Babylonia, advanced to meet them, and are discomfited. Cyrus then challenged the King of Assyria to meet him in single combat, but was refused. Having raised, by several means, a great army, his uncle Cyaxares, became jealous of his power. Cyrus, however, satisfied him that he was in error, and Cyaxares bestowed upon him as a reward for his honesty and valour, the hand of his daughter, with the kingdom of Media as her portion. Cyrus then marches a second time against the Babylonians, with an army of 186,000, and met Crœsus, who had an army of 420,000, at Thymbra. The battle lasted till evening; Crœsus was defeated, and he retired hurriedly to his chief city, Sardis. His allies in like manner betaking themselves to their own capitals, Cyrus pursued Crœsus to Sardis, besieged that city—took it. He then proceeded towards Babylon, encamped before it, turned the Euphrates from its course, entered the city, and put the inhabitants to the sword, consolidated his power there, brought Cyaxares to Babylon, instituted a form of government for the vast empire he had conquered. Cyaxares died, and he became king. His empire was bounded by the Indus on the east, the Caspian and Euxine on the north, the Egean sea on the west, and on the south by Ethiopia and the Arabian sea. He resided alternately at Babylon, Susa, and Ecbatana, and died in peace, after having demitted his Government to his children B.C. 529. We may mention in conclusion that it was the general opinion of the ancients that the *Cyropædia* was an historical romance, and that in it there are many geographical errors, and other circumstances which seem to prove that—as Cicero says—"Xenophon's design in writing the History of Cyrus was not so much to follow truth as to give a model of a just government."—S. N.

59 *John Hutchinson*, born 1674, died 1737, occupied in early life the office of Steward to the Duke of Somerset, and while in that situation, accompanied his Lordship in his travels on the continent. Living as he did in the early-day dawn of modern science, when the almost marvellous mental-achievements of Newton were being offered to the world, and before that great philosopher's renown had gathered in a glorious halo round his name, his mind like that of the contemporaries of all great men, listened doubtfully to the voice of the discoverer of the star-writ hieroglyphics of the sky, and could not credit the fact that now only the true theory of the

heavens had been revealed. Being a firm believer too in the Scriptures, he, unfortunately, assumed that they had been bestowed upon man as a complete revelation of all that man ought to desire to know, both as regarded natural philosophy and religion. The science of Astronomy, based upon a true knowledge of the mechanism of the heavens had just arisen. Geology had just begun to exist—its facts had been collected and arranged by the labours of Ray and Woodward, and had been pushed to extravagant lengths by Dr. Thomas Burnet, in his "*Sacred Theory of the Earth*" which contains a conjectural—and in many parts baseless—account of

the formation of this globe; the changes which had taken place upon its surface were still going on, as well as those which were to happen in the future. Natural philosophy was assuming an independent position through the labours of the not long previously chartered Royal Society, and physical speculations were beginning to occupy the minds of many men. What wonder then that penetrated as he was with this faith in the infallibility of Scripture upon all points—whether these were the topics on which it was intended to give information or not—being then seriously concerned for the honour of the Gospel, and exceedingly jealous for the glory of its Heavenly Author, he should be incited to inquire into the truth of the alleged discoveries of the Physicists. To this labour he set himself, and became an eager collector of fossils, &c. The result of these inquiries produced in 1724 a work entitled *Moses's Principia*, which hotly contested the theory contained in Dr Woodward's "Natural History of the Earth;" in 1727 *Moses's Principia*, part II., appeared, in which he treated the Theory of Gravitation as contained in Newton's *Principia*, with ridicule, and contended that the "principia" contained in the inspired writer's works were far more entitled to credit than those of any uninspired mere human agent whatever. This Theory very closely resembles that of Descartes, born 1596, died 1650, who had published his "*Principia Philosophica*," at Amsterdam, in 1644. Hutchinson maintained, of course, the opinion that the earth was the chief orb, that for its especial service the sun, moon, and stars were created, that consequently they occupied a subordinate place in creation, that the universe was upheld and regulated by the direct will and power of God, and consequently that it was no farther possible to know the law which governed matter, than it was to know the will of Deity, for upon that alone did they depend, that hence miraculous agency was not inconsistent with, but a part of, the Laws of the Universe, and that a holy and religious life on the part of the inhabitants of the earth was necessary, in order to be favoured with the forbearance of God. His "Thoughts concerning Religion," are very eccentric, and have given birth to a sect of religionists, called from their founder, Hutchinsonians. His works were published posthumously, in 12 vols., 8vo, in 1748, by some of his disciples. He is a singular instance of the sagacity of Lord Bacon's remark* "*corruptio philosophica ex superstitione et theologia admista, latius omnino patet et plurimum mali infect, aut in philosophas integras aut in eorum parteo.*" * *Huic autem vanitati nonnulli ex moderatis summa levitate ita indulserunt, est in primo capitulo Geneseos et in libro Job, et aliis scripturis sacris philosophiam naturalem fundare, conati sunt; inter viva quærentes mortua. Tantoque magis hæc vanitas inhiibenda venit et coercenda, quia divinum est humanorum malesana admistione, non solum educitur philosophia phantasmatica, sed etiam religio hæretica,*" which may be thus translated, "The corruption of philosophy, from the admixture of superstition and theology is of very wide extent, and brings forth very many evil effects,

both as a whole and in parts. * * But some of the moderns have indulged in this folly with such consummate inconsiderateness that they have attempted to rear up a system of natural philosophy on the 1st chap. of Genesis, the Book of Job, and other parts of sacred writ, seeking thus the dead amongst the living. But this folly of mingling together human and divine things is the rather to be restrained and repressed, because thence there arise not only fantastical philosophies but heretical religions."—S. N.

63. *Beauty*.—Perhaps it may be more useful to the general reader, as well as equally serviceable to your correspondent, if we mention the chief works known to us, which either in whole, or in part, treat upon the topic in question, slightly indicating, as far as my memory shall at present serve me, the general idea which pervades their several pages; there will thus be furnished to the general reader a synopsis of the various sources from which information may be drawn, as well as an answer to the query proposed. Addison's papers on the "Pleasures of Imagination" (*Spectator*, 411 to 421,) are the earliest British productions known to me on this subject. In these, he attributes Beauty to visible appearances only, but does not attempt to give a philosophic view of the reasons why it gratifies the taste. Shaftesbury, in his several works on the "Human Mind" and its operations, advocates the existence of an internal Beauty-discerning sense, excited to activity by objects. These two ideas combined, formed the theory which Akenside maintained in his poem on the "Pleasures of Imagination," as may be seen from the following quotations:—

"What then is Taste but these internal powers,
Active and strong, and feelingly alive
To each fine impulse? A discerning sense
Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust
Of things deformed, or disarranged, or gross."
In species, &c., Book III, 516.

"Thus was Beauty sent from Heaven,
The lovely ministrant of truth and good
In this dark world: for truth and good are one,
And Beauty dwells in them, and they in her,
With like participation. Book I, 372.

"Even so did Nature's hand
To certain species of external things
Attune the finer organs of the mind!
So the glad impulse of congenial powers,
Or of sweet sound, or fair proportioned form,
The grace of motion, or the bloom of light,
Thrills through Imagination's tender frame;
From nerve to nerve: all naked and alive
They catch the spreading rays, till now the soul
At length discloses every tuneful spring
To that harmonious movement from without
Responsive." Book I, 114.

Hutchinson in his inquiry concerning Beauty and Virtue, considers these as internal senses, and distinguishes them by the names of *subsequent* and *reflex*—*subsequent* because they presuppose some prior perception of the objects of their action; and *reflex* because the mind requires to reflect before it can perceive the full power of the qualities of the objects which excite them. He divides Beauty into *relative* and

* Nov. Org. Book I. Aph. 65.

absolute ;—*relative*, when it consists of imitation or representation, as in sculpture, painting, architecture, and the drama; and *absolute* when the mind is impressed by something in external objects, which, by pre-adaptation, gratifies the internal senses of beauty, harmony, utility, variety, smoothness, &c. Hume asserts that "Beauty is no quality in things themselves; it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them, and each mind perceives a different Beauty,"—*Essays*, vol. I, Essay 22. Thus Beauty consists in the perception of the utility of objects. His theory has been severely criticized. We may mention in this place the article by the late Lord Jeffrey, in the *Edinburgh Review*, No. xxxv., in which he remarks, "ploughs, dunghills, and bank-notes were very useful; but no one could be persuaded to think them beautiful; and people were in raptures with the beauty of rosebuds, and statues, and idle young women, that were allowed to be of no use whatever." Hogarth's *Analysis of Beauty* is an able work. In it he asserts that fitness, simplicity, uniformity, variety, and a due amount of intricacy, all co-operate to constitute Beauty, and that these all meet in a certain waving line, essential to all beautiful forms, and denominated the "line of Beauty." Burke in his treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful, considers that bodies possess a sort of love-creating influence, which acts upon the senses by relaxing the tissues of the frame, and producing a general agreeability of sensation; smallness, variety, gradual complication, fineness of texture, smoothness, delicacy, and clear, distinct, though not gaudy colours, are said by him to produce this effect. Sir Joshua Reynolds, in "The Idler," No. 82, and in his "Discourses," conceives that there is an ideal point of perfection of structure, which we set up in our mind, to which, in the progress of man, and of general cultivation, everything tends; and that the more nearly the objects resemble this ideal portraiture, and the more exact their conformity to it, the more beautiful do we consider the object to be. Johann Winkelmann wrote some eloquent passages on this topic, in his works on "The Imitation of Grecian works of Art," and "History of Ancient Art among the Greeks," in which he maintains that beauty is an educt of the imagination, called into vivid action, and excited by fitting objects, in that land of Beauty worship, philosophy, and song. Crousaz in his "*Traité du beau*," treats of unity, variety, order, proportion, evenness of surface, as the constituent elements in the Beauty-emotion. Diderot, in one of his fragmentary sketches, makes the perception of relative perfection the chief element in our idea of what is beautiful. Voltaire, D'Alembert, and Montesquieu, have each written on this subject, taking the objective view of the question—as depending upon the properties of things, and the ideas which they lead us to form; and thus maintain that the cultivation of the judgment will increase our capacity of appreciating the Beautiful. Gerard in his "Essay on Taste" takes a somewhat similar view, inasmuch, as he regards the perception of Beauty as a complex act of mind, depending upon the knowledge which we have of the qualities of objects, and the relative suitability

of these objects to fulfil their various purposes. Then comes the Association Theory, first perfected by Alison, in his *Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste*. He thinks that the qualities of matter in themselves have no Beauty, but as they are the occasions of producing in us emotions of an agreeable kind—such as satisfaction, cheerfulness, pity, admiration, love, &c., or a pleasing exercise of the imaginative faculties, in harmony with the kindly and social affections. This theory was rendered more perfect by Jeffrey, in the article in the *Edinburgh Review*, above alluded to, and in the Supplement to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Article Beauty.—Knight in his "Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste" held a modification of the views of Alison, Burke, and Hume. Reid maintains the inherency of Beauty in objects, and Dr. Thomas Brown, while leaning rather more to the Association Theory, still asserts that there appears to be some original power in objects which acts as the first educer of the feeling. Schelling's work on the "Philosophy of Art" makes beauty consist in the eliminating of the idea of the exertion of creative power. Cousin's "Philosophy of the Beautiful," according to the principle of the Eclectic school, places the Beautiful in a medium, or central point between these several views, by asserting that an ideal, absolute, formal and mental notion of Beauty, is inwoven with the contexture of mind, and that real Beauty is the result of external objects, calling this *form* of the intellect into exercise; and Beauty is thus the *idealization* of nature. Eastlake, Ruskin, and Coleridge, seem to favour the formal or mind-educed idea of Beauty; and D. R. Hay, in his several writings on this much-contested point, viz., "The Laws of Harmonious Colouring," "The Natural Principles and Analogy of Form," &c., has striven to prove that there is a geometric scale of harmonic form, colour, and proportion, from which the true principles of Beauty are discoverable, and by the attentive study of which a "science of Beauty" may be perfected. Hazlitt, Haydon, Knox, Fau, De Quincey, &c., have written upon this subject, and several articles of ability are to be found in the Reviews and leading Magazines of the last half-century. We may mention particularly "Remarks on Mr. Alison's Theory of Beauty," as explained by Mr. Jeffrey, in *Blackwood's Magazine*, No. lxxv., and the papers on "Ideal Beauty," "The Science of Art," and "The new Theory of Beauty," by Leigh Ritchie, in *Chamber's Journal*, Nos. 330, 332, 332, New Series. Of the ideas of the ancients,—Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,—we have not sufficient *criteria* for forming any definite opinion. Schiller's "Philosophical Essays," Jouffroy's "*Cours D'Esthétique*" we have not read, and the opinions of Dugald Stewart are modelled, if we recollect aright, upon the poem of Aken-side. Uvedale Price "On the Picturesque" opened up a new branch of this complicated subject, and the whole question has become of so much importance that it is now erected into a science by itself, under the name of *Æsthetics*. Some idea of the extensiveness of this department may be gathered from an enumeration of some of the species of Beauty of which it takes

cognizance, viz., Beauty of person, of sound, of colour, of form, of motion, gracefulness, majesty, the picturesque. I hope that my communication may answer your correspondent's purpose, be satisfactory to the general reader, and be not deemed too tedious by yourself.—
PHILOMATHOS.

64 and 66. *Studies for, and Admission to, the English Bar.*—The Inns of Court are, the Inner Temple, the Middle Temple, Lincoln's Inn, and Gray's Inn. These enjoy the ancient and exclusive privilege of conferring the rank or degree of *Barrister at Law*, the profession of which (or of the higher degree of Serjeant) constitutes an indispensable qualification for practising as an advocate in the Superior Courts at Westminster. The mode of proceeding in order to gain admission to either of these Courts, is to get the nomination of two Barristers of the Inn or Court selected; pay the fees, and stamp (about £30), and pay down £100 as security—nearly all of which is subsequently absorbed by other expenses—and the balance returned when called to the bar. The call is obtained by application to the principal officers or *benchers* of the Court. As a qualification for the "call" the student must have kept commons for three years (i.e., twelve terms) by dining in the Hall of the Society at least three times in each term; and it is farther required in two of the Inns of Court, that he should have been a member of the Society for five years, unless he have taken the degree of Master of Arts, or Bachelor of Law in the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, or Dublin, in which case three will be sufficient. The present system of the Inns of Court involves nothing of the academical discipline or instructions; nor is the applicant for a call to the bar subjected to any previous examination as to his professional

knowledge. At the Inner Temple, however, it has been a rule, since 1829, that no person shall be admitted a student of the Society without a previous examination by a Barrister appointed for that purpose, who is to certify his competency in classical attainments, and the general subjects of a liberal education.

The business of legal education has long been conducted in private channels: and experience has generally proved this method efficacious. The usual plan is to obtain admission into the chambers of a practising barrister, conveyancer, or special pleader, where, in addition to the opportunities of observing the course of practice, the pupil enjoys, for some years, the advantage of tuition in the grounds and principles of the law. To those, however, who prefer the method of scholastic instruction, the means are not entirely wanting: for lectures on the Laws of England, have for some years past been given at King's College, and University College, London; and professorships for this branch of science have now, through the munificence of private donors, been established at Oxford and Cambridge, with ample endowments for that purpose; although originally no provision was made for legal studies in these ancient seats of learning. (vide Stephens "Commentaries on the Laws of England.")

A gentleman of the Bar, who has furnished us with some of the foregoing information, adds, "unfortunately, no forms of Legal Study are absolutely compulsory: the only conditions being attendance at the term dinners four times a year for about three years." The student can read the elementary books and attend the lectures, but the best way is to pay £100 and become a pupil in the office of a practising barrister.—C. W.

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

It has been, and is, indeed, "a labour of love" with us, to watch the gradual and progressive advancement, the elevation and concentration of thought, and the executive ease which is being acquired by our young students. No attempt could have been more successful so far as the individuals who compose our class are concerned; yet we cannot but regret—although fraught with additional labour and responsibility to ourselves—that so small a proportion of our readers should be animated with the noble aspiration for improvement. Can it be that you doubt your own powers? If it be, remember the immortal Shakspeare has already unloosed the gordian knot of that sophistry in these words—

"Our doubts are traitors,
And make us lose the good we oft might win,
By fearing to attempt."

Is it that ye are "lovers of pleasure?" Then allow us to tell you that you have mistaken the course, for the only true and lasting pleasures are those which result from the cultivation of the mind—that of bravely donning

"The close-knit panoply of thought."

Everyone must have felt that no hours of dalliance—no seasons of riotous mirth—no time spent in trivial sports—no period past under the influence of the song, the jeer, the revel, the convivial laugh—the "poetry of motion," and the blaze of midnight torches, can satisfy the resistless ardour of the mind.

"The high-born soul
Disdains to rest her heaven-aspiring wing
Beneath its native quarry."

But we are not writing a homily, nor did we intend to fall into the hortatory mood, yet we cannot avoid saying, with Thomas Cooper, "If we could use words of fire—syllables of lightning—they should be employed, if by such means we could arouse you (young men) to the noblest of all aspirations—that of becoming truly intelligent men." We hope that more of our readers will unite in striving after—mental improvement.

The following is our registry for the month:—94. Effort, (there is a German proverb which is suggested by your essays—viz., "I cannot" never accomplished anything, "I'll try" per-

forms wonders, but "I will do" conquers every obstacle—persevere); 92. H. T. (exceedingly well reasoned); D. G. B. (a highly satisfactory essay); E. S. J. (go on—you are improving rapidly—let past success only nerve you to greater exertions in future); 88. T. W. (capital)! J. W. H. (progressing very praiseworthy); 83. R. K. (very good—one assertion you will not surely maintain to its full extent—viz., "error is infinite"); 82. Robin (well—pleasing); 80. S. H. A. (more correctly written than formerly); A. B. M. (we welcome you—work hard); E. S. B. (clear and discriminating); 78. J. N. (marks of an earnest student appear in your papers—yield not to difficulties); T. T. (if you can find time, or make it, you should rewrite your papers; they are better in thought than in expression); 76. J. E. (clear—although a novice to such speculations you do well).

EXERCISE ON THE ART OF REASONING.

No. X.

1. On what does Logic depend for its first principles?
2. Explain the distinction between the *manner* and the *matter* of Thought, and how it affects the Science of Reasoning.
3. *Is* experience the basis of Knowledge?
4. Explain how Generalization actually involves the whole *law of ratiocination*.
5. Are *induction* and *deduction* antagonistic to forms of thought?

Notices of Books, etc.

The First Step in Chemistry. By Robert Gallo- way, F.C.S. London: J. Churchill.

It is something to say that this little work answers to its title; and further, that it is not only a first step in Chemistry, but as easy a one as could be expected in a science so abounding with technicalities. The author has attempted, by a series of progressive exercises, to render the pupil familiar with chemical nomenclature, the laws of combining proportion, the construction of chemical formulæ, the mode of expressing chemical changes, the influence which cohesion and repulsion exercise over affinity, &c. These lessons are capable of considerable extension in the hands of a teacher, whilst they mark out a definite course of study for the self-instructed. We admire the plan of the work, and have much pleasure in introducing it to the notice of our readers.

Gutta Percha; its Discovery, History, and Mani- fold Uses. London: Benjamin L. Green.

This is a very interesting account of a very useful article. It is illustrated by a beautiful engraving in oil colours representing the gathering of Gutta Percha from the plant, and there are about 60 wood engravings showing the purposes to which it is applied. We recommend the pamphlet as a contribution to "the philosophy of common things."

The Paper-hanger's and Upholsterer's Guide. By James Arrowsmith. London: Dean and Son.

In a day like the present when so many are becoming not merely house-holders but *house-owners*, we may be performing an appreciable service in noticing a work which professes to be "a treatise on paper-hanging and upholstering, in which the practical operations of the two branches of the trade are systematically laid down, with directions preparatory to papering;—preventions against the effect of damp on walls;—the cements and pastes adapted to the several purposes of the trade;—directions for

the paneling and ornamenting of Rooms;—a retrospective glance at the modes of Furnishing in the last Century, to the present time;—directions and hints for modern Furnishing, as adopted by Persons of acknowledged taste; to which is added, a tabular view, with diagrams, showing the proportion for cutting one hundred and thirty various sized festoons."

The German Language in one Volume. By Falek Lebahn. London: Simkin, Marshall, and Co.

Mr Lebahn is well known in the metropolis as a successful teacher of the German Language, and his usefulness has been greatly extended by the publication of this work, which has already reached a fourth edition. Our author opens with an "Introduction," in which he asserts—"1st that five-sixths of all English words are of German origin; 2nd, that the pronunciation of German is exceedingly simple; and 3rd, that the construction of the German Language, can give but little difficulty to the English student, since the varieties which exist in the two languages may be brought under a few rules easily acquired." The design of the volume is to prove this, and to render the attainment of the German languages easy to the English student, by simplifying the rules of Grammar by presenting to him the similarities of the two languages, and by shewing that he can learn a great deal of German with very little trouble. The introduction is followed 1st, by "a practical Grammar," with useful exercises to every rule; 2ndly, by *La Motte Fouqué's* exquisite tale of "Undine;" 3rd, by a vocabulary of 4,500 words synonymous in German and English; and lastly, by a key to the Exercises. A cursory examination of the volume gives us a very favourable opinion of it, and induces us to recommend it to the attention of any of our readers who are desirous of becoming familiar with the German language and literature.

Erratum:—Page 381, col. 2, line 23, for *gaze* read *case*.

The Art of Reasoning.

No. XX.

ON METHOD.

"All's well that ends well."—*Shakspeare.*

"Hic labor extremus, longarum hæc meta viarum." *—*Virgil*

"I must now quit a subject on which I have, perhaps, dwelt too long."—*Hallam.*

"How much remains to be done for the improvement of that part of Logic whose province it is to fix the limits by which contiguous departments of study are defined and separated! and how many unsuspected affinities may be reasonably presumed to exist among sciences which, to our circumscribed views, appear, at present, the most alien from each other! The abstract Geometry of Appollonius and Archimedes was found, after an interval of two thousand years, to furnish a torch to the physical inquiries of Newton; while, in the further progress of Knowledge, the Etymology of Languages has been happily employed to fill up the chasms of Ancient History; and the conclusions of Comparative Anatomy to illustrate the theory of the earth. For my own part, even if the task were executed with the most complete success, I should be strongly inclined to think that its appropriate place would be as a branch of an article on Logic." † Agreeing, as we do, with the opinions expressed in the foregoing extract, yet we feel, forcibly, the difficulty of executing the great design which it unfolds to the mind; indeed, the very multiplicity of topics which seem to us to be included in the signification of the word Method, introduces a sort of embarrassment into our mind which is likely to make this paper the most *immethodical* of all those which have preceded it. We could have wished, had space permitted, to lay before our readers an abstract of the methods of various philosophers in a somewhat fuller form than we can now do, but as we have the hope of shortly returning to this subject, we shall content ourselves for the present, and begin by giving a tabulated outline, of Bacon's classification of knowledge, as contained in his treatise "*De Augmentis Scientiarum.*" We dare not now, however, do more than present the following brief *formula* of his Methodology—viz. :

* "This is our final labour, this the termination of our lengthy journeyings."

† Stewart's Parliamentary Discourse on Metaphysical and Moral Science. Preface, p. 11.

KNOWLEDGE.

Memory.		Imagination.	Reason.
History.		Poesy.	Philosophy.
Natural.	Civil.		
1. History of Creatures, or Nature in Action.	1. Literary.	1. Narrative or Heroic.	1. Divine, or Theology natural and revealed.
2. History of Marvels, or Nature varying.	2. Ecclesiastic.	2. Representative or Dramatic.	2. Natural, or Science Speculative and Operative.
3. History of Arts, or Nature varied.	3. Civil.	3. Allusive and Parabolical.	3. Human, or Anthropology and Sociology.
		4. Appendices—viz., Biographies, Orations, Letters, and Apophthegms.	

This classification has been slightly varied by D'Alembert, in his "Encyclopedical tree of the arrangements of human knowledge," by the extension of the province of Imagination, and placing it last in the catalogue of primary intellectual powers; but we think this alteration more refined than philosophical. Locke, also, has attempted the mighty task of arranging, classifying, and co-ordinating human knowledge, in the last chapter of his celebrated "Essay." This classification may be tabulated as follows—viz. :—

KNOWLEDGE.

Φυσική. (Physics.)	Πρακτική. (Operative skill.)	Σημειωτική. (Sign-knowledge.)
1. Natural Philosophy.	1. Ethics.	1. Logic.
2. Mental Philosophy.	2. The Mechanical Arts.	2. Language.
3. Natural Theology.	3. The Fine Arts.	3. Rites, Ceremonies, Customs, Fashions, &c.

The Categories of Kant are next deserving of attention, as an attempt to methodize "the laws of the Understanding." These constitute the *forms* under some one of which the mind is necessitated to marshal each individual object of thought, and they comprehend all the possible judgments which the human mind is capable of forming. They may be exhibited thus :—

LAWS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.

Quantity.	Quality.	Relation.	Modality.
1. Unity.	1. Reality.	1. Substance and Attribute.	1. Possibility or Impossibility.
2. Plurality.	2. Negation.	2. Causality and Subsequency.	2. Existence or Non-existence.
3. Universality or Totality.	3. Limitation.	3. Action and Reaction.	3. Necessity or Contingency.

The *triadial* system of Hegel, as the representative of another and a differing Methodology, deserves mention. His general principle is, that everything has two contrary aspects in which it may be viewed, but that Truth, Reality, and Being, are the results of the idea educed in the mind by the identity—or becoming-united-into-one—of these diverse aspects. Everything is thus *triadial*. There are, firstly, the two contraries; and secondly, the resultant of their identity; thus—

First. *Thought unconditioned.*

I. Quality.

1. Being unconditioned.
2. Existence or Being conditioned.
3. Existence realized.

II. Quantity.

1. Pure quantity.
2. Divisible quantity.
3. Degree of quantity.

III. Measure.

1. The Union or *realization* of quality, and quantity.

Second. *Thought conditioned.*

I. Noumenon.

1. Ideal Being.
2. Essential Being.
3. Thing.

II. Phenomenon.

1. Appearances.
2. Matter and Form, or appearances conditioned.
3. Relation, or *becomingness*.

III. Reality.

1. Substance.
2. Causation.
3. Action.

Third. *Thought identified, or realized.*

I. Mental Idea.

1. Term.
2. Judgment.
3. Inference.

II. Object.

1. Mechanicals.
2. Chemicals.
3. Final cause.

III. Idea.

1. Life.
2. Intelligence.
3. The absolute.

The system of Comte we have already explained, and may therefore pass on to the New Methodology, propounded in a most excellent work, recently published, under the title of "The Theory of Human Progression." The ideas of the Author may be thus abridgedly expressed—viz.,—each science posits, or lays down, an idea—that regarding which it treats. The name of this idea is a substantive. Each Science presents to the mind the three following parts—viz., 1st. Its substantive. 2nd. The *relation* between that and another substantive, *i. e.*, the proposition. 3rd. A new idea evolved from the consideration of the relation of that and another proposition, *i. e.*, the Syllogism. Every science, therefore, consists of terms, propositions, and syllogisms. Classification is not science, but the preparation for science. Science is an educt of the mind. Ontology is, therefore, the fountain of science. Logic teaches the forms of the mental operations, gives out the laws of identity and equality, and is hence the primary science. The co-ordination of the sciences may be thus exhibited:—

I. Primary knowledge—necessary and universal.

{ Ontologic.

{ Logic. Formal Thought.

{ Mathematic. Number, Quantity, Space.

{ Dynamic. Force.

II. Science.

{ Physic. Mechanic, Magnetic, Chemic, Electro-galvanic.

{ Organic. Botanic, Zoologic.

{ Anthropologic. Artistic, Economic, Socialistic, Politic.

{ Theologic.

III. Philosophy.

{ Critic. Knowledge.

{ Dikaistic. Duty.

{ Elpistic. Hope.

IV. Revelation.

{ Theic.

These formulæ are not given here so much because they can convey much information to the mind, as to introduce our readers to a new field of thought. We may thus pique their curiosity, and lead them on to higher studies; and at the same time we offer no apology for inserting them, because we believe that a paper on Method is a proper place in which to introduce a notice of every attempt to methodize and arrange the details of human knowledge. All that we regret is, that we cannot now more fully explain them,

and that we have been compelled to do such injustice to their respective authors as to present the mere skeleton of their thoughts. But if a Cuvier, or an Owen, from a few scattered and fragmentary bones is capable of filling up the outline of the animal structure to which these bones belonged, so ought the student of mind also to be able to follow out the general scope and design of any philosophy from such skeletoic abstracts as those which we have now placed before him.

We are compelled to omit, however unwillingly, all mention of the works of Concio, Gaulier, Algezeri, Vico, Ploucquet, Ventura, Chretien, and the Authors of the "Port Royal System of Logic," and shall now proceed, as briefly as may be, to the consideration of the remaining divisions of our subject.

The *second* part of Method is that which relates to the things able to be named of knowledge. Of logical classification and division we have already spoken under the topics *Categoriae*, *Predicables*, *Syllogisms*, *Fallacies*, to which we beg to refer our readers. The laws of Mnemonics have been fully treated in other portions of this work, under the title of *Phrenotypics*, by "an abler pen," on that subject, than our own; there, therefore remains for our present consideration, only "the laws of simple and relative suggestion."

"Not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently," says the acute Hobbes, and thus, for the first time, introduced the idea of *law* as regulating the succession of our thoughts. Hartley next endeavoured to analyze some of the complex thoughts which take up their residence in the mind, by reference to this "law of association," and thus to bring to the test of experiment the assertion which Hobbes has made in the third chapter of the "*Leviathan*,"—viz., that "in the wild ranging of the mind a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependence of one thought upon another." In this he, to some extent, succeeded. Upon this subject Dr. Reid remarks, that "we seem to treat the thoughts that present themselves to the fancy in crowds, as a great man treats the persons who attend his levee. They are all ambitious of his attention; he goes round the circle, bestowing a bow upon one, a smile upon another, asks a short question of a third, while a fourth is honoured with a particular conference; and the greater part have no particular mark of attention, but go as they came. It is true he can give no mark of his attention to those who came not there, but he has a sufficient number for making a choice and distinction." Mr. James Mill, in his "*Analysis of the Human Mind*," set himself strenuously to the task of discovering by what connecting links our thoughts are recalled and reproduced, and gave out the following as the general associative law—viz., "Our ideas spring up and exist in the order in which the sensations existed, of which they are the copy." This law branches out into the three following secondary laws—viz., 1st. Ideas of sensations which impress the mind simultaneously, reappear simultaneously. 2nd. Ideas of sensations which impress the mind successively, reappear successively. 3rd. Ideas of sensations are made to reappear by other sensations which have occurred either simultaneously with, or successively to, the sensations whose representatives they recall. The primary influences which operate in enabling the mind to recall its ideas, are—Resemblance, Contrast, Juxtaposition, and Consecutiveness. The circumstances which modify the recurrence of ideas are the following—viz., 1st. The

duration of the original impression. 2nd. The greater or less similarity of impressions. 3rd. The greater or less frequency of recurrence. 4th. The recentness or remoteness of the date of the impressions. 5th. The greater or less accuracy of the original impressions. 6th. Original mental differences among men. 7th. Mental habits. The philosophy of the recurrence of simple ideas, is denominated simple suggestion. Relative suggestion signifies the calling up of ideas regarding the *relations* of objects, ideas, attributes, &c., in contradistinction to the suggestion of simple conceptions. Relations are capable of a twofold division—viz., into Coexistent Relations, and Relations of Succession. Under the former are classed the relations of Coequality, Similarity, Quality, &c.; under the latter, Succession, Causation, Position, &c.* Dr. Thomas Brown made all reasoning consist of a series of Relative suggestions. He says, "Objects, and the relations of objects—these are all that reasoning involves, and these must always be involved in every reasoning." "One conception follows another conception, according to certain laws of suggestion, to which our Divine Author has adapted our mental constitution; and by another set of laws, which the same Divine Author has established, certain feelings of relation arise from the consideration of the suggesting and suggested objects. This is all in which reasoning, as felt by us, truly consists. * * * Each subject of our thoughts suggests something which forms a part of it, or something which has to it a certain relation of proportion; and the relation of comprehension in the one case, or of proportion in the other case, is felt accordingly at every step."† The Philosophy of Suggestion has been most elegantly expressed by Samuel Rogers, in "The Pleasures of Memory," in the following lines:—

"Lulled in the countless chambers of the brain,
Our thoughts are linked by many a hidden chain;
Awake but one, and lo! what myriads rise!
Each stamps its image as the other flies.

Each at thy call advances or retires,
As Judgment dictates or the scene inspires.
Each thrills the seat of sense, that sacred source
Whence the fine nerves direct their mazy course,
And through the mind invisibly convey
The subtle quick vibrations as they play."

The *third* part of Method concerns itself with the *communication* of knowledge, and refers either to *narrative* or *argumentative* discourse. It will readily appear from a consideration of what has been said above, that that method of communicating knowledge which most corresponds to "the laws of suggestion" which are impressed upon the mind, is that which ought to be most uniformly employed. It will follow from this that in narrative discourses, the natural order is most to be preferred, and ought most frequently to be adopted, because it will be that which most accurately accords with the laws of the mind, and is consequently that which will be most easily comprehended by it; thus Civil History will generally follow the laws of succession in time, or causative

* Vide vol. I., p. 134.

† Brown "On the Philosophy of the Mind." Lect. 40.

agency; Natural History those of similarity, quality or position. In argumentative discourse, however, there are two methods of arrangement, which severally, according to the purpose which we have in view, add weight and aptness to the evidence which we can produce. These are respectively denominated, Analysis, and Synthesis. These terms have already been fully defined* and we shall therefore assume that their significations are sufficiently known by our readers to enable them to comprehend our future remarks. When we are desirous of detailing the mode in which we proceeded to examine a subject, and of detailing the results which followed from each step in our investigation, we must present our views in the analytical order. Thus we impart to another the several processes in which we engaged; we lead him along the pathway which we travelled; we point out to him the various objects which arrested our attention; we place him in a position to judge of the accuracy of our procedure, and are thus fully justified in appealing to him for his verdict upon the point at issue. But it is obvious that in every investigation which we may make, many false steps will be taken; many observations will have been made entirely foreign to our purpose; many hypotheses may have been thought of, which subsequent observations may have lead us to reject.† These as contributing little or nothing to the illustration of the subject, it is not necessary to bring prominently into view, unless indeed, some peculiar importance has been attached to such hypotheses either by the errors of former ages, or the prevalence of such notions among the individuals constituting the auditory.—In such cases it is necessary to notice and refute them; but, in general, it is only necessary to bring forward the most extraordinary examples which prove the accuracy of an hypothesis, or those which are best adapted to illustrate, enforce, and establish, the truth of the propositions sought to be established. Locke's "Essay on the Human Understanding," Hume's "Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals," Butler's "Analogy," James Mill's "Analysis of the Human Mind," Brown's "Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind," Knight's "Principles of Taste," and Cairn's "Moral Freedom," contain the best specimens of Philosophical Analysis which have come under our notice, so far as we at present remember. When we wish to convey information in the didactic style,—to explain any science or system of science, to those who are unacquainted with such speculations,—to shew the general principles which pervade nature, and the laws from which particulars flow,—we generally employ the Synthetic method, and exhibit the general truths or comprehensive propositions in which are wrapped up, or involved, the rational explanations of individual facts. The question of the relative advantages of Synthesis and Analysis for the purposes of communication, has been thus strongly put by Priestley." Is it not much readier to take the right key at first, and open a number of locks, than to begin with examining the locks and after trying several keys that will open one or two of them only, at last to produce that which will open them all."‡ Hartley's "Observations on man," Godwin's "Political Justice," Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," Comte's "*Philosophie Positive*,"

* Vol II, p. 406.

† In proof of this see "Life of Kepler," or in default of this "Whewell's History of the Inductive Sciences," Book V.

‡ Priestley's Works Vol. xxiii. p 267.

Buffier's "*Premières Vérités*," Stoddarts "Universal Grammar," and Whateley's "Logic," contain some of the most valuable specimens of Synthetic argumentation which we can at present recollect.

"Neither of these two *Methods* should be too scrupulously pursued, either in the invention or communication of knowledge. It is enough if the order of nature be but observed in making the knowledge of things following, depend on the knowledge of things which go before; oftentimes a mixed method will be found most effectual for these purposes; and indeed a wise and judicious prospect of our main end and design, must regulate all method whatsoever."*

The following are the chief rules which ought to be attended to in the communication of knowledge.

I. So dispose the materials of discourse that they will impinge upon and affect the most usual and the most influential laws of suggestion.

II. Explain the terms to be employed so as to free them from any ambiguity.

III. State the question or subject of inquiry and separate it from any adventitious circumstances.

IV. Enumerate the several points which shall come under discussion as proofs of the point at issue.

V. Mention and consider these several points in such an order that the determination of one may lead by an easy transition to the proving of the others.

VI. All the arguments relating to one topic should be taken up while considering that topic, and ought not to be introduced at random.

VII. Objections should be honestly met, candidly dealt with, and never evaded.

VIII. Subordinate and doubtful points ought carefully to be distinguished from those which are essential.

IX. Objections and difficulties should be carefully balanced; and if in equipoise, either suspend the judgment, or give the decision on the side of virtue, morality, justice, and religion.

We have purposely abstained from treating these points more fully, as they fall more completely under the province of "*Rhetoric*," and shall at a future period be more elaborately discoursed about; meanwhile,

"My task is done:

The torch shall be extinguished which hath lit
My midnight lamp;—and what is writ is writ;—
WOULD IT WERE WORTHIER!"

ADDRESS TO THE READER.

GENTLE READER,—A word with you before we part. It is fitting that you, who have witnessed the gradual erection of the edifice, should know the design which regulated its construction. In looking at the works on Logic now generally read, we observed that they constituted two great classes,—1st. Those which were strictly formal in

*Watts's "Logic," Par. iv., Chap. I, p. 166.

their character, and which, consequently, appeared to the general reader tedious, precise, dry, dull, and uninviting. 2nd. Those which, aiming at popularity, overstepped the legitimate bounds of the science—denuded it of its rigidly-formal and abstract nature—spread their observations over a widely-discursive field—and thus, by their very vagueness and indefiniteness, rendered their precepts vain, nugatory, unmeaning, and impracticable. No one appeared to me sufficiently adapted, in manner and in matter, to the spirit of “the age in which we live.” To write a Logic which would be the *synthesis* of these—which would be popular in its method of exposition, without abating “one jot or tittle” of that abstract and formal austerity which science invariably assumes—was the aim of the Author. In this work I have not *affected* originality—as the number of my quotations and references will show—but I should not like it to be understood, from this, that I consider there is nothing in it which may be so denominated. Those who are accustomed to such speculations will readily perceive the points of divergence from the usual course pursued by Logical writers. I have made no scruple in differing, occasionally, from men highly renowned in philosophical pursuits; and did I not believe that the attainment of Truth, on these topics, was the most ardent desire of their soul, I might be tempted to apologize for intruding the *adversaria* of an anonymous writer, upon such speculations, on the notice of the public. I am very far, indeed, from asserting that the execution of the task which I undertook, has reached the excellence of my ideal of such a work. It is one thing to plan, another to execute. How can it be otherwise? The plan rises before the mind’s eye, captivating by its beauty and originality; takes no account of the frequent falterings which one must feel in essaying an untried path, allows nothing for interruptions from sickness, sorrow, or fatiguing professional pursuits, takes not within its ken the contingencies of life, the occasional procrastination in which the mind *will* indulge, and the disadvantages which distance from the press, disjunctness of publication, and the imperative demands of the printer’s familiar, may concur in producing. All these several points I am able to plead in excuse of the many imperfections and blemishes, “the faults of omission and commission,” with which this literary effort is chargeable. How far I have succeeded the public *will* judge—how far I have fallen below my own estimate, none *can* know. That it has been so far successful in meeting “the wants of the time,” the favourable notices which, unsolicited, the newspaper press has bestowed on it, as well as the frequent receipt of congratulatory letters from private individuals—some of them of considerable standing in the literary world—abundantly testify. To those who have thus encouraged me—who strengthened my heart to proceed—I owe a debt of gratitude. And to you, gentle reader, for your patience and forbearance, how much am I indebted? I can assure you that, in saying “Farewell,” I feel with Lord Byron, that it is “a word which makes us linger.” But we hope to meet again when the new year, with joyous face, comes round. Till which time, I pray you permit me to bid you—Adieu.

Yours sincerely,

THE AUTHOR OF “THE ART OF REASONING.”

Religion.

DOES THE DIVINE TRINITY OF FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT, EXIST IN THE PERSON OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

No paper on this subject is inserted in the November number of the *British Controversialist*. It is certainly far from being exhausted; but from that omission it is concluded that the discussion is not likely to be prolonged. I, therefore, forward a reply to those two articles on the negative side, which have appeared since my previous communication.

I am pleased with the general tone of those productions, though I am not satisfied with their arguments. I hope, therefore, that we are in similarities of charity, whatever may be our differences of faith: for, after all, it is charity that saves, faith only points out the way.

Those papers have evidently arisen out of two conflicting sets of religious sentiments, though, from the character of their advocacy, I venture to infer that neither of them are held with great stringency. The thinking by which they have been produced, seems to be the result of habit and association, rather than of conviction and certainty. It is, however, with the arguments that I have to do. These I shall take up in the order in which I find them, and first, those of the Tripersonalist. He opens his communication with an apology for the mysteriousness of his doctrine. I had held that the very circumstance of Tripersonalism not being within the bounds of comprehension, was a "presumption against its truth, and a *certain evidence that it is received in blindness.*" The first portion of this citation is attempted to be replied to, but the latter, which is now italicized, is left entirely untouched: and the idea thereby indicated I again, respectfully, urge upon the attention of the reader. If he professes to believe the Tripersonal doctrine, sees its paradoxes, and does not understand them,—does he not receive it blindness?

N n

But I am asked whether I "maintain that every doctrine which cannot be *fully* understood, is untruthful, or that this is a presumptive proof that it is so?" Now I have not said anything about *every* doctrine, nor uttered a single idea respecting *fully* understanding any. What I said was in specific reference to the doctrine commonly received respecting "three Persons in one God," and the truth of it so applied, I do maintain. I say that the paradoxes, contradictions, difficulties, and absurd consequences, to which the authorized statements of that doctrine lead, are evidences on which its untruthfulness may with the utmost fairness be presumed. But will J. M. S. take the converse of his proposition? Will he "maintain that every doctrine which cannot be *fully* understood," is true, or a presumptive proof that it is so? If he will do so, he is a most extraordinary reasoner, and if not he has no alternative but to concede the accuracy of my statement.

I am told that "true doctrines are facts in statement." This may be a correct definition; but on this I am asked whether I dispute all facts that I cannot fully understand? My reply is that I cannot know any statement to be a fact, unless it comes to my understanding with some amount of reasonable credence, or consistent probability. Take for instance the "surmised existence of a central sun." This may or may not be a fact: but so long as it, like the doctrine of three persons in one God, is universally confessed to be incomprehensible,—so long as its light is withheld from human eyes,—so long as the evidence on which the conjecture rests was contradictory, I should most certainly dispute its truth. The circumstance that consistent and intelligible evidence could not be produced for any opinion, would be, f

me, sound and honest credentials for disputing it.

But I am again asked "how far I understood the nature of the vital principle." I understand that it exists, because I have evidence of it in the thousand forms in which it is developed. But if I do not understand anything about its *nature*, that is a reason why I should not believe anything about its *nature*. Does my friend believe any thing respecting the *nature* of the vital principle? if he does, he surely must have some reason, or understanding, or evidence for such a belief; if he has not some such testimony, I will venture to predict that he has no faith respecting it. Again, it is asked how far I understand "the difference between the essence of animal and vegetable life?" I understand that the essence of both animal and vegetable life must be the same in its origin, because there are sound reasons for believing that there is only one source of life, who is the Lord and Giver of it, and in whom, and from whom, all things "live, and move, and have their being." From these grounds I understand that there is no essential difference between animal and vegetable life; and that the difference observable is not in the essential life, but in the difference of the respective forms adapted for its reception. This, and also the "mode in which mind acts upon matter, I understand, so far as I have any satisfactory information: my faith stops with the cessation of the evidence.

These questions were intended to insinuate that men are continually believing things generally confessed to be mysterious, and so to intimate that the mystery of three persons in one God, was only one of common phenomena. But this is a fallacy which has long prevailed. It is true there are numerous things in existence, the occult nature of which is very mysterious. The *why*, the *how*, the *wherefore*, of those existences, are not known, and therefore, nothing respecting the *why*, the *how*, and the *wherefore*, is believed; if any thing is believed respecting these things, it is because there is some satisfactory knowledge and consequent understanding of them. Again, then, we say that this mode of argument, by which apologists seek to render the Tripersonal scheme acceptable, is a common

fallacy. They are continually telling us that we believe many things which we cannot comprehend, and that therefore we ought not to reject the doctrine of three persons in one God, on that account. But the premises are not true. Every man who believes anything, has some ground or evidence, perceived by his understanding, and on which that belief rests. It may be that the evidences are weak, and the comprehension imperfect; if so, *that* also is the character of the belief, and this we hold to be the case in respect to the doctrine of three persons in one God; and, therefore, we dispute its truth.

The next point consists of a complaint against the use made of the word Person in this discussion. The word is not of our invention; it is the genuine produce of the Tripersonal school; but we are not inclined to take any undue advantage of its modern signification. Truth can afford to be generous; it wants no extraneous aid. We have no objection to any other term being employed, if Trinitarians will only clearly define the entity they mean by it.

We are next told that Tripersonalists "do not believe in three persons in the Divine Godhead subsisting separately by themselves, possessing distinct and specific natures, without co-existence in each other;" that is they do believe "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God, and yet there are not three Gods but one God:" *Athanasian Creed*. This is what our friend calls "representing the three subsistences as consistent with the unity of the Divine essence," and yet he concedes that they are "personal distinctions in the same Godhead." Thus he first asserts that "they do not believe three persons in the Divine Godhead to subsist separately by themselves," but that they are "personal distinctions existing in the same Godhead," thus they do not exist *separately* but *distinctly*! Really this is a remarkable explanation; but it is the natural consequence of a person's undertaking to explain what, after all, he confesses to be inexplicable.

The next point with which I have to do refers to the syllogism with which I attempted to demonstrate the sole Deity of Jesus Christ. I again repeat, because both

my opponents admit, that it contains some force. "If it can be shewn that Jesus Christ is God, and there is but one God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God." Let us notice the objections which are taken to it. It is argued that the Unitarian may prove his doctrine true by the same course. Thus he may say "If it can be shewn that the Divine Father is God, and that there is but God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God." And again, another party might say "If it can be shewn that the Holy Ghost is God, and that there is but one God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God:" and then I am asked if I "maintain the force of the syllogism, in the form No. 1, on what principle I can object to it in Nos. 2 and 3." My friend says, "he waits to learn." I will endeavour to inform him.

In each case the conclusion to which the syllogism leads, is equally good; but then the premises are not equally true. I should not complain of the reasoning if it were placed in any other form—thus, for instance:—If it can be shown that Aaron is God, and that there is but one God, as the Scriptures affirm, then it will follow that he is the only God. This, I maintain, is sound reasoning from the premises; but as the premises cannot be shown, the conclusion is necessarily false. And so with regard to syllogisms Nos. 2 and 3. I hold, and so does the writer of the paper to which I am replying, that it cannot be proven that the Being called "the Father," is God out of the glorified person of Jesus Christ; neither can the Being called "the Holy Ghost," be shown to be God out of the glorified person of Jesus Christ. These things, we say, cannot be shown, if the New Testament revelation of God be taken as the supreme witness. The premises, therefore, of syllogisms Nos. 2 and 3, are not good, and, consequently, the conclusions are not true. But the premise of No. 1 is true. It can be shown that Jesus Christ is God, that the Father as the Divine Essence is in him, and the Holy Spirit as the Divine Influence is from him; and, thus, that "in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily,"—the premise of the syllogism

being proven, the truth of its conclusion is irresistible.

The next paragraph contains another attempt to apologize for the admitted difficulties of Tripersonalism, by intimating that few religions, or ethical opinions, are free from them. I shall not, however, dwell on this point further than to observe that, if such is the case, it only shows that those opinions have been formed without sufficient evidence and comprehension; and, consequently, that such a fact is no reason why the most important doctrine of Revelation should be placed, or, if placed, remain in, the same unsatisfactory position. But this is followed up with the assertion, that the doctrine I have maintained respecting the Trinity being a Trinity of essential principles, is not without its difficulties. "Thus," it is said, "according to the Triprincipiists, we have in our Lord's intercessory prayer with his disciples, the Humanity praying to the Divinity, that the Proceeding issuing from both might descend upon believers, and yet the Humanity was the Divinity itself." Now the whole force of this objection lies in the last sentence, which I have italicized, and that sentence is not true of the doctrine which I have advocated. It has never been held that the Humanity which prayed was the Divinity, and, therefore, the difficulty which J. M. S. thought he had discovered in my doctrine, is, in reality, a mere expletive of his own invention. It was the Humanity yet unglorified which so prayed, and so long as that process remained incomplete, so long intercessory prayers, and expressions of inferiority, were continued. And what other explanation can J. M. S., as a Trinitarian, offer of this subject? He must either abandon the Deity of Jesus Christ, or adopt those modes of reasoning which have now been indicated. He says, that those statements of inferiority prove that "Jesus Christ was not solely and exclusively God." Why does he say "solely and exclusively God?" Why does he not distinctly avow that they prove him to be no God at all? for this must be the meaning of such an argument, unless he means to say that he was a "part" of God, and thus to deny the Article which declares that he has *no parts*.

The fact is, those passages simply prov-

that the Humanity of which they are predicated was not God, and no one, so far as I am aware of, has ever contended that it was. When we say that Jesus Christ is solely and exclusively God, we mean Jesus Christ in his fully glorified Humanity and character;—He who declared He had “all power in heaven and on earth,” “in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily;” that “Christ” who, the Apostle says, “is over all, God blessed for ever.” (Rom. ix. 5.)

I now pass on to the paper of F. J. B. Some of the arguments I have already adduced, will also serve as an answer to some of the objections of this communication. For instance, those in which he contends, that Jesus is not God, from his prayers, &c., and that which he has urged against the syllogism, which, by a remarkable coincidence, is very similar to that of the preceding paper. His arguments, however, appear to be directed more against Tripersonalism, than against the doctrine which I have undertaken to defend. He admits that “if Jesus Christ is God in the full acceptance of the word, and if in God there be a Trinity, either of Persons or essential Principles, then it is clear that in the person of Jesus Christ this Trinity must exist.” He then lays aside the argument which refers this Trinity to essential principles, and taking the Trinitarian view he concludes on the supposed equality of each person, that each person must have a Trinity, and consequently, that there is a Trinity of Trinities. This is for Tripersonalists to consider, and not for me. He will hardly apply such reasoning to the doctrine that there is but one Divine Person, and that in Him there is a Divine Trinity of essentials, which may be illustrated by the human Trinity in man, namely soul, body, and their proceeding operation.

The chief difficulty with F. J. B. lies in the doctrine of Jesus Christ having had two natures, the Divine and Human. This is the Unitarian stumbling-block, and evidence of their existence is demanded. We think it is plainly indicated in most of the passages which he has himself produced; some of which are satisfactorily and lucidly explained in the affirmative paper of C. G.

But it is asked “who shall settle which passages refer to his humanity, and which to his Divinity?” Surely this can require little more than ordinary sagacity. All the passages in which are indicated his inferiority to the Father, and in which his sufferings, crucifixion, and death, are described, plainly refer to his Humanity,—his infirm humanity which was finally put away: while those in which he declares the Father to be in him, himself to be one with the Father, and that they who saw him saw the Father, refer, as plainly, to his Divine nature,—that nature which is the “same yesterday, to day, and for ever.”

It is conceded that the passages where he says “I and my Father are one,” “he that hath seen me hath seen the Father,” are a forcible testimony to the exclusive Deity of Jesus Christ; but it is said, to avoid its force, that it is not to be literally understood, and the reason assigned is, because he also said, “no man hath seen God at any time.” Now if the former passage is not to be literally understood, neither can the latter; for it is distinctly written that “Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and the seventy elders of Israel, saw the God of Israel,” Exod. xxiv. 9, 10. The Lord’s statement, therefore, is to be understood as referring to the essential nature of God. Whenever he has been seen, it has been by means of veils and coverings; and so when he said “he that hath seen me hath seen the Father,” the meaning is,—he that hath seen me hath seen the Father *manifested*. Thus the two passages are reconciled with the fact for which we contend, and the latter fully agrees with the statement of the apostle, that he was “God manifest in the flesh.”

The chief of the other difficulties of F. J. B. are urged against Tripersonalists. He thinks that the logic of my syllogism proves, that according to their view there must be “three *only* Gods.” This is a point for their consideration.

Thus, I have taken a rapid survey of the arguments which have been brought against the doctrine of Jesus Christ being the true and only God, and that in him there exists a Divine Trinity of essential principles, called the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. I have offered such proofs of this, as I have proceeded, as the nature of the argu-

ments which I had to rebut, would admit, consistent with the space that could be allowed. They are, however, far from being complete, they may, nevertheless, be useful. I believe the doctrine to be the sum and substance of what the Scriptures teach upon

this important subject, and, therefore, affectionately urge a pious, reflecting, and rational inquiry into its truth, by all those who are interested in the reception of genuine religion.

E. D. R.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

YOUR correspondent E. D. R. has made some remarks on my former article, which it may be right to notice, in order that the subject may be fairly brought before your numerous readers.

These remarks may be reduced to three classes:—1st, He seems to affirm that the doctrine of three persons in the Trinity cannot be proved from Holy Scripture; 2nd, that it should be rejected as a novelty, and a mystery; and 3rd, he attempts to refute the arguments brought against his system of a Trinity of principles.

He commences with a quotation from my article, wherein I observe that in reading the Scriptures we find mention made of three distinct persons, called the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that these propositions are capable of the most unanswerable proof drawn from the Word of God. He declares that not a single passage, from Genesis to Revelation, can be produced to prove this assertion. Well, let us see. I suppose it will be admitted by all parties that God the Father is a person, for to deny this would be only to confirm the atheistical declaration that "there is no God." Then, as it regards the Son, he is said to be the "express image of his Father's person." So if we take the language of prophecy we read, "unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given, and the government shall be on his shoulder, and he shall be called Wonderful, &c." Surely the subject of this prophecy must be a personal agent. Nor is the evidence less conclusive respecting the personality of the Holy Spirit, for "when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth; for he shall not speak of himself; but whatsoever he shall hear that shall he speak, and he will shew you things to come." John xvi, 13. I should be glad to learn what stronger language could be made use of to describe the nature and operations of a personal agent. As for the notion, that

we cannot depend on these personal pronouns, I will venture to say that the example which E. D. R. has produced would be the best answer to his own argument, for we read, "Jesus said, put up again thy sword into his place." From this it is inferred that the speaker is a person; oh, no! replies our objector, no more than the sword which is to be put into his sheath! Will E. D. R. assert that there is in that passage the same argument for the distinct personality of the sword, as there is for that of the Lord Jesus? But then it may be inquired, what proof have we that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not human or angelic persons? I answer that the former have attributes which can never be ascribed to any created being. The attributes, the works, and the glory of the Father are in the same sense, and to the same extent, ascribed to the Son and the Holy Spirit. I did not at first believe that E. D. R. really meant to rob the Father and Holy Spirit of their true and proper Deity! It seems then that the Arian seeks to escape all difficulty by denying the Divinity of the Son and Spirit, while the Swedenborgian would prefer settling the question by denying the distinct personality of the Father and the Holy Spirit. What then is the real question? The Father is called God, the Son is called God, and the Holy Ghost is called God. Each has the same Divine attributes ascribed to him; each is distinguished by personal qualities; each claims Divine honours, and yet the same Scriptures which teach these things, also affirm that the Deity is one. What then is the only conclusion at which I can arrive? I must either reject those statements of Holy Writ which describe the Trinity of persons, or the unity of essence; or I must take the orthodox view that the God of the Scriptures, although one in nature, in essence, in substance,—yet exists in a Trinity of persons. Is this view

then according to the Scriptures? We certainly believe it is. Does it of necessity involve a contradiction? We think not, except by misrepresentation. Is it unreasonable? That we cannot tell, unless our reason could grasp the *whole subject*; and if it could, then we should require no revelation at all.

Let me here notice an instance of misrepresentation, of which Trinitarians constantly complain. E. D. R. states that the Athanasian Creed expressly asserts that there are three distinct Gods, for the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God. Now here we have two things carefully concealed from the reader; *first*, that the creed declares nothing but what the Scriptures teach; for, of the Father the Psalmist asserts, "from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." Of the Son St. Paul declares, that "he is God over all, blessed for evermore," while Peter assures Ananias that in "lying to the Holy Ghost he had not lied unto men but unto God." What then has the creed said more than the Holy Scriptures? A second fact suppressed is, that the same creed immediately adds, "yet there are not three Gods but one God." Not a word of this however is stated in the article to which I refer. Let me ask E. D. R. whether he supposes the cause of truth can be really advanced by such methods as I have here enumerated?

We may now pass on,—*secondly*, to consider the objections urged by E. D. R. The first objection to the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is, that it is a human fabrication, unknown to the church until the third century. This is rather a singular argument from one who defends the doctrines of the *New Church*, so *new* indeed, that it dates back to about the year A.D. 1750! We must, however, rejoice that the question now assumes an historical form. Let us test our opponent's assertion. He will not object to the canon that "*a doctrine must exist before it can be opposed.*" We will then, take Praxeas, who lived A. D. 198. He denied that the Son and the Holy Ghost were distinct persons, and taught that they were modes or operations of the one Being called God. This notion was at once declared to be a heresy, and both Irenæus and Tertullian wrote against him, as teaching

that which was opposed to the catholic doctrine. Again, in A. D. 257, Sabellius undertook to shew that neither the Son, nor the Holy Spirit were distinct persons, and for teaching these novel and heretical opinions he was suspended by the Bishop of his diocese. So likewise, when Arius endeavoured to subvert the Deity of the Lord Jesus, he was condemned by the Council of Nice, in A. D. 325; and if any one will name a writer earlier than the above, who in *any* sense denied the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, I will promise to shew that such a writer was regarded by the great majority of Christians in that age, in precisely the same light as E. D. R. is regarded by the orthodox now; *i. e.*, as a sincere, though misguided opponent of the Scriptural and catholic faith. What! the doctrine of the Trinity a fabrication of the third century, or the dark ages? Impossible! The idea of opposing it startled the whole of the Christian Church, before the close of the second century. The doctrine is found in the benedictions of St. Paul, in the commission of the Apostles, and in the remarkable circumstances which attended the baptism of the Lord Jesus! I need not here insist on the fact that traces of this doctrine are found even in the Old Testament, but there is one passage so plain in itself, and so fearfully misunderstood, that it may be well to glance at it. I mean the words used at the creation, "let *us* make man in *our* image after *our* likeness." "I admit" remarks E. D. R. "that those pronouns do indicate a plurality of something pertaining to the Divine Being, but I see no necessity for concluding that something to be persons." But let E. D. R. take what follows. After the fall, "the Lord God said Behold the man is become as *one of us.*" That seems to indicate that this something must be persons. But E. D. R. argues that God cannot exist in a Trinity of persons, otherwise man made in his image must be three persons also. Let us try this course of reasoning. Man is made in the image of God, but God is an infinite, self-existing, eternal, all-perfect being; therefore man must be the same, *i. e.*, a God, or he cannot be made in the Divine image! Did E. D. R. never read St. Paul's comment on these words, in which the apostle expressly

teaches that it was in the *moral* image of God in which man was created?—"that ye put on the new man which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." It is in this careless and ignorant manner of treating divine subjects that not only are creeds made to appear ridiculous, but the Word of God is also made of none effect.

But a second objection is, that we demand a surrender of the reason, and it is asserted that "the very circumstance that it is not to be understood, is a strong presumption against its truth; and a certain evidence that it is received in blindness." But this mere flourish of words can have little force with those who recollect that a wide distinction was made between the real nature of the subject and the credence on which it must be received. Can the doctrine be distinctly stated in clear propositions? Is it supported by the word of the living God? Has it any practical value in the formation of the Christian character? Has it been held as a fundamental article of the one true faith, even from the days of the Apostles? Now, these are questions on which human reason not only may, but *must* be exercised, and when these things have been made out to the satisfaction of thousands, whose intellectual powers have been of the first order, then for a man to say I cannot *fully* comprehend all these matters, I cannot solve all the mysteries connected with them, and therefore I reject them—this is not reason but rebellion against the authority of God, and will, in the end, prove consummate folly. Let me suggest to our friend E. D. R., the conclusion of an able writer on this subject. "There is nothing peculiar to the doctrine of the Trinity, any thing near so perplexing as eternity is, and yet these gentlemen, who are for discarding mysteries, are forced to believe *that*. I know no remedy for these things, but an humble mind, a just sense of our ignorance in many things, and of our imperfect knowledge in all."*

But we must now consider *thirdly*, how E. D. R. deals with the arguments which were brought against his own system. My demand was obviously fair and just, *i. e.*, that it should be free from all difficulty or

mystery; that it should be based upon the clear statements of Holy Scripture. If it cannot claim and establish all these marks, then we had better remain satisfied with the good old-fashioned doctrine held by the orthodox churches. E. D. R. intimates that I have misrepresented this doctrine, and supposed that they held three persons; but afterwards considered them as three principles. Now I never wished to produce this impression. What I meant to assert was, that the peculiar manner in which these three persons are mentioned, renders any idea of three mere principles absolutely absurd. They are called the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. These terms are evidently taken from the relation which one man bears to another. If there be no similarity between these and human relationship; that is to say, if God be not called a Father, to express his relation to the Son, and if the Son be not thus spoken of to denote his relation to the Father, then language can have no real, no definite meaning. But if there be any resemblance to the relations existing between a human father and his son, then, as sure as the father and son are two distinct persons, so surely are God and his Son Jesus Christ two persons, and to reduce them to one person by this Trinity of principles is, to my own mind, as absurd as it would be to speak of a father, a son, and their collective action as one person! There seems no way of avoiding the thing here insisted on; for if there be no analogy between the Human and Divine relation of Father and Son, then why, in the name of common sense, are these terms so constantly employed? And if there be *any* such analogy, then does the absurdity to which I have referred, follow as a matter of strict logical sequence. Then, as it regards the Saviour praying to his Father, E. D. R. promises to explain all this. But he redeems this promise by charging us with holding Socinian views, and yet, strange to say, he admits that they, the Swedenborgians, hold similar sentiments respecting the Humanity of the Lord, and then follows the cool admission that their system has its difficulties, which are removed—how think you, gentle reader?—why by adopting the *same principles* which the Trinitarians maintain, and which this writer is labouring to subvert!

* Dr. Waterland's "Defence of Queries," p. 318.

So according to his own confession, Swedenborgians have difficulties as well as the Trinitarians, and to avoid them they adopt Socinian sentiments! But let us look our difficulties fairly in the face. The orthodox admit that "Christ was equal to the Father as touching the Godhead; but inferior to the Father as touching his manhood;" or, as St. Paul expresses the same truth, "for though he were a son (*i.e.*, of the same nature as the Father,) yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered." Heb. v. 8. On this ground we can explain the trials, the sorrows, and the prayers of the Son of Man. While a partaker of our humanity, and being prepared to become the future example of his people, what more natural or consistent than that he should offer up strong cries and tears unto him that was able to save him? Yet, if the Father and Son be only different names for the same person, then was Christ praying to himself, and answering himself, and returning thanks to himself; while the people must have thought that the Father in heaven was the object of prayer, and the source of help! E. D. R. then speaks of some infirmity which the Saviour derived from his mother, but that this was removed and supplied by a Humanity wholly derived from the Father. Now if language can have any meaning, will not this sentence prove that the Father and Son must be two distinct persons? The Son has a Humanity which is subject to infirmity; this he feels, this he prays against, this he obtains deliverance from; but from what source,—from whom are these things obtained? Why, from the Father. Here we find E. D. R. proving the very thing he undertook to refute; how singular, that such a writer should make so loud a boast of his reason! Then the case of a person is introduced who is passing through mental or spiritual sorrows, and such a one will often say, "why art thou cast down, O my soul, and why art thou disquieted within me?" What then is this intended to prove? Then when a son is seeking for advice or help from a kind and affectionate father, we need not suppose them to be two distinct persons, for a man will often talk to himself, or commune with his own heart!

But a few words on the subject of the

baptism of our blessed Lord. This I adduced as a proof of the existence of three persons in the Trinity. The voice from heaven cannot, I think, be mistaken; the personality of Christ cannot be denied at the moment he was receiving baptism; and why should not the Holy Spirit assume for a time the form of a dove, to represent his pure and peaceable nature, just as the Son appeared for a time in the form of a servant? Why should such an idea affect the sensitive mind of E. D. R. as a painful absurdity? But if it will be any relief to your correspondent I will take the Greek expression *ὡς ἐπετερεύων*, to denote the manner in which the Spirit descended to sanctify the Saviour, and open the new dispensation. But the most extraordinary part in the production of E. D. R. is the explanation which he gives of this passage. The only portion of it which is plain is not *true*, and the parts which *may* be true are so mysterious that I very much doubt whether the writer himself really understands them. He remarks that "the narrative describes a phenomenon that was perceptible to the Lord Jesus *only*. It was he *only* who saw the heavens opened; it was he *only* who saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and none but he heard the voice." Now it will only be necessary to contrast this *notion* with the direct testimony of John the Baptist. John, it will be remembered, is giving his reasons for believing that Jesus was the Messiah, "and John bare record saying, I saw the Spirit descending from heaven *like a dove*, and it abode upon him. And I knew him not, but he that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me—upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining on him, the same is he which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost: and I saw and bare record that this is the Son of God," John i. 32, 33, 34. Surely a mistake like this should put the readers of the *British Controversialist* on their guard against a writer who can thus make a narrative say anything he pleases, in favour of the doctrines of the *New Church*. As it regards the other portion of this learned exposition, I can only say that if E. D. R. is fortunate enough in persuading men never to believe until they can fully understand a doctrine, we need not fear for the progress

of his views. Men require plain and simple truth, and not elaborate quibbles, to shew that the word of God means the very opposite to what it says.

I can offer no apology even for the length of this article, because I believe the subject is worthy of the deepest consideration ; nor

can I offer any better wish on the behalf of E. D. R. than that he may be led to see the sin and folly of that system which is alike opposed to the reason of man, and the Word of God.

B. W.

History.

DID CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFY THE EXECUTION OF KING CHARLES I.?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

"Charles died a martyr,—not to the Church of England, as it is testified in the Rubric,—not to the people, as it was declared by him on the scaffold,—but to the right and perpetuity of tyrannic power in the kings of England."—*Right Hon. Sir James Mackintosh*.

"The question, then, is this, had Charles I. broken the fundamental laws of England? If there be any truth in any historian of any party, who has related the events of that reign, his conduct, from his accession, to the meeting of the Long Parliament, had been a continued source of oppression and treachery. * * * Posterity has estimated Charles's character from his death rather than from his life."—*Macaulay's Essays*, vol. 1, page 35 and 177.

"For those who demand what law could justify the trial of the King, this other question remains to be answered, Was the King any less bound than his subjects to observe the law solemnly assented to by himself and his predecessors? The King had rejected all government by law, the only means by which irresponsibility could be secured to him, and having striven in vain to trample on all law, its asserters saw no wrong in meting to him the same measure of justice that had been awarded to many of his abettors."—*Daniel Wilson, F.S.A.S.*

MR. EDITOR, Monarchs are subject to, and affected by, the same controlling influence and passions as mankind generally. They likewise inherit the same qualities, whether good or evil, and although they may be called upon to occupy positions, and to discharge duties, with which we are unacquainted, still they are in no manner changed in their moral character. It behoves them, therefore, to set examples to their subjects, of which they themselves may not be ashamed, and which, when tested by the

standard of truth and morality, may result in satisfactorily proving that they possess a share of those important attributes. Kings, with but few exceptions, have disregarded this rule, and have, as a necessary consequence, committed acts which they would have condemned in others had they stood in different positions, as being unsuited to a reasoning people, and as unworthy of a place in historical record.

These remarks are applicable to the subject before us, as seen in the career of Charles I. They are alike applicable to the historian, as it is on his evidence that the result of this discussion depends. What a melancholy picture is presented to the mind of him who contemplates the scenes between king, parliament, and people! Need I say that there is no period in history which will parallel the one before us. The period from 1625 to 1649 presents a continued series of conflicts, threatenings, imprisonments, civil commotion, &c. The sensitive reader's mind is hurt and distracted with the contests which occurred between despotism and liberty,—but the confused and rambling statements which historians have given,—the marvellous discrepancies, the falsehoods which they relate, together with the attempts to palm that off for truth which is a fabrication, and to defend those deeds at which an honest man would revolt,—are sufficient to make him distrust his own senses.

The foregoing observations apply more particularly to the historian of the period

referred to—viz., Hyde, Earl of Clarendon. He was a weak, licentious man, careless about the truth of the statements he recorded respecting the quarrels between King and Parliament. He was placed in a situation which would have been speedily denied him, if he resolved to publish statements condemning the policy of the King, or censuring the illegal measures which he pursued. In his official capacity he was employed by Charles as a spy, to inform him of the transactions which occurred in parliament,—so that as soon as any business had commenced, which had for its object the vindication of the law,—the protection of the interests of the people—or the reduction of the power of the Sovereign, it was instantaneously communicated by Hyde to the King, and the latter at once squashed it while only in embryo. This will be seen by Charles's hasty passage to the House on several occasions, either for the purpose of arresting the progress of the Commons, or by granting them something by which their design was to be baffled. To show that no reliance can safely be placed on his history, it only remains to be stated that he accuses Cromwell of being "ridiculous" and "contemptible," because he refused to join in licentious living. Although he pleaded in the strongest terms on behalf of the policy of Charles, and although he endeavoured to transmit a good character of that monarch, yet so disgusted was Charles II. with his character, and moreover with the commission of a deed, which will for ever be ineffaceably imprinted on his memory, that the latter (Charles II.) banished him the realm, and he died in France, (although prohibited from visiting that territory.) If such be the character of this historian, how can we expect truth from such a source? The result of Clarendon's slanders is, that a great proportion of the histories of the present day are copied from his work, with slight alterations, so as to impart to them a show of originality.

The first assertion which I would refute in the article of "Justitia," is that the parliament of Charles I. was niggardly in its

supplies. If "Justitia" had had the candour to relate the whole story, he would have discovered that the money which the Commons voted to the King was spent in a manner quite different from that for which it was voted. One instance will give an idea of the frauds he practised. I refer to the French Squadron. Sir J. Mackintosh says, "During the late reign (James's) an arrangement had been entered into for the hire of English vessels by the King of France, to be employed against *Genoa*, the common enemy of France and England. Charles, however, ordered the ships to proceed against *Rochelle*, where the Huguenots or French protestants resided. The sailors, on discovering the imposture, refused to proceed, and stated that they would rather return home to be hanged for disobedience, than fight against the protestants. The address in which the remonstrance was contained, was placed between the leaves of Charles's Bible so as to catch his eye. The defence he made was that he contemplated the employment of the English ships according to their original destination,—against *Genoa*. There is no instance in which his falsehood is more manifest than in this. After the design upon *Rochelle* became manifest and avowed, he sent Pennington his orders to place the squadron at the disposal of the French, and, if necessary, compel the obedience of the crew by extreme means,—"even to sinking." What can "Justitia" plead in answer to this grave charge? But how were the numberless grievances which the people suffered to be redressed? After so gross an invasion of their rights as those mentioned in my former paper, and repeated infringements of the law, by what bond of fidelity could Charles be controlled? Will "Justitia" answer the question? Another example of his treachery was shown by his violation of the Petition of Rights. That law he had promised to observe, and in return he obtained from parliament their thanks and a subsidy. He kept the subsidy, but broke the promise, and the parliament was thus left without any security from the King. Finding that the various illegal means which he employed to fill his coffers did not succeed, he had the hardihood and the effrontery to assure them that he only convened them in order to allow them an

* The extracts given in this paper are collected from unimpeachable sources, viz., "The King's Cabinet Opened," and the Archives of London, Oxford, Edinburgh, &c.

opportunity to grant him money, and that he should allow no business to proceed,—would receive no addresses,—hear no complaints,—redress no grievances, until they met his wishes. When these were satisfied, he treated them, as before, with the utmost scorn, and associated uncivil and unbecoming terms with the names of the popular leaders. Such conduct justly deserved the contempt of the Commons, and the latter acted in a proper manner in not yielding to the King's demands when a deaf ear was turned to their appeals, advice, and legislative transactions. If "Justitia" had made himself acquainted with the quarrels which ensued between the King and Parliament, he would not have been surprised that they were "niggardly."

The next accusation made by "Justitia" is, "That the Parliament constituted itself Charles's judge, and raised armies to battle against him." This is a monstrous perversion of the truth. If "Justitia" means that the Parliament was the first to appeal to arms, I deny it. I say this distinctly, but respectfully. On perusing the assertion a second time, I could not but think that there was a mistake on the side of the printer, or that "Justitia" had reversed the true order of the words. Had the sentence been, "Charles called another parliament, of which he constituted *himself* the judge, and *he* raised *armies* to battle against it," he would have been decidedly right. Let us suppose that the sentence is true, still "Justitia" has, by this single avowal, given indisputable evidence that he knows little about the subject. Any one acquainted with the facts will know that if the assertion be true, the words should be reversed, viz., "They raised armies to battle against him, and then constituted themselves his judges." According to my friend's theory, "They *first* judged him, and *then* battled against him." The injunction "Catch the bear before you sell his skin," has been evidently set at nought by "Justitia." Is it not much more probable that the Parliament having secured Charles, would then bring him to judgment? This appears to be the only sensible course, and the one which the Parliament adopted.

But I repudiate the allegation that the Parliament battled against Charles before

that monarch had set the example. Has "Justitia" forgotten the unwarrantable act which Charles committed when he endeavoured (with the assistance of 500 armed soldiers) to seize the persons of the five Members of the House of Commons? The Parliament, conscious that right and justice were enlisted on its side, refrained from retaliating. Even though invaded by the soldiery, headed by the King, still the Commons remained peaceable. What have those pedantic historians to say to this conciliatory, but wise and judicious, step of the Commons? What can they plead for the King, and what for themselves—when they are anxious to defend a rebellious monarch,—and to calumniate, slander, and vilify an intelligent, and honest body of representatives, who, conscious of their ability to govern, legislated nobly and fearlessly, unmindful of the threats of the King, or the terror of his courtiers? The second time that Charles raised the standard of war, was at Nottingham, and it was there that he appealed to the demagogue to come forward and to espouse the unrighteous cause of destroying a nation's liberties. Then it was, and not till then, that the Parliament, followed by the people of England, took up arms in self-defence, to protect their rights and liberty.

"Justitia" refers to the four propositions rejected by the King. I will give them, in order that my readers may see if there was anything in them unworthy of the acceptance of King Charles. They are as honorable in their provision, as they are to the party from whom they emanated. The proposals were—1. That a bill should pass for settling the militia of the Kingdom. 2. That all oaths, and declarations made against the Parliament and its adherents, should be rescinded. 3. That the Lords made by the *counterfeit* Great Seal at Oxford, (the Parliament which existed while one sat at Westminster,) should not be eligible to sit in the House of Peers thereby. 4. That the two Houses may have power to adjourn as they may think fit. Is there anything in the foregoing which the most sensitive king could reject with any show of reason? Charles would accept nothing which did not restore to him his ill-begotten power, his arrogant demands, and

boasted rights, honors, and dignity of the crown. "I can turn the scales which way I please," was his rejoinder, when the propositions were presented to him. Ashburton, one of his chief favorites, replied, "A crown so near lost, was never recovered on easier terms." The answer of Charles was characteristic of the man. The same haughty, proud, and imperious spirit ever dominant in his heart, was not disturbed by his fallen situation, and he possessed, unchanged, the high opinion of his judgment which he had received in his education. His fallen state affected him but little, and he imagined that although in the hands of the Parliament, his position was unaffected, and that nothing connected with the affairs of Government could be transacted unless "his sovereign will and pleasure" were first ascertained.

In justice to the Members of Parliament, whom "Justitia" has impeached, I will quote one authority to prove that they were well fitted for the important duty they were called upon to discharge. It is as follows:—"But a cause more powerful than all these,—a principle of higher order—animated the Commons of England in the first Parliament of Charles I. * * Public opinion was represented in the House of Commons by men whose public virtue and political genius would have qualified them to figure in the proudest senate of antiquity;—that noble growth of public men which was perpetuated in full vigour from the accession of Charles I. to the Restoration, and degenerated thence forward to the Revolution, when it became extinct. From the glory of their virtues, their talents, and their achievements, proceeds whatever of light and interest may be found in the succeeding pages. It may be proper to name a few of the leading patriots in the three short Parliaments, so abruptly and fatally dissolved by Charles in the first four years of his reign. Among them were, Sir John Elliot, Sir Edward Sandyor, Sir Dudley Digges, Sir Francis Seymour, Sir Robert Phillips, Sir Robert Collon, Selden, Pym. * * These men thus eminently endowed with the qualities of statesmanship, were further animated by zeal for the Protestant religion. * * They formed themselves into a compact, for defining and fixing the uncertain limits of

the prerogative, and guaranteeing by clear and strict legislature the precarious liberties of the people." The preceding acts of which Charles was the author, admit of no doubt that he was guilty of High Treason. It is a difficult task to discover in what relation the King stood with regard to law and justice, the parliament, and the people. Charles virtually destroyed the Constitution, set Magna Charta at defiance, and attempted to subvert the Rights of Englishmen. That there was *no* law by which he could be tried for these heinous crimes *cannot* be *denied*. So far I coincide with "Justitia," but *no* further. He denies that Charles's crimes merited that punishment; I, on the contrary, assert that the punishment by *no* means exceeded the offence. At the same time it must be admitted that no just and tangible cause can be shown why there should not be a law to meet particular and isolated cases, like the one before us. I repeat it, —Charles was guilty of High Treason; *this* the statute book *admits*, and *this* "Justitia" cannot deny. High Treason is defined to be "an offence committed against the *dignity* and *majesty* of the *Commonwealth*." The enormities I have related with reference to Charles, prove that there never was a king or queen of England who committed more flagrant and diabolical acts than those referred to. There was no prime minister after the death of Strafford. Charles assumed that position, and consequently made himself responsible for all misdeeds. He incurred, by so doing, the same risk of punishment as if he had acted under the advice of another.

A brief summary of what has been advanced will not be unimportant. I have endeavoured to show that Charles, from the commencement of his reign, endeavoured, by policy or by force, to establish an absolute and despotic sovereignty, in lieu of a free and limited government. He essayed to sweep away all vestiges of governing by law, and to destroy those enactments which secured to the people the right of nominating members to represent them in Parliament. He next laboured to deprive the House of Commons of those privileges which they possessed, and attempted to influence their debates either by his own speeches to them, or by deputy, both of which were

unlawful. He then determined to order the levy of unjust taxes. Finding by experience that the Commons were not to be duped by his promises, intimidated by his threats, or governed by his dictates, he dissolved them, and even while they sat he registered in the council book "that he did not acknowledge their jurisdiction." Reigning without Parliament, not being so successful in raising supplies as he desired, he convened other parliaments, and candidly assured them "that he had assembled them together to give them an opportunity to give him supplies, and that no business would be allowed to proceed till the aforesaid subsidies were given." Finding that the popular members were honourable, straightforward, and independent men,—he endeavoured to seize their persons by *force of arms*, (thus giving the first signal for war,) and took their documents, goods, and chattels. The Parliament still continuing as obstinate as usual to his demands, he counterfeited another Great Seal, convened another Parliament, (while the other remained at Westminster, transacting business,) created a number of *pseudo* peers, and in return for their advice, branded them with harsh, mean, and reproachful epithets. Thus guilty of holding an opposition Parliament, and becoming cognizant of the fact that he could not succeed in obtaining the gratification of his ambition, and also that the people were almost on the point of revolting against him, he sounded the tocsin of war for the second time, and after a series of battles he was reduced, and refusing to accede to the most favorable propositions, which his own friends considered as magnanimous offers on the side of the Parliament, he was tried as a traitor to the laws and constitution of England, condemned, and executed on the 30th of January, 1649. It is worthy of remark that a lineal descendant of Charles I., a peer, declared in the House of Lords that he would never attend church on the 30th January, because he thought that his ancestor had suffered justly.* Immediately on the rejection of the propositions, the Lords and Commons, by unanimous resolution, voted "that they would make no more addresses or applica-

tions to the King; that no person whatsoever should make address or application to him; that whosoever should break this order should incur the penalty of High Treason; that they would receive no more addresses from the King; and that no person should presume to bring any to either House, or any other person." The Lords (January 8th) resolved "that whosoever King of England shall hereafter levy war against the Parliament and people of England, shall be guilty of High Treason, to be tried in Parliament." (*Parl. Hist.*, 18th vol., p. 501.) The House of Commons resolved also, "that the vote of June 30th, 1648, (which concurred with the Lords, that the vote of January 3rd, 1647 forbidding that all addresses to or from the King be taken off,) was highly dishonorable to the proceedings of Parliament and destructive to the good of the kingdom." The Lords voted on the same day, "to make no more addresses to the King, and that the revocation of the votes about non-addresses, and that the vote of July 28, 1648, for a treaty with the King, were highly dishonorable, and destructive to the good of the nation." According to these votes, how could they justly regard him but as a criminal, liable to punishment, or at least as a prisoner of war, surrendered at discretion, and thus holding his life at the mere pleasure of the victors?

To maintain, therefore, that because there was no law applicable to the King he should be unpunished, is to maintain that monarchy should ride rampant and rough-shod over a progressive people, unpunished,—unmolested,—and uncontrolled. The cause of humanity denies that this should be the case, civilization revolts at it, and liberty, the birthright of Britons, would never be seen more were this to be the order of the day. While, therefore, I contend that the punishment which Charles suffered was just, I hold that life is sacred, and that it is not the jurisdiction of man to take that which he cannot give. The sentence which was carried into effect upon Charles, I uphold only so far as this,—that it was justified by the deeds which he committed. I believe that it was expedient to take his life, for, had he been exiled, he would not have failed to obtain all the aid possible to recover his

* Burton's Cromwellian Diary, vol. 1.

lost possessions. Bloodshed would have followed ; a second and a fiercer revolution would have been the result ; famine, destruction, poverty, and death, would have completed the scene by the irrevocable destruction of England. Taking these premises into consideration, I believe that the policy pursued by the Parliament (although necessarily harassing and disagreeable) was the most suitable for the emergency, and that it was calculated to avert those evils to which I have just referred.

I have now discharged an unpleasant duty,—that of laying before my readers an epitome of the life and career of King Charles the First. I have not shrunk from exposing his misdeeds, nor the motives which prompted him to commit them. I am aware that many of his acts may be at-

tributed to his nature, education, and the peculiar character of the times in which he lived. While some extenuation is made for Charles, let us not grudge it to those to whom he was opposed, for they too were influenced by the same controlling power. Doubtless there were faults on both sides, grave and serious ones. Let us hope that neither party was so culpable as it has been represented. A rigid inquiry into history, and a strict investigation into documentary evidence, will alone determine which party was the most reprehensible. Truth *will* develop itself, and expose falsehood, for TRUTH, and not VICTORY, is the aim of the historian, and TRUTH is the Daughter of TIME.

J. G. R.

Cheetham, Manchester.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

THAT size is not an infallible indication of power, will be admitted by all our readers ; and if they would see a striking illustration of it, we would refer them to the two Historical papers in the last number of this magazine, where J. G. R. occupies four and a half pages in proving just nothing ; and "Justitia," in less than two pages, establishes several propositions which we apprehend our *Cheat 'um* friend will find it difficult to overthrow. It should be distinctly understood, that the subject of debate is not whether Charles I. was a wise or foolish king—a good or bad man ; but whether circumstances justified his execution. Few, we apprehend, will attempt to justify every step which he took ; and none, perhaps, will admire the course that he adopted ; and yet many will deprecate the end which he suffered. He might entertain monstrous ideas about "divine right ;" but these had been instilled into his mind by others, and were generally prevalent in that age. He might be led, as he thought, in self-defence, to commit acts contrary to the laws and constitution of these realms ; but then, he had been taught that "a king can do no wrong," and this he firmly believed. Nor was this belief confined to himself : it had long been held by the common people, and was only now beginning to give way ;

and who wonders to find that its stronghold in the king's heart remained unshaken ? especially when we remember that that king was the only son of the pedantic James I., and proved himself "a worthy son of an unworthy sire."

It is singular that, although J. G. R. is fond of narrating some of the circumstances which preceded the execution of Charles I., he does not attempt to estimate their natural effect upon the character and conduct of the king. He appears to forget that Charles succeeded to a crown whose prerogatives had been largely asserted, and seldom disputed ; to a scanty revenue, and to a popular but expensive war, in no way honourable to the nation, in its cause or conduct. The history of his reign is that of a series of errors and faults on all sides, so that an impartial spectator would have been perplexed to decide whether the king and his ministers, or the parliament and the army, were the most reprehensible, or which party had given the greatest provocation, and thereby afforded most excuse for the conduct of the other.

It should be borne in mind, that though the system of Charles's administration was arbitrary, the revenue which he raised by extraordinary means was not greater than what would have been readily granted him in the ordinary course of government : it

was not squandered away, but applied in a manner suitable to the interests and honour of the kingdom, which, for twelve years, in the words of Lord Clarendon, "enjoyed the greatest calm and the fullest measure of felicity that any people, in any age, for so long time together, have been blessed with, to the wonder and envy of all the other parts of Christendom."

That Charles was influenced by a sincere though mistaken conviction of the rectitude of his course, appears evident from many documents which he left behind him. And perhaps we may be permitted to quote from one of his letters, as so much has been made, in late years, of the letters of his great antagonist, Cromwell. In writing to Prince Rupert, during the progress of the civil wars, he says: "I cannot flatter myself with expectations of good success more than this, *to end my days with honour and a good conscience*; which obliges me to continue my endeavours, as not despairing that God may, in due time, avenge his own cause. Though I must avow to all my friends, that he that will stay with me at this time, must expect, and resolve either to die for a good cause, or, which is worse, to live as miserable in the maintaining it as the violence of insulting rebels can make him."

Surely they who are so loud in the condemnation of the king ought not to pass by in silence the conduct of the parliament; for they adopted towards him a course of conduct similar to the one he unfortunately pursued towards them. "One of the most unpopular acts of the king had been the levying of ship-money without the consent of parliament,—an impost then only of doubtful legality, yet equally levied, excellently applied, and so light in itself that the payment which Hampden honourably disputed was only *twenty shillings upon an estate of £500 a year*. The parliament did not scruple without consent of the king to demand the twentieth part of every man's

property in London, or so much as their seditious mayor, and three other persons, as seditious as himself, might be pleased to call a twentieth part, to be levied by distress if the parties refused payment: and if the distress did not cover the assessment, then the defaulter was to be imprisoned where and so long as a committee of the House of Commons should think proper; and his family was no longer to remain in London, or the suburbs, or the adjoining counties. With an impudence of slander which would be incredible, if anything which would serve their purpose were too bad to be believed of thoroughly factious men, they accused the king of exciting the massacre in Ireland, and fomenting the rebellion there; and they themselves employed the money and the means which were prepared for quelling the rebellion in carrying on a war against the king at home."*

If, then, these things were so, may we not presume that those who defend the execution of Charles I., would also have defended the execution of the parliamentary leaders, had that taken place? We do them the honour to believe that they are the friends of *equal justice*, and that they would not tolerate crimes in subjects which they would condemn in kings. But if they shrink from a conclusion to which their own opinions would lead them, they ought to abandon those opinions as erroneous, and seek others more consonant with truth and righteousness; and such, we venture to affirm, are contained in the paper of "*Justitia*." His two simple, but incontrovertible, propositions, viz., that the execution was—1st, Contrary to the laws, and 2nd, Unsanctioned by the people—must, in our humble judgment, for ever settle the question; and we rejoice that they settle it in favour of humanity and the sacredness of human life.

L. G. G.

* "*Quarterly Review*," vol. xxv., p. 296.

I give you leave (says Erasmus) to adopt war, if it shall not appear, on a fair calculation, that you are in pursuit of an uncertain profit, at a certain loss not to be estimated; in pursuit of a profit, not only less in amount than the certain loss, but also doubtful whether it will ever be obtained at all.

Politics.

IS IT DESIRABLE THAT THE REVENUE OF THIS COUNTRY SHOULD BE RAISED ON A SYSTEM OF INDIRECT TAXATION?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

OF modern sciences, the most universally important is Political Economy. But till of late years, its progress has not nearly been commensurate with its merits. One consequence, however, of its principles becoming known beyond the politician's closet, is a wide-spread appreciation of their truth; but even yet, the popular mind is more sensibly affected by the popular "pocket," than by all the treatises and doctrines of Adam Smith and his followers combined. Thus, Free Trade has been rendered more than abstract theory; and *Taration* bids fair, in a short time, to attain the nearest practical conformity to political justice.

Advocating Indirect Taxation, we yet look upon the tax controversy as indicative, not merely of the faults and inconsistencies of the present system, but of an accession of spirit and numbers to fiscal reformers. That the agitation will be popular and keen, may be inferred from the question coming, as we have said, so close to "men's business and bosoms." There are two sides to the question, however, and it would be well for the British tax-payer to hesitate before allowing a too headlong desire of change to put his liberty, his convenience, and his money, at a disproportionate hazard.

Political reformers are divided as to the most suitable mode of Taxation. Agreeing, necessarily, that taxation ought to be derived from revenue or income—that it should not press heavily upon capital or industry—that its imposition should be *equal, certain, convenient, light, and economical*—the two sections of fiscal reformers yet differ as to the manner of assessment. Confessedly, the Direct system would be the most just, and, therefore, the most *desirable*, could it be conformed in practice to the above fundamental requisites. C. W., Jun., has already pointed out where, apparently, (not *really*, as shall be afterwards shown,) the

Indirect mode of assessment, at present in use, is inconsistent with the just principles of imposition; and his opponent, L. I., has performed, and more successfully, a similar duty with the system of Direct Taxation. While the latter supports Indirect Taxation as the best substitute for an impracticable theory of Direct assessment, the former, on the contrary, scouts the Indirect mode as "inexpedient," but without showing how a system of purely Direct Taxation is to work advantageously. Both systems appear faulty in operation; but while Indirect assessment is comparatively reformable, Direct Taxes seem entirely beyond fiscal equalization or political justice.

Looking to antecedents, there has been no plan of Direct Taxation in this country, as yet, but what has been a signal failure. In 1798, in the heat of an intense European war, when Britain maintained, almost single-handed, the war against France, the first Direct Tax upon income was imposed. An extraordinary imposition, the birth of a great exigency, it created along with it extraordinary evasions. As with Indirect assessment, the fair tax payer must be protected; so the new system brought along with it an intricate commissariat machinery for eliciting fair disclosures. In each county and town, commissioners were appointed, who, assisted by surveyors, &c., had the power of instituting rigorous and minute investigations into the private affairs of individuals. Although the tax was grossly inquisitorial, yet from the duties of commissioners being performed leniently, the interests of the honest tax payer were sacrificed to the *liberty* of the equivocating trader. In 1802, the first peace thereafter, Direct Taxation was repealed; but in the succeeding year, with a renewal of the war, there came a renewal of the "Property Tax." By this tax, small incomes were heavier rated than large—annual incomes

of £60 paying 3*d.* per £1.; every succeeding £10, 1*d.*; up to £150, which paid one-fifth! This tax, it is true, brought an accession to the revenue; but the increase was purchased by an assessment operating in direct opposition to the four maxims of Adam Smith. Unequal, arbitrary, inconvenient, heavy, and uneconomical, the Direct Tax of Mr. Pitt was tolerated in a great emergency; but, had the commissariat duties been fully and honestly discharged, a tax rebellion would have been a likelier result than complete equalization. And the existing "Income Tax" is no less a failure; since a large amount of income, not reached, although nominally assessed, by the direct method, is taxed by an Indirect imposition upon articles of enjoyment. Those curious as to how the Income Tax Commissioners' duties are discharged, will find, from recent disclosures before a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry, that numerous well-known cases of gross evasion have wilfully been allowed to pass, even after troublesome investigations into private concerns. Can C. W., Jun., therefore, tell us how income, so successfully saved from the pocket of the State, would be assessed were his so-called "inexpedient" mode of Indirect Taxation entirely repealed?

The only practicable basis of a Direct Tax, is a rate proportioned to the net incomes of individuals, or the net produce of land. But, as acutely shown by L. I., individual income is not always a criterion of tax-paying ability; for the annuitant and professional man are so circumstanced, that, though of equal income with individuals whose property is permanently invested, and though, therefore, rated equally, yet the circulating capital of the one, (his annuity,) and the fixed capital of the other, (his industry and skill,) would be most inequitably taxed. And with the net produce of land, such a rate would be as manifestly unjust. When a landlord is taxed, it ought only to be as *owner of land*; when in his capacity of *producer*, *i. e.*, as an investor of capital on buildings, improvements, drainage, &c., he ought to be exempt from taxation. Tax him as a producer, and the means of production would be contracted, the price of labour and food would be heightened, and the consumer

would be the severest sufferer. The landlord, when taxed for his rent proper, *i. e.*, the sum given him for the use of the soil, is assessed as proprietor of the land; when taxed for the interest of capital expended on improvements, &c., he is taxed in his capacity of producer. But how are these two items to be separated from the gross rent of the land? Further, when the soils of two landlords bringing the same income, and equally rated, are disproportionately favoured by nature—the one barren, and engrossing much capital, the other fruitful, and requiring little or no outlay—the laws of fair competition are violated. But how can a Direct Tax be so framed as completely to avoid this injustice?

We thus see that, according to its fairest manner of imposition, a Direct Tax is dissonant with equity. Looking at the tax in its most favourable aspect, its advantages are small and very questionable. C. W., Jun., asserts, that were Direct substituted for Indirect Taxation, the nation would be benefited economically to the extent, annually, of "a million and a-half." But here we are not enlightened as to how it can be accomplished. Were we to abolish, at one swoop, the Customs and Excise of 'his country,—for that course a purely Direct Taxation requires,—and tax the subject at once, his net income being the arbitrary test of ability, we should fly to inequalities already experienced, and to "others that we know not of."

Before concluding, we will briefly examine the Indirect system of Taxation. This system is so devised, that the incomes of individuals may be assessed indirectly, by the imposition of duties upon those articles of enjoyment, which may be employed or consumed for either use or luxury by the subject. It is a tax upon expenditure. That this mode is the most advantageous is apparent, when we recollect that in civilized society individual expenditure keeps pace with individual income. The miser, who hoards his gold, and gives it no opportunity of accumulating, by aiding the great work of production, must be a compound of idiocy and insanity. A philosopher once asked—

"High-built abundance, heap on heap, for what?"

and answered—

“To breed new wants, and beggar us the more.”

And to the same question the British taxpayer, Indirectly assessed, may well give the same answer. Indirect Taxation, however, is only in its infancy of reform; and were reformation more studied than revolution, would speedily be more acceptable to the taxative burden-bearer.

Minor inequalities yet exist in the working of the present Indirect system; and C. W. Jun., has set them prominently forward. “Minor inequalities” we call them, for the fire insurance duty, as a tax upon “prudence and forethought,” stands insignificantly beside the oppressive burdens upon professional industry and skill, resulting from Direct Taxation. And the so-called “encouragement of illicit and contraband dealing” in commodities, is more insignificant still, besides a numerous, high-standing race of conscience-selling, perjured men, the necessary fruit of a tax inquisition. But does not C. W., Jun., blunder, when he characterizes an Indirect Tax as *uncertain*? A knowledge by the tax payer of the time and manner of payment, and amount to be paid, is what constitutes a certain and unarbitrary tax. Now with an Indirect Tax, the time and manner of payment is a *voluntary* effort of the tax payer. When he purchases a commodity, it is of his own will, and, therefore, the time and manner, being a self-dictation, the tax can only be paid with a clear knowledge that it is so. Can the time and manner of paying a tax be more unarbitrary or certain? Again, as to the *amount* to be paid, C. W., Jun., gives examples which, while proving that sugar and tea are heavily taxed, show, at the same time, that the amount is of comparatively easy ascertainment. What can be more simple than to ascertain the tax upon a

commodity,—or what more easily calculated than the amount paid on its purchase? How different were the corn growers’ income directly taxed, so as to limit his means of production! How difficult, then, to calculate the consumer’s loss in the purchase of his bread!

But the great blunder of C. W., Jun., is confounding an *apparent* inequality with a *real*. He should know well that the money paid by the labourer in the purchase of commodities, and so Indirectly Taxed, is one form of Indirect assessment upon the moneyed class. The price of labour is regulated by the cost of the labourer’s subsistence, and, consequently, an Indirect Tax upon wages is drawn indirectly from the employer’s capital. If the labourer of 14s. a-week expends 13s. on food, clothing, and lodging, 4s. of which is absorbed in taxes, he is in no worse position than if receiving 9s., and untaxed. Thus, though the labourer may appear to be taxed to a third of his wages under the Indirect assessment, while the capitalist is assessed one-fourth, it is because, unlike the latter, the labourer has no surplus income to facilitate production or benefit the consumer. In reality, therefore, the argument of C. W., Jun., is neither valid nor sound.

In conclusion, we do not anticipate that the tax payer will accept of taxation so utterly opposed to the principles of equity, and so destructive of the liberty of the subject, as a Direct system. To accept such a system in lieu of Indirect Taxation, would be to purchase a *heavy* for a *light* tax; since though an increase of revenue to the State may follow a Direct levy, it still leaves much income untaxed. And, therefore, if buoyancy of trade, and political justice, is to be the study of fiscal reformers, we look to a unanimous affirmation of the *desirability* of Indirect Taxation.

R. L. G.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

SUBJECTS of great public interest can never suffer by being freely canvassed by that public whom they interest; indeed, they become strengthened thereby, because their several merits are more extensively known, while their imperfections are reme-

died or avoided. Therefore, in submitting the question of the comparative merits of Direct or Indirect Taxation to our readers, we did so under the full conviction that good, and not evil, would result; and that if we were correct in our views we should

meet with support; while if we were treading upon wrong ground, or had assumed incorrect premises, the "error of our ways" would be fully and fearlessly pointed out. Starting with such views, we had everything to hope, and nothing to fear; and, *en passant*, we may remark that, if all questions affecting the interests of the public were subjected to the ordeal of fair and candid *consideration* before some impartial tribunal, many of the evils which now afflict society might, to a great extent, be remedied, or, perhaps, altogether removed.

But to proceed. What is the result of the present inquiry? Two writers have entered the ranks against us—both of them treating the subject with intelligence, and, without doubt, actuated by the desire to arrive at conclusions founded upon truth. The first of these writers (L. I.) tells us fairly, and without disguise, that *Direct Taxation* is "theoretically the most perfect, but, *practically*, most difficult in its application or adaptation to the present position of society." This is a plain acknowledgment that the system we advocate is *correct in principle*,—the obstacle being to carry it out. Now we have heretofore led ourselves to believe that whatever is correct in principle is capable of being practically, and, more or less perfectly, realized. Trifling difficulties and *minor* considerations should never thwart us in carrying out that which is otherwise good and true. In this country, we have had many illustrations of the practical embodiment of principles which were "theoretically perfect," yet surrounded with every variety of difficulty in their attainment. Let one or two instances suffice. When the theory of *locomotion by steam* was first propounded, there were plenty ready to exclaim, and no doubt in earnest, "your theory is good, but how are you to carry it out? In order to the practical adaptation of steam locomotion a level surface is required, whereas our country is one continued hill and dale, and, therefore, however true the principle of steam locomotion may be, we must still make ourselves content with stage-coaches, because the new principle cannot be practically carried out." Well, notwithstanding all such objections, which then *seemed* reasonable, the theory

HAS been reduced to practice—hills have been levelled down—valleys filled up—and steam locomotion has now become a "great fact." One other, yet more striking, example. The theory of telegraphic communication with distant parts was discovered a few years since. The truthfulness of the principle was pretty generally admitted; yet there arose the objection, that "it must be limited in its practical application because of the intervention of oceans, which divide the countries and places with which communication is desired." However, the principle was good and true—it was theoretically perfect—and what is now the fact? A medium of telegraphic communication HAS been extended across the British Channel (upwards of twenty miles) to France, we are now within one instant's whisper of its capital, Paris! and, in a few weeks, we shall have completed a medium of communication with all the chief continental cities and ports from whence such communication is necessary or desirable. Aye, and but yet a little longer, and the great *Atlantic* itself shall be spanned by the thought-conducting medium of electricity! Wherefore, then, do we soften down our desires for that which is correct, because it may *seem* impracticable? Why is the cry of "impossible" ever raised, after what England and her sturdy sons *have* accomplished? Alike the sound and the meaning of the word should be banished from our vocabulary. That which is *true* is *possible*! That which is possible and desirable may, by energy, determination, and intelligence, be reduced to practice.

We dispose, then, of our "friendly opponent," L. I., by expressing our belief that, by a system of *Direct Taxation*, all the advantages to which he refers may be secured; while most, if not all, of the disadvantages which he apprehends may be obviated. We are glad that he has been able to discover no more serious objections than those stated.

With the next writer, J. N. F., we shall be likely to enter into protracted discussion, for he candidly says, "in writing in favour of *Indirect Taxation*, I am far from thinking it desirable that the whole of the revenue should be raised in that manner;" and he goes on to state his opinion, that

all *intoxicating commodities* and *luxuries* should be subjected to some imposts: the former with a view to limit the evil effects resulting from their too prevalent use—the latter, that those whose affluent circumstances enable them to indulge therein, may contribute some greater proportion to the maintenance of the State than their less wealthy neighbours. Now, with respect to the first proposition. If it were *certain* that increased immorality would result from the abolition of duty on intoxicating commodities, there would be ample grounds to induce us to “stop and consider.” We are, however, by no means sure that this would be the case. We have not space, here, to enter into any lengthy consideration of the motives or causes which lead men to acts of moral depravity. We surmise, however, that persons habitually giving way to depraved habits and tastes, seldom stop to “count the cost;” their desires must be gratified even at the certain risk of the starvation of their wives and families. Any considerations as to the probable effect of the changes we are speaking of, on characters so morally depraved, must be at random: our only hope would be that, by being enabled to satisfy their desires at a less cost, a greater surplus would be left for more worthy purposes. Happily such characters, however numerous, form but a small minority of our entire population; and, therefore, upon the principles of common fairness, the majority ought not to suffer because of the existence of such a minority. But the principle upon which we are advocating a system of *Direct Taxation* in preference to the present system of Indirect Taxation, with all its attendant evils, claims to be admitted to a standard far above mere pecuniary considerations. It claims to be one of those elements of reform which, if properly carried out, is destined to raise the moral tone and character of the whole people. It claims to be of that standard which seeks *JUSTICE* in the place of mere political expediency; and if the two cannot be combined, will make a firm stand for the former at all risks. It seeks to remove the evils which at present beset the world, by promoting sound education, rather than by placing restrictions upon commerce, which, at the least, make but a slight approach to

the desired end, and have no sound foundation to fall back upon. The only monetary consideration which we would admit into the question is, that the amount now annually wasted in raising the revenue, by reason of the present defective and complicated machinery, would be available for the purpose of forwarding the education of the people, and otherwise promoting their social comfort.

As to the question of a duty upon luxuries, we may differ in opinion from many. Confining ourselves principally to natural products, we look upon them as being sent by a bountiful Creator, alike for the use and enjoyment of ALL his creatures. Now what is the effect of a duty upon them? Why, that the less wealthy portion of the community, who have an equal right to them, are unable to obtain them by reason of the increased price. We hold, as a broad principle, that none of the natural or spontaneous productions of the earth should be taxed. Beyond the price necessary for producing them, nothing additional should be charged; then all parties, so far as the principle goes, would be on an equal footing: and this would tend, in some measure, to alleviate the keenness of poverty. Property will always command its full share of privileges and enjoyment; and it may, and should, be made, by *Direct means*, to contribute its full quantum of payment for the advantages it confers.

We shall not pursue the question further in its present form. L. G. G., in the last number, answered most of the points raised by our opponents, which we have not here referred to. We have only to add that we perceive, in the movements of society, and in the course of our every-day life, a determination to effect an adjustment in the matter of Taxation. It may be that the progress of this feeling is slow, but we predict that it is nevertheless sure, because it is earnest. In proof of this assertion, let us glance at the political movements of the past six or seven years. Taking for our starting point the abolition of the Bread Tax—a tax, by the way, (whatever were its claims on the score of policy,) coming within the pale of our condemnation, as being one upon natural produce. We have, next, the abolition of the Duty on Bricks—a matter

considerable of importance in relation to the improvement of the dwellings of the poor. This was followed by an alteration in the Stamp Duties, by means of which a great step was made in equalizing their pressure. And, lastly, we have a repeal of the Window Duty, which, in relation to our sanitary improvements and progress, is almost of incalculable advantage. Similar other, but minor changes, have been effected within the same period, all showing that the strong arm of Reform is potent, and destined to sweep away the systems which error and prejudice have founded, and build

up others upon the immutable foundations of justice and truth. That which has already been done is but an earnest of that which will be hereafter accomplished. At the next stroke of this mighty arm, we expect to see destroyed the Duties upon Paper and Advertisements, *alias*, the barriers to "education made easy." While the Duty on Fire Insurances, the Soap Duty, and many other similar annoyances, are awaiting the same certain fate.

We now close the question, pleased with the consideration which it has received.

C. W., Jun.

The Societies' Section.

ESSAY ON HISTORY.

Nor without philosophic accuracy, as well as exquisite grace of fancy, did the ancient Greeks, in those pleasing, beautiful, and wisdom-pregnant *mythi* by which they gratified the enthusiastic poet-feelings of their nature, and with which they have at once adorned and enriched the world's imaginative literature—fable that Mnemosyne—Memory—was the mother of the Muses, and that Clio—History—was their eldest sister; for although one could "speak with the tongue of angels," or with the volubility of "thousand-voiced Rumour," and yet had not *facts* as the basis of his narrative, then would the eloquence of the gifted fail, and the verbosity of the garrulous cease to interest. Even Fiction, to be pleasing or useful, must possess a seeming-actuality; how much more then is it necessary that History should be the record of the *real*? It must have truth for its basis, and human experience for its matter. "History," Says Victor Cousin "is a glorious poem, the drama or epopee of the human race." Schelling calls it "an Epic conceived in the Spirit of God; its two parts are the movement by which humanity leaves its centre, to expand to its utmost development, and the movement which effectuates the return. The former is the *Iliad* of History, the latter its *Odyssey*; the prior movement is centrifugal, the posterior centripetal." "History," remarks Alexis Montei, "is the narration of what *has been done*;" and Cicero eloquently describes it as "the testimony of time, the light of truth, the messenger of antiquity, and the school of life;" while Miss Strickland asserts, that "when truthfully told, and philosophically considered, it is the noblest school of Ethics, replete with moral teaching." It is a "descriptive catalogue" of the most brilliant achievements—the most renowned deeds of heroism—the most glorious instances of patriotism, and nation-benefiting self-sacrifice—the most honour-worthy trans-

actions, and the most illustrious examples of human virtue, as well as an abridged account of the basest perfidiousness and villany—the most sordid profligacy—the most infamous deeds of crime—the most despicable cowardice and fraud—and the most execrable instances of human folly, vice, depravity, and guilt, of which our world has been the theatre. It is at once the recorder of almost angel-virtues and nearly demon-crimes. On the same broad manuscript will be found detailed the magnanimous, fame-deserving, high and holy heroisms, nobilities, and upward aspirings of the human race, as well as the cunning intrigues, the diplomatic trickeries—the sinister springs of action, the court and cabinet duplicities—the subtle self-sophistries—the craftily-contrived enginery of fraud and mind-oppression—the impotent attempts of antiquated power to hold its gewgaw sceptre in its convulsive death grasp—the soul-debasing influences of vice, sloth, and sensuality;—and thus, with all the eloquence of truth-utterances, are we informed of the causes of the upward and onward tendencies of our race, at the same time that we have explained to us the germ-seeds of our misery and woe. In the same vast volume we can at once deary the glory-blazonments of virtue, and the dark hell-tints of criminality. Therein are detailed the principles of conduct,—the laws, the usages, the policy, the crimes, the miseries, the projects, the failures, and successes, which singly or conjoined, led the nations on to bless, or were the means of their decay. The rise, the progress, the culmination, "the decline and fall" of empires are described; the upsurgings of insurrection, the fierce brutalities of contentious war, the sad soul-apathy of the despot-ruled, are depicted; and the characters of the world's heroes, worthies, and demigods, her vice-stained and villainous earth-demons are graven with "an iron pen" in her many-topic'd

page. History is the mirror of man's progress, and the panorama of our world-life. In it we see the bygone ages, as in a telescope we can see the far-distant stars. It is the connecting link of the *long ago* with the *now*, as well as our road-guide for the *future*. It teaches us at once to grieve over errors done in "Time's youthful days"—to strive to rectify them in "the age we live in"—and look to the *to come* with such

"Hopes as even the angels might look on and bless."

Were we inclined to give the rein to our imagination we might fancy the muse of History driving

"Her pearly and pellucid car,

Through the midst of an immense concave
Radiant with million constellations, tinged
With shades of infinite colour,
And semicircled with a belt
Flashing incessant meteors."

and rapidly gaining upon swift-winged father Time, until she at length overtakes him, and with her sunniest smiles, wins the garrulous old man in his more communicative moods to reveal

"The secrets of the immeasurable past."

the reminiscences of his youthful years which we mistakenly imagine to have been mere "creeping centuries of sameness;" but which to us seem so, only because so many have been the strange and wondrous things which have passed before his eyes, that even his memory is confused, and he finds it difficult to steady before his mental vision the fleeting images of fact which, "with the mild magic of reflected light," ceaselessly depict their airy being to his gaze. But we have little leisure to expend in elaborating such an allegorical sketch, and therefore will not venture on the tempting labour. Let it suffice, at present, to conclude our introductory remarks on this topic with the wise words of Owen Feltham:—"History is the resurrection of past ages; it gives us the scenes of human life, that by their actings we may learn to correct and improve. What can be more profitable to man than by an easy change and a delightful entertainment, to make himself wise by the imitation of heroic virtues, or by the evitance (avoidance) of detected vices?—when the glorious actions of the worthiest treaders on the world's stage shall become our guide and conduct; and the errors that the weak have fallen into, shall be marked out to us as rocks that we ought to avoid. It is learning wisdom at the cost of others; and, what is rare, it makes a man the better for being pleased."

Hitherto we have however spoken of History in the ideal which we form of it, in the abstract, and without reference to the mode in which it has been executed through humanitarian agency. We are sorry that the same glowing panegyric which we have passed upon the muse and her labours cannot be unqualifiedly bestowed upon those whom she has gifted with her inspiration. History, as it has been generally written, has been too frequently stained with reprehensible factional and national partialities—has been too often made the vehicle of incorrect or distorted views,—has been too commonly disfigured either

infidel tendencies. Truth, candour, honesty, and accuracy, ought to be the characteristics of history; for by these alone is it distinguishable from fiction. But such is the weakness of the human mind, such the frailty which so easily besets it, that men are frequently biased in their views, while they are entirely ignorant of it, and often incorrect when they know not of it; for rash generalization, hasty acceptance of premises, illogical deduction, and indolence, are frequently too strongly rooted in our minds by habit to be readily detected, or easily rectified. In many cases, therefore, it is possible to err unwittingly; but it is to be feared that fancied interest leads to the distortion of facts, and to the suppression of the real motives of the actors in particular scenes, or the documents from which a true account of actions might be gleaned. We are glad however to observe that these error-sources will soon be invalidated; for as each party and nation is now possessed of men qualified to be their own historians, the person desirous of securing an impartial knowledge of the facts, will be able for himself to compare the differing statements, and thus *eclecticize* the Truth.

History* literally signifies a detail of facts ascertained by diligent research and ocular examination. In this sense it may be applied to the recital of any series of truths; and hence we may speak with strict accuracy of a "History of Animated Nature," a "History of English Literature," a "History of Philosophy," a "History of Astronomical Discoveries," &c., as well as a "History of Greece, Rome, British India," &c. But though these are all legitimate uses of the term, yet in its more usual acceptance it is employed to designate a general view of the occurrences which have marked the several phases of human life, in its various sociarian combinations. The origin, progress, and decline of nations—the emigrations and immigrations of races—the most interesting events which have happened in each commonwealth—the actions of the most renowned of their inhabitants—the various relations in which the several states of the earth stood to each other—the several great questions which agitated or stimulated society—the principles or passions which actuated each political community—the manners, customs, laws, usages, &c., of the nations—the most distinguishing characteristics of their several peoples—the mutual action and reaction of each state upon the other, whether beneficially or injuriously—the progress and state of science, literature, and art amongst them, arranged in such a manner as shall impress upon the mind of the reader the most vivid and correct idea of the several forms of society, the causes of their prosperity or decay, and the influence, for good or evil, which the peculiar legal, political, moral, or religious usages and opinions exerted upon the advance or downfall of each several state,—are a few of the topics which ought to be prominently brought forward in the historian's page, and which should engage the attention of the student in that department of literature. It will be seen from the above enumeration, of

* From Greek *ιστορία*, and that from *ιστημι*, to place, to set, and *ὁρᾶω*, to see, to look.

how much importance the task of the historian is; and if he unite the due qualifications of patient research, unbiased intellect, careful narration, philosophic acumen, and honesty of purpose,—of what inestimable value! And if such qualifications are necessary for the author, somewhat of the same nature is requisite in the reader. Some young men seem to imagine that mere receptivity—the capacity to hurry, with almost railway speed, through a given number of volumes on any given subject, is quite sufficient for the attainment of knowledge. This *cramming system*—this overgorging of the memory—this unthinking accumulation of the materials of knowledge—we cannot too much decry. Intellectual pabulum—like the food of the human frame, to be valuable, must be digested. It is not, therefore, the only duty incumbent on the young student of history, to read a regular and prescribed course of celebrated authors in that department: it is also necessary that earnest thought, patient reflection, diligent and careful comparison, and clear, cool, and calculating discrimination, should be exercised. There can be little doubt but that there may be much pleasure and pure amusement derived from the perusal of historical works; but those who read merely that they may be hurried on by the excitement of the narrative—enraptured by the brilliancy of the writer's diction—or are led captive by the glare and glitter cast on the alluring page—have totally mistaken the lofty object which ought always to be held before the view in study.—The rhetoric-gemmed periods may mislead while they delight; the hues of glory may be thrown around actions intrinsically unworthy of them; the errors, follies, madness, and wickedness of men may be garbed in beauty, and their moral hideousness carefully concealed from view by the melo-dramatic light under which they are presented to the eye;—the narrative may be artistically tricked out, artificially be-ornamented, and skilfully heightened in its colouring, and thus may lead on the passions with tumultuous

emotions; and if sober thought and cultivated moral taste be not called in, as arbitrators, an erroneous impression may be made upon the mind. If history be read merely because of the amusement which it can yield—if its facts be stored up in the memory in disorderly heaps, without regard to their importance, or without an accurate perception of their antecedents and consequents—its chief advantages are yet to be gained; its most precious fruits have yet to be reaped:—it throws no illuminating rays upon the present; it casts no magic light upon the future. Rightly regarded, history is the autobiography of the human race—the grand instructor of mental, moral, and political science; the only adequate evidence of the progressiveness, the essential greatness, and glorious capacities of the human race. The true lessons which history ought to read to humanity, have been nobly enunciated in Longfellow's "Psalm of Life"—

Tell me not in mournful numbers,
"Life is but an empty dream!"
For the soul is dead that slumbers,
And things are not what they seem.
Life is real—life is earnest,
And the grave is not its goal;
"Dust thou art, to dust returnest,"
Was not spoken of the soul.

Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime,
And, departing, leave behind us
Footsteps on the sands of time:—
Footprints that, perhaps, another,
Sailing o'er life's solemn main,
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother,
Seeing, shall take heart again.
Let us, then be up and doing,
With a heart for any fate;
Still achieving—still pursuing—
Learn to labour and to wait.

—S. N.

(To be continued in Vol. III.)

POETICAL CRITIQUE.—NO. II.

"Speech is the golden harvest that followeth the sowing of thought;
Yet oftentimes runneth it to husk, and the grains be withered and scanty."—*Temper.*

In our July No. appeared the first "Critique" on verses sent to us for notice; this to some parties, gave the greatest satisfaction, while a few others seem to have taken a little umbrage at it. The writer of "Lines to my vest" &c., takes it to heart; thinks we were "too severe," and "in some measure unfair." We have reviewed the said article, but can discover nothing in it to regret. W. C. may take a different view of the matter, he may *feel* the remarks, but let him abstract himself, as it were, and place himself in the position of a third person, and we think he will see the justice of what we said. As to being, in the slightest degree "unfair"—we must plead Not Guilty to the charge. We cannot understand a person asking a notice and

then demurring, because we happen not to see with the eyes of a fond nurse, the sorry figure of a deformed pet. We can assure W. C. that we simply spoke our honest opinion upon the verses sent to us. We did not, as he suspects, wish to "get rid" of the applicants for notice in our magazine, but rather desired to impress upon them the necessity of vigorous efforts, by showing them their numerous errors. The Critique has had a beneficial effect, even upon the complainant himself, for he sends us a copy of 122 lines far superior in many respects to the others. Yet there are some rather unpoetical thoughts in it; for instance—

"And when old age has rendered weak my strength,
And spun my metal to its utmost length."

Yes, when *such* an event takes place we should say he would be rather a *wiry* subject; and, instead of "finding repose beneath the hallowed soil," would be more fit to wrap round a toasting

fork; or, to be rather more poetical, to form the net-work of an aviary, in a Parisian *Jardin d'hiver*.

We stated in our first "Critique" that we *did* not address all that we then said, to our correspondents, and as to "getting rid" of them, we think those who understand the labour of this "fault finding," will see that we took no little trouble to point out the errors of the composition, which we should not have done had we felt no interest in them. Had we simply said the verses were passable, where would have been the benefit? It would have been easy to us, but not honest to our friends. Our remarks seem to have startled a few; but others, like true knights of old, no sooner hear of the fray, than they are ready for a tilt.

As to "raising an ideal standard" for our "verse contributors," we have not. No higher ground than the Parnassian mount can be taken. If men will take their stand upon a mole-hill and proclaim that to be the mount whereon the muses stand around the throne of Jupiter, warbling their heaven-born melodies; shall we be blamed, if by actual measurement we show the difference in height of the one from the other? If a man say this is the measurement, we try it by the rod of the sanctuary, and if below the standard say so. The ground is high truly, but if too high, why take it? We did not point it out. But we may remind our correspondent that, though its base is on earth, its summit is in the clouds, yet to a true heart the ascent does but give new strength; if he be a hero, it does then but lend new vigour to his mind. We would have excellence in all departments. And we know that disease, at times, is only to be eradicated by cutting deep. Verse making, unless where there be merit in the composition, is but a sorry occupation. It is untuning so many Gordian knots that ought to be cut.

One of our correspondents, speaking of "versification," says that he is a "little given to that amusement," and hopes we shall honour him with a "pen and ink castigation" to cure him of the itch of rhyming. To this we can only say, that he deserves to be "drawn through the fire personally" for perpetrating such a verse as the following:—

"All hail Victoria! welcome
Once more to old Scotland;
The nation bids thee welcome,
And extends a loyal hand."

Besides we do not like the idea of the poet's office

being burlesqued for the sake of amusement. We consider everything should be done for a purpose, with an end in view. We would say to J. C. if he continues to write, as one said of bell ringing

"Ring your bells well if you can,
But—silence is best for every man."

The verses of E. D. are tolerable till he comes to the lines,

"When we look on the banks of the brook, for to find
The beloved of all poets, 't has vanished in kind;"

"While I on its banks in the posture of grief,
Bemoan, with this beech tree, which drops in a leaf."

Let those of the "wooden heads" take courage, for hope is near; here is a beech tree turned sensible; yes, actually weeping. Do not such individuals sympathize? If not they ought when they see one of their own stock weeping its leaves off its boughs. But after all it is not so strange, for we have seen even deal and oak boards so "cut up" as to weep sawdust—

"And when to the beech tree I turn, drop a tear!
Ay, drop another! let's mingle them here;
Let these oblivious waters roll on,
And the tears of two friends on its bosom be sown!"

What sympathy! "A fellow feeling makes us wondrous kind"! Yet with these drawbacks we think E. D. is capable of better things. We will now turn to a pleasanter task, lest our correspondents should think that, like a true "cuttle," we intend taking refuge in a sea of ink. The best piece we have received is by "Condiscipulus,"—


"THE STARS."

"Beautiful gems in the robe of night,
Decking the heaven with holy light,
Whence do ye rise at evening's moan,
To hallow the night-queen's silver zone?
Come ye from the realms of cloudless day,
Where light is flashing with deathless ray,
Where sunless suns their lustre fling,
Where angels sweep the golden string?
Gaze ye on the bright and festal throng,
Who chant in heaven their glorious song,
Whose brows are wreathed with garlands bright,
Whose halls are bathed in rosy light!—
Beautiful gems! what power have ye
To gladden the soul with extasy!
Ye come in the sacred hour of eve,
And visions of hope ye love to weave;
The spirit that droops, and the spirit that sighs,
Welcome the hour wherein ye rise!
Beautiful gems! be it mine to trace
Your floating cars through sapphire space;
Be it mine to muse in the midnight hour,
Be it mine to cherish your mystic power!"

The Young Student and Writer's Assistant.

THE amount of labour, care, and thought, which has been bestowed upon the essays this month, is most praiseworthy. We had intended to write a few critical notices, but find now that space will not permit the execution of our purpose. The following are the awards given:—

86, B. G. D.; 94, E. S. J., H. T.; 93, Effort;
90, Achates, (we found your description correct as to the paper noticed in our last, and therefore decided in your favour) T. W.; 88, F. A. Y.; 82, Robin; 81, E. L. B.; 80, J. W. H.; 78, S. H. A., J. E.; 68, Julius.



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